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ASTON UNIVERSITY 
THESIS SUMMARY 
Corporate Governance and Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) – Evidence from Two MENA Stock Exchanges 
Marwa Hassan Hassaan 
Doctor of Philosophy 
April 2012 
This study examines the influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on the stock exchanges of two leading 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries, Egypt and Jordan. This study employs a cross-
sectional analysis of a sample of non-financial companies listed on the two stock exchanges for the 
fiscal year 2007. Using an unweighted disclosure index, the study measures the levels of 
compliance by companies listed on the two stock exchanges investigated.Univariate and 
multivariate regression analyses are used to estimate the relationships proposed in the hypotheses. 
In addition, the study uses semi-structured interviews in order to supplement the interpretation of 
the findings of the quantitative analyses. An innovative theoretical foundation is deployed, in which 
compliance is interpretable through three lenses - institutional isomorphism theory, secrecy versus 
transparency (one of Gray’s accounting sub-cultural values), and financial economics theories. The 
study extends the financial reporting literature, cross-national comparative financial disclosure 
literature, and the emerging markets disclosure literature by carrying out one of the first 
comparative studies of the above mentioned stock exchanges. 
Results provide evidence of a lack of de facto compliance (i.e., actual compliance) with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the scrutinised MENA countries. The impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms for best practice on enhancing the extent of compliance with mandatory IFRSs is 
absent in the stock exchanges in question. The limited impact of corporate governance best practice 
is mainly attributed to the novelty of corporate governance in the region, a finding which lends 
support to the applicability of the proposed theoretical foundation to the MENA context. 
Finally, the study provides recommendations for improving de facto compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements and corporate governance best practice in the MENA region and suggests 
areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Study Background, Objectives and Structure 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In a global economy, the financial reporting practices by companies around the world are a key 
issue. Globalisation of the capital markets has increased the need for high-quality, comparable 
financial information (Levitt, 1998; Joshi et al., 2008), and consequently, pressure has been 
increasing for the adoption of a single set of accounting standards worldwide. This explains to a 
great extent, the efforts of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to produce a set of 
international accounting standards for use by private sector entities throughout the world (Levitt, 
1998; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008). 
The adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) by listed companies in 
many countries around the world is seen as one of the most significant regulatory changes in 
accounting history (Daske et al., 2008). Proponents of IFRSs suggest that IFRSs adoption improves 
the reliability and comparability of financial statements, enhances corporate transparency, hence 
increases market efficiency and encourages cross-border investing (Brown, 2011). For the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) capital markets as emerging economies, compliance with IFRSs 
may be important in order to attract foreign investors (CIPE, 2003).  
One of the main reasons for choosing Egypt and Jordan for this study is that they mandated the 
adoption of IFRSs by companies listed on their stock exchanges in 1997 (Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Consequently, they can be considered as early adopters of IFRSs 
compared to other countries such as the European Union countries that only required companies 
listed on their stock exchanges to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRSs since 
2005 (Joshi et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2009). This fact raises the need to investigate the extent 
of compliance with IFRSs, especially after the introduction of corporate governance requirements 
for best practices in the MENA region which are supposed to enhance the levels of disclosure and 
transparency and hence compliance with IFRSs by publicly listed companies, by supporting a better 
monitoring of management behaviour. 
Corporate disclosure practices have been a principal research theme in the area of financial 
accounting research for five decades since Cerf (1961). Beattie (2005) points out that corporate 
disclosure research accounts for over 25% of all research output published in the field of financial 
14 
accounting based on a survey of research published over a ten year period. However, the review of 
prior compliance literature reveals a shortage in the number of financial disclosure studies that have 
investigated the association between levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures under IFRSs 
and corporate governance structures, as will be seen in Chapter Two. Consequently, this study will 
contribute towards filling this gap. Moreover, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, this study is 
the first to use the institutional isomorphism theory (organisations adopt structures and practices 
which are considered legitimate and socially acceptable by other organisations in their field 
irrespective of their actual usefulness) in providing a theoretical foundation for the impact of 
corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance with IFRSs in the MENA region. 
 
The remaining part of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 highlights the background 
and justification for the study, section 1.3 defines the research questions and objectives, section 1.4 
describes the research philosophy and methodology, section 1.5 indicates the importance and 
intended contribution of this study, and finally, section 1.6 presents the structure of the current 
study. 
 
1.2 Study Background and Justification 
The MENA financial reporting environment is seen as a rich area to examine the influence of 
several corporate governance-related variables on the extent of compliance with IFRSs, for the 
following reasons. 
 
Firstly, countries in this region have been confronted by a series of changes in their economic 
environment, followed by extensive efforts to diversify their economies and develop their stock 
exchanges. For instance, this involved the development of a new legal framework with new 
financial disclosure requirements being imposed upon companies listed on their stock exchanges 
such as securities exchange laws and corporate governance codes (CIPE, 2003; Omar, 2007; 
Dahawy, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Consequently, this stimulates empirical investigation of the outcomes 
of such reforms given that the reports released by international institutions claim a de jure but not a 
de facto compliance with the requirements of newly developed laws and regulations in the region, 
that cope with international best practices (e.g., CIPE, 2003; ROSC, 2005; UNCTAD, 2007; IFC & 
Hawkamah, 2008; ROSC, 2009).  
 
15 
Secondly, the cultural context within the region is characterised by preference for secrecy that is 
encouraged by low non-compliance costs if any (Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; 2007; Al-Htaybat, 
2005; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010; 
Ismail et al., 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Consequently, the growing acceptance of IFRSs by 
the region’s capital markets stimulates an empirical investigation of the extent of de facto 
compliance with the requirements of such standards, as it is acknowledged in the international 
accounting literature that harmonising national accounting standards with IFRSs would not 
necessarily lead to harmonised accounting practices and comparable financial reports (Saudagaran, 
2004; Nobes, 2006; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). Research on financial disclosure still reveals the 
existence of important accounting differences among countries (e.g., Choi et al., 2002; Land & 
Lang, 2002; Nobes & Parker, 2004; Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Likewise, research on compliance 
with IFRSs on individual country level reports a lack of complete de facto compliance (e.g., 
Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; 
Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011).  
 
Thirdly, the pressures from international institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other stakeholders on the governments of developing 
countries including those in the MENA region, led to mandating the adoption of IFRSs by 
companies listed on the majority of the MENA region stock exchanges without taking into 
consideration the necessity of spreading sufficient awareness among different parties affecting and 
being affected by the financial reporting practices, about the importance of, and the advantages to 
be gained by following the international best practices. Consequently, there is a need for more 
research in order to identify the barriers that delay the achievement of complete de facto 
compliance with IFRSs by MENA countries.The same can be said for corporate governance 
notions, as they are newly introduced in the region and as many corporate governance requirements 
for best practice may contradict with the native cultural values such as secrecy within the MENA 
society. Consequently, this may limit its influence on compliance with IFRSs. 
 
The two countries that form the focus of this study (Egypt and Jordan) belong both to the Arab 
world and to the Middle East classification as well as being part of the MENA region. Both 
countries were under the UK Protectorate. The Egyptian and the Jordanian stock exchanges were 
the first to be established in the region (1888 and 1978 respectively). Both countries have strong 
ties and political importance in the region. Moreover, both countries have similar legal, economic 
and cultural contexts with minor varying capacities to practise and enforce compliance with IFRSs 
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and corporate governance requirements (CIPE, 2003). In terms of the regulatory framework in 
these two capital markets, securities exchange laws require that audited financial statements be 
prepared and submitted to a governmental authority (Capital Market Authority [CMA] in Egypt, 
and Jordan Securities Commission [JSC] in Jordan). Financial statements of listed companies are 
audited in accordance with the International Standards of Auditing (ISAs). Enforcement bodies (the 
CMA in Egypt, and the JSC in Jordan) are in place and non-complying companies may be 
penalised by delisting according to the Capital Market Law (CML) in Egypt and Securities Law 
(SL) in Jordan. Both Jordan and Egypt have had firms listed on the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) index since late 1970s and 1990s respectively (Ellabbar, 2007:27).  Such 
institutional and cultural similarities, in addition to the novelty of corporate governance reforms in 
both jurisdictions may reduce disparities in the influence of corporate governance structures on the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs by companies listed on the stock exchanges of both jurisdictions. 
The investigation of the association between compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance 
structures in two countries that are similar in their economic development stage can best answer the 
question raised by Dahawy and Samaha (2010) with respect to the possibility of generalising the 
results of one developing country to others. 
 
Particularly, the choice of these countries’ capital markets as the focus of this study is justified for 
the following reasons: 
 
Firstly, they were early adopters of IFRSs on a mandatory basis in the region (1997), however, 
evidence provided by prior research reveals a gap between de facto and de jure compliance with 
IFRSs in both countries (e.g., Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 
2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a) which are considered as sites of 
potential extension of European business into MENA markets (CIPE, 2003), making compliance 
with IFRSs not only a concern for domestic investors but also for foreign ones. This raises the need 
to reinvestigate compliance practices in such countries using more recent data. 
   
Secondly, they are good examples of transitional economies that were early adopters of economic 
restructuring and privatisation programmes in the MENA region since the 1990s to mimic the 
Western free market economy pattern (CIPE, 2003; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Omar, 2007; 
Al-Akra et al., 2009; 2010a,b; Al-Omari, 2010; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). Furthermore, unlike 
MENA oil-exporting countries (which includes the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries), 
securities markets in Egypt and Jordan were established and revitalised in order to function as the 
main vehicle for implementing the privatisation programme and to be a source of medium and 
long-term finance (CIPE, 2003). Consequently, it seems justified to investigate whether such 
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changes enhanced the extent of compliance with IFRSs in scrutinised countries specifically 2007 
witnessed an extraordinary economic performance in both of them. Additionally, 2007 was the first 
year in which all IFRSs except IAS 17: Accounting for Leases became mandatory in Egypt. 
   
Thirdly, the introduction of corporate governance requirements for best practices that are based on 
corporate governance principles issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in both countries as part of the regulatory reform that carried out in parallel 
with the privatisation programme since the second half of the 1990s (Al-Akra et al., 2009; Samaha, 
2010), intended to gain the trust of foreign investors and develop the national capital markets by 
following international recommended practices which mainly aim at improving transparency and 
disclosure, enhancing monitoring of management behaviour and protecting investors' rights (CIPE, 
2003; Dahawy, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Samaha, 2010). Hence, this raises the need to 
document the impact of corporate governance mechanisms for best practice on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs and explore the applicability of the theoretical foundation proposed in this 
study to these two emerging capital markets.  
 
The above discussion emphasises the need to conduct this study, being one of the first, to 
investigate the association between corporate governance best practice as an emerging culture in 
the MENA region and the levels of compliance with IFRSs in two leading MENA stock exchanges 
as claimed by international institutions (CIPE, 2003; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008). 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives  
The proponents of globalisation of IFRSs among developed and developing countries argue that it 
will improve the comparability, and hence the usefulness of financial statements for investment 
decisions (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Brown, 2011). However, as mentioned already, the introduction 
of IFRSs in different MENA region countries and the fact that their adoption is mandated, is not a 
guarantee of full compliance with the requirements of such standards. In other words, the 
mandating of IFRSs adoption in the region does not automatically result in homogeneity between 
their actual implementation and the standard setters’ expectation.This argument implies that de jure 
compliance (i.e., formal compliance) with IFRSs does not necessarily lead to de facto compliance 
and de facto compliance may be problematic (Samaha, 2006; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009). 
This argument is supported on the grounds that the cultural context in developing countries is 
unique and the regulatory agencies and professional bodies in those contexts are not as effective as 
in Western developed countries (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Naser, 1998; Chamisa, 2000; Ball et al., 
2003; Ali et al., 2006; Dahawy & Conover, 2007). This raises the need to revisit this issue using 
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recent data in order to assess the progress in the levels of compliance with such imported standards 
in scrutinised MENA countries. Based on this, the first question and objective of this study are 
proposed.  
 
Prior research investigating compliance with IFRSs suggests that differences in the levels of 
compliance among companies reflect their country of origin (Tower et al., 1999; Street & Briant, 
2000; Street & Gray, 2002, Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Although developing countries in general 
share similar characteristics, they are not homogeneous in terms of their levels of economic, 
accounting, professional and institutional development (Chamisa, 2000; Chand, 2005; Hassan, 
2008; Samaha, 2010). The same argument applies to the selected MENA capital markets. Although, 
they have similar legal, economic and cultural contexts, they have some differences in terms of 
each capital market’s capacity to practise and enforce compliance with IFRSs and corporate 
governance principles (CIPE, 2003). Hence, comparing the results between the two exchanges can 
answer the question whether the results of investigating compliance practices on the level of one 
developing country can be generalised.  On the other hand, although improved disclosure and 
transparency are the heart of effective governance (Haniffa, 1999; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & 
Dahawy, 2011), the recognition of corporate governance best practices by the MENA region 
countries will result in better compliance with IFRSs only if those practices become part of the 
cultural values within the scrutinised contexts. Egypt and Jordan regulatory reforms following the 
commence of the privatisation programmes in both countries since the mid 1990s support better 
board of directors' monitoring function and investor protection, hence improved disclosure and 
transparency. Thus, it is important to explore the current influence of corporate governance 
structures on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in both countries as 
leading MENA stock exchanges (CIPE, 2003; Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). 
Also, given the lack of consensus among researchers regarding the theoretical foundation of 
financial disclosure practices, and the findings of prior research that investigated Egypt and Jordan 
which showed that financial disclosure theories fail to explain all financial disclosure practices in 
such contexts (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005), it is deemed necessary in this study to 
employ an innovative theoretical framework. This will be a step forward in filling the gap in the 
theoretical foundation of financial disclosure and corporate governance research particularly on the 
level of emerging exchanges.  Based on this, the second and third questions and objectives of this 
study are proposed. 
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Based on the above, the main research questions are identified as follows: 
 
1. What is the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed 
on the two selected stock exchanges?  
2. How could differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs be explained by board of 
directors’ (BOD) independence, BOD leadership (i.e., whether the CEO and the Chair 
positions are held by the same person or by two different persons), BOD size and ownership 
structure? 
3. To what extent do institutional isomorphism theory, secrecy versus transparency as one of 
Gray (1988) accounting sub-cultural values, agency theory and cost-benefit analysis help to 
explain the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements within the MENA 
context?  
 
 
Consequently, to answer this study questions and drawing on a comprehensive review of 
accounting and business environments in the Egyptian and Jordanian contexts, compliance 
literature and financial disclosure studies that have investigated these two stock exchanges as well 
as corporate governance literature, the study objectives can be stated as follows: 
 
Objective 1: To investigate the level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements for the 
fiscal year 2007 by companies listed on the stock exchanges of the selected two countries in order 
to evaluate the progress in compliance levels compared to prior research as well as to enable 
objective comparison of compliance behaviour between the two countries.   
 
Objective 2: To examine the relationship between BOD independence, BOD leadership, BOD size 
and ownership structure, and levels of compliance with IFRSs by companies listed on the stock 
exchanges of the selected two countries.   
  
Objective 3: To investigate the underlying theoretical rationale of corporate financial disclosure 
practices within the MENA context. 
 
  
1.4 Research Philosophy and Methodology 
This study is undertaken within the functionalist research paradigm, the research being based on 
investigating the current status and establishing the factual existence of structures (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Hopper & Powell, 1985; Al-Htaybat, 2005). Consequently, levels of compliance 
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with IFRSs by companies listed on the selected MENA region capital markets will be measured in 
order to define and analyse the extent of such compliance. This step will be followed by examining 
the relationship between the chosen corporate governance variables (BOD independence, BOD 
leadership, BOD size and ownership structure) and levels of compliance with IFRSs. The 
researcher investigates a sample of annual reports of non-financial companies listed on the two 
selected stock exchanges for the fiscal year ending 31, December 2007.  The extent of compliance 
is measured using a disclosure index based on IFRSs disclosure requirements for 2007. The model 
of hypotheses explaining the extent of compliance is defined as the interplay of contradictory forces: 
inducements deriving principally from the institutional isomorphism theory and secrecy versus 
transparency as one of the accounting values identified by Gray (1988)1. Furthermore, the notions 
of two financial economics theories; namely, the agency theory2 and cost-benefit analysis3that 
employed in prior research will be used to some extent, in deriving the research hypotheses. The 
selected corporate governance variables include proxies for board independence, board leadership, 
board size, government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private ownership ratio, and 
public ownership ratio. Also, control variables include proxies for company size, profitability, 
gearing, liquidity, type of business activity, and type of audit firm. Statistical analysis is performed 
using univariate and multivariate analyses. Furthermore, the study employs semi-structured 
interviews in order to supplement the interpretations of the findings from the quantitative data 
analysis and to explore the extent to which the institutional isomorphism, cultural theories, and 
financial economics theories provide the theoretical foundation of compliance practices within the 
MENA context.  Thus, to accomplish this study’s objectives, the researcher employed a sequential 
explanatory triangulation design, employing both quantitative and qualitative data collection and 
analysis. 
 
1.5 Study Rationale, Significance and Intended Contribution 
This study is motivated by a belief that achieving de facto compliance with IFRSs by the MENA 
region listed companies is not an easy task. It is an on-going process which requires strong support 
from researchers, capital market authorities, accounting regulators, business firms, accounting 
practitioners and other stakeholders. Hence, continuous assessment of the levels of compliance with 
                                                          
1 Secrecy versus transparency refers to a preference for confidentiality and a restriction of information about business 
only to those who are closely involved with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent open and 
publicly accountable approach (Gray, 1988). 
2 Agency theory is a contract under which one or more persons [the principal(s)] delegate another person [the agent] to 
run the business on their behalf (Meckling, 1976).              
3 Cost-benefit analysis is based on the notion that management decision to disclose business information is influenced 
by the trade-off between the costs and benefits of providing such information (Bhushan & Lessard, 1992; Tricker, 
2009).  
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IFRSs is important in order to evaluate the progress in compliance behaviour and diagnose barriers 
to de facto compliance over time.  
The capital markets investigated in this study have been early mandatory adopters of IFRSs. This 
implies that companies listed on these capital markets have considerable experience with the use of 
IFRSs on a mandatory rather than on a voluntary basis. This will add to the compliance literature 
whereas most prior IFRSs/IASs4 compliance studies examined developed jurisdictions that apply 
the IFRSs on a voluntary basis (e.g., Street et al., 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Street & Bryant, 2000; 
Glaum & Street, 2003). On the other hand, scrutinised countries witnessed a change in the 
ownership structures of companies listed on their stock exchanges as a result of privatising 
government owned enterprises. In addition, the Egyptian and the Jordanian governments introduced 
corporate governance mechanisms that are based on the OECD corporate governance principles as 
a means to enhance transparency and disclosure, by empowering boards, to enable them to carry 
out an effective monitoring of management behaviour (Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Samaha, 2010; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2010). All of this lends support to carrying out this study in order to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms for best practices on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs in scrutinised stock exchanges.  
At the time of commencing this study in 2008 it was the first to investigate the association between 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance structures in the MENA 
region. However, during the time of this study to the best of the researcher's knowledge there are 
only two studies investigated this issue in the region; Al-Akra et al. (2010a) and Alanezi and 
Albuloushi (2011). Al-Akra et al. (2010a) investigate the influence of accounting disclosure 
regulation, governance reforms and ownership changes, resulting from privatisation, on the levels 
of compliance with mandatory disclosures under IFRSs in Jordan in 1996 and 2004 respectively. 
Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) investigate the impact of the existence of a voluntary audit 
committee on the level of IFRSs required disclosure practices in Kuwait. This study extends both 
studies in being comparative as well as being the first to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance structures on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Egypt. On 
the other hand, although there is a number of prior studies that investigate the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs in the Egyptian context (Abd El-Salam, 1999; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; 2007; 
Samaha, 2006; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Dahawy, 2009; Ismail 
et al., 2010), none of them has investigated such issue using a disclosure index that is based on the 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements for 2007. The same argument applies to Jordan as IFRSs 
were amended between 2004 (the recent year for Al-Akra et al. (2010a) study) and 2007 (the year 
of this study). In addition, compared to Al-Akra et al. (2010a) and Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) 
                                                          
4 IASs and IFRSs are used interchangeably in the thesis. 
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studies, this study is the first to investigate the association between board leadership and 
management ownership ratio, and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 
the MENA region.  
Furthermore, this study is one of the first comparative studies to investigate the influence of 
corporate governance structures on de facto compliance with IFRSs between two leading MENA 
emerging capital markets using a disclosure checklist that is organised by standard. This enables 
objective comparison between levels of compliance with disclosure requirements in total as well as 
per standard. Hence, enables identification of the requirements whereas compliance is problematic 
in each jurisdiction. On the other hand, comparing the results between scrutinised countries will 
enable getting a conclusion with respect to whether MENA developing countries are homogeneous.  
Finally, this study provides recent evidence on the theoretical foundation of financial disclosure 
practices in the MENA region in addition to being the first to employ the notions of the institutional 
isomorphism theory in explaining the influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the MENA countries being studied. In addition, 
this study provides an overview regarding the perceptions of different parties involved in the 
financail reporting process in Egypt and Jordan regarding the barriers to full compliance with 
IFRSs and the impact of corporate governance structures on compliance behaviour of publicly 
listed companies. 
 
In broad terms, the findings of this study will be of interest to the national as well as the 
international community, and particularly stakeholders of the MENA region capital markets who 
are keen to know the strengths and weaknesses in disclosure practices in the region’s capital 
markets. The findings of this study are not only of importance for current and potential investors 
but will also provide regulators and policy-makers in Egypt and Jordan with recent comprehensive 
evidence that is expected to enhance their knowledge of the status of their capital markets. This will 
help them to develop new approaches to overcome weaknesses and strengthen enforcement 
mechanisms in order to improve financial disclosure practices within their markets, and meet 
international best practices. Moreover, this study will stimulate more research regarding the issues 
under investigation in other countries. 
 
With respect to the IASB, the findings of this study will provide a recent evidence regarding the 
levels of de facto compliance with disclosure requirements of IFRSs by two leading emerging 
capital markets in the MENA region that adopt IFRSs on mandatory basis. The same argument 
applies to the OECD as a sponsor of corporate governance reforms in scrutinised countries. The 
findings of this study will provide recent evidence regarding the extent to which the requirements 
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for corporate governance best practices in Egypt and Jordan that are based on the OECD corporate 
governance principles enhance compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
 
 
1.6 Study Structure  
Figure 1.1 indicates the general structure of the chapters in this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1: Study Structure 
 
Chapter One: This chapter presents the study background and justification. It highlights how this 
study will fill the theoretical and empirical gaps in prior literature. In addition, the chapter identifies 
the study’s objectives and the research questions, and gives an indication of the methodology 
employed, the rationale for the research, and its perceived importance and contribution.   
 
Chapter One 
Study Background, Objectives and Structure 
Chapter Two 
Financial Disclosure Practices - An 
Overview 
Chapter Four 
MENA Region Capital Markets and 
Financial Disclosure Environment 
Chapter Six 
Extent of Compliance and Corporate 
Governance Structure- Quantitative Analysis  
Chapter Five 
Research Philosophy and Methodology 
Chapter Three 
Corporate Governance and Financial 
Disclosure Practices 
Theoretical and Empirical Gaps 
Chapter Eight  
Conclusion, Limitations and Suggestions 
for Future Research 
Chapter Seven 
Analysis of Interviews 
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Chapter Two: Chapter Two provides an overview of financial disclosure practices, discussing the 
concept of financial disclosure, disclosure scope, the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure, and how disclosure practices are explained in light of relevant theories. It highlights the 
issue of compliance with IFRSs, and then provides a review of prior empirical financial disclosure 
studies that investigated the influence of different corporate attributes on aggregate, mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. This review identifies the gaps in prior research that this study intends to fill.  
 
Chapter Three: The third chapter discusses the concept of corporate governance, its importance, 
and various models associated with it. Additionally, it sheds light on the role of the OECD in 
raising awareness about the importance of corporate governance and the relevance of the OECD 
corporate governance principles to the MENA region capital markets. It then addresses the 
corporate governance variables that are employed as explanatory variables in this study namely, 
board independence, board leadership, board size and ownership structure. 
 
Chapter Four: Chapter Four provides a general background about the scrutinised MENA region 
capital markets and their financial disclosure environments indicating capital market development 
and the financial disclosure regulatory framework in each. In addition, the chapter sheds light on 
the recent developments in the financial reporting environment which make the selected MENA 
countries a suitable context for the current study. 
 
Chapter Five: The fifth chapter explains the research philosophy and methodology, how the levels 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements are to be assessed, how the disclosure index is 
constructed, the research samples, research hypotheses and a description of the statistical analyses 
chosen to analyse the data in the subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter Six: This chapter presents the descriptive analyses of the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
by all non-financial companies listed on the selected MENA region stock exchanges. The mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values are used to interpret the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs within each country and between them. Additionally, descriptive statistics of 
independent variables are presented. The second part in this chapter investigates whether there are 
significant statistical differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts. In addition, the 
variations in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 2007 are explained by 
using corporate governance-related variables through univariate and multivariate statistical 
analyses. 
 
Chapter Seven: This chapter presents a summary and analysis of the findings of the interview data. 
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Chapter Eight: This chapter summarises the overall findings, and implications thereof, and 
concludes the study. The limitations of the study are addressed, and recommendations for future 
research proposed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Financial Disclosure Practices – An Overview 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The need for compliance with one set of accounting standards, namely the IFRSs, is increasing day 
by day as many groups worldwide such as multinational companies, international investors, 
governments, regulating bodies and capital markets, all recognise that they will benefit from the 
globalisation of accounting practices (Basoglu & Goma, 2002; Brown, 2011). However, de jure 
compliance is not a guarantee for achieving de facto compliance, and a need exists for more 
research in this area, particularly within the context of emerging capital markets in order to 
diagnose those factors that influence the levels of de facto compliance with IFRSs. This chapter 
provides a general overview of financial disclosure practices, and is organised as follows. Section 
2.2 presents the concept of financial disclosure, disclosure scope and the relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Section 2.3 discusses the theoretical framework of financial 
disclosure and how disclosure practices are explained in light of the theoretical foundation 
employed in this study (the institutional isomorphism theory, secrecy versus transparency as one of 
Gray (1988) accounting sub-cultural values, and two financial economics theories: the agency 
theory and cost-benefit analysis). The issue of compliance with IFRSs is highlighted in Section 2.4. 
Section 2.5 provides a review of prior empirical financial disclosure studies that investigate the 
influence of corporate attributes on aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure. These studies 
are classified as developed capital market studies, emerging capital market studies, and cross-
national comparative studies. The review of such studies is essential to identify the appearing gaps 
and the position of the current study among prior ones. Additionally, it provides a background that 
will help in formulating the research hypotheses in Chapter Five as well as in understanding and 
explaining the findings of the empirical analysis that appear in Chapter Six. Finally, section 2.6 
concludes. 
 
2.2 Corporate Financial Disclosure 
Companies’ annual reports are considered as the primary regular official medium in which listed 
companies communicate their audited financial information to the public and other stakeholders 
specifically in emerging capital markets (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Yeoh, 2005; Naser et al., 2006; 
Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2007).  
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Financial disclosure influences the actions of different decision-makers by providing them with the 
information they need to make rational economic decisions (Solmons, 1986; Haniffa, 1999; Al-
Hajraf, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Atrill & Mclaney, 2008). 
 
Gibbins et al. (1990:122) refer to financial disclosure as “any deliberate release of financial 
information, whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via formal or informal 
channels”. Also, Hendriksen and Van-Breda (1992:851) highlight the importance of financial 
disclosure by stating that “disclosure in financial reporting is the presentation of information 
necessary for the optimum operations of efficient capital market”. 
 
In general, corporate financial disclosure can be referred to as either mandatory (required by laws, 
regulations and/or formal authorities such as stock exchange regulatory bodies) or voluntary, that is 
additional (optional) disclosures motivated by management attitude. Akhtaruddin (2005:404) refers 
to mandatory disclosure as“the presentation of a minimum amount of information required by laws, 
stock exchanges, and the accounting standards setting body to facilitate evaluation of securities”, 
while voluntary disclosure is defined by Meek et al. (1995:555) as “disclosures in excess of 
requirements, representing free choices on the part of a company's management to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of the annual 
reports”. 
 
According to proponents of mandatory disclosure, mandating disclosure can be seen as a tool that 
enforces companies to disclose the information that they otherwise would be reluctant to disclose 
(Darrough, 1993). This argument applies more to developing capital markets (Al-Htaybat, 2005; 
Yeoh, 2005), and possibly be due to the cultural values in the majority of developing societies 
which prefer secrecy and which are not accustomed to voluntary codes (soft laws) (Dahawy & 
Conover, 2007; Al-Omari, 2010). 
 
The regulatory system affects financial disclosure practices through the development of regulations 
(e.g., CML in Egypt and SL in Jordan), and is expected to result in better investor and creditor 
protection (Jaggi & Low, 2000). Regulations help to reduce information asymmetry between 
informed (e.g., management), and uninformed users such as naïve investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001) 
as listed companies may prefer to comply with such regulations to avoid paying fines, delisting or 
even to protect their reputation and gain legitimacy. Thus, regulatory bodies should sort out the 
disclosure incentives of firms in order to promote efficient disclosure policies (Darrough, 1993). 
This action is more required in developing countries where there is a possibility of non-compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements due to inadequate regulatory frameworks, weak 
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enforcement mechanisms, ineffectiveness of the capital market, and inefficiency of the accounting 
profession (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003). Furthermore, it is important 
to spread awareness among different parties that are involved in the financial reporting process 
concerning the benefits of improving disclosure. This is especially important in developing 
societies where a transparency culture contradicts with their native culture of secrecy (Gray, 1988). 
The effective enforcement of mandatory disclosure requirements can also be achieved by 
independent and expert auditing, and an oversight regulatory system with sufficient power and 
expertise to achieve effective enforcement (Brown & Tarca, 2005; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005).  
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework of Financial Disclosure 
Many scholars suggest that disclosure is influenced by the political and socio-economic 
environment within the country (e.g., Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Hassab Elnaby et al., 
2003; Hassab Elnaby & Mosebach, 2005; Nobes, 2006; Qu & Leung, 2006; Dahawy & Conover, 
2007; Ben Othman & Zeghal, 2008; 2010; Mir et al., 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2009; Al-Akra et al., 
2010a,b; Al-Omari, 2010;  Samaha & Dahawy, 2010). 
 
To date there is no single theory that can comprehensively interpret or predict corporate financial 
disclosure practices (Verrecchia, 2001; Al-Htaybat, 2005), a circumstance which may be attributed 
to the complexity of this issue (Hope, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005). Managers’ incentives may differ 
from one company to another due to the differences in company characteristics as claimed by prior 
studies (e.g., Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke; 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 
2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009). Each theory tries to interpret the reasons behind management 
financial disclosure practices which are influenced to a great extent by the trade-off between the 
costs and benefits of providing such information (Cooke, 1992; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-
Htaybat, 2005). 
 
Further to the theories that are employed as part of the theoretical foundation in this study, there are 
many other theories that used to explain financial disclosure practices by prior researchers (e.g., 
Cooke, 1992; Abayo et al, 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Samaha, 2006; Omar, 2007; 
Samaha & Stapleton, 2009). The most commonly used are signaling theory, capital need theory, 
political costs theory, legitimacy theory, resource dependency theory, stewardship theory and 
stakeholder theory. 
 
Signaling theory has been developed to explain problems of information asymmetry in labour 
markets and how this can be reduced by the party with more information signaling to others 
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(Morris, 1987; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999). Thus, to reduce signaling costs mangers will 
disclose all information that is material to investors (Ross, 1979; Haniffa, 1999).  Consequently, 
managers with good news will disclose more to signal company success, thereby increasing the 
value of the firm's stocks (Verrecchia, 1983; Kaznik & Lev, 1995; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 
1999). On the other hand, mangers with no news will signal this by stressing on the stability of the 
company performance to avoid being confused with firms with bad news (Ross, 1979; Haniffa, 
1999; Vlachos, 2001). Even managers with bad news will effectively signal this to avoid legal 
disputes (Ross, 1979; Ockabol & Tinker, 1993; Vlachos, 2001). However, signaling theory is 
criticized on the grounds that it does not explain certain management disclosure practices such as 
window dressing to opaque bad news (Seligman, 1983; Ockabol & Tinker, 1993; Vlachos, 2001). 
Furthermore, Ockabol and Tinker (1993) argue that it does not take into consideration that non-
disclosure does not necessarily imply bad news or hiding of poor performance as it may be to 
protect valuable information from competitors.  
 
The capital need theory is based on the assumption that disclosure reduces investor uncertainty and 
risk, consequently required rates of return will be reduced. This in turn, results in a lower cost of 
capital.  Thus companies can raise capital at the lowest possible cost by making disclosures that 
will reduce information asymmetry. This will enhance the company's image and reputation in the 
eyes of potential investors (Mueller et al., 1987; Gray & Roberts, 1989; Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991; Haniffa, 1999; Omar, 2007). However, capital need theory is criticized on the grounds that 
finding a link between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital is difficult since both variables 
cannot be observed directly (Hail, 2002). 
 
Political costs theory suggests a further manager incentive to disclose more information. ‘‘This is a 
first move in recognising that the nexus of contracts of a company is not only between management 
and shareholders but other stakeholders as well’’ (Haniffa, 1999: 54). Managers will disclose to 
avoid political costs and counter potential government intrusions (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; 
Vlachos, 2001; Al-Htaybat, 2005). Politically visible companies such as large or profitable ones are 
more in the public eye, thus will disclose more information in order to reduce the likelihood of a 
political action such as nationalization, expropriation or regulation by the government or a 
particular pressure group (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Inchausti, 1997). This theory recognises 
power and conflict in the society and how financial reporting can be used as a tool to mitigate such 
conflict and influence the distribution of income, power and wealth in the society by affecting the 
values and attitudes of management (Haniffa, 1999). However, from the researcher's point of view, 
the notions of this theory are more applicable to developed societies whereas unequal distribution 
of power is not acceptable, and peoples and governments are aware about the rights and 
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responsibilities of each member in the society in contrast to developing societies whereas power 
inequality is the norm.  
 
Legitimacy theory highlights how management reacts to community expectations to avoid 
legitimacy costs and being penalised by the community (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Wilmshurst & 
Frost, 2000). Hence, this theory emphasises the importance of societal acceptance for company 
continuity, on the grounds that, company actions affect the environment in which it operates 
(Ghazali, 2004). ‘‘Legitimacy itself can be considered to be a condition or status. Legitimation, on 
the other hand, is a process which organisations can undertake (perhaps through particular 
disclosure strategies) to take them to this state’’ (Brown & Deegan, 1998: 23). This theory is 
mainly used to explain social and environmental disclosures on the grounds that companies as 
members in the society are expected to carry out their activities within the boundaries established 
by the society within which the company operates (Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000; Ghazali, 2004). 
However, this theory is criticised on the grounds that, it does not take into consideration that 
legitimacy is interpreted differently from one society to another according to societal values, 
political system and government ideology (Ghazali, 2004). 
 
Resource dependency theory reflects the strategic view of corporate governance as directors are 
considered as an essential instrument that links the company with its strategic environment (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002; Tricker, 2009). In other words, this theory“[s]ees the governing body of a 
corporate entity as the lynch pin between a company and the resources it needs to achieve its 
objectives. These resources could include for example, links to relevant markets including potential 
customers and competitors, access to capital and other sources of finance, provision of know-how 
and technology, and relationships with business, political and other societal networks and elites” 
(Tricker, 2009: 226). However, directors as a social networking mechanism may sometimes 
adversely restrict independence and objectivity of governance activities (Tricker, 2009). 
 
Stewardship theory draws on the assumptions of agency theory and transaction cost economics 
theory (Mallin, 2009: 19). This theory replicates the classical notions of corporate governance as 
directors' legal responsibility is to shareholders not to themselves, or to other interest group 
(Tricker, 2009). According to stewardship theory “[d]irectors are regarded as the stewards of the 
company assets and will be predisposed to act in the best interest of the shareholders” (Mallin, 
2009: 14). However, this theory is criticised on the grounds that it is rooted in law, hence it is 
normative. It is unable to show causal relationship between specific behaviours and company 
performance (Tricker, 2009: 225). 
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Stakeholder theory is concerned with different parties that can affect and be affected by the 
achievement of an organisation's purpose rather than merely focusing on shareholders (Haniffa, 
1999). When a wider stakeholder group such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, 
government and the local community is accounted for by the business firm, the prevailing focus on 
shareholder value becomes less evident (Mallin, 2009: 18). However this theory is mainly criticised 
on the grounds that it does not provide guidelines with respect to how the interests of  shareholders 
and different groups of stakeholders can be balanced given that shareholders and different groups 
of stakeholders may have contradicting views with respect to firm's corporate governance structures 
or monitoring mechanisms, hence managers remain unaccountable for their actions due to the 
absence of well defined measurable objectives (Haniffa, 1999; Mallin, 2009). 
  
It is necessary to enhance the integration between empirical findings and their theoretical 
foundation and to examine the applicability of different theories within the context of emerging 
capital markets as such theories do not apply with the same strength as in developed capital markets 
where most of these theories were initially developed (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Leventis & 
Weetman, 2004). According to Robbins (1933, quoted by Allen, 1983 as cited in Owusu-Ansah, 
1998a:90), “[t]he validity of a particular theory is a matter of its logical derivation from the 
assumptions which it makes. But its applicability to a given situation depends upon the extent to 
which its concepts actually reflect the forces operating in that situation”.  
 
This section aims to review the notions of the theoretical standpoints that are relevant to this study: 
secrecy versus transparency accounting sub-cultural value, agency theory, cost-benefit analysis and 
the institutional isomorphism theory. This framework is expected to provide additional insights and 
a comprehensive background that can help in explaining the findings of the empirical analysis that 
is performed in Chapter Six. Built on the above discussion, the review of such theories is based on 
an a priori assumption that levels of compliance with IFRSs in any country reflect that country’s 
political and socio-economic environment, and that disclosure is influenced by supply and demand 
forces of accounting information which is affected to a great extent by the dominant cultural values 
in a given society. 
 
2.3.1 Secrecy versus Transparency and Corporate Financial Disclosure Practices 
Accounting is a socio-technical activity that involves an interaction between both human and non-
human resources and cannot be culture free (Violet, 1983; Perera, 1994; Hassab Elnaby & 
Mosebach, 2005; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). This viewpoint is 
confirmed by many researchers who argue that financial disclosure practices are influenced by the 
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cultural values of the preparers of accounting reports (Perera & Mathews, 1990; Fencher & Kilgore, 
1994; Dahawy & Conover, 2007). 
 
Ngangan et al. (2005:27) see the tension between national cultures of developing countries and 
cultures of ‘exporting’ developed countries which originated accounting standards as the main issue 
that relates to the transfer of accounting technology. This proposition is justified on the grounds 
that perceptions regarding the significance of financial disclosure by financial statement preparers 
and users vary among different cultural backgrounds. Within the same context, Saudagaran & 
Meek (1997:129) state that “[a] nation’s accounting standards and practices are the result of a 
complex interaction of cultural, historical, economic and institutional factors. It is unlikely the mix 
is alike in any two countries and diversity is to be expected.The factors that influence accounting 
development at the national level also help explain accounting diversity across nations”.     
 
Culture affects the formulation and enforcement of laws and regulations (Licht, 2001; Al-Omari, 
2010). In other words, culture affects the institutional context of the country. Even when the 
content of accounting standards is the same, monitoring and enforcement remain national (Nobes, 
2006:235). Another important feature of culture is that it allows for some degree of flexibility, as 
supported by the proposition that cultural values are not fixed and can be modified over time (Pratt 
& Beaulieu, 1992; Haniffa, 1999). This may partially explain the conclusion that financial 
disclosure practices in developing countries may improve over time (Al-Htaybat, 2005; Hassan, 
2006; Al-Akra et al., 2010a).  
 
To sum up, culture is one of the most influential environmental factors that affect accounting 
systems and practices (Gray, 1988), consequently its impact cannot be ignored while investigating 
the gap between de jure and de facto compliance with IFRSs. Although the work of Hofstede (1980) 
is criticised on the ground that the dimentions identified by Hofstede reflect socio-economic make 
up of the nation rather than culture (Baskerville, 2003) and that its findings were derived from the 
study of the employees of IBM, hence cannot be generalized (Gernon & Wallace, 1995), the 
Hofstede/Gray framework is still cited as the basis for most discussions concerning the influence of 
culture on accounting practices (e.g., Zarzeski, 1996; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Baskerville, 2003;  Qu & Leung, 2006; Dahawy 
& Conover, 2007; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Mir et al., 2009).  Moreover, Gray (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model is the most accepted in international accounting area (Dhawy & 
Conover, 2007). 
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The societal values (cultural dimensions) as manifested by Hofstede (1980) are as follows:  
1. Large versus small power distance, which refers to the extent to which hierarchy and 
unequal distribution of power in institutions and organisations are accepted,  
2. Individualism versus collectivism, which refers to ‘I’ versus ‘we’ – showing a preference for 
a loosely knit social fabric or independent tightly knit fabric, 
3. Masculinity versus femininity, which refers to the extent to which gender roles are 
differentiated and performance and visible achievement (traditional masculine values) are 
emphasised over relationships and caring (traditional feminine values), and 
4. Strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, which refers to the degree to which the society 
feels uncomfortable with ambiguity and uncertain future. 
 
According to Hofstede (1980), societies with high power distance accept inequalities among 
members where all powers are concentrated in the hands of the superior and centralisation is the 
norm whereas subordinates expect to receive commands of what they have to do from superiors 
and recognise that it is not acceptable to question a decision of the superior. Collectivistic societies 
call for greater emotional dependence of members on their organisations. Such societies reflect 
dominance of strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their 
group like a family, and loyalty and sense of duty influence policies and practices. In cultures 
which support masculinity, economic growth has a priority over conservation of the environment, 
and some occupations are considered typically male while others are female. Finally, with respect 
to uncertainty avoidance, members in high uncertainty avoidance societies avoid ambiguity by 
developing rigid codes of belief and behaviour. Members in such societies prefer consensus, 
intolerance of unorthodox behaviour and ideas is the norm, change is resisted and achievement in 
life is mainly defined in terms of acquired security rather than social recognition. Both Egypt and 
Jordan score 70 with respect to the level of power distance and 45 with respect to masculinity. 
Uncertainty avoidance is higher in Egypt than Jordan (80 and 65 respectively). With respect to 
individualism level, it is relatively higher in Jordan than Egypt (30 and 25 respectively)5.   
 
Gray (1988) proposes that if the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980) exist, then 
accounting values can be linked to societal values and the influence of culture can be assessed. 
Consequently, Gray (1988) identifies four accounting sub-cultural values which are related to 
Hofstede’s (1980) societal values as follows: 
                                                          
5 The above mentioned scores are reported on Hofstede, G. Website. Available: 
 http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html. Accessed: 14/2/2012. 
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1. Professionalism (versus statutory control), which refers to a preference for the exercise of 
individual professional judgement and maintaining professional self-regulation in contrast 
to compliance with prescriptive legal requirements and statutory control, 
2. Uniformity (versus flexibility), which refers to a preference for uniformity and consistency 
over flexibility according to perceived circumstances,  
3. Conservatism (versus optimism), which refers to a preference for a cautious approach to 
measurement so as to handle the uncertainty of future events as opposed to a more 
optimistic, laissez-faire, risk taking approach, and 
4. Secrecy (versus transparency), which refers to a preference for confidentiality and the 
restriction of information about business only to those who are closely involved with its 
management and financing as opposed to a more transparent open and publicly 
accountable approach.  
 
Among these four values, secrecy versus transparency is more related to financial disclosure 
practices (Qu & Leung, 2006). Consequently, this accounting sub-cultural value is the one used in 
interpreting compliance practices in scrutinised stock exchanges which are characterized by 
preference for secrecy (Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010). Perera 
(1989) demonstrates that the level of preference for secrecy in an accounting sub-culture would 
influence the extent of the information disclosed in accounting reports. Tricker (2009) argues that 
directors preference for secrecy stems from a belief that secrecy is important to protect strategic 
plans, guard trade secrets, preserve reputation, and for listed companies, to avoid a leak of stock 
market price sensitive information. 
 
The importance of the impact of secrecy on financial disclosure practices has been highlighted by 
many researchers (e.g, Gray & Vint, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Ismail et al., 
2010). According to Gray (1988), secretive culture is associated with strong uncertainty avoidance 
that results from the need to restrict information disclosure to avoid conflict and competition and to 
preserve security. Secrecy also is associated with large power distance which results in the 
restriction of information to preserve power inequalities. Furthermore, it is associated with a 
preference for collectivism as opposed to individualism, having its concern for those closely 
involved with the company rather than for external parties. Consequently, recognition of the impact 
of secrecy is expected to help in interpreting the association between levels of compliance with 
IFRSs and corporate governance-related variables in the empirical part of this study. 
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2.3.2 Financial Economics Theories 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Agency Theory 
A significant body of work in the area of developing the theoretical foundation of financial 
disclosure practices and more recently in the development of that of corporate governance has been 
built on the notions of agency theory. Agency theory has been developed within the discipline of 
financial economics (Tricker, 2009) and is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976: 5) as a 
“contract under which one or more persons [the principal(s)] engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent”. 
 
Under agency contracts two potential conflicts of interest may result: the shareholder/manager 
conflict which gives rise to the agency cost of equity, and the bondholder/shareholder-management 
conflict, which gives rise to the agency cost of debt (Abd-Elsalam, 1999).  
 
Agency costs are the sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Kelly, 1983).  Monitoring costs result when the actions of company management are 
observed and judged by the principal and remuneration is linked with the outcome of monitoring 
(McKolgan, 2004; Omar, 2007). Bonding costs result when the agent endeavours to assure that 
he/she will not exploit or harm the principal’s interests (Denis, 2001; McKolgan, 2004; Omar, 
2007). Finally, residual loss results when the principal cannot be assured that the agent acts fully in 
his interest; thus, the principal takes action himself (Omar, 2007). 
 
Owusu-Ansah (1998a) suggests that all agency relationships have two distinguishing characteristics. 
The first is the degree of decision-making autonomy that the agent exercises which affects the 
welfare of both the principal and the agent. The second is the differing and varying interests of both 
parties to the contract. These features create a conflict of interests, whereby the agent acts to 
maximise his/her utility at the expense of the principal – a phenomenon referred to as opportunism 
(Mallin, 2009). 
 
In the agency relationship, agents (managers) are considered to have an information advantage over 
principals (owners). Owners who are not directly involved in running their business believe they 
are at a disadvantage compared to managers who have access to all information (Cooper & Keim, 
1983; Bromwich, 1992; Haniffa, 1999; Fields et al., 2001; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Barako et al., 2006). 
This problem is referred to as information asymmetry which arises when the principal and the agent 
have access to different levels of information (Bromwich 1992; Omar, 2007; Mallin, 2009). Thus, 
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one way of monitoring managers’ activities and ensuring that they are not behaving in a manner 
detrimental to the owners’ interest is by demanding access to financial and non-financial 
information on a regular basis (Haniffa, 1999). Marston and Shrives (1996) and Watson et al. (2002) 
argue that managers could reduce agency costs and investor uncertainty by disclosing more 
financial information in annual reports, which would subsequently increase the confidence of 
shareholders. Mallin (2009) argues that the desire for improved disclosure embodied in corporate 
governance best practices should help in reducing the information asymmetry problem since 
shareholders would be better informed about company activities and strategies. Additionally, Healy 
and Palepu (2001) make the point that the election of a board of directors to act on behalf of 
investors, and the use of intermediaries’ information such as that from financial analysts, help to 
reduce agency costs.  
 
Concerning the interpretative power of agency theory in corporate governance research, Tricker 
(2009) suggests that this enables researchers to examine the hypothesis that a causal relationship 
prevails between governance systems established to control the agent and the impact on the 
interests of the principal. In this regard he states that “agency theory offers a statistically rigorous 
insight into corporate governance processes. Because of its simplicity and the availability of both 
reliable data and statistical tests, agency theory has provided to corporate governance theory 
building” (Tricker, 2009:220). In a similar vein, Daily et al (2003) argue that in addition to 
recognising the self-interested nature of humans, this theory is simple as it reduces large 
corporations to two participants; managers and shareholders with a clear and consistent 
identification of the interests of each. Based on this argument, the use of agency theory in prior 
corporate governance research seems justified (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; Ghazali, 2004; Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Dey, 2008; Khan, 2010). However, although the 
agency theory goes some way toward explaining management’s motivation to disclose all material 
information, and whilst it is the most commonly used in corporate governance scholarly research, 
its opponents argue that it fails to explain non-financial motivations which influence levels of 
disclosure such as the unwillingness by some companies to avoid the release of material 
information to their competitors (Ockabol & Tinker, 1993, cited in Vlachos, 2001:107). Also, it is 
criticised on the grounds that in corporate governance research, it has a relatively narrow 
theoretical scope as it interprets corporate governance-related issues in terms of the principal-agent 
contract, ignoring the fact that board behaviour is influenced by interpersonal communication, 
group dynamics and political intrigue which cannot be measured (Tricker, 2009). Daily et al (2003: 
372) state that “A multitheoretic approach to corporate governance is essential for recognizing the 
many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably enhance organizational functioning”.  
Hence, it can be said that agency theory alone cannot provide a competent theoretical foundation 
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for compliance behaviour, especially within the developing country context where the cultural 
influence dominates. Consequently, in this study, the employment of other theories in order to 
enhance the integration between the empirical findings and their theoretical foundation is justified. 
 
2.3.2.2 Cost-benefit Analysis 
Managers’ incentives to disclose more information in order to reduce agency costs, to raise capital 
as cheaply as possible, or to distinguish their companies from other companies, are based on the 
trade-off between the costs and benefits of providing such information (Bhushan & Lessard, 1992; 
Al-Htaybat, 2005). In a similar vein, Abd-Elsalam (1999) argues that management decision to 
comply with mandatory disclosure requirements involves a comparison between compliance and 
non-compliance costs. This supports the notions of ‘Transaction Cost Economics’ theory which 
argues that financial disclosure costs should be incurred to the point at which the increase in costs 
equals the reduction of the potential loss from non-compliance (Tricker, 2009).This theory is 
closely related to agency theory with its underlying financial economics basis (Mallin, 2009; 
Tricker, 2009). In this regard, Stiles and Taylor (2001, cited in Tricker, 2009:223 and in Mallin, 
2009:18) argue that both transaction cost economics and agency theories focus on managerial 
discretion. Additionally, they argue that both theories highlight the important role of board of 
directors in monitoring management behaviour.  
 
As proposed in prior research, there are direct and indirect costs associated with disclosure (Foster, 
1986; Haniffa, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005).The former include the value of the resources used in 
gathering, preparing and processing the information, management, supervision, audit and legal fees 
as well as the dissemination of information (Foster, 1986; Cooke, 1992). Indirect costs include the 
time spent in deciding what to disclose by corporate managers (Benston, 1976). In most cases, 
managers must balance the benefits of lower capital cost, extra information and the costs associated 
with such disclosure like the cost of providing and preparing information. In the meantime, they 
must consider the effects of such disclosure on their competitive status (Meek et al., 1995; Al-
Htaybat, 2005). Within the same context, Vlachos (2001) proposes that in order to assess 
management’s disclosure decision, it is necessary to analyse the different costs of, and benefits 
from, corporate financial disclosure and to assess which of them are likely to have significant 
influence on the disclosure decision. However, he argues that although several costs and benefits 
have frequently been suggested, most cannot be easily measured in monetary terms and, 
consequently, their empirical testing is difficult. 
 
Many researchers argue that due to transaction costs related to financial disclosure, companies in 
general are unwilling to incur additional costs through expanded disclosures unless required to do 
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so, or the potential benefits exceed the estimated costs (Gray et al., 1984a cited in Haniffa, 1999:66; 
Suwaidan, 1997). This argument emphasises the importance of accounting regulations and the 
importance of strict enforcement of such regulations especially within the context of developing 
countries (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Fields et al., 2001; Scott, 2003). The same argument applies to the 
MENA stock exchanges examined in this study as there is a low demand for accounting 
information by naïve investors (Al-Htaybat, 2005; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007) and market 
pressures and regulatory enforcement are not as effective as in developed capital markets – hence, 
non-compliance costs might be less than compliance costs (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). Consequently, it 
can be argued that, the stimulation of disclosure practices requires strict enforcement of capital 
market regulations and awareness raising among producers of accounting information regarding the 
benefits of improved disclosure to overcome anti-disclosure cultural values such as secrecy, which 
undoubtedly has a negative impact on management incentives to improve transparency. Developing 
the moral hazards of management regarding the importance of disclosure and compliance with laws 
and regulations is expected to change management’s way of evaluating the costs and benefits of 
financial disclosure. Meanwhile, it is important to develop the awareness of naïve (i.e., non-
professional) investors regarding the minimum level of disclosure required of companies to satisfy 
the enhanced demand for accounting information. 
 
2.3.3 Institutional Isomorphism Theory 
Isomorphism is a term that originated in the fields of natural sciences such as mathematics, 
chemistry and biology (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). Rodrigues and Craig (2007:742) point out that 
“[i]somorphism (convergence) describes a process whereby one organization (or set of 
institutional arrangements, such as international accounting standards) becomes similar to another 
organization (or set of institutional arrangements) by adopting (or moving closer to) the 
characteristics of the other organization”. 
 
Isomorphism is a basic component of the institutional theory which is concerned with the presumed 
values and beliefs of social and organisational life which influence the way of company operation 
(Al-Omari, 2010). From this perspective, organisations adopt structures and practices which are 
considered legitimate and socially acceptable by other organisations in their field irrespective of 
their actual usefulness (Scott, 1995; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Hassan, 
2008). This argument is supported by many scholars who demonstrate that for an organisation to 
gain legitimacy and social acceptability from the external community as well as to develop its 
image as being modern, rational, responsible and compliant, it must experience institutional 
isomorphism (Carruthers, 1995; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). If an organisation fails, it will lose 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Carruthers, 1995). 
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There are three forms (mechanisms) of isomorphism as defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as 
follows: 
 
Firstly, Coercive Isomorphism is indicated by the pressure exerted by government on other 
organisations through the enactment of legislation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
 
Secondly, Mimetic Isomorphism is demonstrated by Scott (1995) as the desire to adopt others’ 
practices that are both successful and worthy of adoption. In a similar vein, Rodrigues and Craig 
(2007) consider it as the ways in which organisations mime the actions of similar but more 
legitimate or successful organisations in the institutional environment. Furthermore, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) argue that in cases of uncertainty about the proper action, it is appropriate to seek a 
successful reference group and mimic its approach. 
 
Thirdly, Normative Isomorphism is primarily related to the profession (Hassan, 2008). DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) demonstrate how individuals of a similar calling organise in a professional 
organisation to promote a cognitive base, diffuse shared orientations and organisational practices, 
and legitimise their activities. Normative isomorphism is derived from two key aspects of such 
professionalisation: firstly, through formal education and legitimation of the cognitive base by 
discipline specialists in universities; and secondly, through the expansion of professional networks 
that span organisations and facilitate the rapid diffusion of new models and practices (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). Professions exert normative isomorphism through their 
control of registration and certification procedures, accreditation of University courses, and 
promulgation of normative, mandatory rules of conduct for use by profession members (Rodrigues 
& Craig, 2007; Hassan, 2008). 
 
Rodrigues and Craig (2007) recognise that the institutional isomorphism is able to explain the 
developments in international accounting practices over time. In this regard, they argue the theory 
to contend “[t]hat organizations reproduce widely held myths by adopting formal structures and 
procedures. One widely held myth is that a formally announced practice of an organization (e.g., 
steadfast total compliance with IFRS) does not differ from its actual, or informal practice (e.g., less 
than 100% adherence to IFRS). This gap between formal and informal structure or practice is 
described metaphorically as a decoupling” (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007:743). 
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Full compliance with IFRSs depends to some extent on the enforcement mechanisms imposed by 
the organisational actors with responsibility for supporting, imposing or influencing such practice, 
such as the capital market regulators (e.g., the CMA in Egypt and JSC in Jordan), legal authorities, 
taxation authorities, and the accountancy profession (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hope, 2003, 
Hassan, 2006, Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Hail et al., 2010). However, low investor demand for 
improved financial disclosure, and low monitoring costs and the weak enforcement of IFRSs in 
developing capital markets, cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs for listed 
companies, and direct management incentives towards non-compliance (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Dahawy & Conover, 2007). Consequently, this bolsters the continuity of decoupling. 
 
For coercive isomorphism, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, although the Egyptian and 
Jordanian governments developed regulatory frameworks that are consistent with internationally 
recommended practices by mandating the adoption of IFRSs in 1997 and developing their capital 
market regulations, the gap reported by prior research between de facto and de jure compliance 
(e.g., Abdelsalam & Weetmen, 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2010) 
indicates that such regulatory requirements seem to be poorly enforced. In respect of mimetic 
isomorphism, the main reasons for mandating IFRSs were pressure from the international lending 
institutions particularly the WB and the IMF and the desire to promote a more legitimate or 
successful image by following globally recommended practices, since they lacked the expertise to 
develop national standards of the same quality (Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et 
al., 2009). Finally, regarding normative isomorphism, whilst in Egypt and to some extent in Jordan, 
the last decade witnessed a substantial effort to develop the educational and professional 
frameworks to promote financial reporting practices (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Omar, 2007; Al-Omari, 
2010), the gap between de facto and de jure compliance as reported by prior research may signal 
that this effort is insufficient to improve the quality of accounting profession in these countries due 
to the unsatisfactory performance of the professional bodies in controlling registration, certification, 
quality of performance, and ethics associated with accounting and auditing. 
 
In summary, although the first glance shows that countries concerned adopted all forms of 
institutional isomorphism, the prevailing gap between de facto and de jure compliance with IFRSs 
as reported by prior research (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Al-
Akra et al, 2010a) shows that the measures taken may be purely window dressing to impress 
external communities such as the WB and the IMF in order to gain their financial and political 
support, and legitimacy. It is thus, imperative to consider the influence of the cultural context 
within these countries as de facto compliance should be seen as the outcome of the interaction 
between cultural context and institutional pressures.With respect to such influence, Rodrigues and 
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Craig (2007) suggest that decoupling may be a result of cultural barriers in understanding the 
Anglo-American model of accounting, difficulties in translating standards to give the intended 
meaning of the English text of IFRSs, use of terminology that is incapable of translation into some 
languages, and the complexity of implementing IFRSs. Consequently, companies may argue that 
they are applying IFRSs while full compliance with IFRSs is absent. 
 
The review of the forms of institutional isomorphism implies that these forms (mechanisms) should 
be seen as complementary. Furthermore, from the researcher’s viewpoint, to avoid the problem of 
decoupling, normative isomorphism should come before coercive isomorphism. The adoption of 
IFRSs in emerging markets requires consideration of the importance of preliminary preparation of 
national markets, mainly by developing the national cultural values to perceive the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs in the same way as it is perceived in developed countries where such 
standards were initially developed. In this regard, Ngangan et al. (2005) recognise that significant 
differences in the cultural contexts between developing and developed countries affect the 
cognitive structures and knowledge systems regarding the importance of accounting information 
disclosure. In secretive cultural contexts such as the Egyptian and the Jordanian stock exchanges 
(Al-Htaybat, 2005; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2009), mandating the adoption of 
IFRSs is not enough to facilitate comparability of reporting and disclosure practices, because of the 
lack of convergence of other factors that influence management reporting incentives. This 
perspective is emphasised by Hail et al. (2010:360-361) who state that “[a]ccounting standards are 
one of many important institutional elements affecting financial reporting practices in a country … 
it is reasonable to expect that corporate reporting evolves in concert with other institutional 
factors … well-designed set of accounting standards and other elements of the institutional 
infrastructure should be complementary, i.e., fit and reinforce each other”. 
 
2.4 Compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
Accounting standards are defined as “… accounting regulations. At best, they restrict the choice of 
accounting methods available to management. At worst, they force companies to report financial 
information in a form which companies would not have chosen voluntarily” (Sutton, 1984:81 
quoted in Al-Hajraf, 2002:102). 
 
Since the 1970s an extensive effort toward the development of IASs (referred to as the IFRSs since 
2002) has been exerted by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (referred to 
as the International Accounting Standards Board [IASB] since 2001). The IASB and its former 
body the IASC were developed with the purpose to develop in the public interest, a single set of 
high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards to improve decision 
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making of all user groups; to promote the use of such standards and to achieve convergence of 
national accounting standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to high quality 
solutions (IASB, 2008: 64). 
 
However, opponents of adoption of IFRSs worldwide argue that this one set of accounting 
standards might not be the best option for both developed and developing countries. For developed 
countries such as the US and the UK, IFRSs may be seen of lower quality than national standards 
as well as healthy competition between standard setters is required (Barth et al., 2008; Jamal et al., 
2010). On the other hand, for developing countries it is argued that the IASC/IASB was not initially 
designed (structurally or operationally) as an effective tool to improve the accounting 
measurements and practices among developing countries (Kapaya, 2000). Likewise, Chamisa 
(2000) highlights that the conclusion regarding the relevance of IASs/IFRSs for developing 
countries should be made with caution due to several limitations associated with developing 
economies, such as their amorphous and heterogeneous nature. Within the same context some 
researchers propose that the accounting profession is nationalistic and thus, the development of 
financial reporting practices must be in light of national socio-political characteristics (Mueller, 
1967 cited in Chand & Patel, 2008:84; Nobes, 1991) as the quality of financial reporting is more 
attributable to incentives of preparers and the country context (Jamal et al., 2010). However, the 
current scene shows that, globalisation and political convenience are forcing an increasing number 
of countries to adopt IFRSs, resulting in their wide international adoption (Ali et al., 2006; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; Joshi et al., 2008). Moreover, many developing capital 
markets including Egypt and Jordan, can be regarded as early adopters of IASs/IFRSs on a 
mandatory basis as will be discussed in Chapter Four. In contrast with Nobes (1991:78), who 
twenty years ago described the IASC’s effort toward worldwide standardisation as “a hopeless and 
unnecessary target”, Rodrigues and Craig (2007:740) argue that “[t]he push for global adoption of 
IFRS is part of a general wave of standardization that has taken place in broader, non-accounting 
contexts over the past 150 years … Consequently, in modern society, the global harmonization of 
accounting standards might be regarded as uncontroversial, unremarkable, and inevitable”. 
 
On the other hand, proponents of compliance with IASs/IFRSs emphasise that one of the most 
important merits of compliance with IFRSs is that it enables easy comparison of the results and 
financial positions of companies across national boundaries, thereby removing barriers to 
international investment (Emyunu, 1993; Ali et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 2009). Furthermore, the 
adoption of the IFRSs is a pre-requisite of listing on foreign stock exchanges (Omar, 2007). Street 
et al. (1999) argue that the adoption of the IASs/IFRSs can help in lowering the cost of capital and 
the risk worldwide, reducing the costs of multiple reporting, providing a better understanding of 
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companies’ performance across countries by eliminating the confusion arising from different 
practices and measures of companies’ financial positions, promoting international financial 
investments in the capital markets, and improving the allocation of savings worldwide. 
In addition, proponents argue that compliance with IFRSs enhances the professional status of the 
accountancy bodies, and saves costs associated with research and standard-setting efforts 
(Chandler, 1992; Larson, 1993; Chand, 2005). Peasnell (1993) suggests that for developing 
countries where there are poor national accounting structures and the accounting profession is not 
able to effectively regulate accounting and financial reporting, it is preferable to apply the IASs. 
Furthermore, developing countries fall under pressures from the international lending organisations, 
which justify such pressures by referral to their lack of resources and infrastructure to enable them 
to prepare their own standards, as well as their need to manage changes in line with modern and 
international harmony (Kapaya, 2000, Al-Htaybat, 2005; Ellabbar, 2007). According to Vlachos 
(2001), compliance helps to secure the minimum amount of information needed for decision-
making and ensures that unsophisticated investors are not fooled.  
 
Mandating the adoption of IFRSs worldwide reflects the success of the IASB, as supported by the 
international institutions such as the WB and IMF in persuading national governments worldwide 
of the merits of following a single set of accounting standards to connect their national capital 
markets as part of a global economy. Furthermore, the IASB-FASB project on convergence reflects 
to a great extent, their support to the adoption of IFRSs worldwide (Joshi et al., 2008)6. However, 
given that IFRSs originated in developed countries, it is necessary to acknowledge that it will take 
some time before full compliance with IFRSs is achieved in developing contexts, because these are 
different in their economies, institutional infrastructures, and accounting systems as well as in their 
ability to swiftly adopt IFRSs (Ali et al., 2006). In this regard other scholars argue that even with de 
jure compliance with IFRSs, important accounting differences still exist in different jurisdictions 
(Choi et al., 2002; Nobes & Parker, 2004; Saudagaran, 2004; Chand & Patel, 2008; Dahawy & 
Samaha, 2010). Ball et al. (2003:260) state that some countries adopt IFRSs to gain “instant 
respectability” or to serve as a “politically correct substitute” for their own accounting standards 
without developing the appropriate infrastructure that enables compliance with IFRSs. 
Consequently, given the increasing importance of compliance with IFRSs worldwide, it is 
important for all countries to take the appropriate steps to narrow the gap between de facto and de 
jure compliance, and thus achieve the most from the standards. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 For more details about the development of IFRSs see Black (2003) and Laskawy (2009). 
44 
 
2.5 Financial Disclosure - Empirical Studies 
Financial disclosure is a rich field of empirical enquiry (Healy & Palepu, 2001). In general, the 
most important contribution to this research effort during the 1960s was the development of the 
disclosure index as a research tool to measure the extent of corporate financial disclosure (Cerf, 
1961). The next stream of research in the area focused on developing a theoretical framework to 
provide the basis for interpreting financial disclosure behaviour (e.g., Cooke, 1992; Abayo et al, 
1994; Inchausti, 1997). More recently, researchers became concerned with investigating the issue 
of the worldwide adoption of a unified set of accounting standards. This line of research is 
concerned with investigating the applicability of full compliance with IFRSs, and the association 
between levels of compliance with IFRSs and disclosure environment attributes (e.g., Vlachos, 
2001; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Samaha, 2006; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Al-Shammari et 
al., 2008;Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Dahawy, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). Appendix 1 
provides a summary of many empirical studies on financial disclosure which used disclosure 
indices as a research instrument. 
 
This section presents an analytical overview of the general themes of prior research that examined 
different issues relating to financial disclosure practices since the pioneer study of Cerf (1961). Its 
purpose is twofold: firstly, to critically analyse the different aspects relating to prior financial 
disclosure studies, focusing on single developing capital market studies and cross-national 
comparative studies in order to develop the necessary background for establishing the appropriate 
research methodology for this study, and interpreting the findings of the statistical analysis; 
secondly, to identify the gap in the literature which this study intends to fill. 
 
To produce a more meaningful overview of prior literature in this field, the remaining parts of this 
section will discuss previous studies in terms of the structure of the financial disclosure index, the 
type of financial disclosure practices under scrutiny, financial disclosure theories and explanatory 
variables employed, sample size, study period, and statistical analysis techniques used. The section 
will end with a discussion of such studies in respect of the range of countries covered. 
 
2.5.1 Structure of Financial Disclosure Index 
The review reveals the existence of great differences among the financial disclosure indices used by 
previous researchers, quite likely attributable to the absence of a theory providing the basis for 
determining the number or type of information items to be included in the disclosure index. The 
number of information items included in the indices ranged from a very limited number such as in 
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Tai et al. (1990) who used only 11 mandatory items, and Barrett (1976) who used a mix of 17 
voluntary and mandatory items to a large number of information items such as in Craig and Diga 
(1998) who used 530 mandatory items, Vlachos (2001) who used 514 and Al-Akra et al. (2010a) 
who applied the Price Waterhouse Cooper checklist for the fiscal year 2004 that contains 641 items. 
Additionally, the majority of researchers applied unweighted disclosure indices. Some researchers, 
especially early ones, used weighted indices reflecting the views of a specific user group such as 
financial analysts, regarding the relative importance of various information items (Cerf, 1961; 
Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976; Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978; Firth, 
1979; Firth, 1980; McNally et al., 1982; Ho & Wong, 2001; Al-Hajraf, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; 
Barako et al, 2006). The last group of researchers apply both weighted and unweighted approaches 
(Choi, 1973; Choi & Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1988; Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004). However, 
the use of weighted indices is criticised since weighted indices may reflect the subjectivity of either 
researchers or users rather than the actual relative importance of items, and thus, unweighted 
indices are preferred (Cooke, 1989a,b; 1992; 1993). Furthermore, some studies which apply both 
weighted and unweighted indices report that there are no significant differences between either 
(Choi, 1973; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). Consequently, most researchers use a dichotomous, 
unweighted disclosure index. Furthermore, it is noticed that many researchers such as Cerf (1961), 
Abd-Elsalam (1999) and Al-Htaybat (2005) apply self-constructed disclosure indices, while others 
such as Hassan (2006), Dahawi and Conover (2007) and Hassan et al. (2009) apply existing ones. 
A few researchers such as Malone et al. (1993) and Al-Hajraf (2002) have developed a disclosure 
index for the purpose of measuring disclosure practices by firms of a specific industry type, but in 
general, researchers construct comprehensive indices with the purpose of examining financial 
disclosure practices in a wide range of industries. 
 
2.5.2 The Type of Financial Disclosure Practices Scrutinised 
The review of previous studies reveals that the type of financial disclosure practice being assessed 
ranges from only mandatory disclosure, only voluntary disclosure, or an aggregate (overall 
disclosure). Voluntary disclosure studies include those of Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Cooke 
(1989b), Hossain et al. (1994), Hossain et al. (1995), Meek et al. (1995), Suwaidan (1997), Haniffa 
(1999), Depoers (2000), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Al-Razeen and Karbhari 
(2004), Anderson and Daoud (2005), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Al-Akra et al. (2010b), El-
Sayed and Hoque (2010), Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011). Mandatory financial disclosure 
studies include those of Tai et al. (1990), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Abd-Elsalam (1999), Naser et al. (2002), Al-Shayab (2003), Abdelsalam 
and Weetman (2003),  Glaum and Street (2003), Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005), Dahawy and 
Conover (2007), Dahawy (2009), Al-Akra et al. (2010a) and Ismail et al. (2010). Studies measuring 
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overall or aggregate disclosure practices using both mandatory and voluntary items whether mixed 
or separated include those of Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Busby (1975), Stanga (1976), 
Wallace (1988), Cooke (1989a), Cooke (1992), Wallace and Naser (1994), Al-Mulhem (1997), 
Inchausti (1997), Al-Htaybat (2005), Hassan (2006), Samaha (2006), Omar (2007) and Samaha and 
Stapleton (2008; 2009).  
 
It is recognised that since Cerf’s (1961) pioneering study, the aggregate financial disclosure 
research has represented a cornerstone for the first stream of financial disclosure empirical work. 
From the late 1970s voluntary disclosure-based empirical studies occurred, based on the 
assumption that either there is full compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements or there are 
no mandatory disclosure requirements and that voluntary practices exist according to several 
company characteristics (Al-Htaybat, 2005; Hassan, 2006). Most recently, many researchers have 
recognised the importance of assessing levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements as determined by laws and regulations. The importance of evaluating such levels of 
compliance is shown by the findings, which report the existence of low compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements, especially in developing countries. The assessment of IASs/IFRSs 
compliance levels in different developed and developing countries internationally has prompted 
several studies since the late 1990s (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Street & Gray, 2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Samaha, 2006; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Samaha & 
Stapleton, 2008; 2009;  Dahawy, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Ismail et al., 2010). 
 
2.5.3 Financial Disclosure Theories and Explanatory Variables 
The reliance on financial disclosure theories (e.g., agency theory, signaling theory, capital need 
theory, political cost theories, and cultural theories) in previous studies accompanied the 
development of voluntary financial disclosure literature for the purpose of interpreting the 
determinants of management decisions to provide additional information in annual reports. 
Subsequently, researchers employed financial disclosure theories in all disclosure studies 
(regardless of whether they examined voluntary or mandatory disclosure practices) in order to 
explain variations in levels of financial disclosure among sampled companies (e.g., Cooke, 1992; 
Abayo et al, 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 
2008; 2009).  Furthermore, corporate attributes and cultural factors have been used as explanatory 
variables in prior studies to explain the differences in levels of voluntary and/or mandatory 
disclosure practices among companies, as is discussed in Chapter Five (hypotheses section) (e.g., 
Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1991; Hossain et al., 1994; 
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Raffournier, 1995; Suwaidan, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Street & Gray, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Hassan, 
2006; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009; Dahawy, 2009; Al-akra 
et al., 2010a,b; Elsayed & Hoque, 2010; Ismail et al., 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). The 
researchers attribute differences in levels of voluntary disclosure and no or low levels of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements including IASs/IFRSs, to several company 
characteristics such as company size, gearing, age, liquidity, profitability, listing status, legal form, 
type of auditor, and type of industry. Additionally, levels of disclosure have been attributed to 
culture-related factors such as race, education, and familiarity, and most recently to corporate 
governance structures such as ownership structure, existence of audit committe and board 
characteristics (e.g, Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Samaha, 2010; Alanezi & 
Albuloushi, 2011; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011) . A few researchers do not employ any 
explanatory variables (e.g., Yeoh, 2005; Dahawy & Conover, 2007). However, generally, the 
number of such variables ranges from one (e.g., entry into a broadly based capital market as in Choi, 
1973; Firm size as in Firth, 1980; and Ownership structure as in Chau & Gray, 2002) to 14 (e.g., 
Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
 
2.5.4 Sample Size, Study Period, and Statistical Analyses 
Previous studies differ in terms of sample size and study period. Sample size ranges from 15 
companies (Dahawy & Conover, 2007) to 761 companies (Archambault & Archambault, 2003). 
The majority of studies use cross-sectional analysis based on the assumption that disclosure 
practices improve over time (e.g., Cerf, 1961;  Cooke, 1989a,b; 1991; 1992; 1993; Malone et al., 
1993; Suwaidan, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Chau & Gray, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Ali et 
al., 2004; Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Dahawi & Conover, 2007). Relatively few, such as 
Inchausti (1997), Hassan (2006) and Hassan et al. (2009), use panel data. The main purpose of 
studies investigating financial disclosure practices over a period exceeding one year is either to 
examine whether disclosure levels improve over time or whether the variation in disclosure level 
can be attributed to a specific company characteristic. The longest study period covered by a 
previous study is ten years (Barrett, 1976). 
 
In terms of statistical tools suitable for the examination of associations between levels of financial 
disclosure (dependent variable) and explanatory variables, Cooke (1998) proposes that no one 
procedure is the best, and that multiple approaches help to ensure robust results. Likewise, Wallace 
et al. (1994) observe that there is no agreement on the approach to be followed when examining the 
relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables. Prior studies employ parametric 
and/or non-parametric statistical tests (e.g., Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989a; Hossain et al., 1994; 
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Suwaidan, 1997; Craig & Diga, 1998; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Camffermann & Cooke, 2002; Al-Shiab, 
2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Al-
Akra et al., 2010a,b; Ismail et al., 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). Regression analysis is 
employed by almost all researchers to examine the relationship between independent variables (i.e., 
corporate characteristics, corporate governance, and culture-related variables) and the level of 
financial disclosure. 
 
2.5.5 The Range of Scrutinised Capital Markets 
Generally, the majority of financial disclosure literature is concentrated on developed countries, 
specifically Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US and the UK. Before the late 1980s such studies 
investigating developing countries were rare. As revealed in Appendix 1, findings from prior 
studies tend to confirm that a wide gap exists between financial disclosure practices in developing 
capital markets compared to their developed counterparts. Research extended to explore financial 
disclosure practices in emerging capital markets mainly attributes this phenomenon to the influence 
of secrecy, unfamiliarity, language barriers, the wide spread of unsophisticated investors, and weak 
enforcement of accounting standards and regulations resulting in compliance costs being greater 
than non-compliance costs for listed companies (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Hassan, 2006; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Dahawy & 
Conover, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Ismail et al., 2010). 
 
2.5.5.1 Single Developed Capital Market Studies 
As previously mentioned, studies in developed countries far outweigh those in developing ones. 
However, as the purpose of this study is to investigate financial disclosure practices in emerging 
markets, Appendix 1 provides a summary of 25 single developed capital market studies published 
during the last 50 years (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Busby, 1975; Stanga, 1976; Belkaoui 
& Kahl, 1978; Firth, 1979; Firth, 1980; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a,b; 91; 92; 93; Malone 
et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Depoers, 
2000; Street & Gray, 2002; Glaum & Street, 2003; Anderson & Daoud, 2005; Arcay & Vazquez, 
2005; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005; Yeoh, 2005). These are considered the most influential as they 
have either introduced new empirical facts or presented rigorous analytical tools that help in 
supporting the research methods employed in this study. The chosen developed capital market 
studies use financial disclosure indices in order to assess financial disclosure practices in ten 
developed countries, namely the US, the UK, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, 
Spain, Switzerland and France. With the exception of samples used by Cooke (1991; 1992; 1993), 
the number of sampled companies in developed capital market studies is relatively high compared 
to that in the developing capital market context, attributable to the challenge of collecting data in 
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such environments due to the lack of databases and the culture of secrecy surrounding the 
dissemination of information. This problem only arises in the literature related to developing 
countries (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Hassan, 2006; Omar, 2007). The review of developed capital 
market studies shows that financial disclosure theories succeeded in providing a satisfactory and 
competent explanation for differences in disclosure levels among companies. This is to be expected 
since these theories originated in Western environments. 
 
2.5.5.2 Single Developing Capital Market Studies 
Generally, the extent of financial disclosure in developing countries is much lower than that in 
developed countries (e.g., 50% in Samaha, 2006 and Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009 applied to 
Egypt compared to 93% in Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005 applied to Newzealand). It is also noticed 
that except for the studies of Haniffa (1999); Haniffa & Cooke (2002), Samaha (2006) and Samaha 
and Stapleton (2008; 2009), which use samples of 167, 167, 281 and 281 companies respectively, 
the norm in single developing country studies is to adopt a small sample size, usually not exceeding 
100 companies, in contrast to the developed country studies. Appendix 1 provides a summary of 46 
single developing capital market studies using a disclosure index covering India (Singhvi, 1968), 
Bangladesh (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Akhtaruddin, 2005), Malaysia (Hossain et al., 1994; 
Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006), Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998a,b), Tanzanya (Abayo et al., 1993), Nigeria (Wallace, 1988); Kenya (Barako et al., 2006), 
Mexico (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987), Singapore (Eng & Mak, 2003), Czech Republic (Patton & 
Zelenka, 1997), Saudi Arabia (Al-Mulhem, 1997; Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004), Kuwait (Al-Hajraf, 
2002; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011), the UAE (Al-Jifri, 2008), Qatar (Naser et al., 2006), Turkey 
(Aksu & Kosedag, 2006), Egypt (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Hassan, 
2006; Samaha, 2006; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Samaha & 
Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Dahawy, 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; El-Sayed & Hoque, 2010; Ismail et al., 
2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011), and Jordan (Suwaidan, 1997; Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 
2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b). The review of 
single developing capital market studies in Appendix 1 that investigated MENA countries reveals 
that these were published during the period from 1997 (Al-Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997) to 
2011 (Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Compliance with IASs/IFRSs is 
investigated in Egypt by Abd-Elsalam (1999), Abdelsalam and Weetman (2003), Samaha (2006), 
Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007), Dahawi and Conover (2007), Samaha and Stapleton (2008; 
2009), Dahawy (2009) and Ismail et al. (2010). In Jordan, mandatory disclosure practices are 
investigated by all researchers except Suwaidan (1997). Al-Htaybat (2005) and Omar (2007), 
investigate aggregate disclosure as further divided into mandatory and voluntary items. The two 
available studies exploring financial disclosure practices in Kuwait (Al-Hajraf, 2002 and Alanezi & 
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Albuloushi, 2011) scrutinise compliance with IAS 30 (Accounting for Banks and Financial 
Institutions) and compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements respectively. Naser et al. (2006) 
investigate voluntary disclosure practices in Qatar while Al-Jifri (2008) investigates compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements in the UAE. The periods covered in those studies range 
from 1980 (Suwaidan, 1997) to 2007 (Ismail et al., 2010), the research samples range from 15 
companies (Dahawy & Conover, 2007) to 281 companies (Samaha, 2006; Samaha & Stapleton, 
2008; 2009), and the maximum number of items included in the disclosure index is 641 items 
(Price Waterhouse Cooper checklist for 2004) in Al-Akra et al. (2010a). 
 
In conclusion, the review of prior research investigated compliance with IAS/IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in single MENA region countries reveals scarecity in the number of studies that used 
recent data. Only two studies investigate annual reports for the fiscal year 2007 (Ismail et al., 2010 
on Egypt and Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011 on Kuwait). However, Ismail et al. (2010) unreasonably 
employed the checklist developed by the CMA for the year 2000 ignoring the fact that 2007 was 
the first year in which all IFRSs except IAS 17: Accounting for Leases became mandatory in Egypt 
according to the Ministerial Decree No. 243 of 2006 (Hassaan, 2007; Elsayed, 2010), hence the 
year 2000 checklist does not recognise the amendments to disclosure requirements under IFRSs 
during a seven year period. With respect to Jordan, the most recent data used in investigating 
compliance with IFRSs relates to 2004 (Al-Akra et al., 2010a). In addition, only two studies (Al-
Akra et al., 2010a on Jordan and Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011 on Kuwait) investigate the 
association between compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance structures.  Furthermore, 
many studies highlight the reduced applicability of Western financial disclosure theories to 
developing capital market studies (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Al-
Htaybat, 2005; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Elsayed & Hoque, 2010). This is confirmed by 
the findings of Al-Htaybat (2005) which show that financial disclosure theories (agency, capital 
need, political costs and signaling theories) fail to explain disclosure practices in 1997. Also, Abd-
Elsalam (1999) observes that only agency theory and capital need theory apply to the Egyptian 
context, and the applicability of signaling theory is not clear. It is further noticed that, all studies 
using panel data analyses show that financial disclosure practices improve over time (e.g., Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Hassan, 2006; Al-Akra et al., 2010a).  
 
2.5.5.3 Cross-national Comparative Capital Market Studies 
The review of comparative financial disclosure studies reveals a relative shortage of research in the 
area. Furthermore, the review of the 14 comparative financial disclosure studies listed in Appendix 
1 indicates that the majority of these studies were concerned with developed capital markets (Choi, 
1973; Barrett, 1976; Spero, 1979; Meek et al., 1995; Hussain, 1996; Zarzeski, 1996; Camfferman & 
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Cooke, 2002). Beginning in the late 1990s, this line of research extended to developing markets 
(Craig & Diga, 1998; Tower et al., 1999; Vlachos, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2002; Ali et al., 2004; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008). Only one study (Al-Shammari et al., 2008) investigated compliance with 
IFRSs among GCC member countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) 
and reported a lack of de facto compliance with IFRSs among GCC member countries, and that 
despite political and cultural ties among such countries, there are significant differences among 
companies based on size, leverage, industry and internationality. 
  
As revealed in Appendix 1, many comparative studies consider disclosure practices among South 
Asian countries (Craig & Diga, 1998; Tower et al., 1999; Chau & Gray, 2002; Ali et al., 2004). A 
few made a comparison between developed and developing countries such as Chau and Gray 
(2002), and Archambault and Archambault (2003), but comparing the quality of financial 
disclosure in developed and developing contexts which are completely different in terms of their 
stage of economic development, cultural values and accounting regulation requirements, is seen as 
unreasonable and questionable. This viewpoint is supported by Vlachos (2001:124) who argues that 
findings are expected to be biased in favour of the country with more disclosure minima. Spero’s 
(1979) study is one of the rigorous earlier comparative efforts exploring developed countries with 
similar characteristics. By performing several statistical tests, Spero was the first to provide 
evidence that different weighting schemes are of less importance compared to item selection, as his 
findings reveal that companies that view disclosure positively, disclose many items and have high 
scores regardless of item weights (Spero, 1979). 
 
Within the context of emerging capital markets, the study of Craig and Diga (1998) is one of the 
first rigorous attempts to compare disclosure practices among a number of developing countries. 
The investigation of mandatory disclosure practices in five emerging Asian markets, as indicated in 
Appendix 1, reveals that unlike pre-expectations, banks and utilities (which have been assumed to 
have a high political cost exposure in these countries) were the industry groups with the lowest 
levels of disclosure. This conclusion highlights the importance of examining the applicability of 
different financial disclosure theories within the context of developing countries. 
 
Since 2000, the number of cross-national comparative disclosure studies has increased (e.g., Chau 
& Gray, 2001; Vlachos, 2001; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; 
Ali et al., 2004). The review in Appendix 1 reveals that several of these studies investigated the 
association between levels of financial disclosure and many explanatory variables. For example, 
some researchers explored the relationship between levels of financial disclosure and corporate 
attributes among different countries such as Vlachos (2001); Chau and Gray (2002), and Ali et al. 
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(2004). Other studies such as Archambault and Archambault (2003) investigated the association 
between levels of financial disclosure and culture, national politics, economics, corporate finance, 
and reporting systems among 37 countries worldwide. 
 
Generally, cross-national comparative disclosure studies demonstrate two methodological 
approaches (Vlachos, 2001), the first based on a comparison of disclosure practices in a sample of 
companies from a limited number of countries as followed in this study (e.g., Hussain, 1996; 
Vlachos, 2001; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Chau & Gray, 2002; Ali et al., 2004). Usually the 
purpose of this approach is to assess the quality of disclosure practices and to identify the factors 
influencing disclosure practices in each country and the strength of each. The second approach is 
based on a comparison of a sample of companies from multiple countries (e.g., Barrett, 1976; 
Zarzeski, 1996; Craig & Diga, 1998; Tower et al., 1999; Archambault & Archambault; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008), usually with the intention to rank companies and countries based on 
disclosure scores. 
 
Concerning the quality of cross-national comparative studies, Vlachos (2001:127) argues that 
companies and/or countries under scrutiny must be comparable (i.e., similar in terms of their 
economic, social and political systems). 
 
Finally, the review of these studies indicates that further to the shortage of comparative studies 
investigating developing markets in general and the MENA markets in particular, no prior 
comparative study has explored the association between the levels of compliance with IFRSs and 
corporate governance structures within the MENA context as is intended by this study. 
 
2.5.6 Justification for Current Study 
The critical overview of previous studies that investigated financial disclosure practices reveals that 
even on the level of a single country the results have been mixed and inconsistent. This can be 
attributed to the same reasons claimed by prior researchers (e.g., Wallace & Naser, 1995, Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999; Vlachos, 2001). These reasons include the lack of uniformity in the statistical 
approaches employed, the differing nature of the explanatory variables examined in these studies 
and their proxies, the changes in countries’ disclosure requirements over time, the type of 
disclosure investigated, the period of the study and the differences in the disclosure index content.  
Given the shortage in comparative financial disclosure studies investigating developing capital 
markets in general and the MENA capital markets in particular, together with the detailed rationale 
provided in Chapter One, this study seems to be justified. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, 
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this study is the first comparative study that investigates the association between corporate 
governance structures and levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the MENA 
region and the first to investigate such relationship in Egypt. In addition, it is the first to investigate 
compliance practices in Egypt and Jordan using a checklist that is based on IFRSs disclosure 
requirements for the year 2007. This study extends the study of Al-Akra et al. (2010a) in Jordan by 
using more recent data, investigating the impact of board leadership and management ownership 
ratio on the levels of compliance with IFRSs, in addition of comparing the findings with those of 
another MENA country in a similar stage of economic development. This will enable getting a 
conclusion with respect to the possibility of generalising the results of one developing country to 
others. Finally, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, this study is the first to employ the 
institutional isomorphism theory to explain the association between compliance with IFRSs and 
corporate governance structures as well as being one of the first comparative studies that carry out 
interviews with different parties involved in financial reporting process to support the interpretation 
of the research findings. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided the core theoretical background underpinning the research hypotheses 
and against which the research findings will be explained. It began with an indication of the 
concept of financial disclosure, the scope of financial disclosure and the relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Thereafter, a review of the theoretical framework that is 
relevant to this study was presented. A discussion of the development, objectives and the issue of 
compliance with IFRSs was then provided. Finally, the chapter offered a critical discussion of prior 
empirical studies which investigated the relationship between aggregate, mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure and corporate attributes. These studies were reviewed and classified as developed capital 
market studies, emerging capital market studies, and cross-national comparative studies, and their 
main findings were reported. The chapter concluded by identifying the gap in the financial 
disclosure literature which this study aims to fill. The next chapter will discuss different aspects of 
corporate governance as a means of providing the core background required to investigate the 
association between corporate governance structures and levels of compliance with IFRSs in the 
selected MENA countries. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Corporate Governance and Financial Disclosure Practices 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Across the globe a series of events over the last two decades placed corporate governance at the top 
of the agenda for business communities, international financial institutions, governments, and 
capital market regulators. Specifically, these were the Asian financial crisis and the high-profile 
corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, Lehman Brothers and Tyco. Furthermore, in 
academia, the topic continues to attract much attention from researchers (e.g., Beasley, 1996; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Brown 2007; Ezat & 
El-Masri, 2008; Felo, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 
2011). 
 
Corporate governance is concerned with the system of directing and controlling companies, and it 
is the responsibility of BOD (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). It is a fundamental element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence (OECD, 
2004). ''Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined'' (OECD, 2004: 11). The BOD actions are 
subject to laws, regulations and shareholders in general meeting and the role of shareholders in 
governance is to appoint the directors and auditors and to make sure that the governance structure is 
appropriate (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). 
 
The development of corporate governance is a global phenomenon, influenced by legal, cultural, 
ownership, and other structural differences (Mallin, 2009), but as yet there is no widely accepted 
paradigm or theoretical foundation in its respect (Tricker, 2009). As a company grows, the number 
of its shareholders increases, and its activities become more complex such that owners need to be 
more vigilant in monitoring and controlling management’s activities (CIPE, 2003). 
 
For emerging capital markets, good corporate governance practice may be essential to guarantee 
the success of their reform programmes and to create a healthy investment climate. However, the 
corporate governance codes for best practice were initiated in developed countries and only 
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recently introduced in developing ones. Hence, its contribution towards enhancing capital market 
performance in such countries is subject to the extent to which the conditions for robust governance 
practice are consistent with the existing values, past experiences and the needs of all parties 
involved in the financial reporting process. It is expected, therefore, to be some time before the 
impact of applying corporate governance can be measured in developing contexts as this needs to 
develop, and favourable attitudes and belief must be formed as well as efforts being made to 
develop the human resource capabilities to apply corporate governance requirements for best 
practice. 
 
A number of studies have been conducted in the last decade for the purpose of investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate disclosure practices in different countries 
(e.g., Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Gul & Leung, 2004; 
Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Felo, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b;  Samaha, 
2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011; Abed et al., 2011; Alanezi & Albuloushi, 2011). 
Furthermore, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge this study is the first comparative study to 
examine the influence of corporate governance structures (namely, board independence, board 
leadership, board size and ownership structure) on the overall compliance with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements for 2007 in two MENA region emerging capital markets. As disclosure lies 
at the core of all corporate governance statutes and codes, investigating the association between 
corporate governance structures and the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is 
expected to enrich financial disclosure as well as corporate governance literature. 
 
This chapter aims to provide the core background required to investigate the association between 
corporate governance structures and levels of compliance with IFRSs in Egypt and Jordan. It 
begins by presenting the concept of corporate governance in section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the 
importance of corporate governance and highlights the role of the OECD in raising awareness of 
the importance of corporate governance. Section 3.4 indicates the relevance of the OECD corporate 
governance principles to the MENA region capital markets, and then corporate governance 
variables that are employed as test variables in this study, are discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary in section 3.7. 
 
3.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
Whilst there is no generally agreed definition of corporate governance, it is nevertheless clear that a 
broad spectrum of definitions exist in the literature, ranging from narrow, agency theory-based 
definitions to broader, stakeholder-based definitions. Within the same context Mavrommati 
(2008:22) argues that “[d]ifferent authors vary widely in where they draw the boundaries of the 
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subject. In its narrowest sense, the term may describe the formal system of accountability of senior 
management to the shareholders. At its most expansive, the term is stretched to include the entire 
network of formal and informal relations involving the corporate sector and their consequences for 
society in general”. Historically, the term governance is derived from the Latin word 'gubernare' 
which means to rule or to steer (Tricker, 1984:9; Maassen, 2002:13; Mavrommati, 2008:24). An 
example of the first strand of corporate governance definitions is that provided by Koh (1994:23) 
who claims it to be: “the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs 
of the corporation with the objective of enhancing long-term value for shareholders and financial 
viability of the business”. 
 
Examples of the second strand of corporate governance definitions are those provided by Dahya et 
al. (1996), and Maier (2005 cited in Khan, 2010:88). Dahya et al. (1996:71) define it as “the 
manner in which companies are controlled and in which those responsible for the direction of 
companies are accountable to the stakeholders of these companies”. In a similar vein, Maier 
(2005:5 quoted in Khan, 2010:88) argues that 
 
“[c]orporate governance defines a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and its stakeholders. It is the process by 
which directors and auditors manage their responsibilities towards shareholders 
and wider company stakeholders. For shareholders it can provide increased 
confidence of an equitable return on their investment. For company stakeholders 
it can provide an assurance that the company manages its impact on society and 
the environment in a responsible manner”. 
 
There is a significant difference between these two schools of thought; the former seems to support 
the agency theory as it is based on the idea that companies are mainly accountable for protecting 
the interests of shareholders. The latter seems to be in favour of the stakeholder theory which 
requires companies to be accountable to a wider range of interested parties. 
 
Finally, the most comprehensive definition of corporate governance is provided by the WB (1999 
as cited in Maassen, 2002:13) which claims that 
 
“[c]orporate governance refers to that blend of law, regulation and appropriate 
voluntary private sector practices which enable the corporation to attract 
financial and human capital, perform efficiently, and thereby perpetuate itself by 
generating long-term economic value for its shareholders, while respecting the 
interests of stakeholders and society as a whole. The principal characteristics of 
effective corporate governance are: transparency (disclosure of relevant 
financial and operational information and internal processes of management 
oversight and control); protection and enforceability of the rights and 
prerogatives of all shareholders; and, directors capable of independently 
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approving the corporation’s strategy and major business plans and decisions, 
and of independently hiring management, monitoring management's performance 
and integrity, and replacing management when necessary”. 
 
The review of previous corporate governance studies and definitions reveals that accountability is 
an important concept that is highly correlated with corporate governance. Keasey and Wright 
(1993:291) refer to accountability as involving “the monitoring, evaluation and control of 
organisational agents to ensure that they behave in the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders”. Furthermore, understanding the concept of corporate governance requires complete 
recognition of the differences between the role of management and that of governance as both may 
seem at first glance to be homogeneous (Cochran & Wartick, 1988, cited in Haniffa, 1999:90; 
Mavrommati, 2008). Management is the process of planning, organising, influencing and 
controlling the operations of the business. Meanwhile as proposed by Tricker (1984), governance 
tackles four principal activities: formulating strategic direction for the future of the enterprise in the 
long run, managing the business and ensuring that appropriate operational planning, controlling, 
organising and leadership are fulfilled at the heart of the executive management function, 
monitoring and overseeing management performance and disclosure of information, and finally, 
responding to those making a legitimate demand for accountability. Based on these aforementioned 
activities the basic functions of the BOD are defined as strategic, governance and institutional 
functions (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Treichler, 1995; Mavrommati, 2008). 
 
With respect to corporate governance models, there are two main defined models; one- tier board 
model and two- tier board model (Haniffa, 1999; Maassen, 2002; Mavrommati, 2008). Maassen 
(2002) argues that these models are the outcome of the diversity of the role of corporate board in 
the governance of the corporation, the leadership structure, the organisation structure and the 
composition of boards. Also, Haniffa (1999) proposes that the model of corporate governance 
depends on the country’s cultural and corporate environments. The US and the UK models are 
considered as examples of pure one-tier board model while the German model is an example of 
pure two-tier board model (Haniffa, 1999; Maassen, 2002; Mavrommati, 2008). Under the one-tier 
board model the power to govern is derived from ownership and the board oversees the running of 
the firm and reports regularly to members on the stewardship of their investment; and independent 
auditors report on the fairness of presentation of the company financial statements (Macdonald & 
Beattie, 1993; Haniffa, 1999). However, under the two- tier board model there are two boards; 
supervisory and management and there is a clear distinction between governance and management. 
Under the two- tier board model the supervisory board does not take an active part in management 
(Haniffa, 1999). 
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3.3 Importance of Corporate Governance - the OECD Principles 
Since the declaration of the G7 Summit Meeting in 1998 regarding the new focus on ‘Corporate 
Behavior and Incentives’ and the adoption of a set of principles of corporate governance by the 
OECD in mid-1999, many countries have developed codes of best practice or have initiated legal, 
regulatory, and institutional corporate governance reform projects and programmes (CIPE, 2003; 
Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Al-Omari, 2010; Samaha, 2010; Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011). The rising 
concern with corporate governance is seen as a response to criticisms of the financial reporting 
function’s inability to meet user needs, the widespread of creative accounting and accounting 
scandals, the limited independence and role of auditors, disagreement between executive 
compensation and company performance, and the geographic dispersion of shareholders 
(Macdonald & Beattie, 1993; Haniffa, 1999). 
 
The significance of corporate governance is highlighted by a number of factors: the liberalisation 
and deregulation of capital markets worldwide, the widespread cross-border transactions, and the 
increased financial sophistication of capital markets (Mavrommati, 2008; Al-akra et al., 2010a; 
Samaha, 2010). In broad terms, good corporate governance practice is beneficial for different 
parties. For shareholders it is important to protect their rights and limit management’s opportunistic 
behaviour. For business firms, the application of strong corporate governance rules will improve 
their reputation and enhance their competitive position. For capital markets, sound corporate 
governance practices and strong rule enforcement will enhance the trust of national and foreign 
investors, thereby facilitating access to more capital that is necessary to achieve economic 
development (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Haniffa, 1999; Oman, 2001; CIPE, 2003; Dey, 2008; 
Mavrommati, 2008). Moreover, good corporate governance has the potential to lower corporate 
resources’ expropriation by managers, which in turn enables better asset allocation and better 
performance. Also, the desire for improved transparency raised by good corporate governance and 
IFRSs disclosure requirements is expected to reduce the problem of information asymmetry (Mallin, 
2009). 
 
Discussion about the importance of good corporate governance practices will not be complete 
without shedding light on the role of the OECD in reviewing and examining corporate governance 
issues as well as in developing an understanding and raising awareness of the importance of 
corporate governance for public companies and the economy as a whole. The most important 
contribution of the OECD is the release of six competent corporate governance principles which are 
followed or considered as a benchmark by the majority of countries worldwide, including the 
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MENA countries studied in this research7. Both Egypt and Jordan corporate governance codes and 
regulatory frameworks are based on the OECD corporate governance principles and developed 
under its sponsorship (Al-Akra, 2010a; Al-Omari, 2010; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011).  
Those principles satisfy the quality criterion that for corporations to reap the full benefits of the 
global capital market where a larger pool of investors is available, corporate governance 
arrangements must be credible, well understood across borders, and in conformity with 
internationally accepted principles. The OECD principles can be summarised as follows (OECD, 
2004): 
 
3.3.1 Ensuring the Basis for Effective Corporate Governance 
“The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law, and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among 
different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities” (OECD, 2004: 17). 
 
3.3.2 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
“The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights” (OECD, 2004: 18). These involve basic rights relating to secure methods of ownership, 
registration, share transfer, voting in general shareholder meetings, electing and removing members 
of the board and sharing in the profits of the corporation. Additionally, shareholders have the right 
to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions concerning important corporate 
changes (OECD, 2004). 
 
3.3.3 The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights” (OECD, 2004: 20). All shareholders of the 
same series of a class should be treated equally; insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be 
prohibited, and members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose to the 
board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in any 
transaction or matter directly affecting the corporation (OECD, 2004). 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 It is interesting to know that Sir Adrian Cadbury the Chairman of the Cadbury Committee (Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance) which developed the Cadbury code for corporate governance in 1992 had 
an appreciated contribution in the development of the OECD principles (OECD, 2004: 5).  
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3.3.4 The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
“The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by 
law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises” 
(OECD, 2004: 21). 
 
3.3.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
“The corporate governance framework to ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company” (OECD, 2004: 21). In the researcher’s opinion, this is 
the core OECD principle. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high 
quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure. Furthermore, an annual 
audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified auditor in order to provide 
an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements 
fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects. 
Finally, channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost efficient 
access to relevant information by users and the corporate governance framework should be 
complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or 
advice by analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, 
free from material conflicts of interest that might negatively impact the integrity of their analysis or 
advice (OECD, 2004).  
 
3.3.6 The Responsibilities of the Board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the 
effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company 
and the shareholders (OECD: 2004: 24). Consequently, it is recommended that a sufficient number 
of board members should be independent of mangament. Furthermore, the separation between the 
CEO and Chair positions is recommended (OECD, 2004: 63). 
 
The review of the OECD corporate governance principles reveals that they depict the framework 
for good corporate governance practices that mainly aim to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. This is highly desired in Egypt and Jordan in order to reap the benefits of the 
privatization programme that resulted in ownership dispersion (Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Samaha, 
2010). Furthermore, these principles emphasise the importance of disclosure and transparency and 
the important role of the board of directors in effectively monitoring management behaviour and 
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overseeing the disclosure practices (Al-Akra et al., 2010a; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 
2011). 
 
3.4 Implementation of the OECD Corporate Governance Principles in the 
MENA Region 
This section considers the levels of recognition of the OECD corporate governance principles in the 
MENA region in general and in the scrutinised stock exchanges in particular. As is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Four, Egypt developed its code of corporate governance in 2005 as a further 
step towards globalising its capital market and attracting foreign direct investments. In 2007 Jordan 
developed a code of corporate governance for its banks, followed by a code of corporate 
governance for listed shareholding companies in 2008, on a comply or explain basis. However, the 
requirements for corporate governance best practices under these codes are initially supported by 
the regulatory framework in Egypt and Jordan (company laws and security exchange laws), that 
were issued before the codes as part of the regulatory reforms that took place since the mid 1990s. 
 
3.4.1 Ensuring the Basis for Effective Corporate Governance 
 
“The foundation of any corporate governance framework is provided by the basic 
legal framework, as reflected in the basic company, civil, and securities laws, the 
regulations of the stock exchange (especially the listing rules), and the basic 
accounting standards in place. These laws are the basic rules for board and 
management behavior and in the long term tend to reflect the values of the 
underlying business culture” (CIPE, 2003:22). 
 
This argument highlights the importance of developing a supportive infrastructure for the corporate 
governance framework. The assessment of such infrastructure in the MENA region generally and in 
the scrutinised stock exchanges in particular, reveals that company laws and capital market laws 
(securities laws) are the main sources of corporate governance legal frameworks and practices. 
Most of the rules and regulations that govern the MENA capital markets including Egypt and 
Jordan are either recently issued or updated in conjunction with international practices, as are the 
codes of corporate governance that broadly comply with the OECD principles (CIPE, 2003; Al-
Shammari et al., 2008; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2009; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011)8. 
Nevertheless, de jure compliance with the international regulatory framework in the MENA region 
is only one face of the coin, and the other more important face in the researcher’s opinion, is 
compliance in practice. 
 
                                                          
8 For details of the regulatory framework for listed companies in different MENA exchanges, see the MENA stock 
exchanges Websites. 
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The majority of the MENA listed companies including those listed on the Egyptian Exchange 
(EGX) and Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) have a unitary board structure (one-tier board)9 (CIPE, 
2003).  In most cases, the controlling shareholders are able to choose all board members and the 
assigned persons are either inexperienced in the field of activity of the firm or in financial matters, 
or are closely connected with executive board members or the Chairman, and may feel obligated to 
act in the interest of the controlling shareholders (CIPE, 2003; ROSC, 2009). Furthermore, rules 
and regulations are not supported by a code of ethics that would help in instituting moral 
commitment within management. This may be attributed to the lack of efficiency in the MENA 
capital markets, insufficient development of the judiciary bodies to support strict enforcement of 
capital market laws and regulations, and an issuer’s culture, as issuers are not yet accustomed to 
transparency and corporate governance sound principles (CIPE, 2003; Asfour, 2004; Sharar, 2007; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008). This argument implicitly highlights the importance of appreciating that 
corporate governance good practice is not only influenced by formal laws, accounting standards, 
and regulations, but also by their actual enforcement and most importantly, by societal values. 
Consequently, cultural values operate as a significant antecedent that cannot be ignored when 
evaluating corporate governance practices. 
 
3.4.2 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
As reported by CIPE (2003) and IFC and Hawkamah (2008), shareholders’ rights are identified 
under capital market laws and by-laws and company laws in the majority of the MENA capital 
markets. The regulations indicate shareholders’ rights in securing ownership registration, 
participating and voting in general shareholders’ meetings, as well as involvement in decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes (e.g., articles 144, 170, 172, 175 of the Jordanian 
Companies Law 22 of 1997; articles 59, 66, 72, 157 of the Egyptian Companies Law 159 of 1981). 
In general terms, shareholders’ rights identified by the majority of MENA region countries comply 
with the OECD principles (CIPE, 2003; ROSC, 2005; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008; ROSC, 2009). 
However, still directors and managers can influence the extent of compliance with legal 
requirements in practice (IFC & Hawkamah, 2008). For instance, in Egypt boards do not generally 
safeguard a formal and transparent director nomination and election process and in practice the 
general nomination and election processes are controlled by the major owner and far from formal 
and transparent (ROSC, 2009). Consequently, many boards in Egypt are constituted with family 
members, government officials, and related parties and are often selected for their loyalty to the 
major owner regardless of their qualification (ROSC, 2009). CIPE (2003) attributed such situation 
                                                          
9 Is also known as the 'arm's length' system because shareholders maintain their distance and give executives a free 
hand to manage (Mavrommati, 2008:100).  
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to the lack of culture, poor awareness among small investors, and the speculative nature of stock 
trading. 
 
3.4.3 The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Regulations in the majority of MENA countries, require shareholders to be treated equally as they 
have the same voting rights (CIPE, 2003). Furthermore, in the majority of MENA countries, 
shareholders have the right before others to buy additional shares of the new issue to preserve 
equity (IFC & Hawkamah, 2008). However, in practice, many directors such as the case of Egypt 
feel accountable only to the major owner and minority shareholders may find it difficult to get their 
rights mainly, due to inefficient court system (ROSC, 2009). The situation is not different in Jordan. 
Although articles of the Companies Law 22 of 1997(articles 157 and 159) state that the Chairman 
and the board of directors are responsible before shareholders for any violation of law or any 
negligence in the management of the company, due to the lack of experience in commercial matters 
by the Jordanian court system it is difficult for minority shareholders to hold directors accountable 
for their violations (Sharar, 2007). 
 
With respect to insider trading and self-dealing transactions, laws in many MENA capital markets 
including Egypt and Jordan prohibit this kind of transactions, and unlawful action is penalised by 
imprisonment and fines (CIPE, 2003).Thus, board members, company officers or other persons 
having access to information not available to the public and affecting the price of the company’s 
securities are not allowed to trade (e.g., articles 158 and 166 of the Jordanian companies Law 22 of 
1997 and article 108 of the Jordanian Securities Law of 2002; article 64 of the Egyptian Capital 
Market Law 95 of 1992). However, from the researcher viewpoint, the weak monitoring, lack of 
strict enforcement of laws, slow court system, and the low consideration for moral hazards, may 
stand as barriers to compliance with this requirement.  
 
For related party transactions, CIPE (2003) reports that disclosure requirements relating to related 
party transactions are well articulated in the MENA context (e.g., article 148 of the Jordanian 
companies Law 22 of 1997; article 4 of the EGX Listing Rules of 2002).  
 
3.4.4 The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
Stakeholders include investors, creditors, employees and suppliers (Sharar, 2007). “The role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance in the MENA is not as developed as in many other countries. 
It is a question of culture and requires education, increased awareness and in most of the cases, a 
wider and much more comprehensive coverage in laws, rules and regulations” (CIPE, 2003:31). 
This argument is emphasised by Sharar (2007: 107) who states that stakeholders are not defined in 
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the Jordanian legislation. However, as a source of capital, banks in the region used to be 
stakeholders in most of the listed companies. Whether as creditors or shareholders, banks are 
entitled to demand the observation of standards by the companies they finance, which should 
improve financial disclosure practices by listed companies, hence improve governance practices 
(CIPE, 2003). 
 
3.4.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
As reported by CIPE (2003) and IFC and Hawkamah (2008), companies listed on all MENA stock 
exchanges including the EGX and ASE are legally required to disclose their financial, non-financial 
and operational performance on a continuous and regular basis (e.g., articles 12 to 27 of the EGX 
Listing Rules of 2002 and articles 64 and 65 of the Egyptian Companies Law 159 of 1981; articles 
140 and 141 of the Jordanian Companies Law 22 of 1997 and article 43-a-1 of the Jordanian 
Securities Law). The majority of MENA countries mandate the adoption of IFRSs10, and MENA 
capital markets regulations require financial statements to be audited based on the ISAs (CIPE, 
2003; ROSC, 2005; ROSC, 2009). Consequently, it can be argued that disclosure requirements in 
the MENA context are in conformity with the OECD principles. Compliance with these 
requirements is monitored and enforced by the capital market regulatory bodies (e.g., the CMA in 
Egypt and the JSC in Jordan). Non-compliance is subject to controversial sanctions such as 
delisting from the stock exchange (e.g., articles 34 and 35 of the EGX Listing Rules of 2002; 
section 17 of the Jordanian Securities Law). 
 
3.4.6 The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
As indicated in previous sections, the majority of the MENA listed companies including those 
listed on the EGX and ASE have a unitary board structure. In order for boards to effectively carry 
out their responsibilities they must be able to exercise objective and independent judgment. In 
addition, they are supposed to oversee company convergence with laws and regulations (OECD, 
2004). However, the review of corporate governance practices within the MENA region including 
Egypt and Jordan promulgates that the role of the board of directos in providing strategic guidance 
and overseeing management behaviour is not sufficiently recognised in practice (ROSC, 2005; IFC 
& Hawkamah, 2008; ROSC, 2009). 
 
The CIPE (2003) report, and the IFC and Hawkamah (2008) MENA region corporate governance 
survey, emphasise the weakness of disclosure of corporate governance-related information among 
                                                          
10 Concerning the adoption of IFRSs in the MENA region; Kuwait was the first to mandate IASs/IFRSs (1990) 
followed by Egypt (1997), Jordan (1998), Bahrain (2001), the UAE (2003), and finally Oman in 2007. 
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companies listed on the MENA region stock exchanges. Furthermore, the review of the extent of 
implementation of the OECD corporate governance principles in the MENA region capital markets 
reveals these to be recognised to varying degrees, as indicated by the findings of the IFC and 
Hawkamah (2008) survey, which are summarised in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Implementing Corporate Governance Principles in the MENA Region 
Source: IFC and Hawkamah (2008:17) 
 
As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, MENA region banks follow better governance practices than listed 
companies, attributable to the fact that banks are typically highly regulated, with specific central 
bank circulars and regulations. However, the IFC and Hawkamah (2008) corporate governance 
survey results for both MENA banks and listed companies follow a similar trend, with all 
respondents scoring relatively high (50% and above) on disclosure and transparency, as well as the 
control environment, both of which are typically codified in laws and regulations, while 
respondents failed to break the 50% threshold for the other indicators, namely board practices 
(47%), shareholder rights (42%), and commitment to good corporate governance (40%) (IFC & 
Hawkamah, 2008). This result implies that corporate governance is not yet completely accepted as 
part of the national values in the MENA region. This conclusion is supported by the findings of 
Boytsun et al. (2011) which show that social norms have a direct significant impact on corporate 
governance. 
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3.5 Board Characteristics 
“A professional, independent and vigilant board is essential for good corporate governance. 
Ultimately, the board cannot substitute for talented professional managers. Nor can it change the 
economic environment in which a company operates. It can, however, influence the company’s 
performance and sustainability through its guidance to, and oversight of management” (IFC & 
Hawkamah, 2008:25). This point of view is supported by Samaha and Dahawy (2011: 69) who 
argue that the board of directors is the “central internal control mechanism” in monitoring 
management behaviour. Board characteristics in this study cover board independence, board 
leadership and board size. This section discusses these three variables that will be employed as test 
variables in this study. 
 
3.5.1 Board Independence 
Board independence is an outcome of the number of independent directors in the BOD. “An 
independent director is a director who has no material relationship with the company beyond his 
or her directorship. An independent director should be independent in character and judgment, and 
there should be no relationships or circumstances which could affect, or might appear to affect, the 
director’s independent judgment” (IFC & Hawkamah, 2008: 29). Typically, a board with more 
independent directors is expected to be more effective in monitoring management and lead to 
improved financial disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Dey, 2008). It is expected that insiders 
cannot effectively monitor themselves on behalf of shareholders (Muslu, 2005). Moreover, insiders 
may impair the otherwise helpful contributions of independent directors (Jensen, 1993; Muslu, 
2005). With respect to corporate financial disclosure, board independence is considered as a 
mechanism that can influence disclosure practices, since a majority of independent directors will 
maximise the board’s ability to force management to meet all the disclosure requirements (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). 
 
As indicated in section 3.3, the importance of board independence is highlighted by the OECD 
principles which recommend the existence of a sufficient number of independent directors on 
boards (OECD, 2004: 63). In addition, Cadbury Committee Report (1992) demonstrates the 
important role of independent non-executive directors on boards (Haniffa, 1999; Ghosh, 2006; 
Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008). 
 
Alternative board structures do exist. The first is the ‘all executive board’ which reflects the case of 
owner-managed entrepreneurial firms where there is no separation between owners and 
management, and hence, shareholder interests are represented on the board.The remaining 
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structures represent the case where there is separation of ownership and control.The majority 
executive board is common in large companies in most countries, but this model is criticised 
because the dominance of executive directors may not enable independent directors to exercise 
genuine independence. The majority independent structure has the advantage of emphasising 
checks and balances, in addition to improving and monitoring management performance (Tricker, 
1994; Haniffa, 1999). 
 
Proponents of board independence use agency theory and resource dependency theory to explain its 
importance (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). According to agency theory, independent directors are 
needed to monitor and control management actions, to limit opportunistic behaviour, and to reduce 
management’s chance of withholding information, thus helping to reduce agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Kelton & Yang, 2008). They provide supervision 
of information flows from the firm to outside stakeholders (Biondi et al., 2009), and are also 
perceived as a check and balance mechanism for enhancing board effectiveness (Mangel & Singh, 
1993; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Additionally, independent boards are better in representing 
shareholders’ interests in major company decisions such as investments, CEO replacements, and 
takeovers (Weisbach, 1988; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Cotter et al., 1997; Del Guercio et al., 2003; 
Muslu, 2005). Independent directors may be considered as decision experts (Fama & Jensen, 1983) 
and can positively influence directors’ decisions (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Anderson et al. (2006) 
find that board independence is a better predictor of disclosure informativeness compared to audit 
committee independence. According to the resource dependency theory, independent directors are 
also seen as mechanisms linking the company to the external environment (Tricker, 1984; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002).  
 
However, those who oppose the idea of more independent directors on firm boards also depend on 
agency theory and resource dependency theory to explain their position, arguing that more 
outsiders on boards may result in excessive monitoring (Baysinger & Butler, 1985), or a lack of 
genuine independence (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Tricker, 1994). Also, based on stewardship 
theory insider-dominated boards are preferred for their depth of knowledge, access to current 
operating information, technical expertise, and commitment to the firm (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Bhagat and Black (2000) suggest that a reasonable number of insiders may add value through 
enhanced strategic decisions and by allowing for better monitoring of future CEO candidates. 
Additionally, Jensen (1993) argues that most outside directors lack the financial incentives to 
actively monitor management. Insiders can also enhance operational efficiency (Johnson et al., 
1996; Brickley et al., 1997; Muslu, 2005). 
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In the MENA region, the existence of independent directors on the board is recognised in 
companies listed on scrutinised MENA stock exchanges (IFC & Hawkamah, 2008:27). However, 
the issue is that in most cases independent board members lack material independence or they may 
lack experience (CIPE, 2003; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008; ROSC, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). As 
noted by the CIPE (2003:37): “the assigned persons are either inexperienced in the field of activity 
of the company or in financial matters, or are in close relation with executive board members or 
the Chairman, and may feel obligated to act in the interest of the controlling shareholders”. This 
aspect raises the need to consider the impact of cultural context and the influence of institutional 
isomorphism mechanisms when examining the possible impact of board independence on the levels 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in emerging capital markets. Independent 
directors who do meet the experience criterion may be perceived as a threat, since they may leave 
the board at any time and take away company secrets. So, according to Gray’s (1988) accounting 
sub-cultural model, the preference for secrecy in developing societies may result in strategic 
information being hidden from independent directors. 
 
On the other hand, based on the notions of institutional isomorphism, agency theory and cost-
benefit analysis, it can be proposed that in the scrutinised countries, independent directors are 
recognised in boards in order for the companies to gain legitimacy and respect. However, in reality 
they are only independent in name. This arrangement enables decoupling to continue in such 
countries, such that whilst independent directors are appointed, in reality they are management 
puppets. On the other hand, absence of monitoring by independent directors will not improve the 
board performance with respect to overseeing management compliance with IFRSs. In addition, 
weak enfocement of IFRSs causes non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. 
 
Previous research findings concerning the association between board independence and disclosure 
levels are mixed, making it difficult to predict the relationship between board independence and 
levels of compliance with IFRSs in the MENA capital markets. Some researchers report a positive 
relationship (Adams & Hossain, 1998; Adams et al., 1998; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Xiao et al., 2004; 
Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Anderson et al., 2006; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Abdelsalam & Street, 
2007; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Felo, 2009; Samaha & Dahawy, 
2010; 2011), whilst others find a negative one (Eng & Mak, 2003; Gul & Leung, 2004; Muslu, 
2005), and yet other researchers found no relationship whatsoever (Haniffa, 1999; Ho & Wong, 
2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Al-Akra et al, 2010a,b). 
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3.5.2 Board Leadership 
Board leadership is a governance issue relating to whether the chief executive officer (CEO) is also 
the Chair of the board of directors. The CEO is a full-time position that is responsible for the daily 
management of the company as well as setting and implementing company strategies. However, the 
position of the Chair is usually part-time and the main responsibility is to ensure the effectiveness 
of the board (Weir & Laing, 2001; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). The OECD principles support the 
separation between the CEO and the Chair positions as a mechanism that can further strengthen 
board independence, specifically in one tier boards, by improving the balance of power, board 
objectivity and accountability (OECD, 2004: 63). This requirement agrees with that of the Cadbury 
Committee Report (1992) which recommends a separation of the two roles in large companies 
(Abdelsalam & Street, 2006). Forker (1992) addresses the negative impact of a dominant 
personality on financial disclosure practices in business firms. Separating the two positions can 
potentially improve the board’s monitoring function and reduce the advantages gained by 
withholding information, thereby improving the quality of reporting (Forker, 1992; Jensen, 1993; 
Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Mavrommati, 2008). 
 
Agency theory argues that the separation of the CEO and Chair positions improves the efficiency of 
management personnel (Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). As the CEO may have the right to 
control board meetings, select board members, and agenda items (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Kelton & Yang, 2008), separating 
roles provides checks and balances over management’s performance (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Furthermore, as the Chairman’s role is to run board meetings and to oversee the hiring, firing, 
evaluation and compensation of the CEO, combining both roles reduces the availability of 
independent evaluation of the CEO’s performance as the CEOs themselves will select which 
information to provide to other directors (Jensen, 1993). Additionally, agency theory argues that 
role duality creates a strong individual power base that could impair board independence, thus 
compromising the effectiveness of its governing function (Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008). 
Moreover, Dahya and Travlos (2000) argue that outside Chairmen can provide an external 
perspective to the company that may be important to the development of organisational goals and 
objectives, and strengthen the link between the company and its environment. It may also worth 
noting that role duality may negatively affect the quality of performance, as it may be difficult for 
one person to find the time and have the effort needed to carry out the responsibilities of both 
positions effectively and efficiently. 
 
Some researchers, however, argue that the separation of the two positions is not essential for good 
performance (Dahya et al., 1996; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Gul & 
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Leung, 2004). Eisenhardt (1989) and Stewart (1991) actually argue that role duality improves 
decision-making by permitting a sharper focus on company objectives and promoting swifter 
implementation of operational decisions. Furthermore, Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggest that role 
duality leads to clear unfettered leadership of boards and companies. In this regard Haniffa 
(1999:322) states that “those who favour role duality argue on the basis of stewardship theory in 
contrast to agency theory which views executive managers as opportunistic shirkers. Stewardship 
theory adopts a more positive perspective, viewing directors as guardians of corporate assets and 
wishing to do their best for the company. As such, there is no problem if the two roles are 
combined”. 
 
With respect to the MENA region, role duality in listed companies is recognised as the majority of 
them are family-owned which predisposes an aversion to allowing outsiders to manage the 
enterprise and its profit (CIPE, 2003; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008). In the scrutinised stock exchanges, 
role duality is more prevalent in Egypt (see section 6.3)11. 
 
Institutional isomorphism suggests that board leadership has no influence on independence, as long 
as there is no awareness regarding the importance of separating the positions of the CEO and the 
Chair and how each can exercise his/her role to improve the quality of financial reporting within 
the business firm. Consequently, no significant impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs, is 
expected either way, and decoupling is thus expected to continue due to the existence of cultural 
barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of the two positions as recommended 
under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. However, since no impact is felt by the 
separation of the two roles, companies may fall in line with the separation recommendations purely 
to gain respect. Also, whilst there is no concern regarding the desirability of separating the two 
positions to provide effective monitoring of management’s performance, Gray’s (1988) accounting 
sub-cultural model, the notions of agency theory and cost benefit-analysis would argue that given 
the secretive culture accompanied with weak monitoring and lack of strict enforcement of 
compliance, non-compliance costs will continue to be less than compliance costs. Consequently, 
the separation between the CEO and Chair positions may not result in better compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements.   
 
Findings from previous research into the association between board leadership and levels of 
financial disclosure are mixed. Some studies show that role duality is significantly associated with 
a lower level of financial disclosure (Forker, 1992; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Gul & 
                                                          
11 According to article 3.6 of the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance issued in 2005, role duality is not preferred 
but not prohibited. However, under the Jordanian Code of Corporate Governance issued in 2008, article 5 in Chapter 
Two, states that role duality is not allowed. 
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Leung, 2004; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Abdelsalam & Elamasry, 2008). In contrast, some 
research demonstrates that there is no association between role duality and financial disclosure 
(Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Ezat & El-Masry, 
2008), and two studies (Felo, 2009; Abed et al., 2011) reports a positive relationship between role 
duality and financial disclosure practices. The contradictory nature of these results makes it 
difficult to predict the type of the relationship between board leadership and levels of compliance 
with IFRSs in the scrutinised MENA capital markets. 
 
3.5.3 Board Size 
Board size is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that help in aligning management and 
shareholder interests (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). Good governance 
practices recommend limitations to the size of the BOD (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005:306), but there is 
no general consensus on the optimum. Cochran and Wartick (1988 cited in Haniffa, 1999:106) 
argue that this should be between 5 to13 members. A larger board is perceived as detrimental as it 
may allow members to avoid personal responsibility (Cochran & Wartick, 1988 cited in Haniffa, 
1999:106). 
 
Concerning the role of board size in aligning management and shareholder interests, previous 
research reveals two competing views: proponents of large boards argue that such boards bring 
more knowledge and contributions which can improve the effectiveness of monitoring and strategic 
decision-making, alleviate the dominance of the CEO, and increase the pool of expertise due to 
diversity of board members (Tricker, 1994; Klein, 2002; Singh et al., 2004; Ezat & El-Masry, 
2008). Consequently, and considering agency theory, it is suggested that large boards are expected 
to improve management’s level of compliance with IFRSs in order to reduce monitoring costs. 
 
Conversely, opponents of large boards argue that such boards are less effective than small boards 
because their size may result in poor communication and poorer processing of information, as well 
as precipitating co-ordination difficulties (Jensen, 1993; Huther, 1997; John & Senbet, 1998). 
Jensen (1993) emphasises this viewpoint, claiming that large boards may be slower to make urgent 
decisions than smaller boards. Additionally, he observes that as more directors are added, boards 
lose their ability to be direct and critical in their operation which may result in dominance by the 
CEO. Moreover, good governance practice calls for limitations on the size of the BOD (Arcay & 
Vazquez, 2005). Hence, and also considering agency theory, it is concluded that smaller board size 
is expected to strengthen the monitoring role of the BOD, thereby leading to greater compliance 
with IFRSs. However, given the dominance of concentrated ownership pattern in scrutinised stock 
exchanges and the lack of separation between ownership and control in most cases (CIPE, 2003, 
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UNCTAD, 2007; ROSC, 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a), board size is expected to have no influence 
on improving the monitoring function of the board specifically with the lack of material 
independence and experience of non-executive board memebers. On the other hand, the lack of 
awareness regarding the role of board memebers in overseeing management behaviour and 
ensuring compliance with IFRSs suggests that the problem of decoupling will continue. 
Furthermore, given the secretive nature of scrutinised societies and the lack of separation between 
ownership and control, boards will not enforce management to disclose any information that may 
affect the company competitive position as long as non compliance costs are less than compliance 
costs which is the norm in scrutinised stock exchanges due to the absence of strict enforcement of 
IFRSs.  
 
Findings from previous research into the association between board size and levels of financial 
disclosure are mixed. Some researchers report a positive relationship (Barako et al., 2006; Ezat & 
El-Masry, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). However, others find no association (Lakhal, 2003; Arcay 
& Vazquez, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Abed et al., 2011). 
 
3.6 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is defined by Denis and McConnell (2003:3) as “[t]he identities of a firm’s 
equity holders and the sizes of their positions”. The importance of a firm’s ownership structure 
stems from the fact that distribution of firm stock among shareholders has a significant influence on 
corporate actions that are dependent on shareholder voting (Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008). 
 
Broadly, ownership structure within a firm is either concentrated or dispersed. Ownership 
concentration arises when a particular group has the most influence among the equity owners, 
while ownership dispersion occurs when there is a separation of ownership between managers and 
equity owners as a group (Haniffa, 1999). 
 
A firm’s ownership structure may be a possible determinant of firm disclosure practices 
(Raffournier, 1995; Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). In this regard, Samaha & Dahawy 
(2011) argue that ownership structure influences the level of monitoring and hence disclosure 
levels. High levels of concentration of capital may be accompanied by the owner’s considerable 
involvement in the firm’s management, which may lead to unrestricted access to information, thus 
limiting the demand for and supply of company information (Craswell & Taylor, 1992; McKinnon 
& Dalimunthe, 1993; Raffournier, 1995; Gelb, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Marston & Polei, 
2004; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Al-Najjar & Taylor, 2008; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008). 
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Agency theory holds that separation of ownership and control brings the potential for agency costs 
because of the potential conflict of interests between contracting parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Chen & Gray, 2002; Mallin, 2009). On the other hand, when share ownership is widely held, the 
potential for conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent is greater than in closely-held 
companies. Consequently, disclosure is likely to be greater in widely-held companies to enable the 
principal to effectively monitor whether his/her economic interests are optimised and whether the 
agent acts in the best interests of the principal as an owner of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Haniffa, 1999; Chen & Gray, 2002). Additionally, from the 
agency theory perspective corporate governance mechanisms are considered as a basic monitoring 
tool to solve the principal-agent potential conflict. Furthermore, the call for improved transparency 
and disclosure highlighted by codes of corporate governance and IFRSs is supposed to reduce the 
problem of information asymmetry (Mallin, 2009). 
 
In the MENA stock exchanges, the shares of most companies are family-owned or government-
owned (CIPE, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Naser et al., 2006; ROSC, 2009; Tricker, 2009). The 
dominance of family ownership is expected to negatively influence the level of financial disclosure 
for two reasons; firstly, the owners have direct access to company information (Naser et al., 2006), 
and secondly, the secretive nature of these societies makes family shareholders encourage 
management to keep disclosure to minimum levels as long as compliance costs exceed non-
compliance costs, regardless of the impact on the interests of minority shareholders (ROSC, 2009).  
Concerning the impact of dominant government ownership there are two distinct points of view. 
The first argues that disclosure levels will be low as government can directly request any 
information from company management (Al-Razeen, 1999; Naser et al., 2006), while the second 
perceives dominant government ownership as advantageous since agency theory holds that it will 
improve disclosure practices by encouraging management to use competent disclosure policies 
(Suwaidan, 1997). Thus, to reduce monitoring costs, management will comply with IFRSs.  
 
As demonstrated by IFC and Hawkamah (2008:61): “[s]hareholder rights are generally provided 
by law and directors and managers do not have the right to abridge them. However, following laws 
and regulations by “the letter or book” rather than “in spirit” are two different matters, and 
directors and managers can influence whether and how legal requirements are complied with in 
practice”. This confirms the researcher’s belief in the necessity of considering the cultural context 
and the institutional isomorphism mechanisms when investigating the relationship between 
ownership structure and levels of compliance with IFRSs in the MENA region. Based on Gray 
(1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis and the notions of institutional 
isomorphism, it can be suggested that, the secretive culture and the lack of awareness among 
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management of listed companies in the scrutinised stock exchanges of the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs, in addition to weak enforcement and low demand for improved disclosures 
by naïve investors, cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs, and hence 
management chooses non-compliance. This contributes to the decoupling problem whereas, to gain 
legitimacy, companies state that their financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs 
when this is not the case. 
 
Previous research findings in this field are mixed. Some show a significant association between 
ownership structure and financial disclosure (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa, 1999; Gelb, 2000; 
Jaggi & Low, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Marston & Polei, 2004; Arcay & 
Vazquez, 2005; Debreceny & Rahman, 2005; Barako et al., 2006;  Momany & Al-Shorman, 2006; 
Naser et al., 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010b; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011) while others find no association (e.g., Raffournier, 1995; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 2002; Anderson & Daoud, 2005; Trabelsi & Labelle, 
2006; Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). This inconsistency may be 
attributed to differences in the jurisdictions explored and period(s) of study, and to the use of 
different measures of ownership by different researchers such as top ten shareholders, family 
ownership, company insiders’ ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership or 
foreign ownership (e.g.,Malone et al., 1993; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Raffournier, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Wallace & Nasser, 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; 
Naser, 1998; Al-Razeen, 1999; Depoers, 2000; Gelb, 2000; Chau & Gray, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Naser et al., 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Arcay & Vazquez, 2006; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; 
Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b). Furthermore, the 
review of studies employing ownership structure as an explanatory variable for financial disclosure 
reveals a lack of consensus among researchers concerning the best measure of ownership structure. 
Consequently, based on the review of the patterns of ownership structure in the listed MENA 
companies under scrutiny in this study and the availability of ownership structure-related data for 
these companies, this study examines the influence of ownership structure on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs in the scrutinised MENA capital markets using four distinct measures: 
government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private ownership ratio, and public 
ownership ratio as is discussed in details in Chapter Five. 
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has provided an extensive overview of different aspects relating to corporate 
governance that are expected to provide the necessary background required to investigate the 
association between corporate governance structures and levels of compliance with IFRSs in the 
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selected MENA countries. Consequently, it aimed to support the formulation of research 
hypotheses and the explanation of research findings that will be presented in subsequent chapters. 
 
The chapter commenced with an analysis of the concept of corporate governance, and proceeded to 
discuss the importance of corporate governance and the OECD principles. Thereafter, it provided 
an overview of the implementation of the OECD corporate governance principles in the MENA 
capital markets, revealing that these principles are recognised in varying degrees. Then the chapter 
provided a critical discussion of the corporate governance variables to be used as test variables in 
this study. 
 
It was indicated that the one-tier corporate governance model dominates in most companies in the 
MENA region capital markets and that most companies listed in Egypt and Jordan are characterised 
by weak board independence, although independent directors are recognised on their boards as 
demonstrated by international reports. Additionally, role duality is recognised particularly in Egypt. 
Finally, concerning ownership structure most companies are closely held with most company 
shares being family or government held. 
 
The chapter presented a review of prior research investigating the Relationship between corporate 
governance variables that are relevant to this study and financial disclosure practices as indicated in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.212. 
 
Table 3.1: Board Characteristics and Financial Disclosure Relationship in Previous Empirical Studies 
Board Independence Board Leadership (Role Duality) Board Size 
Study Relationship Study Relationship Study Relationship 
Adams & Hossain 
(1998) + Felo (2009) + 
Barako et al. 
(2006) + 
Adams et al. 
(1998) + Abed et al. (2011) + 
Ezat & El-Masry 
(2008) + 
Chen & Jaggi 
(2000) + Forker (1992) _ 
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010a) + 
Xiao et al. (2004) + Haniffa, (1999) _ Lakhal (2003) Insignificant 
Arcay & Vazquez 
(2005) + 
Haniffa & Cooke 
(2002) _ 
Arcay & 
Vazquez (2005) Insignificant 
Anderson et al. 
(2006) + 
Gul & Leung 
(2004) _ 
Cheng & 
Courtenay(2006) Insignificant 
                                                          
12 Studies in Bold investigated the association between mandatory financial disclosures and corporate governance 
structures. 
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Cheng & 
Courtenay (2006) + 
Abdelsalam & 
Street (2007) _   
Abdelsalam & 
Street (2007) + 
Abdelsalam & El-
Masry (2008) _   
Abdelsalam & El-
Masry (2008) + 
Ho & Wang 
(2001) _   
Ezat & El-Masry 
(2008) + 
Arcay & Vazquez 
(2005) Insignificant   
Felo (2009) + Cheng & Courtenay (2006) Insignificant   
Samaha & 
Dahawy (2010) + 
Ghazali & 
Weetman (2006) Insignificant   
Samaha & 
Dahawy (2011) + 
Ezat & El-Masry 
(2008) Insignificant   
Eng & Mak 
(2003) _ 
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
   
  
  
   
  
Gul & Leung 
(2004) _     
Muslu (2005) _     
Haniffa (1999) Insignificant     
Ho & Wong 
(2001) Insignificant    
Haniffa & Cooke 
(2002) Insignificant     
Ghazali & 
Weetman (2006) Insignificant     
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010a) Insignificant     
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010b) Insignificant     
 
Table 3.2: Ownership Structure and Financial Disclosure Relationship in Previous Empirical Studies  
Government Ownership Management Ownership Private Ownership Public Ownership 
Study Association Study Association Study Association Study Association 
Eng & 
Mak 
(2003) 
+ Eng & Mak 
(2003) 
_ Diamond & 
Verrecchia 
(1991) 
+ Haniffa 
(1999) 
+ 
Al-Razeen 
(1999) 
_ Arcay & 
Vazquez 
(2005) 
_ Haniffa & 
Cooke 
(2002) 
+ Haniffa 
& Cooke 
(2002) 
+ 
Naser et 
al. (2006) 
_ Ghazali & 
Weetman 
(2006) 
_ Naser et al. 
(2006) 
_ Al-
Htaybat 
(2005) 
+ 
Naser 
(1998) 
Insignificant Abdelsalam 
& El-Masry 
(2008) 
_ Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2010) 
_ Arcay & 
Vazquez 
(2005) 
+ 
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Naser et 
al. (2002) 
Insignificant Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2010) 
_ Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2011) 
_ Ezat & 
El-Masry 
(2008) 
+ 
Ghazali & 
Weetman 
(2006) 
Insignificant Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2011) 
Insignificant Suwaidan 
(1997) 
Insignificant Al-Akra 
et al. 
(2010b) 
_ 
Al-Akra 
et al. 
(2010a) 
Insignificant 
 
 
  Depoers 
(2000) 
Insignificant Naser et 
al. 
(2002) 
Insignificant 
Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2010) 
Insignificant   Omar 
(2007) 
 
Insignificant Al-Akra 
et al. 
(2010a) 
Insignificant 
Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2011) 
Insignificant   Al-Akra et 
al. (2010a) 
Insignificant   
    Al-Akra et 
al. (2010b) 
Insignificant   
 
The review reveals mixed results and a relative shortage in this kind of research in general and in 
the MENA capital markets in particular. Furthermore, the review of the theoretical foundation of 
prior research promulgates over-reliance on the financial economics theories, particularly agency 
theory with very limited reliance, if any, on cultural and institutional isomorphism theories. 
Consequently, this study is justified. 
 
The next chapter will shed light on the development of scrutinised MENA region capital markets 
and the regulatory framework that influences financial reporting practices in each capital market. 
This is expected to provide a reasonable background to rely on in understanding and explaining the 
findings of the empirical analysis that will be performed in Chapter Six. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MENA Region - Capital Markets and Financial Disclosure 
Environment 
 
4.1 MENA Region Context – An Overview 
The Arab MENA region capital markets can be categorised into two distinct economic groups. The 
first is capital importers, among which are Egypt and Jordan which represent an example of lower-
middle-income non-oil dependent economies that went through economic restructuring processes 
referred to as economic reform programmes in the 1990s (Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Al-
Akra et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010). Securities markets in these countries were 
revitalised to be the main vehicle for implementing privatisation programmes and to be a source of 
medium and long-term finance (CIPE, 2003; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; 
Al-Omari, 2010).  The second group is oil-exporting countries, which includes the GCC countries 
that hold 45% of the world’s oil reserves (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Fuelled by petrodollars such 
countries recently emerged as global economic players (Fofack, 2009), having achieved 
macroeconomic stability mainly because of the continuous increase in oil prices. They are income 
surplus countries and capital exporters. The remaining MENA capital markets are weak, either 
because of political and economic instability of their jurisdictions (the West Bank and Gaza, and 
Iraq), or because their jurisdictions are in their early stages of economic reform (Lebanon, Syria, 
Algeria, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen) (CIPE, 2003). 
 
In general, the MENA region capital markets are described as emerging, small and illiquid (Tricker, 
2009) 13 . This characterisation is emphasised by the CIPE (2003:11) which states that 
“[t]raditionally, the financial sector in the MENA region countries is a bank based sector and the 
securities markets are still in an early stage of development, playing a limited role in economic 
growth”. 
 
As aforementioned in Chapter One, Jordan’s Stock Exchange was established in 1978. Egypt’s 
Stock Exchange, however, has a long tradition and was the first to be established in the Middle East 
(Abd-Elsalam, 1999), beginning its activities in the late 1800s. It was ranked as the fifth most 
active market in the world (ROSC, 2004). However, following the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the 
                                                          
13 Hassan (2006) refers to an emerging market as a stock market that is moving from an initial stage toward a more 
mature stage. 
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activities of the market witnessed a setback for many decades until the development of the 
Egyptian stock exchange took place in 1995 as part of what is referred to as the Egyptian economic 
reform programme. 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of different aspects that influence financial reporting 
practices in each of the scrutinised MENA capital markets. Hence, it creates the foundation for 
understanding and explaining the findings of the empirical analysis reported in Chapter Six. 
Consequently, the rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of 
the capital market development and financial disclosure regulatory framework in Egypt, Section 4.3 
highlights the same aspects in Jordan, and finally, section 4.4 concludes. 
 
4.2 Egypt’s Stock Exchange and Financial Reporting Practices - An Overview 
The careful review of the Egyptian modern history demonstrates that the Arab Republic of Egypt 
has always been the regional leading reformer. The Economic development in this country has 
gone through four significant phases: Pre-nationalisation (before 1956), Post-nationalisation (1956-
1973), Open Door Policy (1974-1990), and the Extensive Economic Restructuring (1991 to date). 
Each reflects the political strategy adopted by the ruler. Additionally, the performance of the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange is always heavily influenced by government foreign policies which 
subsequently affect internal economic performance14. 
 
The Egyptian economy is unique as Egypt is one of the few developing countries that transformed 
from a capitalist economy to a planned economy, and then returned to a capitalist one (Hassan, 
2008; Desoky, 2009; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). The move from market imperfections and controls 
in the 1970s and 1980s to a free market economy in the 1990s is challenging to the government, 
private sector institutions in general and the accounting profession in particular (Dahawy & 
Samaha, 2010).  
In order to reap the benefits from the transition to a market economy and promote confidence of 
foreign investors, it is necessary to develop the financial reporting system and improve disclosure 
and transparency to enable investors to better evaluate and compare the financial performance of 
business firms (HassabElnaby et al., 2003; Aly et al., 2010; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010; Elsayed & 
                                                          
14 Most recently on the 25th of January, 2011, Egypt witnessed a cold blood revolution. The primary demands from 
protesters were the end of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime after 30 years of ruling, the end of emergency law, better 
management of country resources, improving minimum wages and controlling corruption. Following this revolution the 
EGX closed down for several weeks until it recommenced on 28th of March, 2011 and it is expected to recover in the 
near future. The most important gain from this revolution from the researcher’s viewpoint is the change in monitoring 
culture. This is expected to have a positive impact on de facto compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance best 
practices.  
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Hoque, 2010). In a similar vein, HassabElnaby et al. (2005: 22) argue that “[a]s economies develop, 
the function of accounting becomes more important and the practices become more sophisticated”.   
 
The harmonisation of the Egyptian Accounting Standards with IASs/IFRSs began with the launch 
of the government’s economic reform and structural adjustment programme in the early 1990s 
which commenced under pressure from the international institutions specifically the WB and the 
IMF as a condition of their providing financial support to Egypt (Dahawy & Conover, 2007; 
Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010). In 1997 the Ministry of Economy and 
Foreign Trade issued Ministerial decree No. 478 for the year 1997 according to which, a permanent 
accounting and auditing committee was established with responsibility for setting accounting and 
auditing standards. Thereafter, Ministerial decision No. 503 was issued in October 1997, which 
mandated the adoption of twenty two IASs (Samaha, 2006; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009). In 
2002, a new version of harmonised Egyptian Accounting Standards was issued, and the last was in 
2006 which includes 35 Egyptian Accounting Standards that are an Arabic translation of the 
equivalent IFRSs except for IAS 17: Accounting for Leases (Hassaan, 2007; Dahawy & Samaha, 
2010; Elsayed, 2010). Mandating IFRSs enabled Egypt to access international exchanges, saved 
time and effort needed for developing national standards from scratch, improved fairness of 
financial statements prepared by Egyptian companies (Samaha & Dahawy, 2011: 63). 
 
In summary, the laws regulating the incorporation of companies in Egypt are as follows 14F15: Firstly, 
the Companies Law No. 159 of 1981 regulates joint stock companies, limited liability companies 
and limited by shares partnership companies. Secondly, the Investment Law No.8 of 1997 regulates 
investment in specific industrial locations or economic sectors by offering specific income tax 
exemptions or tax free zones. Thirdly, the Public Business Sector Law No. 203 of 1991 regulates 
the incorporation of public business sector companies. 
 
The legislation regulating companies listed on the EGX includes: Firstly, the Capital Market Law 
No. 95 of 1992 and its Executive Regulations No. 135 of 1993 concerned with regulating the EGX 
by monitoring the market status in general and maintaining steadiness and growth. Secondly, the 
Central Depository Law No.93 of 2000 which maintains all registration, clearance and settlement 
procedures associated with trading transactions, the main purpose being to reduce risks associated 
with trading physical securities, to enhance market liquidity, and to assure fast securities exchange. 
Thirdly, Decree No. 30 of 2002 of the CMA's Board of Directors on Securities Listing and De-
Listing Rules of the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges (Dahawy, 2007; ROSC, 2009).  
                                                          
15 For Details of Articles of all laws see: Capital Market Authority Website, 
http://www.cma.gov.eg/cma/content/english/accounting_criteria_en/accounting_criteria_en.htm, Accessed: 20/2/2010. 
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In general, the primary source of Companies Law No.159 of 1981 is the French civil law. However, 
the Anglo-American common law concepts prevail in the CML No. 95 of 1992, and the Central 
Depository Law’ No. 93 of 2000 (Dahawy, 2007; ROSC, 2009). 
 
According to the CML, listed companies are required to comply with the Egyptian Accounting 
Standards issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade that are in conformity with IFRSs (article 12 of 
Stock Exchange Listing Rules of 2002).  
 
 
The legal framework contains a number of overlapping, ambiguous provisions, which result in 
some legal uncertainty. For example, it is not clear whether shareholders are able to hold the board 
and management accountable for a breach of their duties, and whether the definition of a related 
party provided in the CML is applicable to other laws (ROSC, 2009). Thus, there are ongoing 
efforts to issue a unified law that would replace many laws and dispersed provisions. The Unified 
Companies Law aims to remove conflicts and obstacles to local and foreign investments in Egypt, 
and to enhance transparency (Dahawy, 2007; Dahawy & Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). 
 
The review of the development of the regulatory framework for business firms in Egypt reveals that 
issuance of the Public Business Sector Companies Law No. 203 of 1991 was a turning point in the 
privatisation programme since it permits privatisation of government-owned companies, previously 
prohibited by Law No. 97 of 1983. Consequently, the implementation of this law resulted in the 
removal of 314 public sector companies, initially established as Affiliated Companies, from the 
control of their government’s ministries to the control of 17 state holding companies as a 
preliminary step towards full privatisation. Hassan (2006: 91) reports that between the adoption of 
the Egyptian privatisation programme in 1994 and the end of June 2002, 60% of the original 
portfolio was privatised via initial public offerings (IPO), sales to employee, shareholder 
associations, liquidations, asset sales, and leasing. 
 
The Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges currently referred to as the EGX are among the oldest 
stock exchanges worldwide, the latter being developed in 1888 and the former in 1903. For almost 
40 years they experienced stagnation during the nationalisation regime until they were revitalised in 
1992 as one entity with two trading floors (CIPE, 2003; Desoky, 2009). 
 
Since the 1990s, Egypt’s has made significant contributions in aligning corporate financial 
reporting requirements with IFRSs as well as in revitalising the EGX (CIPE, 2003; Hassan, 2006). 
Significant progress in the Egyptian economy has resulted according to the international reports. 
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The stock market boomed, GDP grew about 5% per year in 2005-06, topping 7.2% in 2007, and 
GDP per capita was $5,400 (CIA, The World Factbook, Egypt, 2008). Even the IMF (2007) reports 
that Egypt’s economy continues to achieve impressive performance because of high growth levels 
resulting from the reforms and solid macroeconomic management, and that the ongoing structural 
reforms continue to promote a dynamic private sector-driven economy. 
 
Certainly, the activities of the EGX increased considerably, market capitalisation growing by an 
average of 40% per annum over the period 1995-2000 (Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2002; Capital 
Market Authority, 2003 cited in Samaha, 2006). Inflation in 2007 was estimated at 8.8% (CIA 
World Factbook, Egypt, 2008). In 2002 there were 1.5 million investors, compared with only 
25,000 in the mid-1990s (CASE, 2001 cited in Samaha, 2006: 118; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). 
Furthermore, the international profile of the EGX has been enhanced since 1997 by its inclusion in 
the emerging market indices of international organisations such as the IFC, Morgan Stanley, and 
Standard and Poor’s (Samaha, 2006). Additionally, ING Barings and EFG Hermes have created 
country indices for Egypt (MOEFT, 2000 cited in Samaha, 2006: 118; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & 
Dahawy, 2011). In 2007, the value traded on Egypt’s Stock Exchange was estimated at 
US$49,388.19 million, the volume of shares traded was 683.84 million, the number of transactions 
was 8,161,607, and market capitalisation was US$134,903.52 million16. According to an index 
developed by the IFC and Hawkamah to measure the strength of good protection for minority 
shareholders in the MENA region, it was estimated to be 5.3 out of 10 (IFC & Hawkamah, 
2008:22)17. The number of listed companies on the EGX in 2007 was 43518. This level of progress 
was considered as a signal that the Egyptian economy is moving towards the globalisation era 
(Dahawy & Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). However, from the researcher’s point of 
view, such efforts were not enough to close the de jure compliance gap in both accounting and 
auditing practices as will be further discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. This point of view is 
supportd by the argument that such economic growth not necessarily to be accompanied by an 
improvement in financial reporting practices (Samaha & Dahawy, 2011: 66). 
 
In Egypt, the CMA founded in 1980, is the regulatory agency responsible for ensuring the 
development of a transparent and secure market for investors. It used to play a major role in 
creating an environment that enhances public confidence to promote investment in Egyptian 
                                                          
16 For more details see:  the AMF Web site, 
http://www.amf.org.ae/sites/default/files/econ/amdb/AMDB%20Performance/Yearly%20Performance/en/prv_yearly_s
ummary.htm. Accessed: 22/3/2010. 
17 The scoring method applied by IFC and Hawkamah (2008) is based on the assumption that good protections for 
minority shareholders are associated with larger and more active stock markets. 
18 For more details about EGX see:  the EGX Website, 
http://directories.globalcustodian.com/directories/organisations/epcDetails.jsf/Stock+Exchanges/Cairo+amp%3B+Alex
andria+Stock+Exchange . Accessed: 22/5/2010.  
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companies (Dahawy & Conover, 2007). It is responsible for developing, regulating and enforcing 
the legal and regulatory framework in the capital market. Furthermore, the CMA enforces the 
capital market law, its executive regulations and related decisions through receiving and approving 
requests to issue new securities, handling licensing of all companies in the securities industry, and 
ensuring disclosure by capital market participants and adherence to the Egyptian Accounting 
Standards based upon IFRSs. The EGX is responsible for enforcing the listing rules and the 
General Authority for Investment (GAFI) is tasked with supervising the implementation of 
Companies Law. 
 
Most recently (July, 2009), the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority replaced the CMA, the 
Egyptian Insurance Supervisory Authority and Mortgage Finance Authority and became 
responsible for supervising non-bank financial institutions and markets, including the capital and 
derivatives markets, as well as activities related to insurance services, mortgage finance, financial 
leasing, factoring, and securitization (ROSC, 2009). 
 
 
4.2.1 Egypt's Code of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance was introduced in Egypt in consequence of the Economic Reform 
Programme and the need to gain the trust of the international community to attract foreign 
investments (Dahawy, 2007; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). Laws which govern the incorporation of 
companies in Egypt, and companies listed on the EGX, provide the legal regulatory framework for 
corporate governance practices in Egypt, in which respect, the Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC, 2001) mentions that 62% of the OECD principles were applied by 
Egyptian companies that were scrutinised. The new listing rules issued by the CMA in 2002 aimed 
to enhance the implementation of corporate governance best practice by listed companies, and 
include comprehensive disclosure requirements (Articles 12 to 19), and detailed requirements for 
financial statements preparation and presentation (Articles 20 to 33). Article 4 requires the 
presentation of complete information about the company’s board members. Additionally, Articles 
34 and 35 indicate delisting rules which compel publicly-listed companies to make a commitment 
to disclosure requirements, or to risk delisting. The application of the aforementioned listing rules 
resulted in delisting of 99 non-compliant companies in 2003 (ROSC, 2004). 
 
The re-assessment of corporate governance practices in the Egyptian Capital Market by the WB in 
2004 revealed that Egypt applied 82% of the OECD principles (ROSC, 2004), indicating 
improvements over time. The major areas of improvement include: basic shareholders’ rights, 
cost/benefit of voting, and disclosure standards (ROSC, 2004). However, the report reveals that all 
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items of the third principle ‘Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance’ showed no progress 
compared to the first assessment in 2001, thus signaling an area for improvement. 
 
In 2003, the Egyptian government established the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD), to work 
jointly with a number of international organisations such as the WB and the United Nations. One of 
the EIoD’s main goals is to spread awareness and improve corporate governance practices in the 
country. It holds various training and advocacy activities, including the provision of information on 
corporate governance principles, codes and best practices. Furthermore, the EIoD exerts continuous 
efforts towards improving good corporate governance practices and strengthening the boards of 
directors in regional companies by hosting international and national conferences, offering 
competitions to create awareness, and developing manuals and procedures to help in implementing 
corporate governance (Dahawy, 2007; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). 
 
In 2005, the CMA further contributed to corporate governance reforms by restructuring its 
organisation and initiating a separate sector focused on corporate finance and corporate governance. 
Now, in addition to other central departments, the CMA includes three major sectors: Corporate 
Finance and Corporate Governance, Market Regulation, and Market Surveillance and Enforcement 
(UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
The first Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (ECCG) was introduced in 2005 by the Ministry 
of Investment and the GAFI. This code is based on the OECD corporate governance principles. It 
was issued with the purpose of improving the quality of financial reporting by listed companies, 
improving decision making, attracting investors, particularly foreign ones, hence fostering the 
economic development in Egypt (Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). It was published in Arabic, and it 
includes guidelines for joint-stock companies listed on the stock exchange, and companies that use 
the banking systems as a major source of finance. The code indicates that its rules should be 
considered as an addition to the corporate-related provisions stated under various laws as well as 
the executive regulations and decrees regarding their implementation. The ECCG rules are neither 
mandatory nor legally binding; rather, they promote and regulate responsible and transparent 
behaviour in managing corporations according to international best practice and aim to ensure 
equilibrium between various party interests (Dahawy, 2007; GAFI, 2007; UNCTAD, 2007; Samaha 
& Dahawy, 2011). 
 
Finally, in 2006, the Ministry of Investment issued the Code of Corporate Governance for the 
Public Enterprise Sector based on the OECD working group report on Privatisation and Corporate 
Governance of State Owned Assets, and the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance issued in 
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2005. The code presents the principles of governing state-owned companies by presenting an 
organisational and legal framework for such entities. It focuses on the actions of the state as 
regulator versus its role as owner. It also introduces the principles for equitable treatment of all 
shareholders including the state as a shareholder and conflict of directors (EIoD, 2006). 
 
Several Egyptian non-profit organisations have also begun to recognise the importance of corporate 
governance in developing a sound business environment in Egypt. The Egyptian Junior 
Businessmen Association (EJB) is one such organisation and is concerned with creating an 
awareness campaign comprised of several events including workshops and roundtables. In 2006 
this association issued the Corporate Governance Manual for Family Businesses which is regarded 
as the first guide in Egypt and the MENA region for family companies seeking growth, continuity 
and sustainability for their businesses (Dahawy, 2007; UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
4.3 Jordan’s Stock Exchange and Financial Reporting Practices - An Overview 
Unlike the majority of Asian Arab countries, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is considered as a 
lower-middle-income economy with limited natural resources, and for years its economy was based 
on financial assistance from the Gulf countries (Al-Htaybat, 2005; Al-Akra et al., 2009)19. 
 
Similar to Egypt, the Jordanian political system crucially influences the country’s economic 
policies, and hence the performance of the domestic capital market. The country’s long ruler was 
King Hussain who was in power for about 45 years (from 1953 to 1999). He successfully navigated 
competing pressures from the major powers (US, USSR, and UK), various Arab states, Israel, and a 
large internal Palestinian population, despite several wars (CIA World Factbook,  Jordan, 2008). 
 
The early stages in the Jordanian economy’s development date back to the early 1950s, attributable 
to the influx of Palestinian refugees since 1948 due to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Those 
refugees supported the Jordanian economy by moving their savings to Jordan and creating new 
demand in the domestic market for houses, goods and services (Kinaan & Kardoosh, 2002 cited in 
Al-Htaybat, 2005:91). During the period from the late 1660s to the late 1980s, Jordan’s economic 
growth was further improved by increases in Arab aid as well as the great support provided by Iraq 
(Al-Htaybat, 2005). In 1995 the country issued the Investment Promotion Law No.16 of 1995 as a 
first measure to attract investments in various projects that were expected to bring wealth and 
prosperity to the country (Haddad, 2005). 
                                                          
19 For more details see: The World Bank Website, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,contentMDK:20420458menuPK:64133156 
pagePK:64133150piPK:64133175theSitePK:239419,00.html, Accessed: 22/3/2010). 
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In February 1999, King Abdallah II, the eldest son of King Hussein, assumed the throne following 
his father's death. Since then, he has refocused the government’s agenda on economic restructuring 
by committing his country to the goals of privatisation, liberalisation, and modernisation of the law. 
Jordan’s economy witnessed significant positive changes in the era of King Abdullah II (Al-
Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2009; CIA World Factbook, Jordan, 2008)20. As a 
result, the Jordanian government signed a free trade agreement with the USA under the umbrella of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in April 2000. Additionally, in 2000 Jordan became a 
member in the WTO. It also increased co-operation with the IMF, the WB, the EU, and USAID 
(Al-Htaybat, 2005; CIA World Factbook, Jordan, 2008). In addition, thanks to government support, 
the role of the industrial sector in fostering the economic development in Jordan was enhanced (Al-
Akra et al., 2009). 
 
Like Egypt, the Jordanian government adopted in1993 a new programme known as the Economic 
Reform Programme to deal with this series of economic developments and to develop balanced 
relationships with other countries at regional and international levels. The main objectives of that 
programme are to create new markets, promote privatisation, and to facilitate trade with countries 
within and outside the Middle East (Al-Htaybat, 2005; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Al-Omari, 2010). 
The most common forms of privatisation agreements in Jordan are total or partial sale, concessions, 
lease contracts, management contracts, private infrastructure development, and operations such as 
Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) contracts (Omar, 2007).  
 
The package of laws and regulations issued in Jordan to govern the business sector practices as well 
as the financial reporting practices by companies listed on the ASE includes the following21: The 
Companies Law No. 12 of 1964, amended by the Companies Law No.1 of 1989 which was the first 
source of regulation of corporate financial reporting in Jordan (Abu-Nassar & Rutherford, 1996: 74; 
Al-Htaybat, 2005:101; Haddad, 2005:125).  
 
Prior to 1997, there was no accounting and auditing standard-setting body in Jordan, and the 
process of regulating accounting practices in Jordan was purely promulgated by the government 
(the Ministry of Industry and Trade) with a very minor role for the private sector (Al-Akra et al., 
2009). However, after the issuance of the new Companies Law of 1997 as an amendment to the 
                                                          
20 Similar to Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries, Jordan has been witnessing uprisings since February 2011, with 
demands being made for more improvement in minimum income and the control of corruption. These uprisings are 
expected to further improve the economic performance in the long run as controlling corruption is one of its major aims 
as well as the fact that it reflects the development of awareness among Jordanian citizens. This is expected to improve 
monitoring and transparency. 
21 For Details of Articles of Jordanian Laws see: Amman Stock Exchange Website, 
http://www.exchange.jo/pages.php?menu_id=119&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0.  Accessed: 20/2/2010. 
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previous Company Act of 1989, and the issuance of the SL of 1997, these two statutes became the 
main source of accounting practices in Jordan (Al-Hataybat, 2005:101). Companies Law No. 22 of 
1997 was enacted with other regulations such as the Investment Promotion Law of 1995 and the SL 
No. 23 of 1997 in order to deal with the deficiencies of the previous legislation (Naser et al., 2002; 
Omar, 2007). According to Article 140 of  the Companies Law of 199722, the board of directors of 
the public shareholding companies shall, within a maximum of three months from the end of the 
company’s fiscal year, prepare the following accounts and statements to be presented to the annual 
general meeting: the annual balance sheet of the company, its profit and loss account, cash flow 
statement and notes comparing these with the last year's accounts, all duly certified by the 
company’s auditor, as well as the board of directors’ annual report on the company’s activities and 
performance and forecasts of activities for the following year. 
 
The Articles within the Companies Law of 1997 reveal that disclosure requirements for 
consolidated financial statements for holding companies (Article 208) and for foreign companies 
(Article 243) were introduced, thereby making this legislation more competent and comprehensive 
than the Companies Law of 1989. Financial statements are required to be prepared and audited in 
accordance with internationally recognised accounting and auditing standards (article, 195) 
 
The disclosure requirements of SL of 2002 which became effective in March, 2004 are similar to 
those of the SL of 1997 with minor differences such as the requirement of identifying the insiders 
who have access to the information before others in the company (article 108). In addition, the new 
Law has extended the tasks and authorities of the Audit Committee (Omar, 2007). 
 
In 2000 the government issued Privatisation Law No. 25 in order to provide the legal and 
institutional framework for the privatisation programme (Omar, 2007). In the same year the 
Executive Privatisation Commission (EPC) was developed to be responsible for formulating 
privatisation policy, and identifying candidate enterprises and measures for privatisation (Omar, 
2007). 
 
Three years later, Investment Law 2003 was issued, which together with the Investment Promotion 
Law, supported the work of the Jordanian Investment Board (JIB) that was developed for the 
purpose of increasing foreign and local investments in Jordan.  
 
                                                          
22  For Details of Articles in this Law see: Ministry of  Industry and Trade,  
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/502/Companies%20Law.aspx. Accessed: 12/10/2010. 
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The Jordanian Income Tax Law is seen as complementary to the Companies  Law No. 22 of 1997 
(Al-Shayab, 2003; Omar, 2007) as it provides companies with regulations relating to some matters 
such as depreciation (Article 3j) which are not covered by the Companies Law of 1997. In 1985 
Income Tax Law No. 57 was issued, to be amended by Income Tax Law No. 4 of 1992, Law No. 
14 of 1995, and most recently, Law No. 25 of 2001 which became effective on 1st January, 200223. 
 
Finally, a new Accountancy Profession Law No. 73 of 2003 was issued provisionally on 16th June 
of that year. This was supported by the establishment of the High Council for Accounting and 
Auditing headed by the Minister of Industries and Trade, and the creation of an improved Jordanian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA). Although the issuance of this Law is a 
significant step toward regulating the profession, it is criticised on the grounds that, some of its 
provisions need further clarification and refinement (Omar, 2007). 
 
Omar (2007:156) comments on the package of laws that affects disclosure practices in Jordan by 
arguing that “the influence of the Income Taxes Law and the Audit Law is limited, while there is 
some effect of the Companies Act on the financial reporting for Jordanian shareholding companies. 
However, the most influential regulations which affect the disclosure requirements in Jordan are 
the Securities Exchange Law (SEL) and IASs”. 
 
Given the above, it would seem appropriate to issue a unified law to replace the dispersed 
provisions. 
 
Concerning the adoption of IFRSs in Jordan, this was stimulated by the open trade agreements with 
foreign partners in the EU and USA as well as pressures from the WB and other international 
lending institutions which necessitated the development of the Jordanian accounting system to 
enhance the credibility of financial statements (Al-Shiab, 2003; Haddad, 2005; Omar, 2007; Al-
Akra et al., 2009). Jordan is a member of the IASB. Prior to 1998; the date listed companies were 
forced to apply the IASs issued by the IASC according to the requirements of the SL of 1997 
(Naser et al., 2002; Al-Akra et al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010), the JACPA lacked the power to enforce 
company compliance with the IASs since there was no legal obligation (Haddad, 2005; Al-Akra et 
al., 2009). Thus, before 1998 the Amman Financial Market (AFM) which was founded in 1978 was 
seen as an unregulated financial market as listed companies were not mandated to adopt a specific 
set of disclosure requirements (Al-Shiab, 2003; Al-Akra et al., 2009). Consequently, one of the 
main contributions of what is referred to as the Economic Reform Programme is the massive 
                                                          
23  For Details of Articles in these Laws see: Income Tax Department, 
http://www.incometax.gov.jo/incometax/en_main%20menue/en_legislations/En_LawMain.aspx.  Accessed: 9/3/2010. 
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development and restructuring of Jordan’s Financial Market in order to globalise its activities. To 
achieve this objective a number of steps have been taken such as the use of electronic trading since 
2000, developing settlement and clearance systems, the elimination of obstacles to investment, and 
improving transparency (Omar, 2007). 
 
The restructuring of the AFM resulted in the development of three new institutions, namely: the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), and Securities Depository 
Centre (SDC) (Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2009; Al-Omari, 2010). The ASE was established in 
March 1999 as a non-profit, private institution with administrative and financial autonomy, and 
authority to function as an exchange for the trading of securities. It is governed by a seven-member 
board of directors, and a CEO oversees day-to-day responsibilities and reports to the board. The 
ASE is working closely with the JSC on surveillance matters and maintaining strong relationships 
with other exchanges, associations, and international organisations. 
 
The JSC is responsible for supervising the issuance of, and dealing in, information related to all 
activities and operations of securities, issuers, insider trading and major shareholding. It has a legal 
personality with financial and administrative autonomy, and is linked directly to the Prime Minister 
(Omar, 2007). The JSC in Jordan is the equivalent body to the CMA in Egypt. 
 
The SDC was established in 1999 as a non-profit legal entity with financial and administrative 
autonomy, and managed by the private sector. It is considered one of the most important 
institutions, as it holds the ownership register of all issued shares. In addition, the SDC has been 
recognised by the Association of National Numbering Agencies (ANNA) and the JSC as the sole 
numbering agency in Jordan for the assignment of International Security Identification Number 
(ISIN) (Omar, 2007:198). 
 
Resulting from the economic restructuring efforts, the performance of the Jordanian economy has 
shown gradual improvements since 2001. The growth rate of GDP at constant market prices 
increased from 5.3% in 2001 (Omar, 2007:129) to reach 5.7% in 2007 (CIA World Factbook, 
Jordan, 2008). Regarding GDP per capita, it was $4,700 in 2007 and the inflation rate was 5.7% 
(CIA World Factbook, Jordan, 2008). Furthermore, in 2007 investment represented 27.8% of GDP 
(CIA World Factbook, Jordan, 2008).   In 2007 value traded on the ASE was estimated at 
US$17,109.39 million, the number of shares traded was 4,387.00 million23F 24 , the number of 
                                                          
24 For more details about trading statistics at the ASE see: the ASE Website, http://www.ase.com.jo/en/key-statistics-
ase. Accessed: 29-3-2010.  
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transactions was 3,384,300 and market capitalisation was US $41,298.4725. Overall the proceeds 
from the adoption of the privatisation programme in Jordan until 2007 amounted $1271 million 
(Al-Akra et al., 2009: 172). The strength of investor protection according to the index developed by 
IFC and Hawkamah was estimated to be 4.3 out of 10 and the number of listed companies on the 
ASE in 2007 was 245 (IFC & Hawkamah, 2008). 
 
4.3.1 Jordan’s Code of Corporate Governance 
In 2005 the Jordanian Corporate Governance Association was established to promote the 
implementation of effective corporate governance practices throughout Jordan. In addition, in 2005 
a draft of a corporate governance code was available but it was not enforced (Shanikat & Abbadi, 
2011: 98).  However, since 2007 an official code of corporate governance that is based on the 
OECD principles exists for the banking sector and is enforced by the Central bank in Jordan and in 
2008 a mandatory corporate governance code for shareholding companies listed on the ASE was 
approved which became effective in January, 200926. However, before the actual issuance of the 
Jordanian code of corporate governance took place, the Jordanian government had already built the 
corporate governance regulatory framework under the sponsorship of the OECD, through the 
issuance of the Companies Law of 1997 and the SL of 2002 (Al-Akra et al., 2009; 2010a; Shanikat 
& Abbadi, 2011). In this regard, Shanikat & Abbadi (2011: 96) argue that Companies Law and SL 
in Jordan cover the different aspects of corporate governance framework which is made up of the 
legislative framework and government oversight, the capital market, disclosure and accounting 
standards, transparency in privatisation, effective supervision of the board of directors, preservation 
of property rights and protection of minority rights. The Companies Law mainly covers some 
corporate governance rules that relate to the auditor. On the other hand, the SL helps in activating 
the rules of governance by defining market regulations, the issuance of shares or bonds and trade 
procedures. It also states the responsibilities of issuers of securities, brokers and auditors, and the 
requirements for listing in the stock exchange, protection procedures for minority rights and the 
requirements for disclosing important information. Furthermore to preserve transparency, the law 
prohibits related party transactions, promoting rumours, misleading investors and disclosing any 
matters that may adversely affect the capital market (Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011: 96).  
 
                                                          
25 For more details see: AMF Website, 
http://www.amf.org.ae/sites/default/files/econ/amdb/AMDB%20Performance/Yearly%20Performance/en/prv_yearly_s
ummary.  Accessed: 22/3/2010. 
26 For details of articles in this code see: the ASE Website, http://www.ase.com.jo/en/key-statistics-ase. Accessed: 29-
6-2010.  
 
91 
The review of the ROSC (2005) concerning the assessment of corporate governance practices in 
Jordan before the issuance of the code of corporate governance for shareholding listed companies 
in 2008 indicated the existence of relatively good disclosure practices. However, although the 
Companies Law and SL provide many of the rules that regulate corporate governance practices of 
publicly-listed companies, such rules are not as strong as the OECD corporate governance 
principles (ROSC, 2005). The ROSC (2005) assessment of Jordan’s compliance with each of the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance promulgated that, the corporate governance 
requirement not materially observed by listed companies on the ASE was board independence. In 
practice, the boards of most companies lack real independence from controlling shareholders and 
from management (ROSC, 2005). Thus, applying the Jordanian Code of Corporate Governance on 
comply or explain basis is expected to improve governance practices within the Jordanian context.  
 
The important issue that is expected to have a negative impact on the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, and hence, transparency by companies listed on the ASE, is the 
non-existence of an accounting and auditing standard setting body in Jordan which may result in 
the absence of an official translation of the IFRSs. Consequently, this may result in divergent 
practices as preparers of financial statements and auditors will interpret the standards according to 
their understanding. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the economic environment, specifically the business 
regulatory framework and capital market development within Egypt and Jordan. As indicated, 
similar to the majority of MENA countries, Egypt and Jordan mandated the adoption of the IFRSs 
in 1997. Initially, mandating IASs/IFRSs in both countries was a response to international lending 
institutions’ pressure. 
 
On the other hand, as indicated, in order to align with international practices both countries 
established the regulatory framework for businesses operating within their jurisdictions, and 
developed their capital markets. In both countries the Company Law and the Securities Law, 
referred to in Egypt as the Capital Market Law, represent the core for the regulatory framework for 
listed companies. 
 
With respect to corporate governance practices, Egypt has been one of the leaders in the region in 
creating corporate governance frameworks, and developing supporting institutions such as the 
EIoD to tackle some of the corporate governance challenges faced by the market. With respect to 
Jordan, since 2007 a code of corporate governance based on the OECD principles exists for the 
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banking sector and in 2008 a code of corporate governance for shareholding companies listed on 
ASE was approved which became effective in January, 2009. However, the regulatory framework 
in Jordan initially provides the basis for good corporate governance practices through the 
requirements of the Companies law of 1997 and the SL of 2002. 
 
Based on the review of the context within Egypt and Jordan, it is appreciated that enormous 
developments in the regulatory requirements have occurred during the last two decades. However, 
to get the best from their de jure compliance with the international best practices, there must be a 
de facto compliance with these requirements. The awareness in the scrutinised countries about the 
importance of de facto compliance with the international best practices will enhance the 
globalisation of the performance of their stock exchanges, attract more local and foreign 
investments, and hence, achieve the proposed financial and economic development objectives. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the methodology employed to accomplish the research objectives. 
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                                         CHAPTER FIVE 
Research Philosophy and Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The main concern of any researcher is to answer his/her research question(s), which requires 
him/her to consider the research methodology and the research method(s) that will be employed. 
Additionally, the researcher must decide within which research paradigm his/her study will be 
undertaken (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Crotty, 2007; Baker & Foy, 2008). 
 
Within the setting of the proposed theoretical foundation discussed in Chapter Two, the empirical 
part of this study assesses the level of compliance with IFRSs by non-financial companies listed on 
the stock exchanges of Egypt and Jordan, simultaneously seeking to determine whether a 
relationship exists between levels of compliance and corporate governance structures in the two 
capital markets. To best meet these objectives the researcher employs the sequential explanatory 
triangulation design. 
 
In providing a detailed discussion of the methodology and methods used to test the research 
hypotheses in order to meet the study’s objectives, the rest of this chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 5.2 discusses research philosophy, section 5.3 introduces the research hypotheses, section 
5.4 describes the research design and methodology, section 5.5 indicates the research methods, 
section 5.6 discusses data analysis, and section 5.7 concludes. 
 
5.2 Research Philosophy 
There is an intense debate in the social sciences about the most appropriate philosophical position 
from which methods should be derived (Easterby-Smith et al., 1993). All researchers build their 
research implicitly or explicitly, on several fundamental theoretical and philosophical assumptions 
derived from their beliefs about the nature of the society and the social science world, as well as 
their knowledge and understanding of the world and research itself (Hopper & Powell, 1985; Al-
Htaybat, 2005). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979:22) propose that social theory is based on four key paradigms emanating 
from different sets of assumptions about the nature of social science and society, these being: 
radical humanist, radical structuralist, interpretive, and functionalist. In this regard they argue that 
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“[t]o be located in a particular paradigm is to view the world in a particular way. The four 
paradigms thus define four views of the social world based upon different meta-theoretical 
assumptions with regards to the nature of science and society” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979:24). The 
radical humanist paradigm perceives the world from a subjective viewpoint, striving to alter 
societal aspects with regard to human constraints; the radical structuralist paradigm equally 
questions the status quo and strives for fundamental change, but contrary to the radical humanist 
paradigm it perceives the world from an objective angle, consequently seeking to change the 
universal structure; the interpretive paradigm reflects the subjective stand where the status quo is 
investigated taking into consideration human beliefs and perceptions; and the functionalist 
paradigm aims to provide a rational explanation of existing social affairs and the current status quo, 
being concerned with understanding society in a way that enables the generation of knowledge. 
Additionally, this paradigm is concerned with effective regulation and control of social affairs in 
order to provide practical solutions to practical problems. In summary, the functionalist paradigm is 
based on investigating the current status and establishing the factual existence of structures. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979:26) observe the functionalist paradigm to be rooted in the sociological 
positivist tradition. It seeks to establish a law for the occurrence of phenomena, and predict their 
occurrence through causal relationships between study variables (Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Al-
Htaybat, 2005). 
 
Given the foregoing discussion, this study is mainly undertaken within the functionalist research 
paradigm. The levels of compliance with IFRSs by companies listed on the selected MENA capital 
markets are measured. This step is followed by an examination of the potential relationship 
between test variables (country, board independence, board leadership, board size and ownership 
structure) and levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. Furthermore, interviews 
(qualitative method) are conducted to support the interpretation of the findings of the quantitative 
analysis. 
 
Robson (1993:4) observes that the purpose of descriptive research is to depict an accurate profile of 
persons, events or situations. Given this observation, this study can be classified as descriptive 
research as it employs a disclosure index and semi-structured interviews to portray an accurate 
profile of compliance practices by companies listed on the EGX and ASE. The study can also be 
considered as explanatory, since according to Collis and Hussey (2003) the purpose of explanatory 
research is to understand phenomena by establishing causal relationships, and this study is 
explanatory in two respects. Firstly, it employs several corporate governance variables to explain 
compliance practices by companies listed on the EGX and ASE. Secondly, it uses different strands 
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of relevant theories (cultural theories, institutional isomorphism theory, and two financial 
economics theories) to explain levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and the 
influence of corporate governance structures on compliance practices within the MENA context. 
 
5.3 Research Hypotheses 
The review of prior compliance literature as well as the chosen MENA region capital markets 
financial disclosure environments reveals that further to the secretive nature of MENA societies, 
enforcement of compliance with IFRSs is relatively weak and market pressures for more disclosure 
are less robust than in developed capital markets. Hence, non-compliance costs are less than 
compliance costs for MENA listed companies (Al-Htaybat, 2005; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; 
Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009). On the other hand, as indicated in 
Chapters Three and Four, corporate governance is newly introduced in the scrutinised countries as 
part of the regulatory reforms that accompanied the privatisation programmes commenced in the 
1990s (Al-Akra et al., 2009; 2010a; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011) and as many of the 
associated requirements for good practice (e.g., board independence, separation between the CEO 
and Chair positions; improved disclosure and transparency, investor protection and board 
responsibility for overseeing management behaviour and financial reporting practices) may 
contradict with the native cultural values (e.g. secrecy), this is expected to diminish its impact on 
the levels of compliance with IFRSs. Furthermore, based on the research questions, objectives and 
the extensive review of disclosure theories employed in prior research in the area of financial 
disclosure, particularly, agency theory and cost-benefit analysis together with the notions of 
institutional isomorphism theory and secrecy versus transparency, as one of Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural values, this study examines whether differences exist between the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements between the selected MENA capital markets. The 
study then explores whether the levels of compliance are influenced by certain corporate 
governance variables (board independence, board leadership, board size and ownership structure). 
 
This section illustrates the development of the research hypotheses formulated to examine whether 
differences between Egypt and Jordan exist and to address the association between the corporate 
governance structures used in this study as test variables and levels of compliance with IFRSs. 
Additionally, the section illuminates those variables to be used as control variables (company size, 
profitability, gearing, liquidity, type of business activity, and type of audit firm) as identified in 
previous research as being associated with financial disclosure practices and compliance. 
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5.3.1 Differences in IFRSs Compliance Levels and in the Dominant Corporate Governance 
Structures  
The differences between countries such as the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts with respect to 
their capacity to enforce compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance best practices may 
affect levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in each jurisdiction. Believing this 
possibility, Al-Shammari et al. (2008:129) used country as an explanatory variable in their study on 
GCC countries, arguing that “[t]he sample countries have many features in common in their 
regulatory frameworks, in addition to economic and cultural ties. This closeness could suggest that 
levels of compliance will be similar. However, it has been proposed that the roles of external 
auditors and independent enforcement bodies are crucial in promoting compliance with accounting 
standards”. 
 
In a similar vein, previous research investigating IFRSs adoption reports that differences in 
compliance levels among companies reflect their country of origin (Tower et al., 1999; Street & 
Bryant, 2000; Al-Shammari et al., 2008). Hence, it seems interesting to investigate whether 
similarities between the Egyptian and the Jordanian settings in their legal, economic and cultural 
contexts reduce the differences in levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements between both jurisdictions. Additionally, whether such similarities reduce the 
differences in company characteristics as well as disparities in the dominant corporate governance 
structures between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts. 
 
According to the institutional isomorphism theory, as both jurisdictions mandated the adoption of 
IFRSs under pressures from the international lending institutions to gain respect and legitimacy, 
they did not give sufficient consideration to the importance of preliminary preparation of their 
markets (i.e., the development of national values accepting the importance of compliance with 
IFRSs, as prevail in the developed countries where such standards originated) and institutional 
infrastructure. This largely accounts for the existing gap between de jure and de facto compliance 
reported by previous research investigating the EGX and ASE on an individual basis (e.g., Al-
Htaybat, 2005; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Omar, 2007; Samaha& Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Al-
Akra et al., 2010a; Ismail et al., 2010). The same argument applies to the introduction of corporate 
governance requirements for best practices that are based on the OECD principles. 
 
Based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-culture model, the secretive nature of societies in both 
jurisdictions is expected to reduce the levels of compliance (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005; 
Samaha& Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Ismail et al., 2010). Indeed, the importance of the impact of 
secrecy on financial disclosure practices has been highlighted by many researchers (e.g, Gray & 
97 
Vint, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; 
Ismail et al., 2010). Secretive cultures are associated with strong uncertainty avoidance that results 
from the need to restrict information disclosure so as to avoid conflict and competition and to 
preserve security. Secrecy is also associated with large power distance resulting in the restriction of 
information to preserve power inequalities (Gray, 1988). 
 
On the other hand, agency theory supposes that low investor demand for improved disclosure, and 
hence low monitoring costs, reduces management incentives to comply with IFRSs (Abd-Elsalam, 
1999; Omar, 2007). Finally, based on cost-benefit analysis, the weak enforcement of IFRSs and 
low sanctions if any in both jurisdictions cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance 
costs for listed companies, and thus, directs management incentives toward non-compliance (Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005). 
 
Based on the above discussion, the first research hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H1: There are no significant statistical differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian 
contexts. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
 H1a: There are no significant statistical differences between Egypt and Jordan in their levels of 
compliance with overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
H1b: There are no significant statistical differences between Egypt and Jordan in their dominant 
corporate governance structures and other company characteristics. 
 
5.3.2 Explanatory Corporate Governance Variables  
Although improved disclosure and transparency are the heart of effective governance, better 
compliance with IFRSs in the MENA region jurisdictions, including Egypt and Jordan will only be 
forthcoming if cultural values change to embrace best corporate governance practice. This assertion 
is confirmed by the international reports which claim the existence of a gap between de jure and de 
facto compliance with corporate governance best practices in the MENA capital markets including 
Egypt and Jordan (e.g., CIPE, 2003; ROSC, 2005; UNICTAD, 2007; IFC & Hawkamah, 2008; 
ROSC, 2009), as well as the findings of prior studies carried out within the MENA context that 
recognise the negative impact of secrecy on compliance practices (e.g., Dahawy & Conover, 2007; 
Dahawy, 2009; Al-Omari, 2010; Ismail et al., 2010).Thus, it is important to explore the current 
influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements within the MENA context. Although the existence of an audit committee is an 
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important mechanism for providing an oversight of the internal audit activities as well as 
overseeing the overall relationship with the external auditor including the non-audit services that 
might be provided by the external auditor (OECD, 2004: 55), the non-availability of data relating to 
this variable for most of the companies listed on the EGX, resulted in excluding this variable from 
the empirical analysis. The relationship between the selected corporate governance explanatory 
variabes (test variables) and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is 
explored by statistically testing the following hypotheses. 
 
5.3.2.1 BOD Independence 
Board independence is an important governance mechanism that is supportd by corporate 
governance reforms in Egypt and Jordan (Samaha, 2010; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Samaha, 2010; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). The detailed discussion of board independence provided in 
section 3.5.1 confirmed that board independence is recognised in scrutinised countries however in 
most cases independent directors lack material independence (CIPE, 2003; IFC & Hawkamah, 
2008; ROSC, 2009). The lack of material independence will not improve BOD monitoring function, 
hence compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements will not improve. Dominance of secretive 
culture may result in hiding company strategic information from independent directors and hence 
will not enable them to carry out their responsibilities as expected. Furthermore, based on the 
notions of  the institutional isomorphism and cost-benefit analysis, it can be proposed that, 
independent directors are recognised in boards in order for the companies just to gain legitimacy 
and respect regardless of their role in monitoring compliance with IFRSs. Hence, decoupling will 
continue as companies will state that they comply with IFRSs while full compliance is absent. In 
addition, weak enforcement of IFRSs by the capital market authorities causes non-compliance costs 
to be less than compliance costs. Consequently, as a result compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements will not improve. 
 
The lack of empirical evidence with respect to the association between board independence and 
levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements within the Egyptian context 
and the availability of only one study that investigates such issue within the Jordanian context using 
earlier data; 1996 and 2004 respectively (Al-Akra et al., 2010a), support the need for further 
investigation.  
 
The findings of prior studies that investigate the association between board independence and 
voluntary disclosures within the Egyptian context report a significant positive relationship (Ezat & 
El-Masry, 2008; Samaha, 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). They attribute this result to the 
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proposition that board independence improves the monitoring function of the board, hence results 
in better transparency. However, the findings of prior research that investigates the association 
between board independence and disclosure practices in Jordan (mandatory and voluntary) do not 
support any significant association between board independence and the extent of disclosure (Al-
Akra et al, 2010a,b). Accordingly, the second research hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H2: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD independence and the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H2a: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD independence and the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. 
H2b: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD independence and the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.2.2 Board Leadership 
As previously mentioned in section 3.5.2, role duality is recognised in scrutinised stock exchanges, 
and it is more obvious within the Egyptian context, although according to article 3.6 of the ECCG it 
is not considered as a best practice. 
  
According to the notions of the institutional isomorphism, separating the CEO and Chair positions 
has no influence on independence, as long as there is no awareness regarding the importance of 
separating the positions of the CEO and the Chair in improving the monitoring function and hence 
the quality of financial reporting within the business firm. Consequently, no significant impact on 
levels of compliance with IFRSs is expected when the positions are carried out by two different 
persons, due to the existence of cultural barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of 
the two positions as recommended under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
However, since no impact is felt by the separation of the two roles, companies may fall in line with 
the separation recommendations purely to gain respect. On the other hand, based on Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model, the notions of agency theory and cost benefit-analysis, the secretive 
culture accompanied with weak monitoring whether the two positions are separated or held by one 
person and the lack of strict enforcement of compliance, non-compliance costs will continue to be 
less than compliance costs. Consequently, the separation between the CEO and Chair positions may 
not result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and decoupling is thus expected 
to continue (companies state that financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs while 
full compliance is absent).   
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As previously indicated in section 3.5.2 the findings from previous research into the association 
between board leadership and levels of financial disclosure are mixed. On the level of developing 
countries, some studies show that role duality is significantly associated with a lower level of 
financial disclosure (Haniffa, 1999 and Haniffa & Cooke, 2002 in Malaysia on the impact of 
culture and corporate governance on companies' financial disclosure practices). In contrast, others 
demonstrate that there is no association between role duality and financial disclosure or reporting 
quality (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006 in Malaysia on the impact of corporate governance structures 
on voluntary disclosures in annual reports; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008 in Egypt on the impact of 
corporate governance structures on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting), and one study 
(Abed et al., 2011 in Jordan on the impact of corporate characterisitics on the inclusion of forcasts 
in the narrative sections of annual reports) reports a positive relationship between role duality and 
corporate disclosure practices. The contradictory nature of these results and the non availability of a 
study that investigates the association between board leadership and levels of compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in both of scrutinised stock exchanges, make it difficult 
to predict the type of the relationship between board leadership and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs in the scrutinised MENA jurisdictions. Accordingly, the third research hypothesis can be 
stated as follows: 
H3: There are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and the Chair 
and those that do not. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H3a: There are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and the Chair 
and those that do not in the Egyptian context. 
H3b: There are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and the Chair 
and those that do not in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.2.3 Board Size 
As demonstrated in section 3.5.3 board size is one of the corporate governance mechanisms that 
help in aligning management and shareholder interests (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Abdelsalam & 
Street, 2007). 
 
Given that ownership in scrutinised stock exchanges is still concentrated and that to a great extent 
there is no separation between ownership and control (CIPE, 2003, UNCTAD, 2007; ROSC, 2009; 
Al-Akra et al., 2010a), as demonstrated in section 3.5.3, board size is expected to have no impact 
101 
on improving the monitoring function of the board specifically with the lack of material 
independence of board members. On the other hand, the lack of experience and awareness 
regarding the role of board memebers in overseeing management behaviour and ensuring 
compliance with IFRSs mean that the problem of decoupling will continue. Furthermore, given the 
secretive nature of scrutinised societies and the lack of separation between ownership and control, 
boards will not enforce management to disclose any information that may affect company's 
competitive position as long as non compliance costs are less than compliance costs which is the 
norm in scrutinised stock exchanges due to the absence of strict enforcement of IFRSs.  
 
As previously mentioned in section 3.5.3 findings from previous research into the association 
between board size and levels of financial disclosure are mixed. Some researchers report a positive 
relationship (Barako et al., 2006; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). However, others 
find no association (Lakhal, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Abed et al., 
2011). The contradictory nature of these results and the non availability of a study that investigates 
the association between board size and levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 
the Egyptian context and the availability of only one study that investigates such association in the 
Jordanian context (Al-Akra et al., 2010a) make it difficult to predict the type of the relationship 
between board size and levels of compliance with IFRSs in the scrutinised MENA capital markets. 
Accordingly, the fourth research hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H4: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD size and the extent of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H4a: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD size and the extent of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. 
H4b: There is no significant statistical relationship between BOD size and the extent of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.2.4 Ownership Structure 
The detailed discussion of ownership structure provided in section 3.6 demonstrated inconsistencies 
in its impact on financial disclosure practices, and hence a need to revisit this issue. Considering the 
patterns of ownership structure in the listed MENA region companies examined in this study and 
the availability of ownership structure-related data for these companies, this study investigates the 
influence of ownership structure on levels of compliance with IFRSs in Egypt and Jordan, using 
four distinct measures: government ownership, management ownership, private ownership, and 
public ownership. 
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5.3.2.4.1 Government Ownership 
Two distinct viewpoints emerge regarding the impact of dominant government ownership as 
indicated in Chapter Three. The first perceives this as advantageous, potentially improving 
disclosure practices and stimulating management to adopt competent disclosure policies (Suwaidan, 
1997; Denis & McConnil, 2003). In this regard, Eng and Mak (2003) suggest government 
ownership increases moral hazard and the possibility of agency problems due to the conflict 
between the pure profit goals of a commercial enterprise and goals related to the interests of the 
nation; thus management is expected to disclose more information to reduce monitoring costs. Also, 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) argue that dominant government ownership may result in more 
disclosure by company management in order to reflect the state’s commitment to transparency. 
This argument is emphasised by Li and Harrison (2008) who state that when the government is a 
major owner, it is important for the BOD to appear to be legitimate and accountable to the public to 
support the political goals of bureaucrats. Thus, levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements are expected to increase to reduce agency costs. 
 
The other viewpoint is that dominant government ownership promotes low disclosure levels as 
governments can directly request any information required from company management (Al-Razeen, 
1999; Naser et al., 2006). Government-controlled enterprises may not need to attract potential 
investors as they can obtain cheaper funds from local banks. Also, political affiliations may result 
in less detailed information being disclosed to protect the beneficial owners (Ghazali, 2004:119). 
Agency theory argues that this reduces monitoring costs, and hence, management incentives to 
improve disclosure. Furthermore, dominant government ownership results in the government 
appointing many of the board members from its officials regardless of their qualification or 
experience. This creates the problem of ‘who watches the watchers’ since management in such 
companies is overwhelmingly chosen from government officials (Mensah, 2002 cited in Tsamenyi, 
2007:322; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). 
 
Simultaneously, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism confirm a management preference for secrecy within MENA societies, to 
preserve their reputation. In addition, the lack of awareness among listed companies’ managements 
regarding the importance of compliance, the lack of awareness among BOD members regarding the 
importance of best corporate governance practice in improving disclosure practices, the weak 
enforcement of laws and regulations, and low demand for improved disclosures due to 
government’s direct access to company information or the lack of qualified government officials to 
monitor company compliance with IFRSs, all precipitate lower non-compliance than compliance 
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costs. Furthermore, the lack of incentives for members of the public (who implicitly own 
government shares) to directly monitor the management of government-owned firms in the studied 
stock exchanges causes non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs, and thus will not 
stimulate management to improve compliance. These circumstances contribute to the problem of 
decoupling.  
    
Previous research results concerning the association between government ownership and levels of 
financial disclosure are mixed. For instance, Eng and Mak (2003) report a positive relationship 
while Al-Razeen (1999) and Naser et al. (2006) report a negative one and Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) find a negative, but insignificant relationship. On the level of scrutinised stock exchanges, 
the results of all studies that investigate the association between government ownership and the 
extent of corporate disclosure do not support the existence of any association (Naser, 1998 in 
Jordan; Naser et al., 2002 in Jordan; Al-Akra et al., 2010a in Jordan; Smaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011 
in Egypt). Accordingly, hypothesis 5a can be stated as follows: 
 
H5a: There is no significant statistical relationship between the government ownership ratio and 
the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H5a1: There is no significant statistical relationship between the government ownership ratio and 
the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. 
H5a2: There is no significant statistical relationship between the government ownership ratio and 
the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.2.4.2 Management Ownership 
Dominant management ownership is expected to reduce levels of compliance with IFRSs as 
managerial ownership has the potential to align the interests of shareholders and managers (Kelton 
& Yang, 2008), and reconcile agency conflicts that may arise between managers and shareholders. 
Hence, it is likely to reduce the latter’s demands for monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008). Having the potential to reduce the asymmetry 
resulting from the separation of ownership from control, such ownership is expected to precipitate a 
larger volume of unstructured information for shareholders (Mavrommatti, 2008). Furthermore, 
Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, institutional isomorphism and cost-benefit analysis, 
all suggest the following outcomes: a) a secretive culture which causes management to minimise 
disclosure to safeguard trade secrets, b) a lack of awareness among management and board 
members of listed companies on the scrutinised stock exchanges regarding the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs and best corporate governance practices that encourage transparency, c) 
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weak enforcement of laws and regulations by capital market authorities and weak sanctions if any, 
d) low demand for improved disclosures and insufficient monitoring from small shareholders who 
cannot put voting pressures on management of listed companies who are in most cases dominant 
shareholders and members of the BOD. The combination of these outcomes will cause non-
compliance costs to be less than compliance costs for company management, and thus, will not 
stimulate management to improve levels of compliance with IFRSs. Consequently, full compliance 
will not be in evidence. 
 
The results of most previous research on the association between management ownership and 
levels of financial disclosure show a negative association (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & 
Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008). On the level of 
scrutinised stock exchanges this association was examined only in Egypt by Samaha and Dahawy 
(2010; 2011) who investigate the association between management ownership and levels of 
voluntary disclosures. Although Samaha and Dahawy (2011) do not find any association, Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010) report a significant negative association. Hence, the effect of managerial 
ownership on the levels of compliance with IFRSs is expected to be substitutive.  
Accordingly, research hypothesis 5b can be stated as follows: 
 
H5b: There is a significant negative statistical relationship between the mangement ownership 
ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H5b1: There is a significant negative statistical relationship between the mangement ownership 
ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. 
H5b2: There is a significant negative statistical relationship between the mangement ownership 
ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.2.4.3 Private Ownership 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the dominance of private ownership is common among companies 
listed on both the EGX and ASE. This results in private investors’ active involvement in company 
management either as executives or as directors. In most cases, private ownership in the scrutinised 
stock exchanges takes the form of private entities which are family-owned. 
 
Agency theory suggests that the dominance of private shareholders may reduce the requirement for 
management monitoring (Eng & Mak, 2003; Abdelslam & El-Masry, 2008). Hence, when share 
ownership is less diffused, levels of financial disclosure are negatively affected. Many researchers 
agree, suggesting that the demand for greater disclosure is decreased as owners have access to all 
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company information (Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998; Archambult & Archambult, 2003; Eng & Mak, 
2003). Consequently, in this case the main role of corporate governance would be to align the 
interests of strong private shareholders and weak minority shareholders rather than to align the 
interests of managers and owners (Mavrommati, 2008:101). 
 
Furthermore, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, institutional isomorphism, agency 
theory and cost-benefit analysis suggest the following: a) the secretive culture causes private 
shareholders to encourage management to minimise disclosure to preserve trade secrets and 
company strategic plans, b) the lack of awareness among management and BOD members of listed 
companies regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs and of following best corporate 
governance practices to enhance transparency, c) the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, 
and d) low demand for improved disclosures due to private shareholders’ direct access to company 
information and insignificant voting pressures from small shareholders. These outcomes cause non-
compliance costs to be less then compliance costs, and hence management is not encouraged to 
improve disclosure levels, and the decoupling problem is enhanced, companies claiming they are 
applying IFRSs whereas full compliance is actually absent. 
 
In contrast, agency theory may also propose that when private ownership is dominant, the owner is 
able to monitor and influence management performance by personally sitting on the BOD to protect 
the economic stakes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Li & Harrison, 2008), thereby improving 
management compliance with IFRSs.  
 
Similar to government ownership, no consensus exists among researchers regarding the influence 
of private ownership on compliance levels with financial disclosure requirements. Some 
researchers report private ownership to be complementary (improving IFRSs compliance levels) as 
substantial shareholding by block investors (e.g., private shareholders) may result in more 
disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002). On the contrary, Naser et al. (2006) report that concentrated ownership and financial 
disclosure are substitutes (dominance of private shareholders reduces levels of financial disclosure) 
while yet other scholars find no association between these two variables (Suwaidan, 1997; Depoers, 
2000; Omar, 2007). On the level of scrutinised stock exchanges, this issue has been examined in 
Egypt by Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) who report a negative association. However in Jordan 
Suwaidan (1997), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) do not find any association.  
Accordingly, research hypothesis 5c can be stated as follows: 
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H5c: There is no significant statistical relationship between the private ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H5c1: There is no significant statistical relationship between the private ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. 
H5c2: There is no significant statistical relationship between the private ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.2.4.4 Public Ownership 
Agency theory suggests that the dominance of public ownership effectively separates ownership 
from the control of corporate decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Li & Harrison, 2008). Public 
shareholders delegate internal control to the BOD which then delegates decision- making to 
management (Li & Harrison, 2008). 
 
Researchers argue that the dominance of public ownership improves levels of financial disclosure 
in order to solve the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. As public investors 
lack first-hand access to information, management needs to disclose more information to prove it is 
acting in the best interests of shareholders (McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993; Gelb, 2000; Arcay & 
Vazquez, 2005). Consequently, it is expected that levels of compliance will be higher in companies 
with dominant public ownership. However, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, 
institutional isomorphism and cost-benefit analysis argue the opposite because: a) the secretive 
culture in the studied stock exchanges causes management to avoid outflow of stock market price-
sensitive information, b) secrecy is also associated with large power distance and a preference for 
collectivism, c) the lack of awareness among management and the BOD of listed companies 
regarding the importance of compliance and following corporate governance best practices to 
enhance transparency, d) weak enforcement of laws and regulations, e) low demand for improved 
disclosures due to the lack of awareness among public investors in developing capital markets 
including the scrutinised stock exchanges regarding their right to ask for more disclosures, f) the 
absence of independent board members with the primary responsibility of protecting public 
shareholders’ rights, and g) public shareholders in the MENA region do not exercise their rights. In 
addition, based on agency theory low monitoring costs will not encourage management to improve 
compliance with IFRSs. Consequently, all these factors cause non-compliance costs to be less than 
compliance costs and hence, motivate management to minimise disclosure, whilst simultaneously 
contributing to the decoupling problem. 
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The results of most prior studies show a positive association between public ownership and levels 
of financial disclosure (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). In 
Egypt this issue was investigated with respect to voluntary disclosures by Ezat and El-Masry (2008) 
who report a significant positive relationship. However in Jordan although Al-Akra et al. (2010b) 
results support the existence of a significant negative association and Al-Htaybat (2005) supports 
the existence of a significant positive relationship, Naser et al. (2002) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a) 
findings do not support the existence of association between public ownership ratio and the levels 
of compliance with IFRSs. Accordingly, research hypothesis 5d can be stated as follows: 
 
H5d: There is no significant statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
This hypothesis can be further divided into the following two hypotheses. 
H5d1: There is no significant statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context. 
H5d2: There is no significant statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
5.3.3 Control Variables 
The review of financial disclosure studies (Appendix 1) particularly those conducted in Egypt and 
Jordan (e.g., Naser et al., 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Omar, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 
2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011), as well as the availability of data, 
led to the decision to incorporate the following firm-specific characteristics in the multivariate 
analysis as control variables: company size, profitability, gearing, liquidity, type of business 
activity, and type of audit firm. 
 
5.3.3.1 Company Size 
Several studies have used company size as an explanatory variable for financial disclosure on the 
ground that larger companies are more likely to disclose a greater number of items than smaller 
ones (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Naser et al., 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ali et al., 2004; Ghazali, 
2004; Alsaeed, 2005; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Omar, 2007; 
Samaha & Stapleton, 2009). 
 
Referring to political cost theory, many researchers argue that large companies are more likely to 
provide more disclosure and to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements as they may be 
more subject to public scrutiny or more sensitive to criticism for falling short of disclosure 
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requirements compared to small firms (Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Busby, 1975; Firth, 
1979; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005). 
 
Referring to agency theory, many researchers propose that large companies are more likely to 
disclose more information because of large numbers of shareholders and the associated pressures 
(e.g., Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Ali et al., 
2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007). 
 
Also, using capital need theory, many researchers claim that larger companies are more likely to 
disclose more information in order to raise funds at lower costs (e.g., Cooke, 1991; Meek et al., 
1995; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Ali et al., 2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, using cost-benefit analysis, many researchers argue that large firms are more likely to 
disclose more information because for them, the costs of non-compliance are higher than the costs 
of compliance. Also, large companies are more likely to disclose more information because of 
lower costs associated with collecting and publishing information and limited impact on the 
competitive position compared to small companies (e.g, Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; 
Busby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Ali et al., 2004; Al-
Htaybat, 2005). 
 
Abd-Elsalam (1999:43) summarises the possible impacts of company size as a determinant of 
disclosure levels, claiming it to be “a comprehensive variable which can proxy a number of 
corporate attributes such as competitive advantage, information productive costs and political 
costs. In other words, it is a reflection of agency theory (e.g. large number of shareholders and 
debt-holders), capital need theory (more likely to collect capital from outsiders) and political costs 
(in the public eye)”. 
 
Most previous research investigating the association between company size and levels of financial 
disclosure, has revealed a positive correlation (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Naser et al., 2006). Consequently, company 
size is adopted in this study as a control variable, being expected to demonstrate a positive 
relationship with compliance levels. 
 
5.3.3.2 Company Profitability 
Many previous studies have used company profitability as an explanatory variable (e.g., Wallace & 
Naser, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Patton & Zelenka, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 
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2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007), on the grounds that agency theory 
suggests that the separation between ownership and control raises the need for investors to monitor 
management performance to ensure their interests are protected (Al-Htaybat, 2005). In this regard, 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that disclosures are likely to relate to a firm’s profitability, only 
if perceived information asymmetry between managers and investors is high. 
 
Based on signaling theory, Wallace & Naser (1995); Abd-Elsalam (1999) and Al-Htaybat (2005) 
suggest that highly profitable firms are more likely to signal their superior performance to the 
market by disclosing greater information in their annual reports. This viewpoint is shared by other 
researchers, such as Singhvi and Desai (1971), who argue that managers are incentivised to disclose 
more information when a company’s profit is higher than the average for the industry, as this will 
enhance public confidence in its continuity, and thus lead to an increase in management 
compensation. 
 
Another explanation based on political cost theory is provided by Inchusti (1997) who argues that 
managements of companies with high profits are motivated to disclose more in order to justify 
these profits. 
 
Evidence relating to the association between firm profitability and levels of financial disclosure is 
mixed. Some studies report a positive association between these variables (e.g., Singhvi, 1968; 
Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Raffournier, 1995; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006), while 
others report a significant negative association between them (e.g., Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978; 
Wallace & Naser, 1995). Consequently, company profitability is employed as a control variable in 
this study, however the direction of the relationship between the two variables is unpredictable. 
 
5.3.3.3 Company Liquidity 
Liquidity is used as a proxy for the company’s ability to meet its short term debts without selling its 
long term assets. It is used by investors, regulators and creditors to evaluate the ability of the 
company to continue as a going concern (Omar, 2007). Consequently, management will disclose 
more information about company ability to meet debts and continue as a going concern to alleviate 
any doubts in this regard by investors and creditors (Wallace & Naser, 1995; Omar, 2007).   
 
Abd-Elsalam (1999) suggests that according to signaling theory, firms with a high liquidity ratio 
are expected to disclose more information in order to be differentiated from other companies with a 
lower liquidity ratio. However, according to agency theory, firms with a low percentage of liquidity 
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tend to disclose more information in order to reduce the conflict between shareholders and creditors 
(Abd-Elsalam, 1999). 
 
Evidence from prior research on this issue is mixed. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) report a positive 
relationship between liquidity and disclosure in Canadian firms, explaining this in terms of 
signaling theory. In contrast, Wallace et al. (1994) and Naser et al. (2002) find a negative 
relationship, accounting for this using agency theory. Consequently, liquidity is used in this study 
as a control variable, recognising that the direction of the relationship between company liquidity 
and compliance levels is unpredictable. 
 
5.3.3.4 Company Gearing 
Gearing or leverage is one of the company characteristics used in previous empirical financial 
disclosure studies. Referring to agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed that highly 
leveraged firms would disclose more information in order to reduce monitoring costs. Malone et al. 
(1993) argue that a high leverage ratio may cause managers to disclose more information to meet 
lenders’ requirements; however, when the leverage ratio is low managers are more concerned with 
disclosing information to meet shareholders’ needs. Within the same context, and in line with 
agency theory, Abd-Elsalam (1999) argues that more disclosure occurs when a company is highly 
leveraged so as to reduce agency costs. However, Zarzeski (1996) argues that companies with high 
debt ratios share more private information with their creditors, and thus, the need for detailed 
disclosure is diminished as creditors already have direct access to information. Also, Eng and Mak 
(2003) highlight a negative association between leverage and levels of financial disclosure, and that 
the agency costs of debt are controlled through restrictive debt covenants in debt agreements rather 
than increased disclosure of information in annual reports. 
 
Evidence regarding the association between gearing and level of financial disclosure is mixed. 
Some studies report a positive relationship (e.g., Schipper, 1981; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Malone et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 2002; 
Barako et al., 2006), whilst others find a negative relationship (e.g., Zarzeski 1996, El-Gazzar et al., 
1999; Eng & Mak 2003). Consequently, gearing is employed in this study as a control variable, 
recognising that the direction of the relationship between the two variables is unpredictable. 
 
5.3.3.5 Type of Business Activity 
The association between industry type and levels of financial disclosure has been empirically 
examined by several researchers (e.g., Stanga, 1976; Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978; McNally et al., 1982; 
Wallace, 1987; Cooke, 1989a,b; 1991; 1992; Wallace et al., 1994; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Haniffa & 
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Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b; Ismail et al., 2010). The use 
of this variable in such research is based on the assumption that levels of financial disclosure differ 
among industries. Within the same context, Meek et al. (1995) propose that proprietary costs vary 
across industries for several reasons such as the differences in the nature of their products, and their 
research and development. They give an example of chemical companies which are more sensitive 
about disclosure to competitors and the public than companies in other industries. This viewpoint is 
supported by Inchausti (1997) who argues that industry type affects the culture of financial 
reporting within companies, which is why firms belonging to particular industries may disclose 
more information than required. Abd-Elsalam (1999) also claims that companies prefer to adopt the 
same disclosure policies adopted by others from the same industry, fearing that anything different 
might be interpreted as bad news by the market. Furthermore, some businesses such as banks may 
disclose more information due to political pressures (Craig & Diga, 1998).  The domination effect 
is also used to explain disparities in disclosure practices among companies as the dominant 
companies are considered as role models by other companies, and are hence expected to influence 
the disclosure policies by their followers (Cooke, 1989b; Suwaidan, 1997). Additional reasons are 
differences in accounting policies and systems among different industries and social responsibility 
(Suwaidan, 1997). Finally, companies with diversified activities are expected to disseminate more 
information compared to un-diversified ones (Craig & Diga, 1998). 
 
Stanga (1976) was the first to investigate the relationship between type of business activity and 
levels of financial disclosure (Vlachos, 2001:115). Based on the evidence provided by prior 
research that the former influences the latter (e.g., Stanga, 1976; Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978; Cooke, 
1989a,b; 1991; 1992; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), type of business activity is employed in this study 
as a control variable. 
 
5.3.3.6 Type of Audit Firm 
The type of auditor has previously been used as an explanatory variable for financial disclosure 
practices (e.g., Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979; Malone et al., 1993; Meek et al., 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Patton & Zelenka, 1997; Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; Omar, 2007; Samaha & 
Stapleton, 2009; Ismail et al., 2010) on the grounds that a large, highly reputable audit firm will 
insist on its clients disclosing more information and complying with financial disclosure regulations 
(Firth, 1979; Malone et al., 1993; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Inchausti, 1997; Dumontier & 
Raffournier, 1998; Street & Bryant, 2000; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007). Additionally, large 
audit firms are more likely to associate themselves with clients who disclose more (Ahmed & 
Nicholls, 1994; Ali et al., 2004), possibly using the amount of disclosure as an indicator of those 
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clients’ audit quality (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Omar, 2007). Owusu-Ansah 
(1998b) argues that large audit firms have many clients thus their economic dependence on a 
certain client is less than in small audit firms, and are thus more likely to report mis-statements. 
Addtionally, they act to preserve their reputation since any damage to that will result in a loss to 
their customers or demands to reduce their fees. Moreover, their exposure to legal liability is 
greater as investors are more likely to depend on the annual reports audited by large firms. 
 
Wallace et al. (1994) argue that international audit firms have more influence on financial 
disclosure practices than local audit firms because international audit firms are larger and possess 
more auditing expertise. Furthermore, international audit firms’ staff are usually highly qualified 
and more familiar with international accounting standards and practices compared to their 
counterparts in local audit firms. This viewpoint is supported by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) 
and Joshi et al. (2008) who argue that large (big 4) audit firms have greater ability than small (non-
big 4) ones to apply IASs/IFRSs as they have the required experience and the economic resources. 
 
In line with signaling theory, Hossain et al. (1995) argue that the choice of external auditor can be 
used as a signal of firm value.  Furthermore, in line with agency theory, the use of a large audit firm 
to monitor disclosure practices helps to reduce agency costs by alleviating the conflict of interest 
between managers and owners (Hossain, et al., 1994; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Naser, 1998; Naser 
et al., 2002; Ali et al., 2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Anderson & Daoud, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; 
Omar, 2007). 
 
Based on the existing evidence of a relationship between the type of auditor and levels of company 
disclosure (e.g., Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton &  Zelenka, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Naser et al., 2002; Al-
Shiab 2003; Glaum & Street 2003; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009), type of auditor is employed in this 
study as a control variable, it being expected that auditing by a big 4 audit firm positively impacts 
on levels of compliance with IFRSs. 
 
5.3.4 Independent Variables and their Operationalisation 
The selection of the independent variables to be employed in this study and their proxies is guided 
by an extensive review of prior research27. Additionally, the choice of the independent variables is 
influenced by the nature of the business environment in Egypt and Jordan as indicated in Chapters 
Three and Four. 
                                                          
27 For more details see, parts: 2.5.3 Financial Disclosure Theories and Explanatory Variables, 3.5 Board Characteristics, 
3.6 Ownership Structure, 5.3 Research Hypotheses and the Summary of empirical financial disclosure studies presented 
in Appendix 1. 
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Test Variables:  
1. Country (1 if Jordan, 0 if Egypt). 
2. BOD Independence (Proxied by the proportion of independent directors to total number of 
directors on the board). 
3. Board Leadership (1 if the Chairman is not the CEO, 0 if the Chairman is the CEO). 
4. Board size (Proxied by the total number of directors on the board). 
5. Government Ownership ratio (Proxied by the percentage of company shares owned by the 
government).  
6. Management Ownership ratio (Proxied by the percentage of company shares owned by 
company management). 
7. Private Ownership (Proxied by the percentage of company shares owned by private 
shareholders). 
8. Public Ownership (Proxied by the percentage of company shares owned by the free float28).  
Control Variables: 
1. Size of the company (Proxied by total assets). 
2. Profitability of the company (Proxied by return on assets [ROA]). 
3. Gearing (Proxied by debt to equity). 
4. Liquidity (Proxied by quick ratio29). 
5. Type of business (1 if non-manufacturing; 0 if manufacturing). 
6. Type of audit firm (1 if not a big 4, 0 if a big 4). 
 
The independent variables include four dummy (categorical) variables (board leadership, type of 
business activity, type of audit firm, and country name) and the remaining variables are continuous. 
Furthermore, the majority of independent variables cannot be measured directly, and are thus 
measured by proxying them (board independence, government ownership, management ownership, 
private ownership, public ownership, company size, profitability, gearing and liquidity). 
 
5.4 Research Design and Methodology 
Research methodology can broadly be defined as the overall research approach, beginning with the 
development of the theoretical foundation and ending with the collection and analysis of data 
(Collis & Hussey, 2003). Baker and Foy (2008) state that in academic disciplines, research 
worthiness is assessed based on the amount it advances knowledge, clarifies or adds to a theory and 
stimulates further investigation. Crotty (2007:3) defines research methodology as “the strategy, 
                                                          
28 Any party owning less than 5% of company shares. 
29 Quick Ratio= current Assets-Inventories/Current Liabilities. 
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plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and the use of particular methods and 
linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes”.  
 
Discussion of research methodology is not complete without some consideration of ontology and 
epistemology which represent essential methodological issues. Epistemology or the theory of 
knowledge is defined by Crotty (2007:3) as “a way of understanding and explaining how we know 
what we know”. He argues that it is embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby, in the 
methodology. Baker and Foy (2008:41) refer to epistemology as “what is regarded as acceptable 
knowledge in a discipline”. In addition, Gill and Johnson (1997) argue that our epistemological 
commitment influences the way we ask a particular question, the assessment of the relevance and 
the value of different research methodologies to investigate research question(s), and how we 
evaluate research output. On the other hand, ontology represents another important concept that is 
highly correlated with epistemology. Baker and Foy (2008:41) refer to ontology as “the theory 
concerning the nature of social entities”, arguing that different research approaches relate to 
different philosophical assumptions about ontology and epistemology. Walliman (2006) supports 
this viewpoint and considers epistemology and ontology as affecting the theoretical basis of how 
the world is experienced, what constitutes knowledge and what can be done with that knowledge. 
Consequently, the epistemological and ontological outlook will both influence the interpretation 
and understanding of research findings. 
 
Figure 5.1 summarises the study’s design and methodology, which aims to secure the objectives, 
and enhance the understanding and interpretations of the empirical findings. 
 
 
Stage (4) 
Construction of Diclosure Checklist 
Stage (3) 
Measuring the Identified Independent Variables 
Stage (2) 
Identifying Relevant Independent Variables 
Stage (1)  
Literature Review 
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Figure 5.1: Research Design and Methodology 
The ten stages in Figure 5.1 are self-explanatory, culminating in the generation of results from 
which inferences can be made. 
 
5.5 Research Methods 
Crotty (2007:30) defines research methods as “the techniques or procedures used to gather and 
analyse data related to some research questions or hypotheses”. They may be quantitative or 
qualitative, distinguished by the latter collecting data that is mainly in the form of words (opinions, 
feelings, perceptions, etc) rather than numbers as in quantitative research (Punch, 1998; Walliman, 
2006; Neuman, 2006). Quantitative research methods are more unidimentional, less variable and 
more easily replicable than qualitative research methods (Punch, 1998). The most important 
adavantage of quantitative data is that it enables standardised objective comparisons, whilst the 
greatest advantage of qualitative methods is flexibility, meaning they are useful in a wider range of 
research (Punch, 1998). However, both can be complementary (Neuman, 2006). To gain the 
benefits of each, this study employs both methods, although as the objectives are related to 
measuring compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and its relationship with corporate 
governance structures, quantitative research methods dominate. 
 
Stage (10) 
Interpreting Results 
Stage (9) 
Conducting Interviews 
Stage (8) 
Statistical Analyses 
Stage (7) 
Scoring the Levels of Complaince with IFRSs Using 
the Refined Checklist 
Stage (6) 
Pilot Study on a number of Randomly Selected 
Annual Reports of Listed Companies on the EGX and 
the ASE 
Stage (5) 
Assessment of the Initial Discloure Checklist 
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In this study, quantitative research methods are employed through the construction of a disclosure 
index, scoring compliance levels, developing and testing research hypotheses, and statistically 
analysing and interpreting the results. On the other hand, in order to improve the interpretation of 
the empirical findings, semi-structured interviews (qualitative method) are undertaken with parties 
involved in educating, practising or enforcing the adoption of IFRSs by companies listed on the 
scrutinised exchanges, and with some individual (naïve) investors trading on them. The use of 
interviews to support the explanation and interpretation of the findings of the primary quantitative 
method (disclosure index) is classified under sequential explanatory design (Creswell, 2003:215). 
This design comprises the collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data, and their 
final integration in the interpretation of the study findings (Creswell, 2003). 
 
A multi-method strategy (triangulation) combining quantitative (disclosure index) and qualitative 
(interviews) methods, using primary (interview findings) and secondary (annual reports) data has 
the advantage of supporting or clarifying results (Saunders et al., 2003; Ghazali, 2004). Moreover, 
it helps to increase the scope, depth and power of research (Punch, 1998), and to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge this study is one of the first comparative studies combining both methods 
to investigate compliance with IFRSs in the MENA region. Hence, it is expected to provide a 
deeper understanding of this issue in this particular context. 
 
5.5.1 The Disclosure Index 
Disclosure refers to any information released by a specific company (Hope, 2003:227). Wallace 
(1987) observes that financial disclosure is an abstract concept which cannot be measured directly 
because it does not possess those characteristics by which one can determine its intensity or quality. 
In their review of different published approaches to the analysis of narratives in annual reports, 
Beattie et al. (2004) indicate the disclosure index as among the most commonly used. Hossain et al. 
(1995) note that a disclosure index can be employed as a proxy for the extent of information 
disclosed by firms, and Wallace (1988:450) defines such an instrument as “a measure by which the 
level of financial reporting of one company can be compared with another. It can also be used to 
measure the degree of disclosure of an item of information by enterprises within a country and is 
the ratio of actual scores awarded to the company and the scores which that company is expected 
to earn”. 
 
Marston and Shrives (1991) note the varying functions of a disclosure index, mentioning its use in 
determining the extent of disclosure among different companies, measuring the degree of 
compliance with regulations, and measuring the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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A disclosure index is used in this study for several reasons. Firstly, it is the most frequently used 
instrument in financial disclosure research (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Busby, 1974; 
Stanga, 1976; Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2007; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b). Secondly, it 
provides a single figure summary indicator of the entire contents of the annual reports of 
comparable firms, hence it captures differences between financial reporting practices of those firms 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991; Hossain et al, 1995). Thirdly, it is a tool capable of exploring the nature 
and the extent of disclosure as well as it facilitates an objective and easy operationalisation of the 
extent of disclosure (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Omar, 2007). 
 
The extensive review of financial disclosure studies indicates that no one commonly-used set of 
disclosure indices exists, this being influenced by the research purpose(s), design and context. 
Hence, the chosen indices depend on the researcher’s judgment in the light of the characteristics of 
the financial market(s) under scrutiny. 
 
5.5.1.1 Disclosure Items 
The choice of the type and number of information items to be included in the disclosure index is an 
important consideration in its construction. There is no theory governing the choice of items, and 
hence, these vary in different studies (Wallace, 1988; Wallace & Naser, 1995). Some researchers 
have constructed disclosure checklists based on the needs of a specific user group such as financial 
analysts or managers (e.g., Buzby 1975; Chow & Wong- Boren 1987; Malone et al., 1993), but the 
majority have chosen to develop disclosure checklists which are not based on the needs of a 
specific user group (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Al-Mulhem 1997; Suwaidan 
1997; Abd-Elsalam 1999; Haniffa & Cooke 2002) and this study follows that practice. 
 
To meet this study’s objectives, the researcher uses a self-constructed checklist of 275 mandatory 
disclosure items, based on the IFRSs required to be followed by the IASB in preparing financial 
statements for the fiscal year beginning January 2007. Although the use of an existing disclosure 
checklist enables comparability with prior research as indicated by Marston and Shrives (1991), the 
extensive review of prior research that concerned with Egypt and Jordan (e.g., Abd-Elsalam 1999; 
Al-Htaybat, 2005; Dahawy & Conover, 2007; Omar, 2007; Samaha & Stapleton, 2008; 2009; 
Dahawy, 2009; Al-Akra et al, 2010a; Ismail et al., 2010) promulgates the non-existence of a 
checklist that is relevant to the IFRSs for the year 2007. Furthermore, objective comparison 
between the EGX and ASE necessitates the development of an appropriate disclosure checklist that 
takes into consideration the nature of both contexts. 
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The initial disclosure index consisted of 539 items of information, which were subsequently refined 
through the following series of steps: 
 
Firstly, the disclosure index was checked against the dominant laws and regulations in Egypt and 
Jordan to evaluate its potential applicability to companies operating in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors on the scrutinised stock exchanges 30 . A number of IFRSs were then 
excluded, being inconsistent with the requirements of the national regulations governing their 
matter in the two countries. Exclusions were: IAS 12:Income Taxes, IAS 17:Leases, IAS 
19:Employee Benefits, and IAS 26:Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans. 
Additionally, IAS 29:Financial Reporting in Hyper Inflationary Economies was excluded due to its 
irrelevance to the nature of the economies of Egypt and Jordan, and IAS 34:Interim Financial 
Reporting was excluded as it is beyond the scope of this study. This step resulted in reducing the 
number of items to 474. 
 
Secondly, To make sure that the checklist items reflect the reporting trend of investigated 
companies and to enable more objective comparison of compliance behaviour between scrutinised 
countries and among companies, following the recommendations of prior researchers (e.g., Cooke 
& Wallace, 1989; Marston & Shrives, 1991; Haniffa, 1999; Ghazali, 2004), the disclosure index 
was checked against a sample of the annual reports of listed companies for the fiscal year ending 31 
December, 2007. This enabled the researcher to determine the potential applicability and relevance 
of the disclosure index items to the accounting practices that are common among listed non-
financial companies on the EGX and ASE. Based on this review, some IFRSs which were not 
observed in the annual reports of the piloted companies were excluded. These IFRSs are IFRS 
2:Share Based Payment, IAS 10:Events after the Balance Sheet Date, IAS 20:Accounting for 
Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance, IAS 32:Financial Instruments 
Presentation, and IAS 40:Agriculture. The scoring of the remaining annual reports confirmed that 
the excluded IFRSs do not reflect the reporting trend in investigated stock exchanges as they were 
not recognised in scrutinised companies. 
 
Thirdly, to avoid the problem of duplication of an information item in the event of it being required 
by more than one standard, a careful review of the information items was made to ensure that the 
most comprehensive requirement was the one selected and that no information items were repeated. 
 
                                                          
30 When a requirement of IFRSs contradicts with the requirements of national laws, companies must follow the 
requirements of national laws. 
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Fourthly, a draft of the refined checklist was further reviewed by two Accounting Staff members; 
one from Egypt and the other from Jordan, the researcher’s first supervisor, an auditor in the 
KPMG auditing firm, and an expert in financial reporting practices in the MENA region to verify 
its validity and make sure that the checklist items are clear, well presented and accurately reflect 
the requirements of the IFRSs. 
 
The final disclosure checklist includes 275 items (see Appendix 2), being divided into 20 sub-
indices. The first sub-index demonstrates IFRS 3:Business Combinations which to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge is investigated for the first time in the MENA region. The remaining sub-
indices demonstrate IAS 1:Presentation of Financial Statements, IAS 2: Inventories, IAS 7:Cash 
flow Statements, IAS 8:Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors, IAS 
11:Construction Contracts, IAS 14:Segment Reporting, IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment, 
IAS 18:Revenue, IAS 21:The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates, IAS 23:Borrowing 
Costs, IAS 24:Related Party Transactions, IAS 27: Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements, 
IAS 28:Investments in Associates, IAS 31: Investment in Joint Ventures, IAS 33:Earnings per 
Share, IAS 36:Impairment of Assets, IAS 37:Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets, IAS 38:Intangible Assets, and IAS 40: Investment Property. 
 
The organisation of the disclosure index by standard was driven by study’s objectives, and its 
nature as a comparative study. In addition to enabling measurement of levels of compliance with 
overall mandatory IFRSs, this structure was expected to enable a clear and accurate measurement 
of the level of compliance with every single standard, and hence to improve the objectivity of the 
comparison across both the countries, and companies within the same country. Given that the 
majority of disclosure checklists used in existing literature are organised by topic, the design of the 
index in this study goes one step further. 
 
5.5.1.2 Scoring and Weighting the Disclosure Items 
The review of previous studies has revealed that the extent of disclosure can be assessed using 
either the weighted or unweighted approaches. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the steps followed by the 
researcher in order to assign scores to the population of non-financial companies listed on the stock 
exchanges of Egypt and Jordan. 
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Figure 5.2: Scoring Disclosure Items 
Figure 5.2 shows that in scoring the corporate annual reports, the refined disclosure checklist was 
employed and then a dichotomous scale was applied (the disclosure item scored 1 if it was 
disclosed and 0 if it was not disclosed although the company had to disclose it). Finally, disclosure 
scores were calculated for submission to statistical analyses. 
 
This method of scoring and weighting corporate annual reports is similar to that in previous studies 
(e.g., Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Abd-Elsalam, 1999, Haniffa, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 
2007), and justified by the nature of this study as it does not spotlight the information needs of any 
particular user group of such reports. It is assumed that each item is of equal importance, thereby 
removing the subjectivity involved in assigning weights to different information items when user 
preferences are known. Furthermore, prior research indicates that there might be no significant 
difference between the weighted and unweighted disclosure index especially when the index 
includes a large number of information items (Firth, 1980; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Abraham, 
2008). Also, a weighted approach might be misleading because the relative importance of each item 
may vary from company to company, industry to industry, and from time to time (Abd El-Salam, 
1999:152). The problem of inapplicable items across sectors has been reduced by excluding banks 
and financial institutions from the sample. 
 
To avoid the problem of penalising a company for non-disclosure of an inapplicable information 
item, a careful review of the entire annual report was made before scoring it (Street & Bryant, 
2000:315), thereby ensuring that any missing item was properly accounted for. Thus, if the item 
was not mentioned in the annual report and the auditor’s report was unqualified and did not 
mention any issues relating to that item, it was assumed that the item was not applicable. Finally, 
the scores for information items were added to calculate the disclosure score for each company 
(Haniffa, 1999). Following Wallace (1988) the total disclosure index and sub-disclosure indices 
(for each standard) were calculated as the ratio of actual scores awarded to a company to the 
maximum score applicable to that company. This approach ensures that companies are not 
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penalised for non-disclosure of an irrelevant item. The calculation of the disclosure index 
(dependent variable) for each company under this approach is as follows: 
DI = ADS/ MD 
Where: 
DI refers to the disclosure index (0≤ DI≤1) 
ADS refers to the actual disclosure score for a particular company 
MD refers to the maximum disclosure score possible for that company (≤ 275 items) 
 
5.5.1.3 Reliability and Validity of Disclosure Scores 
Wallace (1987) argues that financial disclosure is an abstract concept that cannot be measured 
directly, and that requires the particular scale adopted to quantify disclosure to specify the scoring 
procedure to provide evidence that the measures are valid and reliable. Sekaran (1992) refers to 
reliability and validity as two main criteria for testing the goodness of measures. Reliability refers 
to the ability of different people to code the same text in the same manner (Weber, 1990), whilst 
validity refers to the extent to which the variables generated from the classification procedure 
represent what the researcher intends it to present (Weber, 1990; Marston & Shrives, 1991). In a 
similar vein, Collis and Hussey (2003) argue that reliability is concerned with the credibility of 
research findings which can be proved if those findings can be repeated, while validity is the extent 
to which the research findings accurately reflect the reality. 
 
In order to improve reliability in this study, the procedures followed are stated in detail (Cooke & 
Wallace, 1989; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003). This is expected to facilitate replication of 
disclosure scores reported in this study by other researchers. All annual reports were read before 
scoring in order to be familiar with the nature of each company’s activities and avoid penalties for 
inapplicable items. Additionally, following Owusu-Ansah (1998a), the reliability of the scoring 
instruments employed was further assessed by randomly selecting a sample of annual reports that 
were already scored by the researcher and asking another investigator (an academic staff member 
who performs audit work) to score them. Whereas differences in scores were found, they were 
minor ones, hence no significant differences in scores were evident.  
 
With respect to validity, four types of validity (face validity, content validity, criterion validity and 
concurrent validity) are applicable to this study (Neuman, 2006: 192-193). 
  
1. Face validity, is applicable to this study by developing a disclosure index that can measure 
the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on the 
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scrutinised stock exchanges. This is achieved by following the steps discussed in section 
5.5.1.1 in order to refine the disclosure index employed in this study.  
 
2. Content validity is also achieved by developing a disclosure index that can answer the 
research question that relates to the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements by companies listed on the scrutinised stock exchanges. To develop a 
disclosure index that can capture all the aspects related to the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements that are mandatory in Egypt and Jordan in 2007, the 
information items of the disclosure checklist were taken from the IFRSs issued by the IASB 
and are mandatory in both countries.  
 
3. With respect to criterion validity which concerns with whether the disclosure index used 
some standards or criterion to measure the extent of disclosure accurately, the researcher 
achieved by taking the information items of the disclosure checklist from the IFRSs issued 
by the IASB, reviewing the disclosure index by academic and professional staff and by 
following the principles of scoring that adopted in prior research.  Furthermore, the 
disclosure index employed in this study can be used in future research to investigate the 
progress in levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and whether it is 
affected by other independent variables after consideration to any changes in the disclosure 
requirements under each IFRS.  
 
4. With respect to concurrent validity which concerns with whether the indicator (disclosure 
index) is associated with a preexisting valid indicator, the disclosure index employed in this 
study is based on IFRSs' disclosure requirements that are developed by the IASB and 
satisfies face validity as above mentioned.  
 
5.5.2 Data Collection  
The data were obtained from company annual reports (a secondary source) and interviews (a 
primary source). The use of companies’ annual reports facilitates the gathering and checking of 
data by others at any time. Lavers (1993 cited in Naser et al., 2006: 9) argues that there are two 
major advantages of using annual reports: firstly, the firm can exercise editorial control to prevent 
any possible journalistic interpretation or distortion of company information, and secondly, the 
report can be used for the purpose of comparison. Although companies frequently disclose their 
information through other channels such as the media, interim financial statements, and preliminary 
announcements to the stock exchange, annual reports remain the most important mechanism, 
especially in developing markets (Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Naser et al., 2006). Gray et al. 
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(1995b cited in Naser et al., 2006:317) argue that the annual report is widely viewed as a major 
official and legal document produced by a company on a regular basis, and acts as a significant 
forum for the presentation of the firm’s communication within political, social and economic 
systems. Consequently, the principal sources of data for this study are the annual reports of non-
financial companies listed on the EGX and ASE.  
 
After investigating the appropriate sources of data in the scrutinised stock exchanges at the time of 
commencing this research (2008), it was found that the Zawya database and the Egypt for 
Information Dissemination Company (EGID) were the best available options to secure the required 
data as listed companies consider such data as confidential, and refuse to provide any information 
when they are directly contacted. Consequently, annual reports and all of the information relating to 
corporate governance variables and other company characteristics were purchased separately from 
the information companies (Zawya and EGID) after providing an official claim stating that any 
information acquired would be used solely for research purposes31. Another obstacle was that the 
majority of annual reports were in Arabic, and the Arabic vocabulary used varies between the two 
countries. To eliminate potential problems arising from this situation, the researcher used her 
competent knowledge of Arabic language to conduct a very careful reading of the annual reports.  
 
The extensive review of previous research (using panel data) on disclosure in MENA region 
countries shows that in general, disclosure practices improve over time (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Htaybat, 2005; Hassan, 2006; Omar, 2007). This argument is further supported by the findings 
of a recent study on the Jordanian context, that demonstrate the great progress in compliance with 
IFRSs in 2004 compared to 1996 (Al-Akra et al., 2010a). In order to keep the investigation 
manageable, the study analysed the state of compliance in a single year, that being the fiscal year 
ending 31 December, 2007. This choice was supported for the following reasons. Firstly, this is the 
first recent year for which the majority of data required to undertake this comparative study is 
available, and thus the study avoids the problem of a smaller sample size due to the non-availability 
of data for more than one year. Secondly, as indicated in Chapter Four this year witnessed an 
extraordinary economic performance in scrutinised countries; that was before the international 
economic crunch that began in 2008. In addition, it was the first year to mandate the full version of 
IFRSs (except IAS 17: Accounting for Leases) in Egypt.  
 
 
 
                                                          
31 It is worthy to mention that since the second half of 2009, the ASE provides the annual reports for free on its website 
which signal its efforts to improve disclosures overtime. 
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5.5.2.1 Study Population  
The annual reports of the entire population of non-financial companies listed on the EGX and ASE 
(311 companies – 145 from Egypt, and 166 from Jordan) for the fiscal year ending 31 December, 
2007, formed the study population. Institutions that provide financial services such as banks and 
insurance companies were excluded because their reports are not comparable with those of non-
financial companies as they are subject to other disclosure requirements32. Then the following two 
criteria were applied: 
1. The firm should have a complete annual report for the year ended 31 December, 2007. 
2. There should be information related to corporate governance structures within the company 
for the year 2007. 
 
After the imposition of these criteria, the final sample contained 75 companies from Egypt and 91 
companies from Jordan. Table 5.1 depicts the application of the above mentioned study sample 
selection criteria. 
Table 5.1: Study Sample 
Criterion Egypt Jordan Total 
Number of Non-financial Listed 
Companies 
145 166 311 
Number of Companies Excluded 
Under the First Criterion 
17 75 92 
Number of Companies Excluded 
Under the Second Criterion 
53 None 53 
The Remainder 75 91 166 
Final Sample 75 75 150 
 
As indicated in table 5.1, to meet the first criterion 92 companies (17 listed on the EGX and 75 
listed on the ASE) were excluded and to meet the second criterion an additional 53 companies 
listed on the EGX were excluded. To enable objective comparison between scrutinised stock 
exchanges an equal sample of 75 Jordanian listed companies was randomly selected33. 
 
5.5.2.2 Interview Method 
Interviews can be defined as a method of gathering information through verbal questioning 
(Sarantakos, 2005). Punch (1998) argues that interviews are very effective in exploring people’s 
perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations and constructions of reality. Qualitative data such 
                                                          
32 Currently the ASE classifies real estate companies under the Financial Sector instead of the Service Sector as it used 
to, although such companies do not provide financial services. The ASE attributes this change to the vision of the 
current management of the ASE. However, this is not the case for real estate companies that are listed on the EGX. 
33 Appendix 3 presents a list of the sample companies indicating their stock exchange and sector (manufacturing or 
non-manufacturing). 
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as interview findings can be employed to supplement, validate, explain or reinterpret quantitative 
data obtained from the same setting (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Ghazali, 2004). 
 
Interviews are categorised in terms of their structure into three main types - structured, semi-
structured, and unstructured. This study carried out face-to-face semi-structured interviews in 
which questions to be asked and the detailed information to be gathered were all pre-determined, 
although the question sequence could vary according to the situation (Kvale, 1996). Semi-
structured interviews are appropriate in studies investigating the relationships between variables as 
they allow ‘why’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions to be asked, thereby being more revelatory (Saunders 
et al., 2003; Ghazali, 2004). Such interviews were used in this study to obtain the views of different 
groups involved in enforcing, teaching, and adopting IFRSs in Egypt and Jordan concerning the 
different factors influencing de facto compliance with IFRSs. It was also believed that they would 
enable the researcher to estimate the degree of awareness among national investors regarding the 
level of disclosures that must be provided by companies listed on the stock exchanges of their 
jurisdictions, and the concept of corporate governance. Interviewees’ views were expected to 
support the interpretation of the findings of the empirical analyses, and to facilitate the assessment 
of the applicability of the Western theoretical foundations to the MENA region emerging capital 
markets. 
 
The interviews were conducted following the statistical analysis so that the researcher could build 
on the analysis and perform more informed and organised interviews. Also, given the secretive 
nature of the MENA societies and the sensitivity of the issue of this study, it was decided to 
undertake face-to-face interviews since these would be likely to reduce the reluctance of 
participants to be truthful. Easterby-Smith et al. (1993) and Ghazali (2004) recommend face-to-face 
interviews when the subject matter is highly confidential or commercially sensitive, or when the 
interviewee may be reticent about an issue. Additionally, they provide an opportunity for the 
interviewer to clarify the study’s objectives and importance and to ensure that the interview 
questions are well understood by all participants. 
 
5.5.2.2.1 The Interview Sample  
The researcher planned to conduct 40 interviews (20 in Egypt and 20 in Jordan - four persons from 
each of the following groups in each jurisdiction): 
 
Regulators (Disclosure Monitoring Staff at the CMA in Egypt and the JSC in Jordan) as they are 
responsible for enforcing and monitoring compliance with disclosure rules and regulations, and 
presumed to have significant influence on the levels of compliance with IFRSs by listed companies.  
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Financial Accounting professors at the Egyptian and the Jordanian Universities, as they are 
responsible for determining and teaching the content of IFRSs modules to undergraduates and 
postgraduates in accounting departments at their affiliates; and hence, play a vital role in enhancing 
familiarity with IFRSs requirements and their updates among their graduates. 
 
Accountants at listed companies as they are responsible for preparing their companies’ financial 
statements, and presumed to follow the requirements of IFRSs. 
 
Naïve Investors as they are among the primary users of listed companies’ annual reports for rational 
investment decision-making, and should be aware of the minimum level of disclosures that must be 
made by listed companies in accordance with IFRSs as required by company laws, securities law 
and corporate governance best practices. Furthermore, they should be aware of their rights to 
monitor and exert pressure on listed companies’ BODs and managements to improve their 
disclosures. 
 
Auditors from the big 4 international audit firms (KPMG, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Deloitte and 
Touche, and Ernst and Young), as many of listed companies are audited by these firms and the staff 
in these firms have good knowledge and experience with IFRSs, and extensive training on any 
updates of these standards compared to auditors in local audit firms who may have limited 
experience and knowledge. 
 
Despite the original intention, the researcher could only complete 12 interviews (60%) in Egypt, 
and 8 interviews (40%) in Jordan because it was difficult to persuade individuals to participate, 
possibly a reflection of the secretive nature of both societies and political conservatism. It was 
especially hard to secure participation from those in sensitive positions due to the unwillingness of 
some organisations to allow contact with their staff. None of the big 4 audit firms granted access, 
citing company policy which precludes participation in research. However, this did not affect the 
quality or the interpretive power of the interview data. 
 
Regarding other groups of respondents, through networking and personal contacts, the researcher 
could persuade participants, especially in Egypt (the researcher's home country) to co-operate. The 
researcher applied a snowball sampling technique34 to increase interviewee numbers. For instance, 
the chief of the Disclosure Monitoring Department in the CMA facilitated meetings with other 
                                                          
34 This implies that the researcher makes contact with one or two cases and then asks them to identify further cases 
(Saunders et al., 2003:176). 
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members from the CMA. The same happened in Jordan, where an officer at the JSC helped the 
researcher to contact another member of the JSC staff. Also, an academic staff member helped the 
researcher to contact two investors at the ASE and an accountant in one of the companies listed on 
the ASE. 
 
Before conducting any of the interviews, the researcher sent e-mails/letters to the potential 
interviewees explaining the purpose of the study and to obtain their permission (Appendix 4). 
People who agreed to be interviewed were contacted by telephone to arrange a suitable time and to 
inform them of the themes to be covered during the interview to allow them to consider the 
information being requested. This procedure was very effective, for example respondents from the 
CMA prepared some supporting documentation to show to the researcher during the interview, in 
addition to providing certain publications that are under preparation as part of the CMA’s efforts to 
improve disclosure practices in Egypt. Interviews were conducted between 21st September and 
mid-November, 2010. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicate the qualification and years of experience for each 
respondent in Egypt and Jordan respectively. 
Table 5.2: Interviewees in Egypt 
Respondent Years of Experience Qualification 
Regulator (1) 3 Diploma in Financial Analysis 
Regulator (2) 6 Bachelor’s Degree in Law 
Regulator (3) 2 Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting 
Regulator (4) 15 Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting 
Academic Staff (1) 10 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Academic Staff (2) 22 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Academic Staff (3) 15 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Academic Staff (4) 20 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Accountants (1) 7 Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting 
Accountants (2) 10 Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting 
Investor (1) 3 Bachelor's Degree 
Investor (2) 4 Bachelor's Degree 
 
As indicated in Table 5.1, all interviewees held at least a university degree in a related subject. Of 
the four regulators, one had a Diploma in Financial Analysis, two had Bachelor’s Degrees in 
Accounting and the fourth, a Bachelor’s Degree in Law. It is recognised that some of the members 
at the CMA with responsibility for monitoring compliance with IFRSs are not qualified to do that 
task. Years of experience in that position for respondents from that group ranged from 2 to 15 years. 
All academic staff members were professors of Financial Accounting at the Egyptian universities, 
held PhD degrees in Financial Accounting, were responsible for preparing and teaching IFRSs 
courses to undergraduate and postgraduate students, and had long experience in that field ranging 
from 10 to 22 years. Accountants also had reasonable experience (7, 10 years respectively). Finally, 
it is recognised that respondents from the investor group had relatively limited experience in 
trading on the EGX (3, 4 years respectively). 
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Table 5.3: Interviewees in Jordan 
Respondent Years of Experience Qualification 
Regulator (1) 8 Master’s Degree in Finance 
Regulator (2) 3 Bachelor’s Degree in Business 
and Banking Administration 
Academic Staff (1) 6 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Academic Staff (2) 13 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Academic Staff (3) 6 PhD in Financial Accounting 
Accountant (1) 12 Bachelor’s Degree in Accounting 
Investor (1) 5 Bachelor’s Degree 
Investor (2) 9 PhD 
 
As indicated in Table 5.2, all respondents from Jordan held at least a university degree in a related 
subject. Similar to the CMA staff, not all members of the JSC staff with responsibility for 
monitoring compliance with IFRSs are qualified to do that job. The two respondents from the JSC 
staff had been in their positions for 8 and 3 years respectively. All academic staff members held a 
PhD in Financial Accounting at the Jordanian universities and were responsible for preparing and 
teaching accounting courses which include only an introduction to IFRSs. Their experience ranged 
from 6 to 13 years. The only accountant who agreed to participate had 12 years experience with 
IFRSs. Finally, respondents from the investor group had experience of trading on the ASE for 5 and 
9 years respectively. 
 
5.5.2.2.2 Ethical Considerations 
Researchers should acknowledge ethical considerations when conducting social research, especially 
when using qualitative approaches, as these involve collecting data from people and about people. 
Issues to be managed relate to harm, consent, deception, privacy, and confidentiality of data (Punch, 
1998). Furthermore, the researcher should consider ethical issues during data analysis by 
disassociating names from responses to protect the secrecy of the interviewees, and once the data is 
analysed, the researcher should discard it to ensure that it cannot be misused by a third party. 
Additionally, during interpretation, writing and dissemination of the final research report, the 
researcher should not use language or words that are biased because of gender, sexual orientation, 
racial or ethnic group, and findings should not be falsified or invented to meet the researcher’s need 
(Creswell, 2003). 
 
To meet the ethical requirements, the researcher adopted the abovementioned actions, in addition to 
following Aston University’s ethical guidelines, which require researchers to express the title, aims 
and importance of a study in a language that is understandable to a lay person, and to use an 
invitational, rather than coercive or overly persuasive tone. Additionally, the researcher must explain 
how an individual was chosen to participate and how many other people will be asked to take part. 
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The researcher showed all interviewees a letter declaring her status as a PhD student at Aston 
Business School and that the interview was part of her research. She emphasised that all information 
obtained during the interviews would be regarded as confidential, used for research purposes only, 
and that the interviewee had the right to withdraw from the interview at any time, or to refuse to 
answer specific interview questions. The researcher respected the interviewees’ preference not to be 
tape-recorded, and asked each interviewee to read the notes taken by the researcher during the 
interview to confirm they were a correct and full expression of their contribution. To guarantee 
confidentiality and anonymity the researcher offered to send an electronic copy of the thesis or any 
related published work to the interviewees as well as offering acknowledgment of their participation 
if they wished. All respondents except investors refused to sign the interviewee consent forms 
(Appendix 5) because they did not want to reveal their identities. 
 
5.6 Data Analysis 
 
5.6.1 Quantitative Data Analysis 
After calculating the disclosure indices (dependent variable), and summarising the independent 
variables in matching columns, the next step was to analyse the data. Haniffa (1999:319) notes that 
“[t]he first step in data analysis is to get a feel of the data so that appropriate statistical methods 
can be undertaken”. As indicated in the discussion in section 2.5.4, existing research employs 
different statistical approaches to examine the relationship between the extent of disclosure and 
different company characteristics, in which respect Ghazali (2004:131) observes that “[i]n 
analysing data, a decision has to be made regarding the appropriate statistical techniques”. 
 
Two types of statistical tests, parametric and non-parametric, exist. Field (2005:64) argues that 
normality of data distribution is the most important assumption to be met when applying parametric 
tests. Collis and Hussey (2003) confirm this, highlighting that such tests are more powerful than 
non-parametric ones. However, Pallant (2001) observes that non-parametric statistical tests 
(distribution-free tests) can be employed when the data violates the assumptions of parametric 
analysis, and that they are appropriate when data is measured on nominal and ordinal scales and for 
small samples (Pallant, 2001). 
 
5.6.1.1 Normality Test 
Normal refers to a symmetrical bell shaped curve (Pallant, 2001). A wide range of approaches can 
be employed to test the normality of distribution of a given set of data such as plotting histograms, 
stem and leaf plotting, skewness and kurtosis, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. 
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In this study the Kolmorgorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk tests were used to check the 
normality of all variables (dependent and independent). 
 
5.6.1.2 Descriptive Analysis 
One type of data analysis is descriptive analysis obtained by considering the mean, minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation for the total disclosure score (the primary dependent variable) as 
well as for each IFRS/IAS (sub-index). Additionally, the study provides a descriptive analysis for 
all test and control variables to gain insight into the dominant corporate governance structures and 
corporate attributes in the Egyptian and Jordanian contexts. 
 
 
5.6.1.3 Univariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis demonstrates the relationship between the dependent and each of the 
independent variables. Since the distribution of the total disclosure index (dependent variable) and 
all of the contiuous independent variables is not normal as shown by normality tests performed in 
Chapter Six, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was mainly used to assess the association 
between continuous independent variables and the total disclosure index. Rank correlation is used 
to examine whether variables move together. In other words, whether high ranks of one variable are 
associated with high ranks of the other (positive correlation), whether low ranks of one variable are 
associated with high ranks of the other (negative correlation), or whether the ranks in the two 
variables are unrelated (not significant) (Abd-Elsalam, 1999). 
 
For the categorical independent variables (board leadership, type of business activity, and type of 
audit firm), a non-parametric alternative using the Mann-Whitney U test was performed to test for 
differences in the median disclosure indices between the two groups. Additionally, the Mann-
Whitney U test and Chi-square test were employed to test whether there are significant differences 
between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts (H1). 
 
5.6.1.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This study employs multiple regression in order to test mainly how well a set of corporate 
governance-related variables (board independence, board leadership, board size and ownership 
structure) is able to explain the dependent variable (total disclosure index) and which variable in 
the set of independent variables best explains compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 
the focus contexts. The multiple regression model includes all of the independent variables (i.e., all 
test and control variables) as is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
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Given that the dependent and independent variables were not normally distributed as is seen later in 
Chapter Six, the conventional Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method was not preferable. 
Consequently, non-parametric techniques appeared to be more appropriate for analysing the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. However, as non-parametric tests 
may fail to detect differences between groups (Pallant, 2001), the researcher used transformed data 
using normal scores which is an extension of rank regression to make the data distribution appears 
more normal.  
 
Although the rank method yields distribution-free test statistics and may therefore be useful for data 
with non-linear relationships between independent and dependent variables, Cooke (1998) observes 
that it incorporates some weaknesses such as the difficulty of interpreting the regression co-
effecients (βj) for most values. Also, the structure of errors cannot be normal and the 
transformation of individual observations into ranks is, to some extent, arbitrary. 
 
To eliminate some of the weaknesses of rank regression, Cooke (1998) proposes the use of normal 
scores, in which approach, the transformed data are substituted by scores on normal distribution 
rather than ranks. Hence, significance levels would be more meaningful and have greater power 
than when using ranks, and the regression coefficients derived using normal scores would be 
meaningful. 
 
Previous researchers (e.g., Cooke, 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; 
Ghazali, 2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005) have adopted the normal score transformation method. Following 
these, it was decided to gain the benefits of that approach. The transformation was made by 
dividing the normal distribution by the number of observations plus one region, on the basis that 
each region has equal probability. Then the regression analysis was conducted using the normal 
scores. 
 
The multiple regression routines were tested using stepwise search on SPSS 16, allowing the 
researcher to see at what stage independent variables are incorporated into the regression equation, 
and their importance (Cooke: 1989a; Norusis, 1993). 
 
Before running the multiple regression analysis, the researcher must check for any significant 
multicollinearity between the independent variables (Haniffa, 1999) as demonstrated in Chapter Six. 
Multicollinearity refers to the existence of a strong correlation between two or more independent 
variables in a regression model (Field, 2005). Field (2005) argues that the presence of 
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multicollinearity represents a threat to multiple regressions. For instance, a good independent 
variable may be found to be statistically insignificant and be rejected from the model (Type II 
error) because of a collinearity problem (Field, 2005). If the independent variables are highly 
correlated then it would be difficult to know which variable is more important, as the regression 
model could include either one (Field, 2005). 
 
Multicollinearity can be checked using two approaches. The first is based on screening the 
correlation matrix. The most commonly used cut-off point is 0.7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001:84 
cited in Ghazali, 2004:133). This cut-off point is applied by many researchers in financial 
disclosure studies (e.g., Wallace et al., 1994; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Suwaidan, 1997; Omar, 2007) who 
consider independent variables as having a problem of multicollinearity when their correlation is 
above 0.7. As will be seen in Chapter Six, the correlation matrix was conducted using the 
Spearman rank correlation.   
 
The second way of checking for multicollinearity is by calculating the variance inflation factor 
(VIF), which indicates whether a high correlation exists between independent variables. For all 
variables, if the VIF remains below 10 while running the regression models, the absence of a 
multicollinearity problem is confirmed. Moreover, tolerance, which is the reciprocal (1/VIF), 
should be above  0.2 (Field, 2005:175). As Chapter Six confirms, the VIF for all vaiables remained 
below 10 and tolerances were found to be above 0.2 while running the regression models; thus, the 
problem of multicollinearity was not detected. 
 
5.6.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Unlike quantitative data, qualitative data is rarely subjected to statistical testing, and instead, the 
analysis process mainly involves making sense out of text (the words of the participants) (Robson, 
1993; Creswell, 2003; Neuman: 2006). 
 
The approaches commonly used in qualitative data analysis (e.g., coding, memoing, content 
analysis and grounded theory) are more diverse and less standardised compared to those associated 
with quantitative data analysis. 
 
As the purpose of the interviews in this study is interpretive, the researcher decided to apply coding 
as this provides clear and simple procedures to manage, analyse and generate the results from 
qualitative data (Omar, 2007). Coding can be used as an index and as a basis for storing and 
retrieving qualitative data (Punch, 1998). Rubin and Rubin (1995) state that it is the process of 
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grouping interviewees’ responses into categories that bring together similar ideas, concepts or 
themes. 
 
Coding can be done using software programs such as Nvivo or manually. In this study the 
researcher decided to use a manual method as the number of interviews and the interview material 
were manageable. Also, as qualitative data analysis depends mainly on deep understanding of data 
by the researcher and as software programs do not analyse qualitative data in depth, it was decided 
that the use of software was inappropriate. 
 
In analysing the interview data, the researcher followed the undermentioned steps suggested by 
Collis and Hussey (2003), as being necessary for the analysis of qualitiative data: 
1. All interviews were transcribed into English after ascertaining the validity of the English 
translation by a linguistic specialist.The researcher then added her thoughts and reflections in a 
separate field (column) to help with the tentative analysis.  
2. The material collected from interviews was properly referenced to indicate who was involved, 
the date, and the time of the interview.  
3. A code was allocated to each identified theme. This helped in storing, retrieving and 
reorganising the data in a variety of ways.  
4. The codes were reviewed and grouped into smaller categories according to emergent patterns or 
themes. 
5. The findings were summarised and recorded, and defeciences were highlighted and remedied. 
6. The researcher used her summaries to construct generalisations with which to confront existing 
theories and interpret the findings of the quantitative analysis. 
Furthermore, in order to give the reader “some of the flavour of the replies” (Oppenheim, 1992:112 
quoted in Ghazali, 2004:114), most of the responses are reported in full to support the interpretation 
of the findings of quantitative analyses as will be seen in Chapter Seven. 
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has indicated the research methodology employed to achieve the study objectives, 
having considered the usefulness of both quantitative and qualitative research approaches and 
methods. The method of measurement used in respect of the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements by companies listed on the EGX and ASE has been presented, and the 
method of examination of the causal relationship between corporate governance test variables 
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(board independence, board leadership, board size, government ownership, management 
ownership, private ownership, and public ownership) and the dependent variable (overall level of 
compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements) has also been shown. In this respect, a 
discussion of the quantitative research method (disclosure index) as the main research tool, and 
semi-structured interviews (qualiatative research method) to support the interpretation of the 
findings of the quantitative analysis, was provided. 
 
The chapter identified the research hypotheses and discussed the construction of the unweighted 
disclosure index used to measure the level of compliance with IFRSs. Having identified the 
research population and provided details of the eventual sample, the chapter then demonstrated the 
procedures followed in conducting the empirical analysis, explaining the use of descriptive, 
univariate and multivariate analyses. 
 
With respect to the qualitative aspect of the study (semi-structured interviews), details of the 
interview sample, ethical considerations, and the general analytical procedures were presented. The 
next chapter will report the results of the quantitative data analysis.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Extent of Compliance and Corporate Governance Structure - 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to answer the research questions presented in Chapter One. In 
respect of the first research question, comprehensive descriptive statistics are obtained which allow 
for the evaluation of the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies 
listed on the EGX and ASE. To answer the second research question that seeks to identify 
corporate governance factors significantly associated with compliance levels, the statistical 
techniques of univariate and multiple regression are used. Initially, the effect of each individual 
variable on the degree of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is determined (univariate 
analysis), subsequent to which regression analysis is performed to establish the joint influence of 
corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance among companies lised on the 
scrutinised stock exchanges. 
 
Consequently, the remaining part of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides the 
descriptive analysis of the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies 
listed on the EGX and ASE. Section 6.3 provides the descriptive analysis of test and control 
variables in the investigated companies. Section 6.4 reports the results of the test for statistical 
significant differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts (H1). Section 6.5 presents 
the results of the univariate analysis investigating the relationship between the overall level of 
compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements and each corporate governance-related 
variable. Section 6.6 reports the outcome of the multivariate analysis and answers the last research 
question by analysing and interpreting the statistical output and its theoretical implications. Finally, 
section 6.7 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 Descriptive Results of Listed Companies’ Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure 
Requirements 
 
As indicated in Chapter Five the disclosure index employed in this study is based on mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements for the fiscal year beginning 1 January, 2007. It includes 275 
mandatory disclosure items divided into 20 sub-indices35. 
 
The disclosure scores were calculated as a ratio by dividing the actual score awarded by the 
maximum possible score for each company. Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all 
disclosure indices. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Extent of Compliance with IFRSs by Companies Listed on the 
EGX and ASE (Total Score and Sub-scores) 
Rank 
Percentage of 
companies 
above 50% 
Number of 
companies  
above 50% 
Applicability Std. Deviation 
Mean 
% 
Maximum 
% 
Minimum 
% Country 
Total Score 
NA 100% 75 75 0.04 80 91 68 Egypt 
NA 100% 75 75 0.07 76 88 56 Jordan 
Sub-index 1 (IFRS 3: Business Combinations) 
9 57% 4 7 .27 81 100 43 Egypt 
9 75% 9 12 .43 67 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 2 (IAS 1: Presentation of Financial Statements) 
7 100% 75 75 0.05 89 97 75 Egypt 
4 100% 75 75 0.07 84 95 66 Jordan 
Sub-index 3 (IAS 2: Inventories) 
5 94% 63 67 0.16 95 100 0 Egypt 
5 69% 35 51 0.27 80 100 25 Jordan 
Sub-index 4 (IAS 7: Cash Flow Statements) 
6 95% 71 75 0.12 93 100 33 Egypt 
4 96% 72 75 0.24 84 100 44 Jordan 
Sub-index 5 (IAS 8: Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors) 
14 42% 5 12 0.29 61 100 0 Egypt 
11 22% 2 9 0.24 59 100 33 Jordan 
Sub-index 6 (IAS 11: Construction Contracts) 
13 50% 2 5 0.44 63 100 17 Egypt 
14 0% 0 4 0.08 46 50 33 Jordan 
Sub-index 7 (IAS 14: Segment Reporting) 
14 57% 4 7 0.47 61 100 0 Egypt 
12 63% 12 19 0.38 55 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 8 (IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment) 
10 93% 70 75 0.18 80 100 20 Egypt 
2 100% 75 75 0.12 91 100 56 Jordan 
Sub-index 9 (IAS 18: Revenue) 
4 95% 71 75 0.18 96 100 0 Egypt 
                                                          
35 Details of the disclosure items appear in Appendix 2. 
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3 88% 65 75 0.28 90 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 10 (IAS 21: The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates) 
3 99% 67 68 0.17 97 100 0 Egypt 
17 15% 9 60 0.34 19 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 11 (IAS 23: Borrowing Costs) 
2 100% 56 56 0.06 99 100 67 Egypt 
10 70% 42 60 0.40 62 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 12 (IAS 24: Relataed Party Disclosures) 
17 20% 13 65 0.24 40 100 0 Egypt 
13 51% 35 68 0.30 54 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 13 (IAS 27: Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements) 
8 88% 29 33 0.33 88 100 0 Egypt 
8 67% 12 18 0.46 69 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 14 (IAS 28: Investment in Associates) 
12 40% 16 40 0.33 43 100 0 Egypt 
6 84% 21 25 0.36 76 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 15 (IAS 31: Investment in Joint Ventures) 
12 67% 4 6 0.41 71 100 0 Egypt 
15 33% 3 9 0.25 45 83 13 Jordan 
Sub-index 16 (IAS 33: Earnings per Share) 
19 7% 5 75 0.19 31 80 0 Egypt 
16 15% 11 75 0.21 37 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 17 (IAS 36: Impairment of Assets) 
1 100% 3 3 0.00 100 100 100 Egypt 
1 100% 8 8 0.00 100 100 100 Jordan 
Sub-index 18 (IAS 37: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets) 
11 92% 69 75 0.16 72 100 14 Egypt 
10 64% 47 74 0.25 62 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 19 (IAS 38: Intangible Assets) 
18 42% 8 19 0.34 36 100 0 Egypt 
7 68% 17 25 0.35 75 100 0 Jordan 
Sub-index 20 (IAS 40: Investment in Property) 
15 57% 4 7 0.42 52 100 0 Egypt 
13 47% 7 15 0.38 54 100 0 Jordan 
 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Total IFRSs Disclosure Index (Total Score) 
As seen in Table 6.1, the average level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is 80% in 
Egypt and 76% in Jordan. In other words, 80% of the 275 items (220 items) of the disclosure 
checklist were disclosed by companies listed on the EGX, while 76% of the 275 items (209 items) 
of the disclosure checklist were disclosed by companies listed on the ASE. This implies a relative 
similarity between the levels of compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements 
between the two stock exchanges. 
 
The total disclosure index varied among companies listed on the EGX, ranging from 68% (United 
Housing and Development Company) to 91% (Egyptian Chemical Industries). The variation in the 
level of compliance with the total disclosure index was indicated by a standard deviation of 0.04. 
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For companies listed on the ASE the range was from 56% (Palaces Realestate and Development 
P.L.C) to 88% (Jordan Phosphate Mines). This variation was indicated by a standard deviation of 
0.07, indicating the variability in the levels of compliance in Egypt to be less than in Jordan. 
 
It is recognised that the minimum level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by 
companies listed on the EGX is higher than that of companies listed on the ASE (68% and 56% 
respectively), a difference possibly explained by the shortage of qualified accountants in Jordan as 
was confirmed by interviewees (see Chapter Seven). 
 
There is a number of studies that investigated the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in Egypt. Their findings are compared with those from this study in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: The Extent of Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure Requirements in Previous Studies 
Conducted in Egypt 
 
Study Year of Study Minimum Level of 
Compliance (%) 
Maximum Level of 
Compliance (%) 
Mean (%) 
Abd-Elsalam (1999); 
Abdelsalam & Weetman 
(2003) 
1995 57 98 83 
Samaha (2006); Samaha & 
Stapleton (2008; 2009) 
 
 
2000 16 90 50 
Dahawy & Conover (2007) 2004 52 76 62 
Dahawy (2009) 2002 32 73 55 
Ismail et al. (2010) 2007 66 84 77 
This study (2011) 2007 68 91 80 
 
Table 6.2 clearly demonstrates inconsistencies in the results obtained by reported studies. However, 
none of the reported studies reveals a full compliance with IFRSs. This may imply that the CMA’s 
efforts to force full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements from listed companies remain 
insufficient, and that selective disclosure remains the practice, supported by low non- compliance 
costs. However, the observed increase in the minimum level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements during the period from 1995 (the year of Abd-Elsalam and Abdelsalam & Weetman 
studies) to 2007 (the year of this study) from 57% to 68% may indicate enhanced awareness among 
listed companies’ managements regarding the importance of improving transparency and the 
improved experience in applying IFRSs on a mandatory basis. Thus, progress in compliance levels 
can be observed over time. That said, stringent enforcement and strict punishment would foster full 
compliance much swifter. 
 
Compared to the findings of a more recent study that was conducted on the best performing 15 
companies listed on the EGX for the fiscal year 2004 (Dahawy & Conover, 2007), a significant 
increase is seen in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. The average level 
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of compliance reported by Dahawy and Conover (2007) was 62% (compared to 80% in this study) 
with the minimum compliance level 52% (compared to 68% in this study) and the maximum 76% 
(compared to 91% in this study). This difference may be attributed to the use of a more 
comprehensive disclosure index, and a much larger sample in this study and/or the relative 
improvement in the monitoring and enforcement functions of the CMA in 2007 (the year of this 
study) compared to 2004 (the year of Dahawy and Conover’s study). However, this disparity 
supports the notion advanced in this study that overall progress in compliance levels in the 
Egyptian context may be a positive sign that the national norms are moving towards compliance 
but that more time is needed for certain disclosure requirements to become part of the culture of 
Egyptian corporate management. Finally, compared to the findings of Ismail et al. (2010) who 
investigate a sample of 39 financial and non-financial companies listed on the EGX in 2007, there 
is an approximate similarity with respect to the average level of compliance with IFRSs (77% 
compared to 80% in this study) and in the minimum level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements (66% compared to 68% in this study). This supports the findings of this study. Yet, 
the difference in the maximum level of compliance (84% compared to 91% in this study), is most 
likely attributed to the sample differences as well as the structure of the disclosure index. 
 
With respect to the Jordanian context, table 6.3 compares the results of this study with previous 
such studies conducted in Jordan. 
Table 6.3: The Extent of Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure Requirements in Previous Studies 
Conducted in Jordan 
 
Study Year of Study Minimum Level of Compliance (%) 
Maximum Level of 
Compliance (%) Mean (%) 
Naser et al. (2002) 1998 34 85 64 
Al-Shiab (2003) 2000 (most recent) 16 91 56 
Omar (2007) 2003 67 93 82 
Al-Akra et al. 
(2010a) 
2004(most recent) 58 90 79 
This study (2011) 2007 56 88 76 
 
As seen in Table 6.3, similar to the case of Egypt there is a relative inconsistency in the results 
obtained by reported studies. In addition, it is clear that there is a great progress in compliance 
levels by companies listed on the ASE during the period from 1998 (the year of Naser et al. study) 
to 2007 (the year of this study) as the average level of compliance increased from 64% to 76%. The 
same conclusion is derived by comparing the findings of this study with those of Al-Shiab’s (2003) 
which showed that in year 2000 the average level of compliance was 56% (compared to 78% in this 
study) and the minimum compliance level was 16% (compared to 59% in this study). Omar (2007) 
showed a relatively similar average level of compliance with IFRSs (82%) to this study but a higher 
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maximum level of compliance (93%) and a higher minimum level of compliance (67%) by 
companies listed on the ASE for the fiscal year 2003. However, comparing the findings of this 
study with those of the most recent study investigating compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements within the Jordanian context (Al-Akra et al., 2010a), reveals a relative similarity in 
the minimum (58% compared to 56% in this study), maximum (90% compared to 88% in this 
study) and the average levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements (79% compared to 
76% in this study).  
 
In broad terms, the variation in the reported range of disclosure indices among studies can be 
attributed to the following reasons. Firstly, the differences in study sample. Secondly, variations in 
the years being studied, and the structure and the degree of comprehensiveness of the checklist used 
in measuring the extent of compliance. Thirdly, modifications to IFRSs disclosure requirements 
over time. Lastly, the impact of changing political and institutional preferences and attitudes over 
time is a common characteristic of developing countries and may directly or indirectly influence the 
level of enforcement of laws and regulations including disclosure requirements. 
 
On the other hand, the non-increase in the average compliance levels reported in either Al-Akra et 
al. (2010a) or this study, compared to Omar (2007) can be partially attributed to the researcher’s 
proposition that, similar to the case of Egypt, certain barriers to full compliance still remain in the 
Jordanian context. Essentially, these relate to the dominance of secretive culture and low demand 
for improved disclosures. Additionally, some technical barriers prevail relating to the qualification 
and competency of accounting practitioners in Jordan and the JSC monitoring staff, non existence 
of an official Arabic translation of IFRSs in Jordan, and to the weak enforcement of IFRSs 
disclosure requirements by the JSC as demonstrated by interviewee responses that will be reported 
in Chapter Seven. In a similar vein, Tai et al. (1990) suggest that difficulties in interpreting 
disclosure requirements and insufficient awareness of general accounting concepts contribute to 
low levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Also, Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) argue that low levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements may 
result from the lack of familiarity or unavailability of regulations in native language. 
 
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Sub-indices 
 
The findings reported in table 6.1 show that there is a wide range of variations in the average levels 
of compliance with disclosure requirements under individual IFRSs (sub-indices). These large 
variations are recognised on individual country level as well as between the two scrutinised 
countries. As indicated in table 6.1 the average levels of compliance with disclosure requirements 
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on the level of individual IFRSs in the Egyptian context ranged from full compliance (100% 
compliance level) with respect to IAS 36: Impairment of Assets (Sub-index 17) to a low level of 
compliance (31%) with respect to IAS 33: Earnings per Share (Sub-index 16). Interestingly, in the 
Jordanian context, the average levels of compliance with both standards relatively were not 
different (100% and 37% respectively). Yet, a wide gap is found with respect to the average levels 
of compliance with the requirements under IAS 21: The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange 
Rates (sub-index 10) which achieved the lowest average level of compliance in the Jordanian 
context (19%) compared to 97% in the Egyptian context. The same applies with respect to IAS 23: 
Borrowing Costs (sub-index 11) which is ranked the 2nd with respect to the average level of 
compliance with its requirements in the Egyptian context (99%) and the 10th in the Jordanian 
context (62%). On the contrary, a gap is witnessed with respect to the average levels of compliance 
with the requirements of IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment (Sub-index 8) which is ranked the 
10th with respect to the average level of compliance with its requirements in the Egyptian context 
(80%) and the 2nd in the Jordanian context (91%). The same applies to IAS 28: Investment in 
Associates (Sub-index 14) which is ranked the 12th in the Egyptian context (43%) and the 6th in the 
Jordanian context (76%) and IAS 38: Intangible Assets (Sub-index 19) which is ranked the 18th in 
the Egyptian context (36%) and the 7th in the Jordanian context (75%). Differences in the extent of 
compliance on the level of individual IFRSs between the scrutinised stock exchanges are most 
likely attributed to differences in the capacity of applying and enforcing the requirements under 
each standard, given that developing countries are not completely homogeneous. 
 
In terms of the rank of some standards based on the average levels of compliance with their 
requirements between the two scrutinised contexts, similarity in rank is recognised with IFRS 3: 
Business Combinations (sub-index 1) which is ranked the 9th in both countries. The same applies to 
sub-index 3 (IAS 2: Inventories) which is ranked the 5th in both countries and sub-index 13 (IAS 
27: Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements) which is ranked the 8th in both countries. This 
implies that there is a relative similarity in compliance behaviour between both countries on the 
level of some individual IFRSs. 
 
The reported low levels of compliance with some IFRSs disclosure requirements either on 
individual country level or on the level of both scrutinised countries may be attributed to the 
preference for secrecy, fear of competition, low non-compliance costs, and weak monitoring. Lack 
of awareness of the importance of compliance and improved transparency among management of 
the majority of listed companies are also potential reasons for lack of full compliance with the 
requirements of some standards such as the case of IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment within 
the Egyptian context. Also, in Jordan, the shortage of qualified accountants and non-availability of 
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an official Arabic translation of IFRSs may be a major obstacle to achieving full compliance with 
IFRSs, such as the case of IAS 21: The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates. 
 
Moreover, it was recognised that for some IFRSs which were applicable to a few companies, 
technical difficulties (such as the case of IAS 11: Construction Contracts) or the novelty of some 
kinds of transactions (such as the case of IAS 14: Segment Reporting, IAS 31: Investment in Joint 
Ventures and IAS 40: Investment Property) may justify low levels of compliance to some extent as 
lack of experience may result in misunderstanding and interpretation difficulties. Thus, this may 
signal the need for training accountants in companies in which these standards are applicable on 
their appropriate application. Meanwhile, the full compliance with the requirements of IAS 36: 
Impairment of Assets, although it only applies to 3 companies in Egypt and 8 in Jordan implies that, 
IFRSs that do not contradict with the secretive culture of MENA societies, that are understood and 
can be properly applied without interpretation difficulties, and strictly monitored by security 
exchange regulatory bodies, are more likely to be fully complied with by companies listed on the 
two stock exchanges. Consequently, if this stage is reached with respect to all IFRSs, this can solve 
the problem of decoupling (companies report that the financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with IFRSs while full compliance is absent).  
 
The above discussion supports the notions of the institutional isomorphism theory, Gray’s (1988) 
secrecy versus transparency accounting sub-cultural value, agency theory and cost-benefit analysis 
that were comprehensively discussed in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the interpretation of the 
determinants of compliance levels are supported by interviewee responses as revealed in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
6.2.3 Fully Disclosed and Rarely Disclosed Information Items 
This section reports those information items that were fully disclosed (100% compliance) and those 
that were rarely disclosed (less than 50% compliance) within each disclosure sub-index. The extent 
of compliance with each disclosure item is calculated by dividing the number of companies 
disclosing an item by the number of companies to which that item was applicable. This is expected 
to provide insight regarding the disclosure behaviour by companies listed on scrutinised stock 
exchanges. Additionally, it can help in diagnosing barriers to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. Table 6.4 demonstrates the fully disclosed, and the rarely disclosed items by 
companies listed on the EGX and ASE. 
 
 
143 
Table 6.4: Items Fully Disclosed and Rarely Disclosed Under Each IFRS 
Sub-index 
Egypt Jordan 
Fully Disclosed Items 
(100% Compliance) 
Rarely Disclosed Items 
(<50% Compliance) 
Fully Disclosed Items 
(100% Compliance) 
Rarely Disclosed Items 
(<50% Compliance) 
Sub-
index 1 
(IFRS 3) 
Item 1; Item 4; Item 8; 
Item 11 Item 6; Item7 
Item 1; Item 2; Item 3; 
Item 4; Item 5; Item6; 
Item 7; Item  8; Item  9 
 
Sub-
index 2 
(IAS 1) 
Item 12; Item 13; Item 
14; Item 15; Item 16; 
Item 18; Item 19; Item 
20; Item 22; Item 23; 
Item 24; Item 25; Item 
26; Item 27; Item, 28; 
Item 31; Item 34; Item 
35;  Item 37; Item 38; 
Item 39; Item 40; Item 
42;  Item 43; Item 44; 
Item 58; Item 60; Item 
62; Item 74; Item 75; 
Item 77; Item 78; Item 
81; Item 89; Item 90; 
Item 91; Item 92; Item 
93; Item 99; Item 112; 
Item 113; Item 114; 
Item 115; Item  116; 
Item 117 
Item 66; Item 67; Item 
96; Item 98 
Item 12; Item 13; Item 
14; Item 15; Item 16; 
Item  17; Item 18; Item 
19; Item 20; Item 21; 
Item 22; Item 23; Item 
24; Item 25; Item 26; 
Item 27; Item 31; Item 
33; Item 34; Item 35; 
Item 36; Item 37; Item 
38; Item 38; Item; 39; 
Item 40; Item 41; Item 
47; Item 48; Item 49; 
Item 50; Item 51; Item 
52; Item 54; Item 55; 
Item 56; Item 57; Item 
58; Item 59; Item 60; 
Item 71; Item 72; Item 
73; Item 74; Item 75; 
Item 77; Item 78; Item 
81; Item 84; Item 89; 
Item 91; Item 92; Item 
93; Item 102; Item 112; 
Item 113; Item 114 
Item 67; Item 96; Item 
97; Item 106 
Sub-
index 3 
(IAS 2) 
  Item 119; Item 120; Item 121; Item 122; Item 123  
Sub-
index 4 
(IAS 7) 
Item 124; Item 128; 
Item 129; Item 130 Item 126 
Item 124; Item 127; Item 
128; Item 129; Item 134 Item 126 
Sub-
index 5 
(IAS 8) 
Item 135; Item 136; 
Item 137; Item 141; 
Item 142; Item 143; 
Item 144; Item 145 
Item 138; Item 139; Item 
146; Item 147 
 
 
 
Item 135; Item 136; Item 
137; Item 144; Item 145; 
Item 146; Item 147 
Item 138; Item 139; Item 
140; Item 141; Item 142; 
Item 143 
Sub-
index 6 
(IAS 11) 
Item 152  Item 148; Item 150; Item 151 
Item 149; Item 152; Item 
153 
Sub-
index 7 
(IAS 14) 
 Item 161; Item 164; Item, 168 
Item 157; Item 162; Item 
163; Item 164; Item 165 ; 
Item, 168 
Item 155; Item 161 
Sub-
index 8 
(IAS 16) 
Item 174; Item 175; 
Item 178; Item 180; 
Item 181; Item 183 
Item 176; Item 177; Item 
182; Item 189; Item 190 
Item 174; Item 175; Item 
178; Item 179; Item 180; 
Item 181; Item 183; Item 
185; Item 187; Item 188; 
Item 189; Item 190 
Item 172; Item 173; Item 
176; Item 177; Item 182 
Sub-
index 9 
(IAS 18) 
Item 193; Item 194; 
Item 195  
Item 192; Item 193; Item 
194; Item 195  
Sub-
index 10 
(IAS 21) 
   Item 196; Item 197; Item, 198 
Sub-
index 11 
(IAS 23) 
Item 200 Item 199 Item 200  
Sub-
index 12 
(IAS 24) 
 
Item 203; Item 204; Item 
205; ; Item 209; Item 
210; Item 211; Item 212 
 Item 209; Item 210; Item 211; Item 212 
Sub-
index 13 
(IAS 27) 
  Item 214  
Sub-
index 14 
(IAS 28) 
 
Item 218; Item 219; Item 
220; Item 223; Item 224; 
Item 225; Item 226 
 Item 220; Item 226 
Sub-
index 15 
(IAS 31) 
 Item 228; Item 229 Item 227; Item 228; Item 233; Item 234 
Item 229; Item 230; Item 
231; Item 232 
Sub-
index 16 
(IAS 33) 
 
Item 236; Item 237; Item 
238; Item 240; Item 242, 
Item 243 
 Item 236; Item 240; Item 242; Item 243 
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Sub-
index 17 
(IAS 36) 
Item 244; Item 245  Item 244; Item 245  
Sub-
index 18 
(IAS 37) 
Item 255; Item 256 Item 252; Item 253 Item 257 Item 250; Item 252; Item 253 
Sub-
index 19 
(IAS 38) 
 
Item 260; Item 264; Item 
265; Item 266; Item 267; 
Item 268 
Item 264; Item 265; Item 
266; Item 268  
Sub-
index 20 
(IAS 40) 
Item 272 Item 269; Item 270; Item 271; Item 275 
Item 269; Item 270; Item 
272; Item 273; Item 274 Item 271; Item 275 
 
The information in Table 6.4 reveals that some similarities exist between management behaviour in 
Egypt and Jordan with respect to compliance and non-compliance with different disclosure 
requirements under each IFRS. However, there are also differences in compliance behaviour with 
respect to certain disclosure items under each IFRS which may be attributed to the differences in 
each country capacity to enforce and apply all IFRSs disclosure requirements.  
 
The shortage of qualified accountants in Jordan and the non-existence of an official Arabic 
translation of IFRSs, negatively affect compliance levels with some individual disclosure items 
because there are insufficient number of accountants who are capable of understanding and 
applying many of the IFRSs requirements. This obstacle does not, however, commonly feature in 
respect of companies listed on the EGX. 
 
In both jurisdictions, as indicated by interviewees, the main reasons for low or non-compliance 
with particular disclosure requirements may be the preference for secrecy, and lack of awareness 
regarding the importance of compliance with all IFRSs disclosure requirements. Managements fail 
to disclose on the grounds that the information required is too detailed or may be misused by 
competitors. However, in broad terms there is progress in the compliance levels in respect of IFRSs 
individual disclosure requirements compared with previous studies investigating these stock 
exchanges at the individual country level (e.g., Abdelsalam & Weetman, 2003; Omar, 2007). This 
may be attributed to the improved awareness among managements of listed companies regarding 
the importance of compliance with these items (i.e., compliance with these items has become 
embedded within the disclosure sub-cultural values), the enhanced familiarity with respect to their 
proper application, and the improved monitoring of these items by the regulatory bodies in the two 
stock exchanges. For instance, disclosing the capitalisation rate used to determine the amount of 
borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation (item 201) achived 98% and 83% compliance by 
companies listed on the EGX and ASE respectively compared to 79% in Abd-Elsalam (1999) and 
33% in Omar (2007).  
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In contrast, compliance levels with some disclosure requirements, such as disclosing the rights, 
preferences and restrictions attaching to each class of shares (item 67) remain low. The same can be 
said for most of the disclosure requirements under IAS 33: Earnings per Share. This may be 
explained by the secretive culture, and the lack of awareness regarding the importance of 
transparency. Overall, this reflects the existence of decoupling since listed companies state that 
they prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRSs, but the reality is different. The 
issue of low monitoring costs is of relevance here. Also, this position raises doubt about the 
reliability of audit reports, which in most cases particularly in Egypt, are prepard by big 4 affiliates. 
 
 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
As indicated in Chapter Five, independent variables include seven corporate governance-related 
test variables and six control variables 36 . Ten are continuous variables, these being: board 
independence ratio, board size, government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private 
ownership ratio, public ownership ratio, company size, profitability, gearing and liquidity; the 
remainder are categorical variables: board leadership, auditor type and industry type. Table 6.5 
displays the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. 
Table 6.5: Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Jordan (N=75) Egypt (N=75) 
Independent 
Variable 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  
Standard 
Deviation Mean  Maximum  Minimum  
Test Variables 
0.2531 0.3978 0.86 0.00 0.1928 0.5052 1.00 0.00 
Board 
Independence 
Ratio 
0.392 0.81 1.00 0.00 0.503 0.51 1.00 0.00 Board Leadership 
2.299 7.01 13.00 3.00 1.855 5.17 9.00 3.00 Board Size 
0.1321 0.0747 0.69 0.00 0.2964 0.1919 0.98 0.00 Government Ownership Ratio 
0.1998 0.1481 0.98 0.00 0.2361 0.1121 1.00 0.00 Management Ownership Ratio 
0.2526 0.3421 0.91 0.00 0.3231 0.2353 1.00 0.00 Private Ownership Ratio 
                                                          
36 Independent variables were defined in section 5.3.4. 
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0.2225 0.2352 0.94 0.00 0.2429 0.1504 0.86 0.00 Public Ownership Ratio 
Control Variables 
136487.15
0 
65951.
750 937650 1705 1533462.4 
52213
9.500 11388000 624.0000 Company Size
a 
0.0934 0.0670 0.54 -0.18 0.0838 0.1343 0.31 -0.30 Profitability 
2.4873 2.1410 9.57 0.00 0.3995 0.6798 2.22 0.01 Gearing 
1.9045 2.1993 9.52 0.11 1.5314 2.5580 8.58 0.33 Liquidity 
0.503 0.52 1.00 0.00 0.479 0.35 1.00 0.00 Industry 
0.498 0.57 1.00 0.00 0.464 0.31 1.00 0.00 Type of Auditor 
aIn million USD 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the ratio of independent non-executive directors on the BOD of Egyptian 
companies ranges from 0% to 100%, meaning that the BOD of some companies listed on the EGX 
may consist entirely of executive directors or vice versa. However, on average more than 50% of 
the BOD members are independent which agrees with the recommendation of the OECD principles 
and that of the ECCG. In Jordan board independence ranges from 0% to 86% with an average of 
40%. This implies that board independence is more recognised in Egypt than Jordan. However, this 
is only one face of the coin, the most important is the impact of this recommended mechanism on 
disclosure practices by listed companies in scrutinised stock exchanges as will be further 
investigated in the following parts of this chapter. 
 
In respect of board leadership, the CEO and the Chair positions are held by two different persons in 
51% of the companies listed on the EGX compared to 81% in the companies listed on the ASE 
which implies that companies listed on the ASE complies better with the OECD requirements for 
best practices which recommend the separation of the CEO and Chair positions. For board size, it 
ranges from 3 to 9 members in Egypt and 3 to 13 in Jordan, with an average board size of 5 
members in Egypt compared to 7 members in Jordan. Thus board sizes in both countries are not as 
large as those in developed countries.  
 
With respect to government ownership ratio, this ranges from 0% to 98% in companies listed on 
the EGX with an average of 19%. For companies listed on the ASE, the government ownership 
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ratio ranges from 0% to 69% with an average of 7%.  This implies that government ownership is 
more dominant in Egypt compared to Jordan, which may reflect the greater progress in 
privatisation programme in Jordan compared to Egypt. 
 
In terms of the management ownership ratio, this ranges from 0% to 100% in companies listed on 
the EGX with an average 11%.  For companies listed on the ASE, the management ownership ratio 
is relatively higher. It ranges from 0% to 98% with an average of 15%.  
 
The private ownership ratio is seen to range from 0% to 100% in companies listed on the EGX with 
an average of 24%. However, for companies listed on the ASE the private ownership ratio ranges 
from 0% to 91% with an average of 34%. This implies that private ownership is more dominant in 
the Jordanian context. 
 
Finally, with respect to public ownership, the ratio ranges from 0% to 86% in companies listed on 
the EGX with an average of 15%. For companies listed on the ASE this ratio ranges from 0% to 
94% with an average of 24%. This reveals that public ownership is more dominant in Jordan 
compared to Egypt. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the control variables as in Table 6.5, show that the average firm size in 
Egypt measured in terms of total assets (USD 522139.5 million) is higher than in Jordan (USD 
65951.75 million). This indicates that the Egyptian companies are larger in size compared to their 
Jordanian counterparts. Additionally, it can be argued that with more effort by regulators in both 
stock exchanges, the Egyptian and the Jordanian stock exchanges can attract more direct foreign 
investments and hence foster the economic transition in their jurisdictions. Profitability measured in 
terms of return on assets, indicates that in genral companies listed on the EGX achieve more profits 
compared to their counterparts that are listed on the ASE. The average profitability in companies 
listed on the EGX is 13% compared to 7% in Jordan. The gearing measured in terms of debt to 
equity, averages 0.68 in companies listed on the EGX compared to 2.14 in Jordan, which implies 
that companies listed on the ASE are quite highly geared compared to their counterparts in Egypt. 
This also implies that companies listed on the ASE are heavily depending on debts as a major 
source of finance. The average liquidity is very high (2.56 by companies listed on the EGX and 
2.20 by companies listed on the ASE). This implies the high ability of companies listed on the EGX 
and ASE to meet their short term obligations, which reflects the large margin of safety in 
companies listed on scrutinised stock exchanges and their ability to continue as going concerns. 
This in turn has the potential to attract more direct foreign investments. Finally, the descriptive 
statistics of the categorical control variables as indicated in Table 6.5 show that 35% of the sample 
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companies that are listed on the EGX are non-manufacturing companies compared to 52% of the 
sample companies that are listed on the ASE. Also, it is recognised that 31% of the companies 
listed on the EGX are audited by non big 4 audit firms compared to 57% of those listed on the 
ASE. This implies that the majority of companies listed on the EGX (69%) are audited by big 4 
affiliates which may be a reason for higher levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian context compared to the Jordanian one. 
 
To sum up, the above discussion of the descriptive statistics of test and control variables, indicates 
the existence of differences between the two scrutinised stock exchanges.This conclusion, in 
addition to the findings of the assessment of the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the two stock exchanges discussed in section 6.2, raises the need to investigate 
whether there are significant statistical differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian 
Contexts (H1). This hypothesis is investigated in the next section. 
 
6.4 Differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian Contexts 
After calculating the disclosure indices (dependent variable), summarising the independent 
variables in matching columns, and conducting a descriptive analysis of the dependent and 
independent variables, an exploration of any potential significant statistical differences between the 
Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts (H1) is warranted before investigating the relationship 
between the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance 
structures of companies listed on the scrutinised stock exchanges. 
To determine whether to apply parametric or non-parametric tests in the statistical analysis to be 
conducted in this chapter, it was necessary to check the normality of distribution of the dependent 
and independent variables as is now indicated. 
6.4.1 Normality Test 
As indicated in section 5.6, both the K-S Lilliefors test and Shapiro-Wilk test were employed to 
assess the normality of data distribution. The results of these tests are reported in the following two 
sub-sections (6.4.1.1 and 6.4.1.2 respectively). 
 
6.4.1.1 Normality of the Dependent Variable  
Table 6.6 demonstrates the results of the test for normality of the distribution of the dependent 
variable (total disclosure index) using the K-S and Shapiro-Wilk tests. Both tests were performed 
on the 150 companies listed on the EGX and ASE. The table indicates the test statistics, the degrees 
of freedom (df) and significance. 
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Table 6.6: Tests of Normality of the Dependent Variable 
Disclosure 
Index 
(N=150) 
K-S Test Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Total Score .109 150 .000 .942 150 .000 
 
As indicated in Table 6.6, significance is less than 0.05 for total disclosure index (dependent 
variable), meaning that it is not normally distributed. Furthermore, the results of the test of 
normality on individual country level that is reported in Appendix 6 generally confirm this result. 
Consequently, this supports the use of non-parametric tests for the univariate analysis and 
transformed data (normal scores) to run the regression analysis. 
 
6.4.1.2 Normality of Independent Variables 
Table 6.7 presents the results of testing the normality of distribution of the independent variables 
under the K-S and Shapiro-Wilk tests. 
 
Table 6.7:  Tests of Normality of Independent Variables 
Independent 
Variable 
(N=150) 
K-S Test Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Test (Explanatory) Variables 
Board 
Independence .111 150 .000 .969 150 .002 
Board Size .126 150 .000 .929 150 .000 
Board 
Leadership .423 150 .000 .598 150 .000 
Government 
Ownership .286 150 .000 .633 150 .000 
Mnagement 
Ownership .276 150 .000 .662 150 .000 
Private 
Ownership .163 150 .000 .870 150 .000 
Public 
Ownership .207 150 .000 .807 150 .000 
Control Variables 
Total Assets .396 150 .000 .246 150 .000 
Return on 
Assets .083 150 .014 .939 150 .000 
Debt to Equity .328 150 .000 .637 150 .000 
Quick Ratio .167 150 .000 .866 150 .000 
Type of Business .375 150 .000 .630 150 .000 
Type of Auditor .372 150 .000 .631 150 .000 
 
As seen in Table 6.7, significance is less than 0.05 for all independent variables (test and control). 
This implies that they are not normally distributed.This result is further confirmed by normality 
tests on individual country level reported in Appendix 6 and hence, supports the use of non-
parametric tests. 
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6.4.2 Testing Differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian Contexts (H1) 
In order to investigate whether significant statistical differences exist between the Egyptian and the 
Jordanian contexts (H1), the researcher employed the Mann-Whitney U test and Chi-square test 
(non-parametric tests), which are expected to give more accurate results than parametric tests when 
the variables are not normally distributed.  
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to examine whether significant statistical differences exist 
between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts with respect to the overall compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements (total disclosure index), and continuous independent 
variables (board independence, board size, ownership structure, company size, profitability, gearing 
and liquidity). Meanwhile, the Chi-square test was used to examine such issue with respect to the 
categorical independent variables (board leadership, type of business activity, and type of audit 
firm). Accordingly this hypothesis has been further divided into the following two sub-hypotheses. 
 
H1a: There are no significant statistical differences between Egypt and Jordan in their levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
H1b: There are no significant statistical differences between Egypt and Jordan in their dominant 
corporate governance structures and other company characteristics. 
 
H1a is tested in sub-section 6.4.2.1 and H1b in sub-section 6.4.2.2. The acceptance or rejection of 
the null hypothesis is based on whether there are significant statistical differences (P≤.05). 
  
6.4.2.1 Significant Differences between Egypt and Jordan in terms of Levels of Compliance 
with IFRSs Disclosure Requirements 
Table 6.8 demonstrates the results of the Mann-Whitney U test for the total disclosure index 
(dependent variable). 
 
Table 6.8:  Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Total Disclosure Index (Dependent Variable) 
Disclosure Index 
(N=150) Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Total Score 1922.000 4772.000 -3.349 .001 
 
The results show that there are statistically significant differences (P<.05) between the two groups 
of companies: those listed on the EGX and those listed on the ASE with respect to the overall level 
of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements (total disclosure index). 
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Consequently, H1a will be rejected. This result confirms the findings of the descriptive statistical 
analysis presented in section 6.2.1 which demonstrates that the overall level of compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements is higher in Egypt than in Jordan. As previously 
indicated, this difference may be mainly attributed to the existence of technical difficulties due to 
the lack of adequately qualified accountants in Jordan and the unavailability of official Arabic 
translation of the IFRSs in Jordan. 
 
6.4.2.2 Significant Differences between Egypt and Jordan in terms of the Independent 
Variables  
Table 6.9 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney U test for continuous independent variables. 
 
Table 6.9:  Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Continuous Independent Variables 
Disclosure Index 
(N=150) Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Test Variables 
Board 
Independence 2023.000 4873.000 -2.971 .003 
Board Size 1525.000 4375.000 -4.903 .000 
Government 
Ownership 2647.500 5497.500 -.665 .506 
Mnagement 
Ownership 1974.000 4824.000 -3.411 .001 
Private 
Ownership 1850.000 4700.000 -3.641 .000 
Public 
Ownership 1921.000 4771.000 -3.419 .001 
Control Variables 
Company size 1438.000 4288.000 -5.166 .000 
Profitability 1230.000 4080.000 -5.948 .000 
Gearing 1876.000 4726.000 -3.522 .000 
Liquidity 2230.000 5080.000 -2.191 .028 
 
The results show that there are statistically significant differences (P<.05) between companies 
listed on the EGX and those listed on the ASE with respect to all continuous test and control 
variables except government ownership ratio (P>.05).  
 
With respect to the categorical independent variables, Table 6.10 demonstrates the results of the 
Chi-square test for the differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts. 
Table 6.10: Chi-square Test Results for Categorical Independent Variables   
Variable Egypt (N=75) Jordan (N=75) Pearson Chi-
square 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Board Leadership 
Separate Role 
(Category 1) 
38 (51%) 61 (81%) 14.379 .000 
Dual Role(Category 0) 37 (49%) 19 (7%) 
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Type of Business Activity  
Non-manufacturing  
(Category 1) 
26 (35%) 39 (52%) 3.910 .048 
Manufacturing 
(Category 0) 
49 (65%) 36 (48%) 
Type of Auditor 
Non Big 4 (Category1) 23 (31%) 43 (57%) 9.767 .002 
Big 4 (Category 0) 52 (69%) 32 (43%) 
                      
As indicated in Table 6.10 there are significant differences (Sig.<.05) between the Egyptian and the 
Jordanian contexts with respect to the categorical variables. With respect to board leadership, 
results show that the proportion of companies listed on the ASE that separate the CEO and Chair 
positions is higher than that for those listed on the EGX. In other words, separation of the two 
positions is highly recognised in companies listed on the ASE (81% of the companies) and less so 
(52%) for those listed on the EGX. This indicates that the OECD recommendation for corporate 
governance best practices is more recognised in Jordan than in Egypt. Hence, this raises the need to 
investigate the impact of this mechanism on the levels of compliance with IFRSs in each of the 
scrutinised stock exchanges. Also, the results show that there are significant differences between 
the proportion of companies that are audited by big 4 affiliates (69% in Egypt compared to 43% in 
Jordan) as well as with respect to the type of business activity (65% of the companies listed on the 
EGX are manufacturing companies compared to 48% of those listed on the ASE). Consequently, 
hypothesis H1b will be rejected. 
 
The results from the Mann-Whitney U test and the Chi-square test reveals the existence of 
significant differences between the scrutinised contexts and hence the first research hypothesis will 
be rejected. These findings support those of the descriptive statistical analysis presented in sections 
6.2 and 6.3. Additionally, they imply that although Egypt and Jordan have similarities in their legal, 
economic and cultural contexts, they are not homogeneous. This lends support to the inapplicability 
of generalizing the results of one developing country to others. In addition, this raises the need to 
examine the impact of corporate governance best practices on the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
in each of the scrutinised stock exchanges.  
 
6.5 Univariate Analysis  
Given that the dependent and independent variables are not normally distributed as concluded in 
section 6.4.1, it was decided to use non-parametric tests. Furthermore, as the investigation of the 
significant statistical differences between Egypt and Jordan presented in section 6.4.2 indicated that 
there are significant statistical differences between the two groups of companies (those listed on the 
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EGX and those listed on the ASE), the following analyses are conducted on individual country 
level.  
 
The researcher employed Spearman's rank correlation coefficient to assess the association between 
the continuous independent variables (board independence, board size, government ownership, 
management ownership, private ownership, public ownership, firm size, profitability, gearing and 
liquidity) and the total disclosure index.  
For the categorical independent variables (board leadership, type of business activity, and type of 
audit firm), the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was performed to test the impact of each of 
these on the disclosure level. The remaining part of this section discusses the results of both tests37. 
 
6.5.1 Univariate Analysis – Egypt 
 
6.5.1.1 Univariate Analysis – Total Disclosure Index and the Continuous Independent 
Variables- Egypt 
 
Table 6.11 presents the correlation between the overall level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements (total disclosure index) and continuous independent variables within the Egyptian 
context. Given that the results of the test of normality for the total disclosure index reportd in 
Appendix 6 show that P=.2 (P>.05), it was decided to double-check the results of the Spearman 
Rank Correlation (non-parametric test) using the Pearson Product-moment Correlation (parametric 
test). 
 
Table 6.11: Correlation between Total Disclosure Index and Continuous Independent Variables-Egypt (N=75) 
Variable 
Total Disclosure Index 
Spearman Rank Correlation Pearson Product-moment Correlation 
Correlation 
Coeffecient (r) 
Significance (two-
tailed) 
Correlation 
Coeffecient (r) 
Significance (two-
tailed) 
BOD Independence .072 .538 .008 .945 
BOD Size .052 .657 .066 .574 
Government 
Ownership .127 .277 .139 .235 
Management 
Ownership .031 .790 .019 .872 
Private Ownership -.013 .910 -.019 .871 
Public Ownership -.080 .493 -.152 .193 
Company Size .171 .143 .051 .666 
Profitability -.022 .850 -.087 .456 
                                                          
37 A detailed explanation of these variables, reasons for selection and method of operationalisation of their proxies was 
presented in Chapter Five. 
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Gearing -.122 .297 -.055 .642 
Liquidity -.003 .978 .042 .722 
 
 
As seen in Table 6.11, the results of both the Spearman Rank Correlation and the Pearson Product-
moment Correlation support the non existence of any significant correlation between the overall 
level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements and continuous corporate 
governance test variables (P> .05).  
 
These findings support the second research hypothesis (H2a: there is no significant statistical 
relationship between board independence and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian context). This agrees with the findings of Haniffa (1999), Ho and 
Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Al-Akra et al. 
(2010a,b). Compared with the findings of prior studies that investigated the association between 
corporate governance attributes and disclosure practices within the Egyptian context, these findings 
do not support those of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) which report a significant positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and board independence. With respect to the 
association between board size and compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements, 
these findings support the fourth research hypothesis (H4a: there is no significant statistical 
relationship between board size and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
in the Egyptian context). This agrees with the findings of Lakhal (2003), Arcay and Vazquez (2005) 
and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). Compared with the findings of prior studies that investigated the 
association between board size and disclosure practices within the Egyptian context, these findings 
do not support those of Ezat and El-Masry (2008) which report a significant positive relationship 
between voluntary internet disclosure and board size. 
 
The lack of correlation between levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements and either of board independence or board size within the Egyptian context, supports 
the proposition that the majority of board members in companies listed on the EGX do not carry 
out their responsibilities with respect to monitoring management behaviour properly, even when 
outside directors are recognised on the boards in the Egyptian listed companies, they lack material 
independence as generally, they are appointed to the board because of their close relationship with 
executive board members, the Chair or controlling shareholders. They may also lack experience or 
may have insufficient financial incentive to actively monitor management and protect the interests 
of minority shareholders. This lends weight to the notions of the institutional isomorphism theory 
(board members in the Egyptian listed companies, do not contribute to improving the BOD’s 
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monitoring function even when they meet the independence criterion, being appointed simply to 
signal that such companies follow corporate governance best practices, and hence, gain respect, 
consequently the problem of decoupling will continue as companies will state that financial 
statements are prepared according to IFRSs while full compliance is absent). Furthermore, the 
predictions of financial economics theories relevant to this study (weak monitoring reduces 
monitoring costs and weak enforcement of IFRSs reduces non-compliance costs) and Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model (acceptance of secrecy, absence of awareness regarding the 
importance of transparency and the lack of material independence by board members may support 
management’s selective disclosure to avoid competition and protect company reputation, even 
though the lack of disclosure is in breach of the mandatory requirements). Moreover, the 
interviewees' responses discussed in Chapter Seven also support this proposition. 
 
With respect to the association between government ownership ratio and the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.11 support hypothesis H5a1 
(there is no significant statistical relationship between the government ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This result 
supports the findings of Naser et al. (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Al-Akra et al. (2010a). 
In addition, it supports that of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context.This may 
be explained by the government’s ability to access all company information. Agency theory 
suggests that, this reduces the monitoring costs, and hence reduces management incentives to 
improve disclosure. Simultaneously, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit 
analysis, and institutional isomorphism all suggest that given the preference to secrecy the 
government may not encourage full transparency. This may be due to government’s intention to 
sell its shares in the company at a good price as part of the privatisation programme. Additionally, 
the lack of awareness and the absence of incentives for members of the public who are implicit 
owners of government shares discourage direct monitoring of the management (generally 
government officials) of government-owned enterprises. This contributes to the decoupling 
problem as companies declare their compliance with IFRSs, simply to gain respect and legitimacy, 
when in reality they are not complying. Further support for this result is evident in the 
interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between management ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.11 do not support H5b1 
(there is a significant negative statistical relationship between the management ownership ratio and 
the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). Although, 
this result does not agree with the findings of the majority of prior studies investigating the 
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association between management ownership and levels of disclosure, which support a negative 
relationship (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; 
Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008), and with that of Samaha and Dahawy (2010) in the Egyptian 
context, it supports that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011). This may be explained by reduced agency 
costs, and predictions  based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, 
and institutional isomorphism that the secretive culture, lack of management awareness concerning 
the importance of transparency and compliance, absence of monitoring by board members or stock 
exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders, encourage 
management to keep disclosure levels at a minimum as long as non compliance costs are less than 
compliance costs. This in turn contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this 
result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between private ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.11 support H5c1 (there is no significant 
statistical relationship between the private ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This result supports the findings of Suwaidan 
(1997), Depeors (2000), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b); however, it does not support 
that of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) with respect to voluntary disclosure practices in Egypt. 
This is probably attributable to ease of access to all company information by private investors who 
are in most cases actively involved in company management either as executives or as directors. 
Furthermore, based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism, it can be stated that the secretive culture, and lack of private investor 
awareness of the importance of transparency will not increase pressures by private investors on 
management to improve compliance with IFRSs. Furthermore, absence of monitoring from board 
members or stock exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders will 
reduce non compliance costs; hence will not improve compliance levels with mandatory IFRSs. 
Consequently, this contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is 
evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
Finally, with respect to the association between public ownership ratio and levels of compliance 
with overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.11 support H5d1 
(there is no significant statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This result supports that 
of Al-Akra et al. (2010a). However, it does not support the results of the majority of prior studies 
which support the existence of a positive association between public ownership and disclosure level 
(e.g., Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). In 
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addition, it does not support the finding of Ezat and El-Masry (2008) in the Egyptian context. This 
result may be attributed to the reduced agency costs due to the lack of demand for more disclosure 
by naïve public investors in the Egyptian context. Furthermore, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-
cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism propose that the secretive 
culture causes management to avoid the outflow of stock market price-sensitive information. In 
addition, secrecy is also associated with large power distance and the tendency to collectivism 
(Gray, 1988). Furthermore, the lack of listed companies’ management and BOD awareness 
regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs and of following corporate governance best 
practices to enhance transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and the absence 
of materially independent board members with primary responsibility for protecting public 
shareholders interests, cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. The fact that 
public shareholders in developing stock exchanges do not exercise their rights, adds to this situation, 
thereby management is not stimulated to improve compliance with IFRSs, and the problem of 
decoupling escalates. In this respect, Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007) argue that many public 
shareholders in Egypt are small investors who cannot form pressure groups like those in developed 
markets. Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in 
Chapter Seven.  
 
Regarding the association between company size and compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, the results reported in Table 6.11 do not support a significant association. This 
supports the findings of Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Street and Gray (2002) and Aljifri (2008). In 
addition, this supports the findings of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. 
This may be attributed to the similarity in compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements among all companies listed on the EGX. Table 6.11 reveals that no association exists 
between firm profitability and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the 
Egyptian context, thereby supporting the findings of some previous studies (e.g., Malone et al., 
1993; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Eng & Mak, 
2003; Barako et al., 2006). In addition, it supports those of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Ezat and El-Masry 
(2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This may be explained by 
the similarity in compliance behaviour among all companies listed on the EGX. With respect to the 
association between firm gearing and its level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, 
Table 6.11 reveals that no association exists, thereby supporting research outcomes of some prior 
research (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Patton & Zelenka 1997; Craig & Diga 1998; Dumontier & Raffournier 1998; Tower et al., 1999; 
Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006). In addition, it supports those 
of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the 
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Egyptian context. This may be explained by the similarities in compliance attitude among all 
companies listed on the EGX. Finally, Table 6.11 indicates that no association exists between firm 
liquidity and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context, 
thereby supporting the findings of Alsaeed (2005), Barako et al. (2006) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a). 
In addition, it supports that of Abd-Elsalam (1999) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the Egyptian 
context. This may be due to the similarity among all companies listed on the EGX in their 
compliance attitude with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements.  
 
6.5.1.2 Univariate Analysis – Total Disclosure Index and the Categorical Independent 
Variables- Egypt 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to determine whether there are significant statistical 
differences between the two groups of companies that: separate the CEO and Chair positions and 
those that do not; carry out manufacturing activities and those that carry out non-manufacturing 
activities; audited by big 4 affiliates and those audited by non big 4 ones. Table 6.12 presents the 
results of the Mann-Whitney U test. 
 
Table 6.12:  Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Categorical Independent Variables-Egypt 
Disclosure Index Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Board Leadership 
Total Disclosure 
Index (Total Score) 650.000 1353.000 -.562 .574 
 Type of Business Activity 
Total Disclosure 
Index (Total Score) 634.500 985.500 -.028 .978 
Type of Auditor 
Total Disclosure 
Index (Total Score) 570.000 846.000 -.322 .748 
 
With respect to the impact of board leadership, the Mann-Whitney U test results demonstrated in 
Table 6.12 show that, no statistically significant differences exist between the two groups of 
companies (i.e., in which the CEO and Chair positions are held by different persons, and those that 
do not) in the extent of compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements as the 
probability value calculated is greater than .05 (P=.574). Consequently, H3a: there are no 
statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and Chair and those that do not in the 
Egyptian context, is accepted. This supports the findings of Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006). In addition, it supports those of Ezat and El-
Masry (2008) that carried out in the Egyptian context.This can be mainly explained by the lack of 
material independence of the Chair in the Egyptian listed companies when the CEO and Chair 
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positions are separated. This in turn lends support to the institutional isomorphism which suggests 
that, separating the CEO and Chair positions has no influence on board leadership independence, as 
long as there is no awareness regarding the importance of separating the positions of the CEO and  
Chair in improving the monitoring of management behaviour and hence the quality of financial 
reporting within the business firm. Consequently, no significant impact on levels of compliance 
with IFRSs, is expected when the two positions are separated, and decoupling is thus expected to 
continue due to the existence of cultural barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of 
the two positions as recommended under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. In 
addition, companies may fall in line with the separation recommendations purely to gain respect 
and legitimacy. Also, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, the notions of agency theory 
and cost benefit-analysis would argue that given the secretive culture accompanied with lack of 
material independence of the Chair, weak monitoring and lack of strict enforcement of compliance, 
non-compliance costs will continue to be less than compliance costs. Consequently, the separation 
between the CEO Chair positions will not result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.  Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in 
Chapter Seven.  
 
With respect to the impact of the type of business activity (manufacturing/non-manufacturing) on 
the levels of compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the Mann-Whitney U test 
results demonstrated in Table 6.12 show that, no statistically significant differences exist between 
the two groups of companies in the extent of compliance with the overall mandatory disclosure 
requirements as the probability value calculated is greater than .05 (P=.978). This supports the 
findings of some prior research (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Naser, 1998; Naser at al., 2002; Street & 
Gray, 2002). In addition, it supports those of Ismail et al. (2010) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) 
in the Egyptian context.  This may be attributed to the fact that companies listed on the EGX are the 
largest companies in their sectors and the most important vehicles in the development of the 
Egyptian economy, hence there are no differences in their attitude with respect to compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
 
Finally, with respect to the impact of the type of auditor (big 4/non big 4) on the levels of 
compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the Mann-Whitney U test results 
demonstrated in Table 6.12 show that, no statistically significant differences exist between the two 
groups of companies in the extent of compliance with the overall mandatory disclosure 
requirements as the probability value calculated is greater than .05 (P=.748). This supports the 
findings of some prior research (e.g., Naser, 1998; Naser et al., 2002; Street & Gray, 2002). In 
addition, this supports the findings of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. 
160 
Given that none of the companies that are listed on the EGX achieved full compliance with the 
overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements, this implies that there 
is no difference between the quality of work performed by big 4 affiliates compared to non big 4 
ones. Hence, this raises doubts concerning the quality of audit work performed by big 4 affiliates 
that operate in Egypt. Some of these audit firms may not be strict as they may consider the 
companies to be operating in a developing market, and to require more time to adapt to the 
compliance culture in respect of IFRSs. Additionally, they may fear the prospect of losing the client 
should they issue qualified reports; and another possibility is that they may perceive their clients as 
the best of the worst and believe that issuing them with qualified reports will give an advantage to 
those companies with lower compliance levels but audited by non-big 4 audit firms. This supports 
the continuity of decoupling problem in the Egyptian context in two ways. Firstly, listed companies 
will continue claiming that their financial statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs while 
full compliance is absent. Secondly, it seems that in most cases, listed companies engage with big 4 
audit firms, paying expensive audit fees merely as window dressing to attract more investors or to 
avoid extensive monitoring by the disclosure monitoring staff of the CMA. 
 
The above discussion of the findings from the univariate analysis promulgates that none of the 
corporate governance variables has a significant association with the overall level of compliance 
with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. This implies that the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms that are recommended by the OECD principles and the ECCG is absent in 
the Egyptian context. For further confirmation a regression analysis was carried out using normal 
scores to investigate the joint effect of independent variables, however, none of the independent 
variables appeared to be with significant power to explain variation in the levels of compliance 
with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements within the Egyptian context as will be reported in 
section 6.6.3.1.   
 
6.5.2 Univariate Analysis – Jordan 
 
6.5.2.1 Univariate Analysis – Total Disclosure Index and the Continuous Independent 
Variables- Jordan 
 
Table 6.13 presents the correlation between the overall level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements (total disclosure index) and continuous independent variables within the Jordanian 
context. Given that the results of the test of normality for the total disclosure index (dependent 
variable) and all of the independent variables as reportd in Appendix 6 shows that all variables are 
not normally distributed (P< .05), it was decided to use the Spearman Rank Correlation (non-
parametric test). 
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Table 6.13: Correlation between Total Disclosure Index and Continuous Independent Variables-Jordan (N=75) 
Variable 
Total Disclosure Index 
Spearman Rank  
Correlation Coeffecient (r) 
Significance 
(two-tailed) 
BOD Independence .176 .132 
BOD Size .122 .298 
Government Ownership .118 .314 
Management Ownership -.012 .922 
Private Ownership -.166 .154 
Public Ownership -.336** .003 
Company Size .098 .404 
Profitability .179 .124 
Gearing -.070 .551 
Liquidity -.018 .878 
                         **Correlation is Significant at the 0.01 Level 
 
Table 6.13 indicates the existence of a significant negative relationship between public ownership 
ratio and the extent of compliance with total IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian 
context at the 1% significance level (r= -.336 and P= .003<.05). Hence, H5d2 (there is no 
significant statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the extent of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context), is rejected. This result supports that 
of Hossain et al. (1994). In addition, it supports that of Naser et al. (2002)38 and Al-Akra et al. 
(2010b) in the Jordanian context. However, it does not support the results of the majority of prior 
studies which support the existence of a positive association between public ownership and 
disclosure level (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ezat & El-
Masry, 2008), and those of Al-Htaybat (2005) in the Jordanian context.This result may be 
attributed to the lack of demand for more disclosure by public investors in the Jordanian context 
similar to their counterparts in the Egyptian context. This can be explained by the fact that, the 
majority of individual investors in Jordan are small unsophisticated investors, and their investment 
decisions in most of the cases are speculative and uninformed (Naser et al., 2002; Al-Akra et al., 
2010a). Reduced agency costs due to the lack of demand for more disclosure by public investors, 
accounts for this. Furthermore, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, 
and institutional isomorphism propose that, the secretive culture in Jordan causes management to 
avoid the outflow of stock market price-sensitive information. In addition, secrecy is also 
associated with large power distance and the tendency to collectivism (Gray, 1988). Furthermore, 
the lack of listed companies’ management and BOD awareness regarding the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs and of following corporate governance best practices to enhance 
transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and the absence of materially 
                                                          
38  Naser et al. (2002) report a negative but insignificant association between compliance with IASs disclosure 
requirements and public ownership. 
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independent board members with primary responsibility for protecting public shareholders' interests, 
cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. The fact that public shareholders in 
scrutinised stock exchanges do not exercise their rights, adds to this situation, thereby management 
is not stimulated to improve compliance with IFRSs, and the problem of decoupling escalates. 
Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between board independence and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, as seen in Table 6.13, the results of the Spearman Rank Correlation 
support the non-existence of a statistically significant relationship between board independence and 
the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements (P> .05). These 
findings support the second research hypothesis (H2b: there is no significant statistical relationship 
between board independence and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 
the Jordanian context). This agrees with the findings of Haniffa (1999), Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006). In addition, this result supports those of 
Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) in the Jordanian context. On the other hand, the results demonstrated in 
Table 6.13 with respect to the association between board size and compliance with overall IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, support the fourth research hypothesis (H4b: there is no significant 
statistical relationship between board size and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Jordanian context). This agrees with the findings on the level of the Egyptian 
context. This also agrees with the findings of Lakhal (2003), Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006). However, this result does not support that of Al-Akra et al. (2010a) who 
investigated this issue in the Jordanian context and reported a significant positive relationship. 
 
The lack of correlation between levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements and either of board independence or board size in the Jordanian context similar to the 
Egyptian one, supports the proposition that, board members are not aware about their roles, hence 
they do not carry out their responsibilities properly. Additionally, most outside directors in the 
Jordanian listed companies similar to their Egyptian counterparts, lack material independence as 
generally, they are appointed to the board because of their close relationship with executive board 
members, the Chair or controlling shareholders. They may also lack experience or may have 
insufficient financial incentive to actively monitor management and protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. This lends weight to the notions of the institutional isomorphism theory (board 
members in the Jordanian listed companies, do not contribute to improving the BOD’s monitoring 
function even when they meet the independence criterion, being appointed simply to signal that 
such companies follow corporate governance best practices, and hence, gain respect). Furthermore, 
the predictions of financial economics theories relevant to this study (weak monitoring reduces 
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monitoring costs, hence will not stimulate management to improve compliance as well as the weak 
enforcement of compliance with IFRSs results in low non-compliance costs) and Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model (acceptance of secrecy, absence of awareness regarding the 
importance of transparency and the lack of material independence by board members support 
management’s selective disclosure to avoid competition and protect company reputation, even 
though the lack of disclosure is in breach of the mandatory requirements). Moreover, the 
interviewees' responses reported in Chapter Seven also support this proposition. 
 
With respect to the association between government ownership ratio and the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.13 support those on the level 
of the Egyptian context. Hence, hypothesis H5a2 (there is no significant statistical relationship 
between the government ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Jordanian context), is accepted. This result supports the findings of Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011). In addition, it supports that of Naser et al. 
(2002) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a) in the Jordanian context.This may be explained by the 
government’s ability to access all company information. Agency theory suggests that, this reduces 
the monitoring costs, and hence reduces management incentives to improve disclosure. 
Simultaneously, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism all suggest that given the preference to secrecy the government may not 
encourage full transparency. This may be due to government’s intention to sell its shares in the 
company at a good price as part of the privatisation programme. Additionally, the lack of 
awareness and the absence of incentives for members of the public who are implicit owners of 
government shares discourage direct monitoring of the management (generally government 
officials) in companies with dominant government ownership. This contributes to the decoupling 
problem as companies declare their compliance with IFRSs simply to gain respect and legitimacy, 
when in reality they are not fully complying. Further support for this result is evident in the 
interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between management ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.13 do not support H5b2 
(there is a significant negative statistical relationship between the management ownership ratio and 
the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context). Although, 
this result does not agree with the findings of the majority of prior studies investigating the 
association between management ownership and levels of disclosure which support a negative 
relationship (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; 
Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010), it supports that of this study on the 
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level of the Egyptian context and of Samaha and Dahawy (2011). To the best of the researcher's 
knowledge this study is the first to investigate the association between management ownership and 
levels of compliance with IFRSs in the Jordanian context. However, this finding may be explained 
by the lack of separation between management and control, reduced agency costs, and predictions 
based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional 
isomorphism that the secretive culture, lack of management awareness concerning the importance 
of transparency and compliance, absence of monitoring by board members or stock exchange 
regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders, encourage management to keep 
disclosure levels at a minimum as long as non-compliance costs are less than compliance costs. 
This in turn contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is evident in 
the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between private ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings reported in Table 6.13 support H5c2 (There is no significant 
statistical relationship between the private ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the Jordanaian context). This result supports the findings of this study on 
the level of the Egyptian context. In addition, it supports that of Depeors (2000); and those of 
Suwaidan (1997), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) on the Jordanaian context. Similar to 
the case of Egypt, this may be attributable to ease of access to all company information by private 
investors who are in most cases actively involved in company management either as executives or 
as directors. Furthermore, based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit 
analysis, and institutional isomorphism, it can be stated that the secretive culture, and lack of 
private investor awareness of the importance of transparency will not increase pressures by private 
investors on management to improve compliance with IFRSs. Furthermore, absence of monitoring 
from board members or stock exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority 
shareholders will reduce non compliance costs; hence will not improve compliance levels with 
mandatory IFRSs. Consequently, this contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for 
this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
Regarding the association between company size and compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, the results reported in Table 6.13 do not support a significant association. This 
supports the findings of this study on the level of the Egyptian context. It also supports that of 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Street and Gray (2002), Aljifri (2008) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 
2011). In addition, this supports the findings of Al-Akra et al. (2010a) in the Jordanian context. 
However, it does not agree with the findings of the majority of researchers such as Suwaidan 
(1997), Naser (1998), Naser et al. (2002), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) who report a 
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significant association between company size and disclosure levels mainly due to the low costs of 
disclosing information in large companies compared to small ones. Hence, this association needs to 
be further investigated using multivariate analysis. Table 6.13 reveals that no association exists 
between firm profitability and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the 
Jordanian context similar to the Egyptian context, thereby supporting the findings of some previous 
studies (e.g., Malone et al., 1993; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Tower et 
al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Eng & Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; 
Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). In addition, it supports those of Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) in the 
Jordanian context. This implies similarity in compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements among companies listed on the ASE. With respect to the association 
between firm gearing and its level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, Table 6.13 
reveals that no association exists, thereby supporting this research outcomes on the level of the 
Egyptian context as well as those of some prior research (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 
1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton & Zelenka 1997; Craig & Diga 1998; 
Dumontier & Raffournier 1998; Abd-Elsalam , 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Aksu & Kosedag 2006; Ezat & El-Masry; 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 
2011). In addition, it supports those of Al-Htaybat (2005) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the 
Jordanian context. This may be explained by the similarities in compliance attitude with respect to 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on the ASE. Finally, Table 6.13 
indicates that no significant association exists between firm liquidity and its level of compliance 
with IFRS disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context, thereby supporting the findings of this 
study and of Abd-Elsalam (1999) on the level of the Egyptian context and those of Alsaeed (2005), 
and Barako et al. (2006). It also supports that of Al-Htaybat (2005) in the Jordanain context, 
however, it does not support that of Naser et al. (2002) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the Jordanian 
context.This may be attributed to the similarity in compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements by companies listed on the ASE in 2007 regardless of the level of liquidity. 
However, this issue will be further investigated in the multivariate analysis. 
 
6.5.2.2 Univariate Analysis – Total Disclosure Index and the Categorical Independent 
Variables- Jordan 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to determine whether there are significant statistical 
differences between the two groups of companies that: separate the CEO and the Chair positions 
and those that do not; carry out manufacturing activities and those that carry out non-manufacturing 
activities; audited by big 4 affiliates and those audited by non big 4 ones. Table 6.14 presents the 
results of the Mann-Whitney U test. 
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Table 6.14:  Mann-Whitney U Test Results for Categorical Independent Variables-Jordan 
Disclosure Index Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
Board Leadership  
Total Disclosure 
Index (Total Score) 377.000 2268.000 -.680 .497 
 Type of Business Activity  
Total Disclosure 
Index (Total Score) 530.000 1196.000 -1.824 .068 
Type of Auditor 
Total Disclosure 
Index (Total Score) 332.000 1278.000 -3.814 .000 
 
The results presented in Table 6.14 indicate that significant statistical differences exist between 
companies that are audited by big 4 audit firms and those that are  not audited by big 4 audit firms 
in the Jordanian context in terms of the extent of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements as the probability value calculated is less than .05 (P=.000). Furthermore, the Mann-
Whitney U test results concerning the indices for companies audited by big 4 audit firms and those 
that are not, indicate that the compliance level with the total IFRSs disclosure requirements is 
higher in companies audited by big 4 audit firms than those that are not (the mean rank in the 32 
companies audited by big 4 affiliates = 49.12 compared to 29.72 in the 43 companies audited by 
non-big 4 ones). This result seems reasonable as big 4 audit firm staff are usually highly qualified 
and more familiar with international accounting standards and practices than their counterparts in 
local audit firms. This result supports the findings of some earlier studies (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Glaum & Street, 2003). In addition, it supports those of Suwaidan (1997), Naser et al. (2002), Al-
Shiab (2003), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a) in the Jordanian context. 
 
With respect to the impact of board leadership, the Mann-Whitney U test results demonstrated in 
Table 6.14 show that, similar to the case of Egypt, no statistically significant differences exist 
between the two groups of companies (i.e., in which the CEO and Chair positions are held by 
different persons, and those that do not) in terms of the extent of compliance with the overall 
mandatory disclosure requirements as the probability value calculated is greater than .05 (P=.497). 
Consequently, H3b: there are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and Chair 
and those that do not in the Jordanian context, is accepted. This supports the findings of Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Ezat and El-
Masry (2008). As previously mentioned, the impact of board leadership to the best of the 
researcher's knowledge has been investigated in the Jordanian context by Abed et al. (2011) study 
which reports a significant positive relationship between role duality and level of voluntary 
disclosures in Jordan. Consequently, the finding of the current study may be attributed to the lack 
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of material independence of the Chair in the Jordanian listed companies when the CEO and the 
Chair positions are separated. This in turn lends support to the institutional isomorphism which 
suggests that, separating the CEO and the Chair positions has no influence on board leadership 
independence, as long as there is no awareness regarding the importance of separating the positions 
in improving the monitoring of management behaviour and hence the quality of financial reporting 
within the business firm. Consequently, no significant impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs, 
is expected when the two positions are separated, and decoupling is thus expected to continue due 
to the existence of cultural barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of the two 
positions as recommended under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. In addition, 
companies may fall in line with the separation recommendations purely to gain respect and 
legitimacy. Also, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, the notions of agency theory and 
cost benefit-analysis would argue that given the secretive culture accompanied with lack of 
material independence, weak monitoring and lack of strict enforcement of compliance, non-
compliance costs will continue to be less than compliance costs. Consequently, the separation 
between the CEO and Chair positions may not result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.   
 
Finally, with respect to the impact of the type of business activity (manufacturing/non-
manufacturing) on the levels of compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the 
Mann-Whitney U test results demonstrated in Table 6.14 show that, similar to the case of Egypt, no 
statistically significant differences exist between the two groups of companies in the extent of 
compliance with the overall mandatory disclosure requirements as the probability value calculated 
is greater than .05 (P=.068). This supports the findings of some prior research (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; 
Street & Gray, 2002; Ismail et al., 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). In addition, it supports those of 
Naser (1998) and Naser at al., (2002) in the Jordanian context.This may be attributed to the fact that 
companies listed on the ASE are the largest companies in their sectors and the most important 
contributors in the development of the Jordanian economy and that such companies are relatively 
similar in their behaviour with respect to compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. 
 
Based on the findings of the univariate analysis, it appears that public ownership ratio is the most 
important test variable in explaining the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
by non-financial companies listed on the ASE. 
  
The findings from the univariate analysis on the level of the Jordanian context justify carrying out a 
multivariate analysis for further investigation of those results taking into consideration the 
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interaction between independent variables. The results of the multivariate analysis and their 
theoretical implications are reported in the next section. 
 
6.6 Multivariate Analysis 
As indicated in sub-section 5.6.1.2.2, multiple regression analysis was undertaken to shed light on 
the joint effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Total disclosure index). A 
multiple regression model can also identify variables which, when combined in one regression 
equation, are the best statistical predictors of the dependent variable (Ghazali, 2004). Multiple 
regression is based on correlation but it enables a more sophisticated exploration of the inter-
relationship among a set of variables (Pallant, 2001).  
 
6.6.1 The Regression Model 
The full regression model is constructed as follows: 
Yj= β0+ β1 board independencej + β2 board leadershipj + β3 board sizej+ β4 government 
ownership ratioj + β5 management ownership ratioj + β6 private ownership ratioj + β7 public 
ownership ratioj + β8 total assetsj + β9 return on Assetsj + β10 debt to eqityj + β11 quick ratioj + 
β12 type of business activityj + β13 type of audit firmj + Ɛj 
Where: 
Yj= Total disclosure index for companies (j=1,…, 75) 
β0= The intercept 
Ɛj= Error term 
 
The dependent variable is the total disclosure index (denotes the overall level of compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements), computed for each of the sample companies. The 
intercept captures the average effects on compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements of those 
variables excluded from the model and is assumed to be constant across all the sample companies. 
The independent variables consist of seven test (explanatory) variables (board independence, board 
leadership, board size, government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private 
ownership ratio, and public ownership ratio) and six control variables (firm size [proxied by total 
assets], profitability [proxied by return on assets], gearing [proxied by debt to equity], liquidity 
[proxied by quick ratio], type of business activity, and type of audit firm) that are employed in the 
multiple regression analysis and Ɛ represents error term.  
 
Due to the non-normality of distribution of dependent and independent variables, it was decided to 
use non-parametric tests and to run the regression analysis using normal scores as transforming data 
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is a recommended approach in order to modify their distribution to look more normal (Pallant, 
2001; Field, 2005) as explained in detail in Chapter Five. Before conducting the regression analysis 
it was essential to check for multicollinearity to avoid the potential for misleading results, as 
indicated in Chapter Five.  The following section indicates the results of multicollinearity test.   
 
6.6.2 Multicollinearity 
The inclusion of variables that are highly correlated in one equation can result in one of the 
variables reporting non-significance even though its significance has been widely documented in 
prior research (Ghazali, 2004:179, footnote 105). As indicated in Chapter Five, the problem of 
multicollinearity will be considered when the correlation coefficient (r) exceeds .7 (Pallant, 2001: 
144). 
 
Screening the correlation matrix using the Spearman rank correlation revealed the non-existence of 
the problem of multicollinearity in both of scrutinised stock exchanges as demonstrated below in 
tables 6.15 and 6.16.  
Table 6.15: Correlation Coeffecients for Independent Variables-Egypt 
Variable BOD 
Ind.  
BOD 
Size 
Gov.  Mngt.  Priv.  Public  Size  Prof. Gear Liquid. 
BOD 
Ind. 
1          
BOD 
Size 
-.068 1         
Gov. .183 -.080 1        
Mngt. -.024 -.082 -.188 1       
Priv. -.115 .035 -.416** .615** 1      
Public .065 .003 .035 -.053 -.080 1     
Size -.064 -.049 .183 .127 -.155 .112 1    
Prof. .185 -.189 .195 -.293* -.185 -.112 -.017 1   
Gear -.180 -.055 -.390** .098 .247* -.048 -.249* .044 1  
Liquid. .113 .026 .184 -.267* -.101 -.023 -.182 .325** .001 1 
*Correlation is Significant at the 0.05 Level 
**Correlation is Significant at the 0.01 Level 
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Table 6.16: Correlation Coeffecients for Independent Variables- Jordan 
Variable BOD 
Ind.  
BOD 
Size 
Gov.  Mngt.  Priv.  Public  Size  Prof. Gear Liquid. 
BOD 
Ind. 
1          
BOD 
Size 
-.205 1         
Gov. .073 .324** 1        
Mngt. -.264* .285* -.131 1       
Priv. -.283* .103 -.295* .186 1      
Public -.381** .067 .004 .148 .023 1     
Size -.310** .091 .057 .044 -.117 .011 1    
Prof. .103 .057 .275* -.058 -.179 -.087 .245* 1   
Gear -.344** .377** -.069 .249* .375** .127 .214 .029 1  
Liquid. .064 -.119 .051 -.177 -.138 -.175 .015 .369** -.247* 1 
*Correlation is Significant at the 0.05 Level 
**Correlation is Significant at the 0.01 Level 
 
Additionally, VIF and tolerance were inspected for all models using normal scores to ensure that 
the problem of multicollinearity did not exist. The VIF was lower than 10 and all values of 
tolerance in the regression models were above 0.2. Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity was 
not recognised while running the regression analysis.The following section reports the results of 
regression analysis on individual country level. 
 
6.6.3 Regression Results 
 
6.6.3.1 The Regression Results-Egypt 
 
Stepwise regression on SPSS was performed, thus enabling the researcher to determine the 
individual contribution of each predictor in case the regression results proved that independent 
variables are related to the dependent variable (Landau & Everitt, 2004; Field, 2005). In a Stepwise 
regression, variables are entered one at a time, if they meet the entry criterion and removed one at a 
time if they do not meet the retention criterion. In other words, the researcher provides the SPSS 
with a list of independent variables, then the program selects which variables to enter and the order 
of their entrance into the regression equation based on a set of statistical criteria (Pallant, 2001). 
This study uses the defaults of the SPSS Stepwise regression, which are .05 probability for entry 
and .10 probability for removal.  
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As demonstrated in Figure 6.1 the regression model employed in this study failed to explain 
compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian 
context 39.This result confirms and refines the results of the univariate analysis with respect to the 
non existence of association between the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements and any of the test or control variables in the Egyptian context. This 
implies that the compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by 
companies listed on the EGX does not follow any pattern in relation to neither corporate 
governance related variables nor other company attributes under study in this resaerch. From the 
researcher's point of view, the non-existence of a significant association between levels of 
compliance with mandatory IFRSs requirements and any of the company attributes that are 
employed as control variables is a positive sign that generally all companies listed on the EGX have 
similar attitude with respect to compliance with mandatory requirements (i.e., compliance with the 
majority of the requirements is now part of their culture). However, the lack of significant 
association between compliance levels and any of the corporate governance related variables 
implies that, the influence of corporate governance best practice on the levels of compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs in the Egyptian context is absent. This may be attributed to its novelty and the 
lack of awareness of the advantages of material compliance with its requirements in Egypt, 
meaning that as yet it is not part of the cultural values in the Egyptian context. Building on this, it 
can be argued that there are other factors mainly related to the secretive culture that is dominant in 
MENA society that possibly influence the levels of compliance with most of IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian stock exchange. This suggests that with time, as national cultural 
values develop to perceive the importance of compliance with IFRSs as it is perceived in developed 
countries where such standards were initially developed, and as the qualification of the CMA 
monitoring staff improves, enforcement of mandatory IFRSs becomes more strict, so too are the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 A Snapshot of Regression Analysis Outcome for Egypt 
 
The outcome of the regression analysis as demonstrated in Figure 6.1 supports the second research 
hypothesis (H2a: there is no significant statistical relationship between board independence and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This agrees with 
the findings of Haniffa (1999), Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and 
                                                          
39  Appendix 7 demonstrates Pearson Correlation coeffecients and significance (1-tailed) reported with regression 
analysis results for Egypt. 
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Weetman (2006) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b). However, these findings do not support those of 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) who report a significant positive relationship between voluntary 
disclosure levels and board independence. To the best of the researcher's knowledge there is no 
evidence available from prior research with respect to the association between corporate 
governance structures and the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in the 
Egyptian context. However, the results support the proposition that, the majority of board members 
in companies listed on the EGX do not carry out their responsibilities with respect to monitoring 
management behaviour properly, even when outside directors are recognised on the boards in the 
Egyptian listed companies, they lack material independence as generally, they are appointed to the 
board because of their close relationship with executive board members, the Chair or controlling 
shareholders. They may also lack experience or may have insufficient financial incentive to 
actively monitor management and protect the interests of minority shareholders. This lends weight 
to the notions of the institutional isomorphism theory (board members in the Egyptian listed 
companies, do not contribute to improving the BOD’s monitoring function even when they meet 
the independence criterion, being appointed simply to signal that such companies follow corporate 
governance best practices, and hence, gain respect, consequently the problem of decoupling will 
continue as companies will state that financial statements are prepared according to IFRSs while 
full compliance is absent). Furthermore, the predictions of financial economics theories relevant to 
this study (weak monitoring reduces monitoring costs and weak enforcement of IFRSs reduces 
non-compliance costs) and Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model (acceptance of secrecy, 
absence of awareness regarding the importance of transparency and the lack of material 
independence by board members may support management’s selective disclosure to avoid 
competition and protect company reputation, even though the lack of disclosure is in breach of the 
mandatory requirements). Moreover, the interviewees' responses reported in Chaprter Seven also 
support this proposition. 
 
With respect to the impact of board leadership, H3a: there are no statistically significant differences 
in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements between companies that separate 
the positions of the CEO and the Chair and those that do not in the Egyptian context, is accepted. 
This supports the findings of Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006). In addition, it supports those of Ezat and El-Masry (2008) in the Egyptian 
context.This can be mainly explained by the lack of material independence of the Chair in the 
Egyptian listed companies when the CEO and the Chair positions are separated. This in turn lends 
support to the institutional isomorphism theory which suggests that, separating the CEO and Chair 
positions has no influence on board leadership independence, as long as there is no awareness 
regarding the importance of separating the positions of the CEO and Chair in improving the 
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monitoring of management behaviour and hence the quality of financial reporting within the 
business firm. Consequently, no significant impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs, is expected 
when the two positions are separated, and decoupling is thus expected to continue due to the 
existence of cultural barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of the two positions 
as recommended under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. In addition, 
companies may fall in line with the separation recommendations purely to gain respect and 
legitimacy. Also, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, the notions of agency theory and 
cost benefit-analysis would argue that given the secretive culture accompanied with lack of 
material independence of the Chair, weak monitoring and lack of strict enforcement of compliance, 
non-compliance costs will continue to be less than compliance costs. Consequently, the separation 
between the CEO and Chair positions will not result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.  Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in 
Chapter Seven.  
With respect to the association between board size and compliance with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, these findings support the fourth research hypothesis (H4a: there is no 
significant statistical relationship between board size and the extent of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This supports the findings of Lakhal (2003), 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). However, it does not support the 
findings of Ezat and El-Masry (2008) who report a significant positive relationship between 
voluntary internet disclosure and board size in the Egyptian context. This is mainly attributed to the 
lack of independence and/or experience of board members and the lack of awareness among them 
with respect to their role in monitoring management behaviour and protecting the interests of 
shareholders.This supports the notions of institutional isomorphism theory (board members in the 
Egyptian listed companies, do not contribute to improving the BOD’s monitoring function even 
when they meet the independence criterion, being appointed simply to signal that such companies 
follow corporate governance best practices, and hence, gain respect). Furthermore, weak 
enforcement of full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by the CMA staff, weak 
monitoring and lack of understanding by board members regarding the benefits of transparency, 
hence, low non compliance costs and reduced agency costs, and dominance of secretive culture will 
not stimulate management to improve levels of compliance with IFRS.  
 
With respect to the association between government ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings support hypothesis H5a1 (there is no significant 
statistical relationship between the government ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This result supports the findings of Naser 
et al. (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Al-Akra et al. (2010a). In addition, it supports that of 
174 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context.This may be explained by the 
government’s ability to access all company information. Agency theory suggests that, this reduces 
the monitoring costs, and hence reduces management incentives to improve disclosure. 
Simultaneously, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism all suggest that given the preference to secrecy the government may not 
encourage full transparency. This may be due to government’s intention to sell its shares in the 
company at a good price as part of the privatisation programme. Additionally, the lack of 
awareness and the absence of incentives for members of the public who are implicit owners of 
government shares discourage direct monitoring of the management (generally government 
officials) of government-owned enterprises. This contributes to the decoupling problem as 
companies declare their compliance with IFRSs, simply to gain respect and legitimacy, when in 
reality they are not fully complying. Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ 
responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between management ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings do not support H5b1 (there is a significant 
negative statistical relationship between the management ownership ratio and the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). Although, this result does 
not agree with the findings of the majority of prior studies investigating the association between 
management ownership and levels of disclosure, which support a negative relationship (e.g., Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008), 
and with that of Samaha and Dahawy (2010) in the Egyptian context, it supports that of Samaha 
and Dahawy (2011). This may be explained by reduced agency costs, and predictions  based on 
Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism 
that the secretive culture, lack of management awareness concerning the importance of 
transparency and compliance, absence of monitoring by board members or stock exchange 
regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders, encourage management to keep 
disclosure levels at a minimum as long as non compliance costs are less than compliance costs. 
This in turn contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is evident in 
the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
With respect to the association between private ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, the findings support H5c1 (there is no significant statistical relationship 
between the private ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian context). This result supports the findings of Suwaidan (1997), 
Depeors (2000), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b); however, it does not support that of 
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Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) with respect to voluntary disclosure practices in Egypt. This is 
probably attributable to ease of access to all company information by private investors who are in 
most cases actively involved in company management either as executives or as directors. 
Furthermore, based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism, it can be stated that the secretive culture, and lack of private investor 
awareness of the importance of transparency, will not increase pressures by private investors on 
management to improve compliance with IFRSs. Furthermore, absence of monitoring from board 
members or stock exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders will 
reduce non compliance costs; hence will not improve compliance levels with mandatory IFRSs. 
Consequently, this contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is 
evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
Finally, with respect to the association between public ownership ratio and levels of compliance 
with overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, the findings support H5d1 (there is no significant 
statistical relationship between the public ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context). This result supports that of Al-Akra et al. (2010a). 
However, it does not support the results of the majority of prior studies which report the existence 
of a positive association between public ownership and disclosure level (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). In addition, it does not 
support the finding of Ezat and El-Masry (2008) in the Egyptian context. This result may be 
attributed to the reduced agency costs due to the lack of demand for more disclosure by naïve 
public investors in the Egyptian context. Furthermore, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, 
cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism propose that the secretive culture causes 
management to avoid the outflow of stock market price-sensitive information. In addition, secrecy 
is also associated with large power distance and the tendency to collectivism (Gray, 1988). 
Furthermore, the lack of listed companies’ management and BOD awareness regarding the 
importance of compliance with IFRSs and of following corporate governance best practices to 
enhance transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and the absence of materially 
independent board members with primary responsibility for protecting public shareholders' interests, 
cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. The fact that public shareholders in 
developing stock exchanges do not exercise their rights, adds to this situation, thereby management 
is not stimulated to improve compliance with IFRSs, and the problem of decoupling escalates. This 
supports the argument of Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007) that many public shareholders in Egypt 
are small investors who cannot form pressure groups like those in developed markets. Further 
support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
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Regarding the association between company size and compliance with the overall IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, the findings do not support a significant association. This supports the findings of 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Street and Gray (2002) and Aljifri (2008). In addition, this supports 
the findings of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This may be attributed 
to the similarity in compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements among all 
companies listed on the EGX. Findings also reveal that no association exists between firm 
profitability and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context, 
thereby supporting the findings of some previous studies (e.g., Malone et al., 1993; Al-Mulhem, 
1997; Inchausti, 1997; Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Eng & Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 
2006). Additionally, findings support those of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This may be explained by the similarity 
in compliance behaviour among all companies listed on the EGX regardless of their size. With 
respect to the association between firm gearing and its level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, results reveal that no association exists, thereby supporting research outcomes of 
some prior research (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Patton & Zelenka 1997; Craig & Diga 1998; Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; 
Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Aksu & Kosedag 2006). In 
addition, results support those of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and Samaha and 
Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. This also may be explained by the similarities in 
compliance attitude among all companies listed on the EGX. With respect to firm liquidity, 
findings indicate that no association exists between firm liquidity and its level of compliance with 
IFRS disclosure requirements in the Egyptian context, thereby supporting the findings of Alsaeed 
(2005), Barako et al. (2006) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a). In addition, findings support those of Abd-
Elsalam (1999) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the Egyptian context. This may be due to the 
similarity among all companies listed on the EGX in their compliance attitude with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements.With respect to the impact of the type of business activity 
(manufacturing/non-manufacturing) on the levels of compliance, findings show that, type of 
business activity has no influence on the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Egyptian context. This supports the findings of some prior research (e.g., 
Inchausti, 1997; Naser, 1998; Naser at al., 2002; Street & Gray, 2002). In addition, it supports those 
of Ismail et al. (2010) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the Egyptian context.This may be 
attributed to the fact that companies listed on the EGX are the largest companies in their sectors 
and the most important vehicles in the development of the Egyptian economy, hence, there are no 
differences in their attitude with respect to compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. Finally, with respect to the impact of the type of auditor (big 4/non big 4) on the 
levels of compliance, findings show that, compliance with IFRSs in the Egyptian context is not 
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associated with the type of auditor. This supports the findings of some prior research (e.g., Naser, 
1998; Naser et al., 2002; Street & Gray, 2002). Additionally, this supports the findings of Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the Egyptian context. Given that none of the companies that are listed 
on the EGX achieved full compliance with the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, this raises doubts concerning the quality of audit work performed by big 4 
affiliates that operate in Egypt. As previously stated in section 6.5.1.2, some of these audit firms 
may not be strict as they may consider the companies to be operating in a developing market, and 
to require more time to adapt to the compliance culture in respect of IFRSs. Additionally, they may 
fear the prospect of losing the client should they issue qualified reports; and another possibility is 
that they may perceive their clients as the best of the worst and believe that issuing them with 
qualified reports will give an advantage to those companies with lower compliance levels but 
audited by non-big 4 audit firms. This supports the continuity of decoupling problem in the 
Egyptian context in two ways. Firstly, listed companies will continue claiming that their financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs while full compliance is absent. Secondly, it 
seems that in most cases, listed companies engage with big 4 audit firms, paying expensive audit 
fees merely as window dressing to attract more investors or to avoid extensive monitoring by the 
disclosure monitoring staff of the CMA. 
 
The above discussion of the findings from the regression analysis on the level of the Egyptian 
context promulgates that none of the corporate governance variables has an association with the 
overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. This implies that the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms that are recommended by the OECD principles and 
the ECCG is absent in the Egyptian context. The next section reports regression results for the 
Jordanian context. 
 
6.6.3.2 The Regression Results-Jordan 
This section reports the regression results of the total disclosure index in the Jordanian context 
using Stepwise regression as demonstrated in Table 6.17 40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 Coeffecient estimates and significance level for independent variables that are excluded from the regression model 
are presented in Appendix 8. 
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Table 6.17: Regression Results -Jordan (N=75) 
**, *** Significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 Levels respectively  
 
Table 6.17 shows the adjusted R2 = .245, implying that 24.5% of the variation in the total 
disclosure index (overall compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements) in the 
Jordanian context is explained by the type of auditor, public ownership ratio and firm size. This 
result confirms and refines the results of the univariate analysis with respect to the existence of a 
significant relationship between the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, and 
auditor type and public ownership ratio. Additionally, the model reaches statistical significance 
with F= 8.988 and the significance =.000 (<.01). The explanatory power of the total disclosure 
index model reported in this study exceeds that of Al-Akra et al. (2010a), who investigated the 
same issue in the Jordanian context in 1996 and 2004 respectively. The explanatory power of Al-
Akra et al. (2010a) full model for 1996 was very low (6.3%), however, it reached 14.7% in 2004.  
 
The results reveal that, the influence of corporate governance best practice as recommended by the 
OECD corporate governance principles which are supported by the regulatory framework in Jordan 
on the levels of compliance with IFRSs is absent, possibly because of its novelty and the lack of 
awareness of the advantages of material compliance with its requirements in Jordan similar to the 
case of Egypt, meaning that as yet it is not part of the cultural values within the Jordanian context. 
Building on this, it can be argued that there are other factors mainly related to the secretive culture 
that is dominant in scrutinised MENA societies that possibly influence the levels of compliance 
with some IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
 
Table 6.17 indicates that, type of auditor with the highest Beta coefficient (-.405) is the best 
predictor in terms of the extent of compliance with the overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements (t= -3.779, P= .000) followed by public ownership ratio (t= -2.194, P= .032) and firm 
size (t= 2.188, P= .032). From the information in Table 6.17 the total disclosure index model in the 
Jordanian context can be stated as: 
Model summary       
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error F Sig. 
 .525 .275 .245 .832 8.988 .000*** 
Coefficients     Collinearity Statistics 
Predictor 
Variable 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Tolerance VIF 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) .451 .152  2.967 .004***   
Auditor Type -.788 .206 -.405 -3.779 .000***    .889 1.125 
Public 
Ownership 
-.240 .109 -.230 -2.194 .032** 
                                 
               .930 
                             
1.075 
Firm Size .226 .103 .226 2.188 .032**     .954 1.048 
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Total Disclosure Index = .451- .778 Auditor - .240 Public Ownership Ratio+ .226 Firm Size  
 
In summary, the regression analysis reveals the type of auditor, public ownership ratio and firm 
size as the best predictors of the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Jordanian context; at least among the variables included in the study. 
Companies listed on the ASE which are audited by big 4 audit firms comply better with the overall 
IFRSs mandatory disclosure requirements (the coefficient estimate is significant at .01). This result 
as previously indicated in section 6.5.2.2 is reasonable as big 4 audit firms' staff are highly 
qualified and have better experience with IFRSs, and extensive training on any updates of these 
standards compared to auditors in local audit firms who may have limited experience and 
knowledge. This result supports the findings of many earlier studies (e.g., Singhvi & Desai, 1971; 
Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton & 
Zelenka, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Glaum & Street 2003; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009). In addition, 
it supports those of Suwaidan (1997), Naser et al. (2002), Al-Shiab (2003), Omar (2007) and Al-
Akra et al. (2010a) in the Jordanian context. Howerver, given that none of the companies listed on 
the ASE which are audited by big 4 audit firms achieved full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, although unqualified audit reports are issued, raises doubts regarding the quality of 
audit work performed by big 4 affiliates operating in Jordan. Such behaviour supports the 
continuity of the decoupling problem in Jordan as the case in Egypt (companies claim that financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs while full compliance is absent). As previously 
stated, such audit firms may not be strict as they may consider the companies to be operating in a 
developing market, and to require more time to adapt to the compliance culture in respect of IFRSs. 
Additionally, they may fear the prospect of losing the client should they issue qualified reports; and 
another possibility is that they may perceive their clients as the best of the worst and believe that 
issuing them with qualified reports will give an advantage to those companies with lower 
compliance levels but audited by non-big 4 audit firms. 
 
On the other hand the regression analysis reveals that public ownership ratio is the only corporate 
governance related variable that explains variations in the levels of compliance with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. However there is a significant negative 
relationship between public ownership ratio and total disclosure index at the .05 level. In other 
words, companies with dominant public ownership complied less with the overall mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements (i.e., they had the lowest total disclosure scores). Consequently, hypothesis 
H5d2 (there is no significant statistical relationship between public ownership ratio and the extent 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context), is rejected. This result 
supports that of Hossain et al. (1994). In addition as previously mentioned in section 6.5.2.1, it 
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supports that of Naser et al. (2002) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the Jordanian context. However, it 
does not support the results of the majority of prior studies which support the existence of a 
positive association between public ownership and disclosure level (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008); and those of Al-Htaybat (2005) in 
the Jordanian context.This result may be attributed to the lack of demand for more disclosure by 
public investors in the Jordanian context similar to their counterparts in the Egyptian context. This 
confirms the proposition that, the majority of individual investors in Jordan are small 
unsophisticated investors, and their investment decions in most of the cases are speculative and 
uninformed (Naser et al., 2002; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b). As indicated in section 6.5.2.1reduced 
agency costs due to the lack of demand for more disclosure by public investors, accounts for this. 
Furthermore, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional 
isomorphism propose that, the secretive culture in the Jordanian context causes management to 
avoid the outflow of stock market price-sensitive information. In addition, secrecy is also 
associated with large power distance and the tendency to collectivism (Gray, 1988). Furthermore, 
the lack of listed companies’ management and BOD awareness regarding the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs and of following corporate governance best practices to enhance 
transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and the absence of materially 
independent board members with primary responsibility for protecting public shareholders' interests, 
cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. The fact that public shareholders in 
Jordan similar to Egypt do not exercise their rights, adds to this situation, thereby management is 
not stimulated to improve compliance with IFRSs, and the problem of decoupling escalates. Hence 
dominance of public ownership in the Jordanian context results in lower monitoring capacity 
(Naser et al., 2002; Al-Akra et al., 2010a). Further support for this result is evident in the 
interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven. 
 
In addition, regression results indicate that large companies comply better with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements (the coefficient estimate is significant at .05).  This confirms the findings of the 
majority of prior researchers (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Naser et al., 2006). It also supports the findings of Suwaidan 
(1997), Naser (1998), Naser et al. (2002), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the Jordanian 
context. This may be attributed to low costs of disclosing information in large companies. In 
addition, as large companies in most of the cases engage with big 4 audit firms, this will improve 
their compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements compared to small listed companies 
which engage with non big 4 audit firms due to the high fees associated with engagement with big 
4 ones. In addition, as they are the largest contributors in the Jordanian economy, they are keen 
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about attracting foreign investors by achieving the highest levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements. 
 
With respect to the association between board independence and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, as seen in Table 6.17, regression results support those of the univariate 
analysis with respect to the non-existence of a statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
Hence, these findings support the second research hypothesis (H2b: there is no significant statistical 
relationship between board independence and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Jordanian context). This agrees with the findings of Haniffa (1999), Ho and 
Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006). In addition, this result 
supports those of Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) on the Jordanian context. As previously stated in section 
6.5.2.1, this finding supports the proposition that, most outside directors in the Jordanian listed 
companies similar to their Egyptian counterparts, lack material independence as generally, they are 
appointed to the board because of their close relationship with executive board members, the Chair 
or controlling shareholders. They may also lack experience or may have insufficient financial 
incentive to actively monitor management and protect the interests of minority shareholders. This 
lends weight to the notions of institutional isomorphism theory (board members in the Jordanian 
listed companies, do not contribute to improving the BOD’s monitoring function even when they 
meet the independence criterion, being appointed simply to signal that such companies follow 
corporate governance best practices, and hence, gain legitimacy and respect). Furthermore, the 
predictions of financial economics theories relevant to this study (weak monitoring reduces 
monitoring costs, hence will not stimulate management to improve compliance as well as the weak 
enforcement of compliance with IFRSs results in low non-compliance costs) and Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model (acceptance of secrecy as a dominant culture in the Jordanian context 
similar to the Egyptian context, absence of awareness regarding the importance of transparency and 
the lack of material independence by board members support management’s selective disclosure to 
avoid competition and protect company reputation, even though the lack of disclosure is in breach 
of the mandatory requirements). Moreover, the interviewees' responses discussed in Chaprter Seven 
also support this proposition.  
 
With respect to the impact of board leadership, regression analysis supports the Mann-Whitney U 
test results demonstrated in Table 6.14 that, similar to the case of Egypt, holding the CEO and Chair 
positions by two different persons does not improve the monitoring function. Consequently, H3b: 
there are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and Chair and those that do 
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not in the Jordanian context, is accepted. As previously indicated, this supports the findings of 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Ezat 
and El-Masry (2008). This finding may be attributed to the lack of material independence of the 
Chair in the Jordanian listed companies when the CEO and the Chair positions are separated. This 
in turn lends support to the institutional isomorphism which suggests that, separating the CEO and 
the Chair positions has no influence on board leadership independence, as long as there is no 
awareness regarding the importance of separating the positions in improving the monitoring of 
management behaviour and hence the quality of financial reporting within the business firm. 
Consequently, no significant impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs, is expected when the two 
positions are separated, and decoupling is thus expected to continue due to the existence of cultural 
barriers to understanding the logic behind the separation of the two positions as recommended 
under the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. In addition, companies may fall in line 
with the separation recommendations purely to gain respect and legitimacy. Also, Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model, the notions of agency theory and cost benefit-analysis would argue 
that given the dominant secretive culture accompanied with lack of material independence, weak 
monitoring and lack of strict enforcement of compliance, non-compliance costs will continue to be 
less than compliance costs. Consequently, the separation between the CEO and Chair positions may 
not result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. This viewpoint is confirmed by 
the interviewees' responses reported in Chapter Seven.  
On the other hand, regression results support those of the univariate analysis with respect to the 
non-existence of association between board size and compliance with overall IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. Hence, H4b: there is no significant statistical relationship between board size and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context, is accepted. This 
finding agrees with the findings on the level of the Egyptian context. This also agrees with the 
findings of Lakhal (2003), Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). However, 
this result does not support that of Al-Akra et al. (2010a) who investigated this issue in the 
Jordanian context and reported a significant positive relationship. This is mainly attributed to the 
lack of independence of board members and the lack of awareness among them with respect to their 
role in monitoring management behaviour and protecting the interests of shareholders.This supports 
the notions of institutional isomorphism theory (board members in the Jordanian listed companies, 
do not contribute to improving the BOD’s monitoring function even when they meet the 
independence criterion, being appointed simply to signal that such companies follow corporate 
governance best practices, and hence, gain respect). Furthermore, weak enforcement and 
monitoring by the JSC staff and lack of understanding by board members   regarding the benefits of 
transparency, reduced agency costs, dominance of secretive culture will not stimulate management 
to improve levels of compliance with IFRS.  
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With respect to the association between government ownership ratio and the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements, the regression results support the findings of the univariate 
analysis. Hence, hypothesis H5a2 (there is no significant statistical relationship between the 
government ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 
the Jordanian context), is accepted. This result supports the findings of Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) as well as the findings of this study, Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) on the level of the 
Egyptian context. In addition, it supports that of Naser et al. (2002), Al-Akra et al. (2010a) on the 
Jordanian context.This may be explained by the government’s ability to access all company 
information. Agency theory suggests this reduces the monitoring costs, and hence reduces 
management incentives to improve disclosure. Simultaneously, the notions of Gray’s (1988) 
accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism are supportd. 
Given the preference to secrecy the government may not encourage full transparency. This may be 
due to government’s intention to sell its shares in the company at a good price as part of the 
privatisation programme. Additionally, the lack of awareness and the absence of incentives for 
members of the public who are implicit owners of government shares discourage direct monitoring 
of the management (generally government officials) in companies with dominant government 
ownership. This contributes to the decoupling problem as companies declare their compliance with 
IFRSs when in reality they are not complying, simply to gain respect and legitimacy. Further 
support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
With respect to the association between management ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, regression results support the findings of the univariate 
analysis. Hence, H5b2 (there is a significant negative statistical relationship between the 
management ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in 
the Jordanian context), is rejected. Although, this result does not agree with the findings of the 
majority of prior studies investigating the association between management ownership and levels of 
disclosure which support a negative relationship (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; 
Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010), it supports 
that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) as well as the findings of this study on the level of the Egyptian 
context. As previously stated to the best of the researcher knowledge this study is the first to 
investigate the association between management ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs in 
the Jordanian context. However, this finding may be explained by the lack of separation between 
management and control, reduced agency costs, and predictions based on Gray’s (1988) accounting 
sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism that the secretive culture, 
lack of management awareness concerning the importance of transparency and compliance, 
absence of monitoring by non-executive board members or stock exchange regulators, and the 
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absence of pressure from minority shareholders, encourage management to keep disclosure levels 
at a minimum as long as non-compliance costs are less than compliance costs. This in turn 
contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is evident in the 
interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
With respect to the association between private ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, regression results support those of the univariate analysis. Hence, 
H5c2 (there is no significant statistical relationship between the private ownership ratio and the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanaian context), is accepted. 
As previously stated in section 5.5.2.2, this result supports the findings of this study on the level of 
the Egyptian context. In addition, it supports that of Depeors (2000); and those of Suwaidan (1997), 
Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) in the Jordanaian context. Similar to the case of Egypt, 
this can be explained by ease of access to all company information by private investors who are in 
most cases actively involved in company management either as executives or as directors. 
Moreover, based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism, it can be stated that the secretive culture, and lack of private investor 
awareness of the importance of transparency will not increase pressures by private investors on 
management to improve compliance with IFRSs. Additionally, absence of monitoring from board 
members or stock exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders will 
reduce non compliance costs; hence will not improve compliance levels with mandatory IFRSs. 
Consequently, this contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is 
evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
Finally, with respect to control variables other than firm size and type of auditor, regression results 
confirm the findings of the univariate analysis that, none of the other control variables influences 
the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
Regression analysis reveals that no association exists between firm profitability and its level of 
compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context similar to the Egyptian 
context, thereby supporting the findings of some previous studies (e.g., Malone et al., 1993; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). In 
addition, it supports those of Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) in the Jordanian context. Regression results 
also confirm the results of the univariate analysis with respect to the non-existence of an 
association between firm gearing and its level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, 
thereby supporting this research outcomes on the level of the Egyptian context as well as those of 
some prior research (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; 
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Inchausti, 1997; Patton & Zelenka 1997; Craig & Diga 1998; Dumontier & Raffournier 1998; Abd-
Elsalam , 1999;Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Aksu & Kosedag 
2006; Ezat & El-Masry; 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010; 2011). In addition, they support those of 
Al-Htaybat (2005) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the Jordanian context. Similar to the results of the 
univariate analysis regression analysis indicates the non-existence of association between firm 
liquidity and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context, 
thereby supporting the findings of this study and of Abd-Elsalam (1999) on the level of the 
Egyptian context and those of Alsaeed (2005), and Barako et al. (2006). It also supports that of Al-
Htaybat (2005) in the Jordanain context. Hence, compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements by companies listed on the ASE is not influenced by company liquidity. 
Finally, the results of the regression analysis confirm those of the univariate analysis that, the type 
of firm industry does not affect its level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements in the Jordanian context. This supports the findings of some prior studies (e.g., 
Inchausti, 1997; Street & Gray, 2002; Ismail et al., 2010; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011). In addition, it 
supports the findings of this study on the level of the Egyptian context, and those of Naser (1998) 
and Naser at al., (2002) in the Jordanian context. As indicated in section 5.5.2.2, the lack of 
significant association between level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements 
in the Jordanian context and the majority of control variables indicates that the compliance 
behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on the ASE do not 
follow any pattern in relation to such variables. Hence, this may signal the relative similarity in 
compliance behaviour with mandatory requirements in the Jordanian context.  
 
The above discussion promulgates that, the contribution towards enhancing the ASE performance 
similar to the case of the EGX is subject to the extent to which the conditions for robust governance 
practice are consistent with the existing values and the needs of all parties involved in the financial 
reporting process. It is expected, therefore, to be some time before the impact of applying corporate 
governance can be measured in developing contexts as this needs to develop, and favourable 
attitude and belief must be formed as well as efforts being made to develop the human resource 
capabilities that believe in and able to apply corporate governance requirements for best practice. 
 
6.6.3.3 Significant Differences in the Influence of Corporate governance Attributes between 
Scrutinised Contexts 
This section mainly aims to further investigate whether there are significant differences in the 
influence of corporate governance related variables on the extent of compliance with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements between Egypt and Jordan. In order to investigate this issue, country 
dummy will be introduced and interacted with all test and control variables as follows: 
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Compliancej= a0+ a1 board independencej + a2 board leadershipj + a3 board sizej+ a4 government 
ownership ratioj + a5 management ownership ratioj + a6 private ownership ratioj + a7 public 
ownership ratioj + a8 Sizej + a9 Profitabilityj + a10 Gearingj + a11 Liquidityj + a12 type of business 
activityj + a13 type of audit firmj + a14 Country + a15 Country * board independencej + a16 Country 
* board leadershipj + a17 Country * board sizej+ a18 Country * government ownership ratioj + a19 
Country * management ownership ratioj + a20 Country * private ownership ratioj + a21 Country * 
public ownership ratioj + a22 Country * Sizej + a23 Country * Profitabilityj + a24 Country * 
Gearingj + a25 Country * Liquidityj + a26 Country * type of business activityj + a27 Country * type 
of audit firmj + Ɛj 
Where: 
Compliancej = Total disclosure index (j=1,…, 150) 
a0= The intercept 
a1 to a7 =Test variables 
a8 to a13 = Control variables 
a14=Country dummy 
a15 to a21 = Country * Test variables 
a22 to a27 = Country * Control variables 
Ɛj= Error term 
Table 6.18 demonstrates the Stepwise regression results for total disclosure index41. 
 
Table 6.18: Significant Differences between Scrutinised Contexts in the Influence of Independent Variables on 
the Levels of Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure Requirements   
**, *** Significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 Levels respectively  
 
As demonstrated in Table 6.17 and Appendix 9 the VIF and Tolerance values indicate the non-
existence of the problem of multicollinearity (i.e., all VIF values are less than 10 and all Tolerance 
                                                          
41 Coeffecient estimates and significance level for independent variables that are excluded from the regression model 
are presented in Appendix 9. 
Model summary       
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error F Sig. 
 .449 .202 .191 .877 18.565 .000*** 
Coefficients     Collinearity Statistics 
Predictor 
Variable 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Tolerance VIF 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) .242 .085     2.842 .005***   
Country*Auditor     -.844 .161          -.393   -5.252   .000***              .970           1.031 
Firm Size .160 .075           .160 2.139 .034**              .970              1.031 
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values are above .2). The adjusted R2 = .191, implying that 19.1% of the variation in the total 
disclosure index (overall compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements) for the entire 
sample of companies listed on scrutinised MENA stock exchanges, is explained by the regression 
model. Findings indicate a significantly higher influence of auditing by big 4 audit firms on the 
levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements for companies listed on the 
ASE than for those listed on the EGX. The interactive variable Country*Type of auditor shows a 
significant coefficient at .01 level. This result is reasonable as big 4 audit firms' staff are more 
qualified and have better experience with IFRSs, and extensive training on any updates of these 
standards than auditors in local audit firms who may have limited experience and knowledge 
particularly in a country like Jordan that is suffering from a shortage of qualified accountants and 
auditors. Additionally, big 4 audit firms exert more pressure on their clients to improve compliance 
with IFRSs. This result supports the findings of many earlier studies (e.g., Singhvi & Desai, 1971; 
Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton & 
Zelenka, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Glaum & Street 2003; Samaha & Stapleton, 2009). In addition, 
it supports those of Suwaidan (1997), Naser et al. (2002), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a) 
in the Jordanian context. 
The coefficient firm size is positive and significant at .05 level for the entire sample. This implies 
that large companies comply better with IFRSs disclosure requirements (the coefficient estimate is 
significant at .05).  This confirms the findings of the majority of prior researchers (e.g., Inchausti, 
1997; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Naser et al., 
2006). It also supports the findings of Suwaidan (1997), Naser (1998), Abd-Elsalam (1999), Naser 
et al. (2002), Omar (2007), Samaha and Stapleton (2009) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the 
scrutinised contexts. Referring to political cost theory, many researchers argue that large companies 
are more likely to provide more disclosures and to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements 
as they may be more subject to public scrutiny or more sensitive to criticism for falling short of 
disclosure requirements compared to small firms (e.g., Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; 
Busby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Al-Htaybat, 2005). Referring to agency theory, 
many researchers propose that large companies are more likely to disclose more information 
because of large numbers of shareholders and the associated pressures (e.g., Hossain et al., 1995; 
Meek et al., 1995; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Ali et al., 2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 
2007). Also, using capital need theory, many researchers claim that larger companies are more 
likely to disclose more information in order to raise funds at lower costs (e.g., Cooke, 1991; Meek 
et al., 1995; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Ali et al., 2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005; Omar, 2007). Furthermore, 
using cost-benefit analysis, many researchers argue that large firms are more likely to disclose 
more information because for them, the costs of non-compliance are higher than the costs of 
compliance. Also, large companies are more likely to disclose more information because of lower 
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costs associated with collecting and publishing information and limited impact on the competitive 
position compared to small companies (e.g, Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Busby, 1975; 
Firth, 1979; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Ali et al., 2004; Al-Htaybat, 2005). 
Additionally, based on the notions of the institutional isomorphism theory, large companies are 
more likely to comply with IFRSs to gain legitimacy and respect, hence attract foreign investors. 
 
With respect to the association between board independence and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, regression results support the non-existence of a statistically significant 
relationship between board independence and the overall level of compliance with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements for the entire sample. Hence, these findings support the second 
research hypothesis (H2: there is no significant statistical relationship between board independence 
and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). This agrees with the findings of 
Haniffa (1999), Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006). In 
addition, this result supports those of Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) in the Jordanian context, however, it 
does not support those of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) which report a significant positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and board independence in the Egyptian context. 
This supports the proposition that, most outside directors in the scrutinised listed companies, lack 
material independence as generally, they are appointed to the board because of their close 
relationship with executive board members, the Chair or controlling shareholders. They may also 
lack experience or may have insufficient financial incentive to actively monitor management and 
protect the interests of minority shareholders. This lends weight to the notions of institutional 
isomorphism theory (board members in the scrutinised listed companies, do not contribute to 
improving the BOD’s monitoring function even when they meet the independence criterion, being 
appointed simply to signal that such companies follow corporate governance best practices, and 
hence, gain legitimacy and respect). Furthermore, the predictions of financial economics theories 
relevant to this study (weak monitoring reduces monitoring costs, hence will not stimulate 
management to improve compliance, as well as the weak enforcement of compliance with IFRSs 
results in low non-compliance costs) and Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model (acceptance 
of secrecy as a dominant culture in the scrutinised contexts and absence of awareness regarding the 
importance of transparency support management’s selective disclosure to avoid competition and 
protect company reputation, even though the lack of disclosure is in breach of the mandatory 
requirements). Moreover, the interviewees' responses discussed in Chaprter Seven also support this 
proposition.  
 
With respect to the impact of board leadership, regression analysis reveals that holding the CEO 
and Chair positions by two different persons does not improve the monitoring function. 
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Consequently, H3: there are no statistically significant differences in the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements between companies that separate the positions of the CEO and Chair 
and those that do not, is accepted. This supports the findings of Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006), Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Ezat and El-Masry (2008). This finding 
may be attributed to the lack of material independence of the Chair in the scrutinised listed 
companies when the CEO and the Chair positions are separated. This in turn lends support to the 
institutional isomorphism which suggests that, separating the CEO and Chair positions has no 
influence on board leadership independence, as long as there is no awareness regarding the 
importance of separating the positions in improving the monitoring of management behaviour and 
hence the quality of financial reporting within the business firm. Consequently, no significant 
impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs, is expected when the two positions are separated, and 
decoupling is thus expected to continue due to the existence of cultural barriers to understanding the 
logic behind the separation of the two positions as recommended under the Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance. In addition, companies may fall in line with the separation 
recommendations purely to gain respect and legitimacy. Also, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-
cultural model, the notions of agency theory and cost benefit-analysis would argue that given the 
dominant secretive culture accompanied with lack of material independence, weak monitoring and 
lack of strict enforcement of compliance, non-compliance costs will continue to be less than 
compliance costs. Consequently, the separation between the CEO and Chair positions may not 
result in better compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. This viewpoint is confirmed by the 
interviewees' responses reported in Chapter Seven.  
On the other hand, regression results reveal the non-existence of association between board size 
and compliance with overall IFRSs disclosure requirements for the entire sample. Hence, H4: there 
is no significant statistical relationship between board size and the extent of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, is accepted. This agrees with the findings of Lakhal (2003), Arcay and 
Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006). However, this result does not support that of Al-
Akra et al. (2010a) who investigated this issue in the Jordanian context and reported a significant 
positive relationship. This finding can mainly be explained by the lack of independence of board 
members and the lack of awareness among them with respect to their role in monitoring 
management behaviour and protecting the interests of shareholders.This supports the notions of 
institutional isomorphism theory (board members in the scrutinised contexts, do not contribute to 
improving the BOD’s monitoring function even when they meet the independence criterion, being 
appointed simply to signal that companies follow corporate governance best practices, and hence, 
gain respect). Furthermore, weak enforcement and monitoring by the regulatory bodies, reduced 
agency costs, dominance of secretive culture and lack of understanding by board members 
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regarding the benefits of transparency, will not stimulate management to improve levels of 
compliance with IFRS.  
 
With respect to the association between government ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, the regression results reveal the non existence of association. 
Hence, hypothesis H5a (there is no significant statistical relationship between the government 
ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements), is accepted. 
This result supports the findings of Ghazali and Weetman (2006) as well as the findings of Samaha 
and Dahawy (2010; 2011) on the level of the Egyptian context. In addition, it supports that of Naser 
et al. (2002), Al-Akra et al. (2010a) in the Jordanian context.This may be explained by the 
government’s ability to access all company information. Agency theory suggests this reduces the 
monitoring costs, and hence reduces management incentives to improve disclosure. Simultaneously, 
the notions of Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional 
isomorphism are supportd. Given the preference to secrecy the government may not encourage full 
transparency. This may be due to government’s intention to sell its shares in the company at a good 
price as part of the privatisation programme. Additionally, the lack of awareness and the absence of 
incentives for members of the public who are implicit owners of government shares discourage 
direct monitoring of the management (generally government officials) in companies with dominant 
government ownership. This contributes to the decoupling problem as companies declare their 
compliance with IFRSs when in reality they are not complying, simply to gain respect and 
legitimacy. Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in 
Chapter Seven.  
With respect to the association between management ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
the overall IFRSs disclosure requirements, regression results do not support H5b (there is a 
significant negative statistical relationship between the management ownership ratio and the extent 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). Although, this result does not agree with the 
findings of the majority of prior studies investigating the association between management 
ownership and levels of disclosure which support a negative relationship (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; 
Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Abdelsalam & El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & 
Dahawy, 2010), it supports that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the Egyptian context. This may 
be explained by the lack of separation between ownership and control, reduced agency costs, and 
predictions based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and 
institutional isomorphism that the secretive culture, lack of management awareness concerning the 
importance of transparency and compliance, absence of monitoring by non-executive board 
members or stock exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders, 
encourage management to keep disclosure levels at a minimum as long as non-compliance costs are 
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less than compliance costs. This in turn contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support 
for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
With respect to the association between private ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, regression results support H5c (there is no significant statistical 
relationship between the private ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements). This supports the findings of Depeors (2000); and those of Suwaidan 
(1997), Omar (2007) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) in the Jordanaian context, however, it does not 
support those of Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) with respect to voluntary disclosure practices in 
Egypt. This can be explained by ease of access to all company information by private investors 
who are in most cases actively involved in company management either as executives or as 
directors. Moreover, based on Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, 
and institutional isomorphism, it can be stated that the secretive culture, and lack of private investor 
awareness of the importance of transparency will not increase pressures by private investors on 
management to improve compliance with IFRSs. Additionally, absence of monitoring from board 
members or stock exchange regulators, and the absence of pressure from minority shareholders will 
reduce non compliance costs; hence will not improve compliance levels with mandatory IFRSs. 
Consequently, this contributes to the problem of decoupling. Further support for this result is 
evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
With respect to the association between public ownership ratio and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, regression results support H5d (there is no significant statistical 
relationship between public ownership ratio and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements). This result supports that of Hossain et al. (1994). Furthermore, it supports that of 
Naser et al. (2002) and Al-Akra et al. (2010b) in the Jordanian context. However, it does not 
support the results of the majority of prior studies which report the existence of a positive 
association between public ownership and disclosure level (e.g., Haniffa, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). In addition, it does not support the findings of Ezat and El-Masry 
(2008) in the Egyptian context and those of Al-Htaybat (2005) in the Jordanian context.This result 
may be attributed to the lack of demand for more disclosure by public investors in the scrutinised 
contexts. In this regard, Naser et al. (2002) and Al-Akra et al. (2010a) argue that, dominance of 
public ownership in the Jordanian context results in lower monitoring capacity as the majority of 
individual investors in Jordan are small unsophisticated investors, and their investment decions in 
most of the cases are speculative and uninformed (Naser et al., 2002; Al-Akra et al., 2010a,b). In a 
similar vein, Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007) describe public shareholders in Egypt as small 
investors who cannot form pressure groups like those in developed markets. Reduced agency costs 
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due to the lack of demand for more disclosure by public investors, accounts for this. Furthermore, 
the lack of listed companies’ management and BOD awareness regarding the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs and of following corporate governance best practices to enhance 
transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and the absence of materially 
independent board members with primary responsibility for protecting public shareholders' interests, 
cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. The fact that public shareholders in 
scrutinised stock exchanges do not exercise their rights, adds to this situation, thereby management 
is not stimulated to improve compliance with IFRSs, and the problem of decoupling escalates. 
Further support for this result is evident in the interviewees’ responses presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
With respect to control variables, regression results for the entire sample reveal that, no association 
exists between firm profitability and its level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in 
scrutinised contexts, thereby supporting the findings of some previous studies (e.g., Malone et al., 
1993; Al-Mulhem, 1997; Inchausti, 1997; Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Eng & Mak, 
2003; Barako et al., 2006). Additionally, this supports the findings of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Ezat 
and El-Masry (2008), Al-Akra et al. (2010a,b) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in scrutinised 
contexts. Regression results also confirm the non-existence of association between firm gearing and 
its level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, thereby supporting the outcomes of 
some prior research (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Patton & Zelenka 1997; Craig & Diga 1998; Dumontier & Raffournier 1998; 
Tower et al., 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Aksu & Kosedag 2006). In 
addition, they support those of Abd-Elsalam (1999), Al-Htaybat (2005), Ezat and El-Masry (2008), 
Al-Akra et al. (2010b) and Samaha and Dahawy (2010; 2011) in the scrutinised contexts. Similarly, 
regression results reveal the non-existence of association between company liquidity and its level 
of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in scrutinised contexts. This supports the findings 
of Alsaeed (2005), and Barako et al. (2006). Additionally, it supports the findings of Abd-Elsalam 
(1999) in the the Egyptian context. It also supports those of Al-Htaybat (2005) in the Jordanain 
context. Hence, compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by 
companies listed on the scrutinised stock exchanges is not influenced by company liquidity. 
Additionally, the regression results show that, the type of business activity does not affect the level 
of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in the scrutinised contexts. This 
finding supports those of some prior studies (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Street & Gray, 2002). In 
addition, it supports the findings of Ismail et al. (2010) and Samaha and Dahawy (2011) in the 
Egyptian context, and those of Naser (1998) and Naser at al., (2002) in the Jordanian context. The 
lack of significant association between level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
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requirements in the scrutinised contexts and the majority of control variables indicates that the 
compliance behaviour with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on 
scrutinised stock exchanges do not follow any pattern in relation to such variables. This may be 
considered as a good sign that many of the mandatory disclosure requirements are now part of the 
financial reporting culture within companies listed on scrutinised MENA stock exchanges which 
are supposed to be the main vehicle for economic transition in their jurisdictions.   
Finally, the regression results promulgate that none of the interactive variables; Country*board size, 
Country*board independence, Country*board leadership, Country*government ownership, 
Country*management ownership, Country*private ownership and Country*Public ownership, 
Country*firm size, Country*profitability, Country*gearing, Country*liquidity and Country*type of 
business activity reports a statistically significant coeffecient, suggesting that there are no 
substantial differences in the impact of board size, board independence, board leadership, 
government ownership, management ownership, private ownership, public ownership, firm size, 
profitability, gearing, liquidity and type of business activity on the levels of compliance with 
mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements between Egypt and Jordan. 
  
The above discussion promulgates that, the contribution towards enhancing the performance of 
scrutinised MENA stock exchanges is subject to the extent to which the conditions for robust 
governance practice are consistent with the existing values and the needs of all parties involved in 
the financial reporting process. It is expected, therefore, to be some time before the impact of 
applying corporate governance requirements for best practice can be measured in such developing 
contexts as this needs to develop, and favourable attitude and belief must be formed as well as 
efforts being made to develop the human resource capabilities that believe in and able to apply 
corporate governance requirements for best practice.  
 
6.6.4 Theoretical Implications 
Having tested the overall level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements of the 
2007 annual reports of an equal sample of 75 non-financial companies listed on the EGX and ASE 
respectively (two leading MENA region emerging stock exchanges) for any association with 
corporate governance structures, it is possible to advance a theoretical explanation of the results. 
  
Firstly, although the examination of the first research hypothesis with respect to the existence of 
significant statistical differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts with respect to 
the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, and corporate governance and other 
company attributes, revealed the existence of significant differences, the results of the univariate 
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and multivariate analysis revealed that the impact of corporate governance best practice 
mechanisms on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in both of the 
scrutinised MENA stock exchanges is absent. This finding is consistent with the institutional 
isomorphism theory as Egypt and Jordan mandated the adoption of IFRSs under pressure from the 
international lending institutions to gain respect, legitimacy and of course, to obtain loans from 
such institutions. The same argument applies with respect to governance reforms carried out in both 
jurisdictions. Regulators did not give enough consideration to the importance of preparing their 
markets and neglected to develop national cultural values which predispose positive attitudes 
towards compliance with internationally recommended practices. This contributes to the problem of 
decoupling since companies listed on both of scrutinised stock exchanges state that their financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRSs while in reality, a gap exists between de jure and 
de facto compliance. The same applies to the corporate governance recommended practices, 
although they are present, their positive impact on improving disclosure and transparency practices 
is absent. In the meantime, the existence of some differences between both jurisdictions in the 
levels of compliance with the requirements of some standards reflects the impact of the unique 
national context which also has its influence on some disclosure practices. For instance, the 
qualifications and ability of accounting practitioners in each jurisdiction, and/or the attitude of the 
political leadership, may facilitate or hinder the understanding, interpretation and proper 
application of the requirements of IFRSs. Findings also lend support to Gray’s (1988) accounting 
sub-cultural model (the preference for secrecy in MENA societies provides resistance to full 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements). Furthermore, based on agency theory, companies 
will better comply with IFRSs disclosure requirements for which there is a demand for improved 
disclosure, to reduce the monitoring costs. Although in general terms, both societies are very 
similar, they are however, not identical. Minor differences between both contexts may affect 
agency costs, consequently affecting compliance levels. Finally, based on a cost-benefit analysis, 
for disclosure requirements which are strictly enforced by the stock exchange monitoring bodies, 
compliance will be better as non-compliance costs with such requirements will exceed compliance 
costs and vice versa.  
 
Secondly, the significant negative impact of public ownership on the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs in the Jordanian context (companies with a higher proportion of public ownership, comply 
less with IFRSs disclosure requirements). This result is consistent with institutional isomorphism 
theory (i.e. as long as all parties involved in the financial reporting process are ignorant of the 
importance of transparency and de facto compliance with corporate governance and accounting 
international best practices, and as public investors are not aware of which disclosures are 
mandatory, they do not pressure the BOD or management to improve compliance with IFRSs. 
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Hence, it is difficult to close the gap between de facto and de jure compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements in the scrutinised context and the problem of decoupling will continue). 
This is also consistent with Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model (secretive culture of 
MENA societies is associated with strong uncertainty avoidance resulting from the need to restrict 
information disclosure to avoid conflict and competition and to preserve security. Secrecy is also 
associated with large power distance, causing the restriction of information to preserve power 
inequalities. Simultaneously, this lends support to agency theory (as public investors do not 
demand greater compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and do not pressure the BOD or 
management to improve compliance, monitoring costs are low, thereby reducing management 
incentives to increase compliance). Additionally, this result is consistent with the notions of cost-
benefit analysis (the weak enforcement of IFRSs disclosure requirements and low punishment costs, 
if any, cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs for companies listed on the 
scrutinised contexts, thus directing management incentives toward non-compliance.  
 
The findings of this chapter are further confirmed by the interviewees’ responses presented in the 
next chapter. Furthermore, these findings have policy implications and related recommendations 
which will be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
 
 
6.7 Summary  
This chapter has presented statistics obtained from the various tests undertaken to establish the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by scrutinised companies. The results 
indicated that the average level of compliance with total IFRSs disclosure requirements was 80% 
by companies listed on the EGX and 76% by companies listed on the ASE.  
 
The test of differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts with respect to the levels 
of compliance with overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements, corporate governance 
structures and other company attributes, revelaed the existence of significant statistical differences 
between both jurisdictions. Hence, univariate and multivariate analysis were conducted on 
individual country level.  
 
The findings of the univariate and multivariate analysis on the level of the Egyptian context 
revealed that compliance behaviour with the overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by 
companies listed on the EGX do not follow any pattern in relation to any of the independent 
variables employed in this study. This may be due to the novelty of corporate governance and the 
lack of awareness about the importance and the advantages of  full de facto compliance with IFRSs 
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disclosure requirements and corporate governance best practices in the Egyptian context. 
Additionally, the existence of other factors mainly related to the secretive culture that is dominant 
in the Egyptian society.  
 
On the level of the Jordanian context, the univariate analysis revealed that public ownership has a 
significant negative relationship with the level of compliance with overall mandatory IFRSs 
disclosure requirements. Also, univariate analysis revealed that companies audited by big 4 audit 
firms comply better with IFRSs disclosure requirements than those audited by non-big 4 audit firms. 
These findings were confirmed by multivariate analysis which also revealed that company size has 
a significant positive association with compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements 
in the Jordanian context.   
 
Overall the findings of the univariate and multivariate analysis in both of scrutinised stock 
exchanges revealed that the impact of corporate governance best practice mechanisms is absent in 
both of scrutinised stock exchanges. This was explained by the novelty of corporate governance 
and the lack of awareness about the importance and the advantages of de facto compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance best practices. Hence, it is expected that 
as national cultural values are developed to recognise the importance of compliance with IFRSs as 
is the case in developed countries where such standards originated, and as the qualification levels of 
the monitoring staff of the CMA and JSC and of accounting practitioners particularly in the 
Jordanian context improve, so too will the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.  
 
Finally, the findings were consistent with the notions of institutional isomorphism theory, Gray’s 
(1988) accounting sub-cultural model, and financial economics theories. Such consistency adds to 
the theoretical contribution of this study which can be considered as one of the first studies that 
employ the institutional isomorphism theory in explaining the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs in the MENA region.  
 
The next chapter provides a summary of the general findings constructed through the analysis of 
the interview data. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Analysis of Interviews 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As indicated in section 5.5 semi-structured interviews were undertaken to assist in the interpretation 
of the findings of the quantitative data analyses. Two interview questionnaires were designed to 
best meet the occupation of different respondent groups.  
This chapter presents a summary of the general findings constructed through the analysis of the 
interview data. Hence, the remaining part is organised as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the design 
of the interview questions. Section 7.3 reviews the specific features of all respondents. Section 7.4 
provides a summary of generalisations and themes derived from the interview analysis. Section 7.5 
links interview results with research objectives and finally section 7.6 provides a summary of the 
procedures and the findings of the interview data analysis. 
 
7.2 The Interview Questions 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the interviews were conducted after the quantitative data analysis in 
order to supplement the interpretation of the findings of that analysis.  
 
The interview questions were open-ended to encourage free expression of participants’ views, ideas, 
and perceptions. Two interview questionnaires were designed - the first for the first four groups of 
respondents (regulators, academic staff, accountants and auditors) and the second for the fifth 
group (individual investors)42.  
 
The first questionnaire consisted of two parts, the first covering the first and the last research 
questions as presented in section 1.3, the main theme being the barriers to full compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements in Egypt and Jordan. The second part contained six questions 
relating to the influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance (the second 
and last research questions). Responses to these questions were expected to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the influence of cultural and other factors such as monitoring and 
enforcement on compliance levels in the scrutinised jurisdictions and how corporate governance 
requirements for best practice are perceived in MENA societies.  
                                                          
42 The Interview Questionnaires are presented as Appendices 10 and 11. 
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The second questionnaire also had two parts. The first contained three questions relating to the first 
and the last research questions as presented in section 1.3, the main theme being investor 
perceptions regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. The 
second part contained seven questions relating to the second and last research questions the main 
theme being investor awareness of corporate governance as a concept and investor perceptions of 
the impact of board composition and ownership structure on the disclosure behaviour of listed 
companies. The semi-structured interviews with individual investors who rely on annual reports 
when making their investment decisions were also expected to help in the researcher’s exploration 
of the ideas and beliefs of investors in Egypt and Jordan. 
 
In constructing the interview questions the researcher followed the recommendations of Collis and 
Hussey (2003) to keep questions simple, avoid using unnecessary jargon or specialist language, 
phrase questions to keep the meaning clear, avoid asking negative questions because they are easy 
to misinterpret, ask one question at a time, include questions that serve as cross checks on the 
answers to other questions, and avoid leading or value-laden questions. The questions were 
translated into Arabic, as this was the language used. Notes were taken during the interviews, as the 
interviewees were not prepared to be tape-recorded. Interviewees were encouraged to speak freely, 
and for verification purposes, they were asked to read the notes taken by the researcher during the 
interview to ensure their views were accurately reported. The researcher then translated the 
transcripts from Arabic to English, and to further guarantee the validity of the texts, the researcher 
asked a linguistic specialist to review her translation. 
 
7.3 Interviewees’ Information   
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the researcher conducted 12 interviews in Egypt and 8 interviews in 
Jordan with respondents from four different groups (Regulators, Accountants, Academic Staff, and 
Individual Investors). Each interview lasted between 30 to 60 minutes and was undertaken between 
21st September and mid-November, 2010.   
For reporting purposes, participants were classified according to their occupation and jurisdiction 
into Regulators (R), Academic Staff (S), Accountants (A) and Investors (I). Each individual 
interviewee is identified by his/her group code, followed by the first letter of his/her jurisdiction (e 
for Egypt and j for Jodan) and a digit representing his/her serial number within that group. For 
example, Re1 stands for the first interviewee from the Regulator group in Egypt, and Ij2 stands for 
the second interviewee from the investor group in Jordan. The precise details of interviewees 
demonstrated in Section 5.5.2.1.  
199 
 
7.4 Interview Results and Generalisations 
As indicated, the interviews covered two main themes which had emerged from the quantitative 
analysis, these being: barriers to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, and the 
relationship between levels of compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance structures. 
The following sub-sections indicate how many interviewees talked about a certain theme. 
 
7.4.1 Barriers to Full Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure Requirements 
Interviewees identified several factors preventing full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, which after analysis, could be grouped into five main barriers as follows:   
1. Non-compliance costs are less than compliance costs for listed companies. 
2. Inadequate qualification of accounting practitioners. 
3. Low demand for more disclosure by investors. 
4. Management resistance. 
5. Degree of relevance of each IFRS to the economic development stage of the jurisdiction. 
 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate the number of interviewees from each group raising each barrier. 
Table 7.1: Number of Interviewees Raising Each Barrier to Full Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure 
Requirements in Egypt 
Barrier Regulators Accountants Academic Staff Members 
Naïve 
Investors 
Non-compliance costs are less 
than compliance costs 3 (75%) 1 (50%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Inadequate qualification of 
accounting practitioners 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%) 0 (0%) 
Low demand for more disclosure 
by investors 3 (75%) 1 (100%) 4 (100%) 2 
Management resistance 3 (75%) 1 (100%) 3 (75%) 0 (0%) 
Degree of relevance of each IFRS 
to the economic development 
stage of the jurisdiction 
4 (100%) 2 (50%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 
 
Table 7.2: Number of Interviewees Raising Each Barrier to Full Compliance with IFRSs Disclosure 
Requirements in Jordan 
Barrier Regulators Accountants 
Academic 
Staff 
Members 
Naïve 
Investors 
Non-compliance costs are less than 
compliance costs 0 1 (100%) 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Inadequate qualification of accounting 
practitioners 2 (100%) 1 (100%) 2 (67%) 0 (0%) 
Low demand for more disclosure by 
investors 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Management resistance 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Degree of relevance of each IFRS to the 
economic development stage of the 
jurisdiction 
2 (100%) 1 (50%) 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 
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7.4.1.1 Low Non-compliance Costs 
Table 7.1 shows that three of the four CMA regulators referred to low non-compliance costs as one 
of the major barriers to full compliance. They attributed this to the stage of market development 
which makes it difficult to be overly strict with companies since this would result in delisting most 
of the companies and distorting the image of listed companies, which in turn can negatively affect 
the international reputation of the national capital market. The regulators believe that negotiations 
with companies are more effective in improving their awareness of the importance of compliance, 
and refer to the continuous improvement in the disclosure levels by companies listed on the EGX as 
justification for this approach. Also, they argue that the number of companies monitored is above 
the capacity of the CMA staff and that no strict sanctions are imposed by the Egyptian legislation. 
“At the moment non-compliance costs are low. As the market is emerging the 
capital market authority is afraid to be very strict with companies as that means 
delisting most of the companies and then the market will close down so we try to 
improve compliance of companies over time. This works as compliance levels in 
2010 are better than in 2007 and so on. It can be said that compliance levels 
improve with time. Also, although we have competent monitors in the central 
monitoring authority of the CMA, they serve more companies than their capacity. 
This may negatively affect the quality of their monitoring but this also will diminish 
with time as we intend to employ more disclosure monitors.” Re1 
 
“Non-compliance costs are less than compliance costs due to non-existence of strict 
compulsory sanctions in the legislation as well as the whole market culture which 
require more time to be mature and understand the importance of disclosure and 
transparency.” Re2 
 
“Some companies misuse non-strict enforcement of IFRSs by the CMA due to the 
lack of cultural awareness. They cannot understand yet that we do not want to 
distort the reputation of the national market to attract foreign investment. However, 
we try to develop communication channels with those companies to encourage them 
to improve compliance and sometimes when we inform a company several times to 
comply with disclosure requirements and the company insists on ignoring our 
requirements we impose sanctions on it.” Re4 
 
Accountants argue that the lack of accountability, weak enforcement of IFRSs by the CMA as long 
as the auditor report is unqualified, and the too detailed requirements of some standards which may 
harm the company’s competitive position cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance 
costs. However, one of the accountants raises the problem of inequality of treatment of non-
compliants which contributes to encouraging companies with major government ownership to 
ignore full-compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements.  
“Although we do not follow all IFRSs disclosure requirements the CMA does not 
send us any notes in this regard. For sure we do not do that to mislead investors or 
anybody else but our management sees some requirements as very detailed, and that 
these details are useless to investors but if disclosed they may be misused by our 
competitors. To sum up, the general rule is that as the auditor report is unqualified 
and no complaints are submitted from investors regarding the quality of our 
financial reporting we will not be on the spot. Once you are hired in the company 
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your manager tells you that you have to forget anything you learned at Business 
School and do the work in that way. So given the lack of accountability any junior 
employee has to follow the instructions of his manager.” Ae2 
 
“There is a major drawback in the capital market reaction toward non-complying 
companies. They are very strict with small companies but the opposite is true for big 
ones and those privatised with major ownership held by the government. This is not 
fair. Also, the general rule from my experience is that as long as there are no 
complaints regarding the performance of a specific company nobody cares to direct 
it to improve its compliance and its report is accepted regardless of its shortfalls. 
Also, companies say that if non-compliance is detected and they are asked to modify 
there is room for discussion and if the capital market authority insists they will 
apply their requirements.” Ae2 
 
Academic staff members also highlight the negative impact of low non-compliance costs, 
attributing this to ineffective control mechanisms, low sanctions if any, lack of accountability, 
political considerations by the CMA, and cultural influences, such as the preference for secrecy. 
“Low non-compliance cost is an important point to mention when talking about 
barriers to full compliance with IFRSs in a developing country like Egypt. The lack 
of a code of ethics for the accounting and auditing profession contributes to this 
problrm. This code has been under construction since 1997. Hence, in the light of 
ineffective control mechanisms and no sanctions of any type on accountants and 
auditors who fail to comply with accounting and auditing standards, non-
compliance will continue. Another thing is the lack of actual independence of 
auditors. In practice neither the shareholders nor the board of directors makes the 
decision to assign the external auditor and determine the fees. Thus, auditors 
comply with top management wishes in order to gain higher fees and be 
reassigned.” Se1 
 
“For political reasons the Capital market authority does not exercise its authority 
to enforce listed companies to comply with IFRSs and corporate governance best 
practice especially those relating to transparency and disclosure. Consequently, as 
there are no or low sanctions imposed in case of non-compliance, companies prefer 
not to comply as in this case non-compliance costs are lower than compliance 
costs.” Se2 
 
“This is normal as the Egyptian market is emerging and thus it is expected to take 
time until things are done correctly. The company decision to comply with IFRSs is 
strongly influenced by the business and socio-economic culture particularly, secrecy 
and window dressing.  Adding to this, there is no lobby from naïve investors to 
protect their rights. Thus non-compliance costs are low in our society.” Se3 
 
“As long as there is weak monitoring of management compliance with IFRSs, 
monitoring costs will be low so managers do not need to improve compliance levels 
and the situation of lack of full compliance will continue.” Se4 
 
With respect to Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.2, four respondents talked about low non-
compliance costs as a barrier to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Jordan. The 
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accountant perceived non-compliance costs as low for those companies with CEOs or major 
owners in powerful positions. 
“Governors are not strict with companies when the CEO or major owners are well 
known names or in powerful positions. Those persons can change the decisions of 
political authority. Consequently, for these companies when they hide information 
nobody will follow them up; thus for them non-compliance costs are very low if 
any.” Aj1 
 
The three academics also highlighted low non-compliance costs as a barrier to achieving full 
compliance with IFRSs, attributing this problem to the low value of sanctions, weak enforcement 
and monitoring by the JSC which company managements may abuse, and the lack of individual 
investor awareness regarding their rights to pressure the BOD and management of listed companies 
to improve their compliance. They also believed the attitude of JSC staff, who consider compliance 
with IFRSs as the responsibility of auditors, to be a contributory factor, since companies in Jordan 
generally depend on auditors to prepare their financial statements due to the shortage in qualified 
accountants. Furthermore, they raised the problem of the shortage in the number of qualified staff 
in the JSC to monitor compliance with IFRSs by listed companies. This implies that as long as the 
auditor report is unqualified, JSC staff will not make a detailed monitoring of the reported accounts 
to ensure that all IFRSs disclosure requirements are followed properly in producing the company 
financial statements.   
“For companies non-compliance costs are less than compliance costs due to the 
minor impact and value of the fine in case of punishment. Also, lack of awareness 
among investors regarding their rights to put pressure on the BOD and 
management of listed companies to comply with IFRSs disclosure requirements is 
an important factor.” Sj1 
 
“The majority of companies listed on the ASE are audited by big 4 audit firms, even 
the financial statements are prepared by auditors; thus the JSC considers that, as 
the auditor report is unqualified this means that companies complied with the 
requirements of IFRSs or at least the spirit of IFRSs. Also, the shortage in the 
number of qualified members in the JSC makes it difficult to properly monitor 
companies to stimulate them to reach 100% compliance with IFRSs. All of this, 
given the cultural values in our societies may result in low non-compliance costs.” 
Sj2 
 
“Low non-compliance costs is a major barrier to full compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements due to the probable misuse of implicit flexibility given by 
the JSC concerning some IFRSs disclosure requirements which may be seen as very 
detailed or need more competent accounting practitioners.” Sj3 
 
The above discussion supports the notions of institutional isomorphism theory that the country 
mandated the IFRSs simply to acquire legitimacy without building the infrastructure required to 
guarantee de facto compliance with those standards. For instance, in Jordan most respondents 
pointed to the shortage in the number of qualified accountants in listed companies as well as the 
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shortage of qualified staff members in the JSC to monitor compliance with IFRSs. Additionally, the 
discussion supports the notions of agency theory as low monitoring costs will not stimulate 
management to improve compliance, and cost-benefit analysis and the cultural theories, as 
management’s preference for secrecy, and low sanctions if any, promote lower costs for non-
compliance than for compliance. 
  
7.4.1.2 Inadequate Qualification of Accounting Practitioners 
Table 7.1 shows that one of the regulators in Egypt talked about the inadequate qualification of 
some accounting practitioners in some listed companies, especially those with dominant 
government ownership. He attributed this to the existence of senior accountants with many years of 
experience but who are not familiar with IFRSs, and to the lack of continuous professional training 
on the requirements of IFRSs which may result in misunderstandings concerning some standards 
requirements. 
“Unfortunately senior accountants in some of the listed companies especially those 
with major government ownership, graduated a long time ago so they did not study 
IFRSs. In addition, to save training costs, management of such companies do not 
encourage their staff to engage in training programmes. This affects the quality of 
compliance with IFRSs requirements.”  Re3 
 
However, the fact that only one interviewee mentioned this problem, indicates that inadequate 
qualification of accounting practitioners is not highly recognised in Egypt.  
 
Conversely, as indicated in Table 7.2, all non-investor participants in Jordan raised the issue of 
inadequately qualified accountants as a major barrier toward full compliance with IFRSs.  
 
Regulators attributed the lack of full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements to the lack of 
awareness among practitioners, listed companies’ management, academic staff members and 
Jordanian universities, regarding the importance of the proper application of IFRSs and the need for 
continuous training on their updates. 
“Actually, there is still a lack of understanding among different parties particularly 
our universities, management of listed companies and national accountants of the 
severe negative impact of inadequate qualification on achieving high levels of 
compliance with IFRSs. I think we are achieving success in raising the awareness of 
listed companies of the importance of compliance with IFRSs and they are 
struggling to do that within the limit of the capabilities of their accountants as we 
have a shortage in qualified accountants.” Rj1 
 
“Inappropriate qualification of accounting practitioners is a major factor which 
negatively affects their level of competency. The accounting curricula are very weak 
even the majority of accounting teaching staff in Jordanian universities are not 
aware of the importance of IFRSs modules and not interested in the implications of 
IFRSs adoption in Jordan as a developing market.” Rj2 
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Surprisingly, the accountant mentioned this problem, which he attributed to the weak curriculum 
delivered in Jordanian universities and the poor quality of training courses attended by accountants 
who are trying to become knowledgeable about IFRSs updates. 
“Most accounting practitioners in Jordan are not properly qualified which is why 
most of the companies depend on the auditing offices to prepare their annual 
reports. This is not our mistake; even when we are sent to a training courseo on 
IFRSs by our company we go to five star hotels where everything is superorganised 
except the course material and the trainer!” Aj1 
 
Two of the academic staff members also mentioned this problem, believing it to be a part of the 
current stage of development of Accounting Departments in Jordanian universities, the shortage of 
academic staff members who are specialised in financial accounting, and the lack of co-ordination 
between the Jordanian universities and regulators in the ASE to ensure the improvement of 
accounting practitioners’ qualifications. 
“The lack of competent practitioners is the major barrier to reaching full 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Jordan as most accounting 
departments in the Jordanian universities are newly established and do not have 
adequate numbers of staff members who are specialised in Financial Accounting.”. 
Sj1 
 
“In Jordan we suffer from the problem of a shortage of qualified accounting staff 
members which severely affects levels of compliance with IFRSs. However, I think 
now after opening Accounting Departments in the Jordanian universities, the lack of 
co-ordination between our universities and the ASE regulators will be the major 
factor that contributes to this problem.” Sj3 
 
The above discussion supports the notions of institutional isomorphism particularly in Jordan, 
whereas IFRSs were mandated by government in order to gain legitimacy, but where the required 
infrastructure (particularly qualified accountants) to guarantee de facto compliance with those 
standards was not provided. 
 
7.4.1.3 Low Demand for More Disclosure by Investors 
Table 7.1 shows that many respondents in Egypt talked about the issue of low demand for more 
disclosure by investors.  
 
All interviewees except the investor group blamed this on the lack of awareness among individual 
investors regarding their rights to pressure the BOD and management of companies in which they 
are shareholders in order to improve compliance. They believe that given the secretive nature of 
Egyptian society it is difficult for companies to improve their compliance without pressures. 
“Low or non-demand for more disclosure by investors is a major characteristic of 
the Egyptian investor. This can be attributed to the lack of awareness among 
individual investors regarding their rights.” Re1 
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“We are doing our best to stimulate listed companies to improve their levels of 
compliance with IFRSs and we succeeded in that as the levels of compliance 
improve over time. However, without the support of investors by putting pressure on 
companies to improve their disclosures it will take a long time to reach the stage of 
full compliance with IFRSs by listed companies.” Re2 
 
“Lack of investor awareness regarding disclosures that must be made by listed 
companies is a barrier toward full compliance with IFRSs. To date the whole work 
is done by the CMA without any co-operation from the side of companies or 
investors.”  Re3 
 
One of the accountants stated that widespread concentrated ownership in the Egyptian capital 
market and lack of awareness among naïve investors form additional barriers to full compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements.  
“As the majority of listed companies have concentrated ownership, owners have 
access to all the information they need. In the meantime, naïve investors are not 
aware about their right to ask for company information so our level of compliance 
is not developed as nobody asks for more disclosures. Also, some disclosure 
requirements are too detailed which may threaten our competitive position so we 
prefer not to disclose as long as nobody asks about it.” Ae1 
 
All participants from the academic staff group mentioned the ignorance among naïve investors 
regarding their entitlement to demand more disclosure.  
“Small investors are not aware of their rights to ask for more disclosures; thus this 
has a negative impact on reaching the full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.” Se1 
 
“Lack of naïve investor awareness regarding the minimum level of disclosures to be 
provided by listed companies makes it difficult to reach full compliance with 
IFRSs.” Se2 
 
“Small investors make their investment decisions based on rumours and they do not 
know and do not wish to know what disclosures must be made by listed companies, 
and this of course, has a negative impact on improving the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs.” Se3 
 
“The Egyptian investor is not aware about disclosures that must be made by listed 
companies; thus, companies will not improve their levels of compliance voluntarly.” 
Se4 
 
This viewpoint is confirmed by the responses of the interviewees from the investor group who had 
no idea about IFRSs or disclosures that listed companies are obligated to make. They argued that 
disclosures made by companies are of no importance when making their investment decisions, 
believing that it does not matter whether listed companies are fully-compliant or otherwise with 
mandated disclosure requirements. They also stated that they do not trust the accuracy of 
information disclosed, nor how to use such information. Basically, they accept the situation, 
seemingly not motivated to agitate for more disclosure by listed companies. 
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“I have no idea about IFRSs … I am not interested to know about mandatory 
disclosures as I do not trust the accuracy of disclosed information … that is why I 
focus on the trend of the company’s stock price when making investment decisions.” 
Ie1 
 
'I do not know what IFRSs are. I do not know how to read and extract important 
information from the annual reports, and reports are not available for free. We hear 
about disclosure problems and fraud in developed markets so do you expect 
excellence in an emerging market!! I ask the brokers about the best investments as 
they have more experience. I sign buying and selling orders to give my broker the 
opportunity to do the best for me without even asking me as I have no experience at 
all in this regard. However, as the stock exchange is a place to raise funds quickly I 
am interested in investing my savings in it.”  Ie2 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.2, regulators argue that low demand for greater disclosure is a 
major reason for lack of full compliance with IFRSs. They attributed this to low investor awareness 
regarding IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
“The low demand for more disclosures by national investors is one of the barriers 
to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Jordan. This can be 
attributed to low awareness among national investors about their rights to ask for 
more information.”' Rj1 
 
“The naive national investors do not ask for more disclosure. This is reasonable as 
in an emerging market which already has a shortage of qualified practitioners it is 
not strange to have investors who are not aware about their rights to monitor 
company disclosures. I think all of this is a matter of time.” Rj2 
 
Academic staff memebers also mentioned the negative impact of this issue on improving 
compliance levels within companies listed on the ASE. 
“One of the important barriers to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements is low demand for more disclosure by small national investors.” Sj1 
 
“The national culture does not encourage investors to ask for more disclosure. 
Thus, low levels of demand are expected to continue as a barrier to full compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements.” Sj2 
 
“Given the secretive culture of our societies and the lack of awareness among 
investors regarding their right to ask listed compsnies to make full compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, it is difficult to stimulate companies to improve their 
levels of disclosure.” Sj3 
 
This point is also concluded through the interviews with investors who indicated that they may be 
familiar with the name but not with the detailed requirements of IFRSs and that company 
disclosures are not considered in making their investment decisions. One investor believed that all 
companies listed on the ASE makes all required disclosures, whilst the other believed otherwise. 
“These standards are applicable in Jordan and they determine the rules the 
company should follow in preparing its financial statements ... Because we are an 
emerging market and still have a shortage of well developed competent accountants, 
it is not expected that companies will disclose all required information … I make my 
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investment decision based on the information I hear from the media and my 
financial broker regarding company prospects as well as the names of the members 
of the BOD in this company and the names of its major investor(s).” Ij1 
 
“Just the name but I do not know about their requirements ... I think in most cases 
companies disclose the required information ... I make investment decisions based 
on the recommendations of my friends who are major traders in the ASE as well as 
from information about the historical trend of a company’s stock price.” Ij2 
 
The above discussion supports the notions of institutional isomorphism (normative isomorphism) 
as investors are not aware of the importance of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements or 
even of what those requirements are. Addtionally, it supports the notions of agency theory as low 
monitoring costs will not stimulate management to improve compliance. Furthermore, it supports 
the cultural theories as lack of full compliance may be associated with large power distance which 
results in the restriction of information to preserve power inequalities. This also supports the 
notions of cost-benefit analysis as low demand for disclosure may make non-compliance costs less 
than compliance costs. However, it is concluded that investors in Jordan are relatively more aware 
about the IFRSs compared to those in Egypt and that they have more trust in the information 
disclosed by companies listed on the ASE. 
 
7.4.1.4 Management Resistance 
Table 7.1 shows that three regulators identified management resistance as a barrier to full 
compliance in Egypt, which they believe results from the dominant secretive culture that will take 
time to change. 
“Management resistance is one of the barriers to reaching full compliance with 
IFRSs. Our market is emerging and being very strict with companies will have a 
negative impact on the continuity of the market and will market the idea that all 
listed companies are performing fraudulent actions. We believe that our regulatory 
framework is efficient but in the meantime with Egyptian culture that believes in 
rumours and with investors’ preference to save their money at banks our market 
will close down. So our strategy is based on stopping non-compliance that really 
reflects fraudulent behaviour to protect investors. But in the meantime we try to 
develop a compliance culture among listed companies by providing training 
courses, asking companies to develop audit committees and hiring qualified non-
executives on these committees.” Re1  
 
“The compliance level in listed companies is also negatively affected by 
management resisitance to transparency. This is a cultural issue. For years 
managers used to keep books for investors and others for the tax authority in order 
to hide information from their competitors so it is expected to take some time to 
change that behaviour.” Re2  
 
“Management still lack awareness regarding the importance of being transparent 
so this currently threatens the achievement of full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements, but I am sure that will disappear in the future.” Re4  
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The accountant also mentioned this issue as a problem, but insisted that in most cases this is to 
protect the company image and avoid misuse of important information by competitors. 
“Management of the company affects the level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements as some requirements may be too detailed and not supposed to be 
important for investors but if disclosed they might be used by our competitors so 
management ask us to ignore disclosing such information.” Ae2 
 
All academic staff members highlighted management resistance as a major negative influence, and 
attributed it to the secretive nature of Egyptian society and the lack of accountability. 
“Management of listed companies used for years to control the type and quantity of 
company information that is disseminated to the public. As IFRSs disclosure 
requirements encourage transparency and detailed disclosures management will not 
co-operate until they feel that non-compliance with any of the requirements will put 
them under investigation.” Se1 
 
“Management resists transparency due to the absence of strict compulsory 
sanctions in the legislation as well as the absence of a market culture which 
understands the benefits of transparency.” Se2 
 
“In light of the current situation of ineffective control mechanisms and no sanctions 
of any type on accountants and auditors who fail to comply with accounting and 
auditing standards, management is the main determinant of the levels of compliance 
with IFESs. Due to the opportunistic behaviour of some managers or to protect their 
image and competive position of their companies they control company disclosures; 
thus it is difficult to achieve full compliance with the IFRSs.” Se3 
 
“Management is the main determinant of levels of compliance with IFRSs. 
Management’s decision to comply with IFRSs is strongly influenced by business and 
socio-economic culture, particularly secrecy and window dressing. Adding to this 
there is no lobby from naïve investors to protect their rights.” Se4 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.2, one of the regulators and two of the academic staff members 
mentioned management resistance as a barrier to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. They all attributed that mainly to management ignorance regarding the importance of 
improved transparency and the lack of independence of auditors, weak sanctions and lack of 
investor awareness. 
“Sometimes management of some companies may not be aware about the 
importance of detailed compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements for the 
company and this has a negative impact on levels of compliance. However this 
behaviour is less common among modern managers, which gives us ambitions that 
such behavior will disappear in the near future.” Rj2 
 
“Due to the secretive nature of our society, management may resist improving 
disclosure levels. If we improved investor awareness regarding the disclosures that 
must be made and imposed more strict sanctions management will change that 
behaviour.” Sj1 
 
“Full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is not a common practice in 
Jordan and I am sure this is the case in all developing markets. Management is the 
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main determinant of the level of compliance with IFRSs. In Jordan the majority of 
listed companies ask auditors to prepare their financial statements so for sure this 
affects auditor independence as, if they ignore management’s instructions to keep 
some information undisclosed to protect the company’s competitive position, they 
will not be engaged in the future.” Sj3 
 
The above discussion supports the notions of institutional isomorphism theory (particularly 
normative isomorphism) as managements of listed companies are not yet aware of the importance 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. Also, it supports the notions of agency theory, 
as low monitoring costs due to low demand for greater disclosure will not provoke management 
into improving compliance. Also, cultural theory provides an explanation of company 
management’s secretive and selective behaviour, and the subsequent ignorance among national 
investors regarding their rights to demand more transparency. Additionally, the ideas expressed in 
cost-benefit analysis are confirmed, as weak enforcement of IFRSs and low sanctions if any, may 
make non-compliance costs less than compliance costs for management of listed companies. 
 
7.4.1.5 Relevance of IFRSs 
As indicated in Table 7.1 two of the regulators identified the relevance of IFRSs disclosure 
requirements to the Egyptian context, attributing this to the problem of familiarity with some 
requirements and dominant cultural values such as secrecy. 
“Not all the requirements of IFRSs are relevant to the Egyptian context. It is better 
to develop national standards that are suitable to the characteristics and the stage 
of development of our capital market. The current standards are a typical 
translation of IFRSs which include many parts that are not clear to some 
accountants as they may not be common practices in the Egyptian companies.” Re3 
 
“The relevance of IFRSs disclosure requirements to the Egyptian business 
environment affects the levels of compliance with IFRSs. For example, the treatment 
for accounting errors is done based on the personal experience of the senior 
accountant, not in accordance with standards. Another example is risk management 
as company management prefers to keep such information secret because this may 
affect the company image before creditors or investors, or may be misused by 
competitors. For R&D costs it is considered as useless so the majority of companies 
do not have this item as part of their expenses.” Re4 
 
The accountant argued that some requirements are very detailed and irrelevant to users within the 
national market, nor are they disclosed by other listed companies. 
“Not all IFRSs requirements are relevant as some are very detailed and there is no 
need to provide these details as it may harm the company's competitive position. 
Furthermore, some are not disclosed by other listed companies and nobody asks 
about them.” Ae2 
 
Two of the academic staff members talked about the issue of relevance of IFRSs to the Egyptian 
context and its impact on levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. They attributed 
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this to unfamiliarity with some requirements as companies listed on the EGX are not as developed 
as those listed on developed capital markets where such standards originated. 
“Although no one can deny that IFRSs are the best developed standards worldwide 
as they guarantee disclosure of the minimum level of information necessary for 
informed decisions, some of these requirements are not yet suitable to the level of 
development of our companies and the volume of their transactions. Consequently, 
some may have unclear translation which makes it difficult to follow or to be 
monitored by CMA staff. Thus, there is a need to review the translation of the 
current standards and listed companies must carry out gradual training courses for 
their accountants and internal auditors to make sure they know and apply 
accounting standards efficiently.” Se1 
 
“The Egyptian government mandated the adoption of IFRSs under pressures from 
the international lending institutions without developing the capital market to be 
ready to adopt such requirements in an appropriate manner. So it is expected to 
take some time until such standards be relevant to our capital market or we have to 
review such standards and choose only the requirements that are relevant to us to 
make sure we will have 100% compliance with them.” Se3 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.2, many respondents argued that IFRSs are not relevant to the 
Jordanian context mainly because they were developed to meet the requirements of developed 
capital markets, and because of the lack of qualified accounting practitioners in Jordan and the non-
existence of an official translation. 
“I think as long as our market is not well infrastructured with qualified competent 
regulators and accounting practitioners, and as we have a shortage in funds to 
attract qualified persons to develop accounting standards that fit to our context, we 
will not have full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. We are all aware 
that it is inappropriate to apply accounting standards that are developed to meet the 
needs of developed markets. So this is the challenge of our leadership to build a 
strong infrastructure soon to make sure that there will be an effective 
implementation of IFRSs.” Rj1 
 
“IFRSs are not completely relevant to Jordan because of lack of sufficiently 
qualified accounting practitioners and inadequate training, as well as the market 
system needs more time to mature.”  Sj1 
 
“We applied IFRSs to attract foreign investment and to globalise our economy 
although they may not be relevant to Jordan. For IFRSs to be relevant to our 
environment there must be sufficient and continuous training for accounting 
practitioners to ensure they are aware of the latest IFRSs and how to apply them. 
Also, there must be an official translation of IFRSs into Arabic.” Sj2 
 
“It is better to have national accounting standards that are more suitable to the 
characteristics of our market as a developing one. IFRSs are more suitable for 
developed markets and we only applied them because we are not qualified to 
develop our own set of standards.” Sj3 
 
The above discussion supports the notions of institutional isomorphism, as similar to the Egyptian 
government, the Jordanian government mandated the adoption of IFRSs mainly to gain legitimacy 
within the international community. However, it seems that the problem in Jordan is more 
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complicated as there are insufficient qualified regulators and practitioners to efficiently apply 
IFRSs or to develop a set of accounting standards that best fit their context. 
 
7.4.2 The Relationship between Levels of Compliance with IFRSs and Corporate Governance 
Variables 
 
In order to support the interpretation of the findings of the quantitative analyses investigating the 
association between corporate governance structures and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements, this section discusses the interviewee responses for the second part of the 
first and the second questionnaires as indicated in section 7.2. 
  
7.4.2.1 The Relationship between Board Independence and Levels of Compliance with IFRSs  
Perceptions of different interviewees in both countries regarding the influence of board 
independence on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements are presented in 
Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Perceptions of the Influence of Board Independence on Levels of Compliance with IFRSs 
Interviewee No Effect Positive Negative 
Re1  √  
Re2  √  
Re3  √  
Re4  √  
Ae1 √   
Ae2 √   
Se1 √   
Se2  √  
Se3  √  
Se4 √   
Ie1 √   
Ie2 √   
Rj1 √   
Rj2  √  
Aj1 √   
Sj1 √   
Sj2 √   
Sj3  √  
Ij1 √   
Ij2 √   
 
Table 7.3 shows that in Egypt, all regulators and two of the academic staff members support a 
positive association between board independence and levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements on the grounds that board independence improves the monitoring of management and 
that management in turn, will disclose more information to reduce the monitoring costs. 
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The remaining respondents (Ae1, Ae2, Se1, Se4, Ie1 and Ie2) argue, however, that board 
independence has no effect on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
because of the lack of de facto independence and the lack of awareness regarding the role of 
independent directors in monitoring company compliance with disclosure requirements. 
“In most cases if not in all, this ‘independence’ is not practised in the real world; 
independent members consider themselves and are also considered by executive 
members as guests.”  Ae1 
 
“Independence is just on paper - it has no impact on improving compliance.” Ae2 
 
“Theoretically, a BOD with more independent directors should be more effective in 
monitoring management to ensure compliance with IFRSs. However, the novelty of 
the concept of corporate governance causes companies to adopt the requirements 
just to gain legitimacy but in the reality they do not understand why this is 
important.Thus, given the secretive natre of our society even where there is board 
independence it has no effect on compliance levels.” Se1 
 
“Management is the main determinant of everything within the company including 
the disclosure policy so it does not matter whether there are independent directors 
on the board or not.” Se4 
 
“No, I do not think so because always the loyalty of the majority of the board 
members will be to major owners who are also in most cases, the managers of the 
company.” Ie1 
 
“No, as independent directors are chosen by the executive members.” Ie2 
 
In Jordan, the majority of respondents (Rj1, Aj1, Sj1, Sj2, Ij1 and Ij2) argue that no association 
exists between board independence and the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements and only two respondents (Rj2 and Sj3) support a positive association on the grounds 
that it will improve the BOD’s monitoring function. 
  
Those who oppose the notion that an association exists argue that the unique nature of the 
Jordanian culture makes it impossible to achieve real independence. Consequently, board 
independence will not affect management disclosure behaviour. 
“Due to the nature of our society, it is difficult to achieve the advantage of board 
independence without developing awareness regarding its importance.” Rj1 
 
“In our company the majority of board members are independent; however, they 
are very weak and have no influence at all. Management is the one who decides 
everything according to its vision.” Aj1 
 
“In reality Jordan is a small country and we all have strong blood ties. 
Unfortunately, these interrelations stand as a barrier toward achieving real 
independence. I think it is impossible to reach real board independence in Arab 
countries in general and in Jordan in particular because of our culture.” Sj1 
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“I think in Jordan as a developing market, the independent persons appointed to the 
BOD of listed companies are chosen for two reasons. The first is to gain respect as 
the company is applying good governance practices and the second is to support the 
executive board members’ chosen policies. Consequently, given the secretive nature 
of our society, weak enforcement and monitoring and lack of understanding by 
management and those described as independent directors regarding the benefits of 
transparency, board independence will not make a difference in compliance levels.” 
Sj2 
 
“I think there is no association between board independence and company 
disclosures.” Ij1 
 
“In my opinion according to my experience in the market there is no association.” 
Ij2 
 
The above discussion indicates that in Jordan, similar to Egypt, board independence is not an 
effective mechanism with respect to improving the levels of compliance with IFRSs. This supports 
the notions of institutional isomorphism that even when companies adopt board independence as 
proof of their modernity and the introduction of international best practices, this has no impact on 
its levels of compliance. So the problem of decoupling will continue. Also, as independent directors 
do not use their authority in monitoring company compliance with IFRSs, management will not 
improve disclosures so this supports the notions of agency theory, cultural theory, and cost benefit 
analysis. 
 
7.4.2.2 The Relationship between Board Leadership and Levels of Compliance with IFRSs  
Perceptions of different interviewees in Egypt and Jordan regarding the influence of board 
leadership on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements are presented in Table 
7.4. 
Table 7.4: Perceptions of the Influence of Role Duality on Levels of Compliance with IFRSs 
Interviewee No Effect Positive Negative 
Re1 √   
Re2   √ 
Re3   √ 
Re4   √ 
Ae1 √   
Ae2 √   
Se1 √   
Se2   √ 
Se3   √ 
Se4 √   
Ie1 √   
Ie2   √ 
Rj1   √ 
Rj2   √ 
Aj1 √   
Sj1 √   
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Sj2 √   
Sj3   √ 
Ij1   √ 
Ij2 √   
 
Table 7.4 shows that in Egypt six interviewees (Re2, Re3, Re4, Se2, Se3 and Ie2) believe that role 
duality has a negative impact on compliance levels because this reduces the potential for 
independent evaluation. The CEO who controls the management of the company will also choose 
what information to provide to other directors. 
 
However, the remaining interviewees argue that no association exists between board leadership and 
compliance levels, since in all cases the CEO is the actual operator of the business firm and the 
board whether there is separation between the two positions or not, and that the CEO is therefore 
the figure with the power.  Additionally, they cited lack of awareness among different parties 
regarding the purpose of separation between the two roles and/or the benefits of increasing 
transparency and compliance with IFRSs, contributed towards this situation. 
“The ownership in the majority of companies listed on the EGX is concentrated and 
even when there is a separation between the CEO and the Chair positions, the 
separation does not help in improving transparency and monitoring of company 
compliance with IFRSs. This is because in most cases the Chair is chosen because 
of his close relationship with major shareholders so in such cases I expect that 
separation of the roles will not affect management disclosure policy, hence levels of 
compliance with IFRSs will not be enhanced.” Re1 
 
“In all cases, the CEO controls everything and the Chair has no role, so I think 
whether roles are separated or held by the same person that will not affect 
compliance levels.” Ae1 
 
“In our company there is separation between the two positions but they are 
relatives and the Chair role is just to sign any papers or decisions presented to him 
by the CEO. Thus, I believe this issue will make no difference.” Ae2 
 
“In some companies the Chair is appointed in order to benefit from his political or 
powerful position to settle any difficulties with the regulatory or monitoring 
authorities, he knows that so he does not exercise his role. Thus the CEO is still the 
person who controls everything including the Chair. Consequently, as long as the 
CEO does not believe in the importance of compliance, compliance will not be 
improved.” Se2 
 
“The main problem is in our cultural context which prefers secrecy, in addition to 
absence of accountability and weak monitoring, if any. When the company 
separates the roles of the CEO and the Chair this is just to say it follows the 
international best practice but in reality, the CEO and the Chair do not believe in 
the benefits of doing this so this practice will not enhance transparency or 
compliance.” Se4 
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“I do not think there is an association between board leadership and level of 
disclosure because I know that the top manger is always the main controller in any 
busisness organisation.” Ie1 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.4, four respondents (Rj1, Rj2, Sj3 and Ij1) supported a negative 
association between role duality and compliance levels with IFRSs disclosure requirements on the 
grounds that it has a negative impact on the monitoring function of the board, and hence, on 
compliance levels.  
 
The remaining respondents (Aj1, Sj1, Sj2, and Ij2) argued differently, believing that whether the 
two roles were held by the same person or otherwise, levels of compliance would not be influenced, 
as no awareness exists regarding the benefits of separating roles. Consequently, disclosure is a 
feature of management vision.  
“I think in Jordan there is no association between board leadership and the levels 
of compliance with IFRSs as managements are always responsible for determining 
the extent of company disclosure and the Chair in most cases delegates everything 
to management.” Aj1 
 
“Some companies listed on the ASE have the CEO and Chair positions held by the 
same person. However, even when the two positions are separated this does not 
affect the existing compliance levels as in all cases the CEO determines the extent of 
disclosure. As we are suffering from a weak monitoring system by the governmental 
authorities and weak small shareholders who are unaware of their rights, there is 
no pressure to stimulate management whether from inside or outside the firm to 
improve its compliance.”  Sj1 
 
“I think it is not clear in our society the importance of separating the positions of 
the CEO and the Chair in achieving better monitoring of the company disclosure. 
Thus, even when the two roles are separated the Chair will not monitor the CEO’s 
performance to make sure that he complies with disclosure requirements.” Sj2 
 
“Jordan is a small country and we are all closely related so I do not believe that 
when the role is separated the Chair will monitor the CEO to make sure that he 
follows disclosure requirements. The compliance will happen if the CEO has self-
accountability and understands the benefits of transparency.” Ij2 
 
The above discussion supports the notions of institutional isomorphism since even when the roles 
are separated, this can be seen merely as window dressing, and in practice there is no difference in 
the attitude towards compliance, which in turn contributes to the problem of decoupling. Also as 
the Chair does not use his authority in monitoring company compliance with IFRSs, and given 
weak monitoring by regulatory bodies and weak small investors, management will determine the 
extent of disclosure according to its vision. This supports the notions of agency theory, cultural 
theory, and cost benefit analysis. 
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7.4.2.3 The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Levels of Compliance with IFRSs  
A wide range of opinion regarding the impact of ownership structure on compliance levels in Egypt 
and Jordan is evident from Table 7.5.  
Table 7.5: Perceptions of the Influence of Ownership Structure on Levels of Compliance with IFRSs 
Interviewee Government 
i  
Management 
i  
Private 
i  
Public 
i  Re1 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Re2 Negative Negative No Association No Association 
Re3 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Re4 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Ae1 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Ae2 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Se1 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Se2 Positive Negative Negative No Association 
Se3 Negative Negative Negative No Association 
Se4 Negative Negative Negative No Association 
Ie1 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Ie2 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Rj1 Negative Negative Negative Positive 
Rj2 Positive No Association Negative No Association 
Aj1 Negative Negative Negative No Association 
Sj1 No Association Negative Negative No Association 
Sj2 No Association Negative Negative Positive 
Sj3 No Association Negative Negative No Association 
Ij1 No Association No Association No Association No Association 
Ij2 No Association No Association No Association Positive 
 
As seen in Table 7.5, in Egypt, five respondents (Re2, Re4, Ae1, Se3 and Se4) supported a negative 
relationship between dominant government ownership and compliance levels on the grounds that 
management and board members in such companies are government officials with work 
relationships. Also, the government has access to all the information it needs, and for political 
reasons, the CMA as a governmental body, may not be strict with government-owned companies. 
All of these factors are expected to negatively influence compliance levels. Only one respondent 
(Se2) believed a positive relationship exists between dominant government ownership and levels of 
compliance with IFRSs, arguing that the government is accountable before the people and is 
responsible for protecting their wealth; hence, it is expected to pressure companies in which it has 
major ownership to improve their disclosure and hence, improve its public image. Additionally, the 
financial statements of such companies are further audited by the Central Auditing Organisation 
(CAO)43. 
 
                                                          
43 The Central Auditing Organization Law 144/1988 governs the auditing of government departments and agencies, 
public sector enterprises, and companies in which ownership interest of public investment is not less than 25 percent 
(ROSC, 2002:4). 
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The other six respondents (Re1, Re3, Ae2, Se1, Ie1 and Ie2) considered that no relationship exists 
between dominant government ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs. They gave various 
reasons for this perspective: a) disclosure requirements are required by laws and regulations so 
company management should comply with them to avoid being penalised, b) the disclosure 
behaviour depends on management awareness regarding the importance of compliance and 
improved transparency, c) given the secretive culture of the Egyptian society and weak monitoring 
and enforcement of regulations by the CMA and low demand for improved disclosure by naïve 
investors, management determine the extent of disclosure according to their vision.  
“I think there is no association between dominant government ownership and the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, as disclosure is regulated 
by company law and the capital market law and in case of non-compliance with any 
of the mandatory requirements the company will be penalised and may be delisted.” 
Re1 
 
“Companies' disclosure policy is bounded by laws and regulations so management 
in all cases must comply with those requirements regardless of company ownership 
structure.” Re3 
 
“The extent of disclosure mainly depends on management policy so I do not think 
that ownership structure has any effect.” Ae2 
 
“The secretive nature of our society, poor performance of management in 
companies with dominant government ownership, low demand for more disclosures 
by government as it has direct access to any information, and lack of awareness 
among small investors regarding the disclosures that must be made by companies, 
weak enforcement and sanctions imposed by CMA will all encourage management 
to disclose according to its vision.” Se1 
 
“I do not think so. I think management chooses the level of disclosure according to 
its agenda regardless of laws or the type of major shareholders.” Ie1 
 
“I think such association may exist in developed countries but in Egypt I do not 
think so because nobody cares about improving disclosure.” Ie2 
 
In Jordan two respondents (Rj1 and Aj1) supported a negative association between dominant 
government ownership and compliance levels on the grounds that the government has access to all 
company information it wants. Only Rj2 supported a positive relationship, believing that when the 
government is the major shareholder, it is important for the BOD to comply with disclosure 
requirements to gain the political support of the public. All the remaining five respondents (Sj1, 
Sj2, Sj3, Ij1 and Ij2) argued that no association exists between dominant government ownership 
and levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, suggesting that the level of 
awareness regarding the benefits of improving compliance represents the main determinant of 
company disclosure level. Additionally, they see the secretive nature of their society and weak 
enforcement of disclosure requirements as the main antecedent of compliance, rather than 
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dominance of government ownership. Also, they argue that the shortage in competent accounting 
practitioners negatively affects progress in compliance levels. 
“The level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements is mainly a function of 
management awareness regarding the importance and advantages of disclosure and 
transparency. Thus, I think it needs more time to understand this culture.” Sj1 
 
“The secretive nature of developing socities such as Jordan and weak monitoring of 
management disclosure policy reduce any possible impact of such variable on the 
extent of disclosure. Thus, I expect no association between dominance of 
government ownership and the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.” Sj2 
 
“As we are suffering a shortage of competent accountants so I think non-
compliance can be attributed to unfamiliarity or poor qualification of accountants 
and the monitoring body so it is not affected by the ownership structure.”  Sj3 
 
“I do not think that when the government is a major shareholder this will result in 
better disclosures as disclosure policy is determined by management according to 
its vision and the government already can obtain any information about the 
company at any time.” Ij1 
 
“As I understand, disclosures are required by laws but as long as the monitoring 
body does not follow up non-compliant companies as is the case in all Arab 
markets, management will disclose only the information they need to disseminate.” 
Ij2 
The above discussion indicates that in both Egypt and Jordan the majority of interviewees believed 
the ideas espoused in Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, agency 
theory, and institutional isomorphism accounted for the prevailing situation. The preference for 
secrecy by company management, the lack of awareness among management of listed companies 
regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations, 
and low demand for improved disclosures due to the government’s direct access to company 
information or lack of qualification of government officials who monitor company compliance with 
IFRSs, all cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs and hence, management is 
not prompted to improve compliance. Additionally, this contributes to the problem of decoupling as 
companies to gain respect and legitimacy argue that they are complying with the disclosure 
regulations when they are not.  
 
Concerning the influence of dominant management ownership on compliance levels, as indicated in 
Table 7.5, in Egypt five respondents (Re2, Re4, Ae1, Se2, Se3 and Se4) argued there is a negative 
relationship between these two variables on the grounds that the dominance of management 
ownership will reduce the monitoring costs, and hence result in low levels of compliance. Also, due 
to the preference for secrecy by management of listed companies, and weak monitoring by the 
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CMA and individual small investors, the dominance of management ownership is expected to have 
a negative impact on compliance levels. 
“In my opinion the dominance of management ownership results in lower levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements due to management preference for 
secrecy to protect important information from being available to competitors, and 
as the majority of board members are from management members or have been 
chosen by management which is the major owner of company shares, this will 
reduce monitoring costs so may result in lower levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements.” Re2 
 
“Unfortunately, due to the dominance of the secretive culture, management will not 
disclose important information and as the majority of company shares are also 
owned by management this is expected to have a negative impact on the levels of 
compliance.” Re4 
 
“As management is the producer and the main user of company information this 
will reduce the monitoring costs, and hence will have a negative effect on the levels 
of compliance.” Ae1 
 
“The secretive culture, weak enforcement of regulations and low demend for 
improved disclosure by small individual investors is expected to increase the 
possibility of a negative association between the dominance of management 
ownership and the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements.” Se2 
 
“As long as there is no effective monitoring of companies’ levels of compliance with 
IFRSs, dominance of management ownership is supposed to have a negative impact 
on the levels of compliance with IFRSs.” Se3 
 
“Low monitoring costs are expected to result in a negative relationship between 
dominance of management ownership and the levels of compliance with IFRSs.” 
Se4 
 
However, the remaining respondents (Re1, Re3, Ae2, Se1, Ie1 and Ie2) argued that there is no 
association between levels of compliance with IFRSs and the dominance of management ownership, 
believing that disclosure is regulated by mandatory disclosure requirements determined by 
legislation, or due to the lack of awareness of the importance of improving transparency and 
disclosure levels by company management, irrespective of whether management is the major 
shareholder or otherwise. 
“I think there is no association between dominant management ownership and 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, as disclosure is covered 
by regulations.” Re1 
 
“Companies' disclosure policy is bounded by laws and regulations so management 
in all cases must comply with those requirements regardless of company ownership 
structure.” Re3 
 
“The extent of disclosure mainly depends on management policy so I do not think 
that ownership structure has any effect.” Ae2 
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“The secretive nature of our society, low demand for more disclosures by small 
investors, weak enforcement and sanctions imposed by the CMA will encourage 
management to disclose according to its vision.” Se1 
 
“I do not think so. I think management chooses the level of disclosure according to 
its agenda regardless of laws or the type of major shareholders.” Ie1 
 
“I think in Egypt there is an absence of accountability so management determines 
what to disclose according to its interests.”  Ie2 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.5, the majority of respondents (Rj1, Aj1, Sj1, Sj2 and Sj3) 
supported a negative association between management ownership and levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements. They justified their opinions by reference to management’s 
preference for secrecy and fear of competitors.  
“When the majority of company shares are owned by management this is expected 
to increase mangement preference for secrecy. Thus, I expect that dominance of 
management ownership results in lower levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.” Rj1 
 
“'Negative - as management may prefer to hide some information from their 
competitors.” Aj1 
 
“The culture of secrecy will cause management to hide important information to 
avoid competition so I expect dominance of management ownership to result in low 
levels of compliance with IFRSs.” Sj1 
 
“Preference for secrecy encouraged by lack of effective monitoring is expected to 
result in a negative association between dominance of management ownership and 
the levels of compliance with IFRSs.” Sj2 
 
“The dominance of management ownership supports management’s cultural value 
of secrecy as in this case monitoring costs will be very low.” Sj3 
 
Conversely, the remaining respondents (Rj2, Ij1and Ij2) argued that no association exists between 
dominance of management ownership and compliance levels, suggesting compliance to be 
influenced by the strictness of enforcement by the regulatory bodies, which is weak, thereby 
prompting management to disclose according to its vision, regardless of the company’s ownership 
structure. Others argued that compliance is determined by the level of management awareness 
regarding the importance and benefits of improving transparency.  
“I think management policy toward the level of compliance with IFRSs is the same 
regardless of the dominant type of ownership within the company as this behaviour 
is influenced by management awareness regarding the benefits of improving 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements.” Rj2 
 
“I think company disclosure policy is the main determinant of the level of disclosure 
so in my opinion there is no association between the level of compliance with IFRSs 
and the dominance of management ownership.” Ie1 
 
221 
“In my opinion disclosures are required by laws so as long as the monitoring body 
does not follow up non-compliant companies and impose strict sanctions on them as 
is the case in all Arab markets, management disclosure will be selective regardless 
of whether it has a dominant ownership in the company or not.” Ij2 
 
The above discussion indicates that the perceptions of the interviewees in Egypt and Jordan 
regarding the relationship between the dominance of management ownership and the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements support the notions of agency theory due to low 
monitoring costs. Furthermore, they support the ideas proposed in Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-
cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism as the secretive culture in both 
countries causes management to keep disclosure levels at a minimum to protect company 
information from being misused by competitors. Also the lack of management and board members’ 
awareness regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance best 
practice that encourage transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and regulations by regulatory 
bodies, the weak sanctions (if any), the low demand for improved disclosures, and insufficient 
monitoring from small shareholders who cannot put voting pressures on management who are 
simultaneously the dominant shareholders and board members, all combine to promote lower non-
compliance costs than compliance costs. Hence, management is not encouraged to enhance 
compliance levels. Consequently, dominance of management ownership is believed to have no 
impact on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements rather than a negative 
impact as in all cases management disclosure policy is mainly based on attitudes toward 
transparency. 
 
Concerning the influence of dominant private ownership on the compliance levels, Table 7.5 shows 
that in Egypt five respondents (Re4, Ae1, Se2, Se3 and Se4) believed a negative relationship exists 
between these two variables, due to owners’ access to company information, low monitoring costs, 
and the secretive nature of society. 
“The majority of shares in listed companies on EGX are held by families who also 
hold managerial positions and are also members of the BOD of listed companies so 
they already have access to company information. In addition due to competition 
they may prefer to hide some information to protect company reputation so this is 
expected to result in low compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements.” Re4 
 
“When there is a dominance of private ownership, management compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements will decrease as such shareholders can acquire any 
information they need and of course small investors do not ask for anything and do 
not put any pressure on the company’s BOD to monitor compliance so levels of 
compliance are expected to decrease.” Ae1 
 
“Private ownership results in low monitoring costs; thus it is expected to have a 
negative impact on compliance.” Se2 
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“When there is a dominance of private ownership such owners can easily get access 
to all company information so there is no pressure on the BOD or management to 
improve compliance so it is expected to have a negative impact on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs.” Se3 
 
“Due to the secretive nature of our society dominance of private ownership is 
expected to have a negative impact on the levels of compliance as owners are 
expected to ask management to hide important information to avoid competition.” 
Se4 
 
Conversely, seven respondents (Re1, Re2, Re3, Ae2, Se1, Ie1 and Ie2) argued that no such 
relationship exists between dominance of private ownership and compliance levels, on the grounds 
that disclosure is regulated by mandatory disclosure requirements determined by laws, or 
determined by the lack of awareness regarding the importance of improving transparency and 
disclosure levels by company management and board members. For the sake of brevity and to 
avoid repetition, a selection only of interviewee responses follows: 
“I also think there is no association between dominance of private ownership and 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements for the same 
aforementioned reasons.” Re1 
 
“The dominance of private ownership is expected to have no relationship with the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements as compliance with IFRSs 
is influenced mainly by management attitude.” Re2 
 
“Companies' disclosure policy is bounded by laws and regulations so management 
in all cases must comply with those requirements regardless of company ownership 
structure.” Re3 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.5, the majority of respondents (Rj1, Rj2, Aj1, Sj1, Sj2 and Sj3) 
supported a negative association between private ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements. They justified their opinions referring to the fact that private owners have 
direct access to company information, and by management’s and owners’ preference for secrecy to 
counter competition. 
“The dominance of private ownership will have a negative impact on compliance 
with IFRSs if they interfere in company disclosure policy and ask management to 
hide information from competitors.” Rj1 
 
“As dominant ownership by private investors is expected to give them access to 
company information the secretive nature of our society may result in lower levels 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements.” Rj2 
 
“I think dominance of private ownership has a negative impact on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs as investors in this case already have access to any 
information they need so it is better to hide information to reduce the threat from 
competitors.”Aj1  
 
“There is a negative association between private ownership and the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs as private owners have access to information and they do 
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not like company information to be available to the public to avoid competition.” 
Sj1 
 
“I expect dominance of private ownership to lead to lower levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements as owners in this case have access to company 
information, they interfere in setting company policies including disclosures and 
they do not like company information to be available to the public to avoid 
competition.” Sj2 
“Dominance of private ownership negatively affects the extent of disclosure in 
developing countries as investors may ask management to hide important 
information that may threaten the company reputation or competitive position.” 
Sj3 
 
Only Ij1 and Ij2 argued that no association exists between dominance of private ownership and 
levels of company disclosure on the grounds that in all cases the company is supposed to disclose 
the information required by law and in all Jordanian companies, management is the main 
determinant of the disclosures to be made and nobody asks for better compliance. 
“Disclosure is made according to the Jordanian laws and in reality management 
choose the information to be disclosed regardless of the dominance of any group.” 
Ij1 
 
“As private owners already get all the information they need and also management 
determines the disclosure policy of the company and nobody whether from inside or 
outside the company asks for better disclosure, so the situation will continue and 
management will control the extent of information to be disseminated.” Ij2  
 
The above discussion supports the propositions of agency theory, cultural theory, cost-benefit 
analysis, and institutional isomorphism, in both Egypt and Jordan. Based on agency theory and 
cost-benefit analysis, direct access to company information by this group of shareholders and lack 
of demand for improving disclosure by small investors and regulatory bodies, results in low 
monitoring costs. Also, the preference for secrecy and the lack of awareness by management and 
possibly by private investors who are generally the managers and members of the BOD, regarding 
the benefits of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements may not encourage management to 
improve compliance levels. This also contributes to the problem of decoupling as companies will 
argue that they are applying IFRSs when actually, full compliance is absent.  Consequently, the 
dominance of private ownership is expected to have no impact on the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements, if not a negative impact. In Jordan the majority of interviewees 
strongly supported the claim of a negative association between dominance of private ownership and 
compliance levels compared to the interviewees in Egypt.  
 
Finally, with respect to the possible impact of dominance of public ownership on the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, as indicated in Table 7.5, in Egypt the majority of 
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respondents (Re1, Re2, Re3, Ae2, Se1, Se2, Se3, Se4, Ie1, Ie2) argued that no association is 
evident between these two variables, due to the lack of awareness and accountability among 
management of listed companies regarding the necessity to follow disclosure requirements, and the 
benefits of protecting the rights of individual investors in attracting foreign investors and improving 
the reputation of the national stock exchange. Also, some respondents argued that the laws and 
regulations that govern the disclosure practices by listed companies must be followed. For the sake 
of brevity and to avoid repetition, a selection only of interviewee responses follows: 
“I also think there is no association between dominance of public ownership and 
the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, as disclosure is 
regulated by company law and the capital market law and in case of non-
compliance with any of the mandatory requirements the company will be penalised 
and may be delisted.” Re1 
 
“The dominance of public ownership is expected to have no relationship with the 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements as compliance with IFRSs 
is influenced mainly by management and unfortunately public investors have no 
awareness about their rights and even if they have they do not practise such rights.” 
Re2 
 
“The secretive nature of our society, low demand for more disclosures by the public 
investors, weak enforcement and sanctions imposed by CMA will encourage 
management to disclose according to its vision.” Se1 
 
“The lack of accountability and lack of management belief in the benefits of 
improving compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in order to attract 
foreign investment is expected to reduce the expected positive impact of dominance 
of public ownership on the levels of compliance in a country like Egypt.” Se3 
 
 “I do not think so. I think management chooses the level of disclosure according to 
its agenda regardless of laws or the type of major shareholders.” Ie1 
 
 
Only Re4 and Ae1 supported a positive relationship between dominance of public ownership and 
the levels of compliance with IFRSs on the grounds that dominance of public shareholders is 
expected to improve the monitoring of the BOD and management of publicly listed companies.  
“When the majority of company shares are owned by public investors, this is 
expected to improve the monitoring of the BOD and management to protect the 
public shareholders' right to get at least the minimum information required by 
company law and capital market law.” Re4 
 
“I think when there is a dominance of public ownership, levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements will improve because public investors will monitor 
management compliance.” Ae1 
 
In Jordan, as indicated in Table 7.5, three respondents (Rj1, Sj2 and Ij2) believed a positive 
relationship exists between dominant public ownership and compliance levels, in order to reduce 
monitoring costs. 
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“Dominance of public ownership is expected to result in better levels of compliance 
with IFRSs by listed companies in order to reduce monitoring costs and bad 
reputation in case of being penalised for non-compliance.” Rj1 
 
“According to agency theory dominance of public ownership should result in higher 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in order to lower the 
monitoring costs. I think this also applies to Jordan.” Sj2 
 
“When the majority of company shares is publicly held, public investors can form a 
lobby that is able to monitor management disclosure practices and report any 
misuse to the BOD and the JSC.” Ij2 
 
However, the remaining respondents (Rj2, Aj1, Sj1, Sj3 and Ij1) argued that there is no association 
between dominance of public ownership and levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements. This was similar to Egyptian interviewees’ beliefs. They argued that the preference 
for secrecy and the lack of awareness and accountability among management of listed companies 
regarding the necessity to follow disclosure requirements and the benefits of protecting the rights of 
individual investors in attracting foreign investors and improving the reputation of the national 
stock exchange, would precipitate such outcomes. Additionally, lack of awareness among public 
investors about their rights and the flexibility given by the JSC to avoid delisting the majority of 
non-compliant companies, together with the negative consequences resulting from damage to the 
international reputation of the ASE, do not stimulate management to improve compliance. Also, 
some of the respondents argued that no association exists between the dominance of public 
ownership and compliance levels as there are laws and regulations governing disclosure practices 
by listed companies and such laws must be followed.   
“To be honest we are trying to encourage companies listed on ASE to comply with 
IFRSs, however due to cultural barriers, mainly secrecy and the lack of awareness 
among the public regarding their right to put pressure on the BOD and 
management of listed companies to improve disclosure, levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements do not improve as expected when there is a 
dominance of public shareholders.” Rj2 
 
“I think dominance of public ownership has no impact on improving the levels of 
compliance with IFRSs as such investors lack awareness about their rights.” Aj1 
 
“The dominance of secretive culture, weak enforcement of laws by JSC and lack of 
awareness among management, BOD and investors regarding the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements, dominance of public shareholders 
is not expected to result in better compliance levels as argued by different financial 
disclosure theories that developed in the west.” Sj1 
 
“In Jordan the culture and weak enforcement are the main barriers to the existence 
of a positive association between the dominance of public ownership and the levels 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements as proposed by the majority of 
researchers in the field who investigated this issue in more developed countries.” 
Sj3 
 
226 
“Disclosure is made according to the Jordanian laws and in reality management 
choose the information to be disclosed regardless of the dominance of ownership of 
any investor group.” Ij1 
 
The above discussion indicates that in Egypt and Jordan there are two viewpoints regarding the 
influence of dominance of public ownership upon compliance levels with IFRSs. The first argues 
that dominance of public ownership results in better compliance as a means of reducing monitoring 
costs and avoiding penalties by the regulatory bodies. This mainly supports the ideas expressed in 
agency theory, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism. The second perspective argues 
that no association exists between these two variables, which agrees with the notions of agency 
theory in respect of low monitoring costs. It also supports Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural 
model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional isomorphism. It can be proposed that the secretive 
culture in Egypt and Jordan causes management to avoid the outflow of company-sensitive 
information. Additionally, secrecy is associated with large power distance and a preference for 
collectivism (Gray, 1988). Furthermore, the lack of awareness among management and BODs of 
listed companies regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs and the importance of 
following corporate governance best practice to enhance transparency, the weak enforcement of 
laws and regulations, and low demand for improved disclosures due to the lack of awareness 
among public investors in the two capital markets regarding their right to ask for more disclosures, 
will cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs. Hence, management will not be 
stimulated to improve compliance levels. Moreover, this then contributes to the problem of 
decoupling. 
  
7.5 Linking the Interview Results with the Research Objectives 
A clear link can be identified between the interview results and study objectives. It can be seen in 
two ways. Firstly, the findings from the quantitative analysis are directly relatd to the study 
objectives, and secondly, the interview protocol was built on these findings. This link is further 
explained as follows: 
 
The first objective was to evaluate the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by 
companies listed on the EGX and ASE as leading MENA stock exchanges. The first subject in the 
interview framework was the perceptions regarding barriers to full compliance with these 
requirements in the interviewee’s jurisdiction (Egypt/Jordan). This exploration resulted in an 
enhanced understanding of the relevance of IFRSs to MENA countries and of the obstacles to full 
compliance with these standards in Egypt and Jordan.  Accordingly, levels of compliance with 
IFRSs could be explained by reference to the interview results. 
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The second, third, and fourth objectives of the study were to explore the relationship between 
different corporate governance variables (BOD independence, board leadership, and ownership 
structure) and levels of compliance with IFRSs by companies listed on the EGX and ASE. The 
second subject in the interview framework focused on this relationship. The interview results 
emphasised that corporate governance variables are not the main determinants of the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Egypt and Jordan. 
 
The fifth objective of the study was to explore the underlying theoretical rationale of corporate 
financial disclosure practices within the MENA context. This objective was indirectly met through 
the analysis of the interview data which emphasised that the study’s findings regarding the extent 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and its relationship with corporate governance 
structures of companies listed on the EGX and ASE are consistent with the suggestions of cultural, 
institutional isomorphism, and financial economics theories, which based on the discussions in 
Chapter Two, were found to be relevant to financial disclosure practices in the MENA context. 
 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented a summary of generalisations and themes derived from the interview 
analysis, and linked the interview results with the study objectives. 
 
In total, 20 interviews were conducted (12 in Egypt and 8 in Jordan) with individuals representing 
regulators, accountants, academics, and individual investors.  The questions posed to the 
interviewees were the same for the first three groups, but contained some differences for the 
investor group. They were, however, all generated as a result of the findings from the quantitative 
analysis, and hence used to gain more detail about certain issues. 
  
The generalisations which could be concluded from the interview data are summarised as follows: 
1. The major barriers to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the EGX 
and ASE are: low non-compliance costs, inadequate qualification of accounting 
practitioners, low demand for more disclosure by investors, management resistance, the 
degree of relevance of the requirements under each IFRS to the economic development 
stage of the scrutinised jurisdictions. 
2. In Egypt and Jordan board independence is not an effective mechanism for improving 
compliance levels. This supports the ideas advanced by institutional isomorphism that 
even when companies adopt board independence as evidence of their modernity and 
commitment to international best practices, this has no impact on levels of compliance. 
Hence, the decoupling problem prevails. Also, as independent directors do not exercise 
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their authority in monitoring company compliance with IFRSs, management has no 
pressure to increase disclosure levels, thereby the proposed theoretical foundation for 
the analysis is justified. 
3. In Egypt and Jordan the separation between the positions of the CEO and the Chair does 
not necessarily lead to enhancing the level of compliance with IFRSs. This supports the 
notions of institutional isomorphism that even when roles are separated this is effected 
merely as window dressing, to gain respect and legitimacy, but in practice the separation 
does not increase compliance levels, and the problem of decoupling is magnified. Also 
as the Chair does not use his authority in monitoring management attitude toward 
compliance with IFRSs, and given the weak monitoring by the CMA in Egypt, the JSC 
in Jordan and the weak naïve investors in both countries, managements determine the 
extent of disclosure according to their vision. The proposed theoretical foundation is 
thus, supported. 
4. In Egypt and Jordan the perceptions of the majority of the interviwees support a limited 
impact of government ownership (if any) on compliance levels, thereby confirming the 
proposed theoretical foundation. The management preference for secrecy, the lack of 
management awareness of the importance of compliance with IFRSs, the lack of 
awareness among BOD members regarding the importance of corporate governance best 
practice in improving disclosure practices, the weak enforcement of laws and 
regulations by regulatory bodies, the failure to impose sanctions, the low demand for 
improved disclosure due to the government’s direct access to company information, the 
lack of qualification of government officials who monitor company compliance with 
IFRSs, and the resultant low monitoring costs all combine to sustain the status quo, 
being that management continue with their current levels of compliance. Again, these 
conditions contribute to the problem of decoupling as companies to gain respect and 
legitimacy will argue that they are applying IFRSs whereas full compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements is absent. 
5. In Egypt and Jordan the perceptions of the majority of the interviewees is that 
dominance of management ownership has a limited impact on the levels of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements. This supports the notions of the proposed 
theoretical foundation as the secretive culture in both countries causes management to 
keep disclosure levels at minimum levels to protect company information from being 
misused by competitors. Also the lack of awareness by management and board members 
regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs and corporate governance best 
practices that encourage enhanced transparency, the weak enforcement of laws and 
regulations by regulatory bodies and weak sanctions if any, and the low demand for 
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improved disclosures and insufficient monitoring from small shareholders who cannot 
put voting pressures on company managements (who are simultaneously dominant 
shareholders and BOD members), cause non-compliance costs to be less than 
compliance costs, and thus managements are not stimulated to improve compliance 
levels. Consequently, dominance of management ownership probably has no impact 
(although possibly a negative one) on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements because in all cases, regardless of the ownership structure, compliance is a 
management affair. 
6. In Egypt and Jordan the perceptions of the majority of the interviewees are that a limited 
impact of dominance of private ownership occurs on compliance levels. Based on 
agency theory and cost-benefit analysis, direct access to company information by this 
group of shareholders and lack of demand for improved disclosure by small investors 
and regulatory bodies, result in low monitoring costs and low sanctions, if any. Also, the 
preference for secrecy and the lack of awareness by management and possibly private 
investors (who are generally also the managers and BOD members) regarding the 
benefits of compliance may not encourage management to improve levels of compliance 
with IFRSs. This also contributes to the problem of decoupling as companies will argue 
that they are applying IFRSs whereas full compliance with IFRSs is absent.  
Consequently, the dominance of private ownership most likely has no impact (but 
possibly a negative impact) on compliance levels. In Jordan it is recognised that the 
majority of interviewees provide much stronger support than the interviewees in Egypt, 
for the contention that a negative association between dominance of private ownership 
and compliance levels exists.  
7. In Egypt and Jordan two distinct viewpoints exist regarding the influence of dominant 
public ownership upon compliance levels. The first argures that dominance of public 
ownership will result in better compliance in an effort to reduce monitoring costs and 
escape penalties by the regulatory bodies. This in turn mainly supports the notions of 
agency theory and cost-benefit analysis. The other perspective suggests that there is no 
association between the dominance of public ownership and compliance levels, thereby 
being in line with agency theory that argues for low monitoring costs. This also supports 
Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, cost-benefit analysis, and institutional 
isomorphism. It can be proposed that the secretive culture in the two countries causes 
management to avoid any outflow of company-sensitive information. Moreover, secrecy 
is associated with large power distance and a preference for collectivism. In addition, 
the lack of awareness among the managements and BODs of listed companies regarding 
the importance of compliance with IFRSs and the importance of following corporate 
230 
governance best practice to enhance transparency does not stimulate management to 
increase disclosure. This absence of stimulation is magnified by the weak enforcement 
of laws and regulations, and the low demand for improved disclosures due to the lack of 
awareness among public investors regarding their right to demand more disclosure. 
Together these result in non-compliance costs being less than compliance costs. 
Management’s aversion to enhancing disclosure subsequently contributes to the 
problem of decoupling. 
The next chapter brings the study to a conclusion and in so doing highlights its limitations, offering 
suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main results and conclusions of the thesis and provides suggestions for 
future research. Hence, the remaining part of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 
provides a summary of the main research findings. Section 8.3 demonstrates the contributions of 
the study, and section 8.4 considers the implications of the research findings. Section 8.5 discusses 
the limitations of the study, and finally, section 8.6 suggests areas for future research. 
 
8.2 Research Results and Conclusion 
The study has examined the influence of corporate governance structures (board characteristics and 
ownership structure), on the levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements 
by companies listed on two leading MENA stock exchanges; the EGX and the ASE. The study has 
employed a cross-sectional analysis of an equal sample of 75 non-financial companies listed on 
each of the scrutinised stock exchanges for the fiscal year ending 31 December, 2007. Using an 
unweighted disclosure index of 275 items derived from mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements 
for the fiscal year beginning in January 2007 (see Appendix 2), this study firstly has measured the 
levels of compliance by the sample companies listed on the focus stock exchanges. The index 
encompasses twenty sub-indices in order to facilitate the measurement of levels of compliance with 
the disclosure requirements under each individual standard (see section 5.5.1.1). The extent of 
disclosure in annual reports was derived by computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the 
maximum possible score attainable for items appropriate to that company (see section 5.5.1.2). 
 
Following this step, univeriate and multivariate regression analyses were used to examine the 
association between corporate governance related variables (board independence, board leadership, 
board size, government ownership ratio, management ownership ratio, private ownership ratio and 
public ownership ratio) and the extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements.Then, 
semi-structured interviews (12 conducted in Egypt and 8 in Jordan) were carried out in order to 
supplement the interpretation of the findings of the empirical analyses as discussed in Chapter 
Seven. 
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An innovative theoretical foundation is deployed, in which compliance is interpretable mainly 
through the inducements of the institutional isomorphism theory and secrecy versus transparency as 
one of the accounting sub-cultural values identified by Gray (1988). Furthermore, the notions of the 
agency theory and Cost-benefit analysis employed in prior research have been used to some extent 
in deriving the research hypotheses and interpreting the research findings. Hence, the last research 
question (Q3) was answered by relating the empirical findings to the notions of the proposed 
theoretical framework. In addition, the analysis of interview data as indicated in Chapter Seven 
helped in exploring the underlying theoretical rationale for corporate financial disclosure practices 
in scrutinised MENA countries.   
   
The examination of annual reports for sample companies listed on the two stock exchanges 
revealed the following: 
1. None of the listed companies in either stock exchange achieved 100% compliance level with 
the overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements. Full compliance was, however, 
achieved by some companies at the level of individual IFRSs.  
 
2. The average level of compliance with the overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements 
(total disclosure index) was relatively higher in Egypt than Jordan (80% and 76% respectively) 
and the maximum level of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements was 91% in Egypt 
and 88% in Jordan. In addition, the minimum level of compliance by companies listed on the 
EGX was much higher than that of companies listed on the ASE (68% and 56% respectively), 
the difference mainly attributed to the shortage of qualified accountants in Jordan.  
 
3. On the level of sub-disclosure indices (section 6.2), sub-index 17 (IAS 36: Impairment of 
Assets) achieved a 100% compliance level by all companies in which it was applicable (3 
companies in Egypt and 8 in Jordan), thereby emphasising the enormous impact of culture on 
disclosure practices in MENA stock exchanges. Although this standard was applicable to a 
limited number of companies in both jurisdictions, all of them fully complied with its 
requirements, thereby supporting the proposition that as long as the requirements of a 
particular standard do not contradict with the dominant culture in a specific society, listed 
company management will be incentivised to fully comply with its requirements. 
Additionally, full compliance with the requirements of this standard may be attributed to the 
non-existence of any understanding or interpretation difficulties concerning those 
requirements. On the other hand, the EGX listed companies achieved the lowest levels of 
compliance with sub-index 16 (IAS 33: Earnings per Share), with an average compliance 
level of 31%. On the level of the ASE also, the average level of compliance with this 
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standard’s requirements was low (37%). Such low compliance levels are explained by the 
preference for secrecy and lack of awareness among different parties concerning the 
importance of compliance with all of the requirements of this standard for improving 
transparency. In respect of sub-index 10 (IAS 21:The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates), the ASE-listed companies showed the lowest average level of compliance, 
with a gap in evidence between Egypt and Jordan (97% and 19% respectively). The low 
compliance level was mainly attributed to the impact of the inadequate qualification of 
accounting practitioners and the non-existence of an official Arabic translation of the IFRSs 
in Jordan.  
4. The analysis of compliance levels with individual disclosure items (section 6.2.3) revealed 
some similarities between the Egyptian and Jordanian management attitudes with respect to 
compliance with many of disclosure requirements. It was recognised that in most cases of 
Jordanian non-compliance, the shortage of competent qualified accountants was cited as the 
reason. However, in broad terms progress is evident in compliance levels with some IFRSs 
disclosure requirements that have been reported as not complied with in previous studies 
investigating the two stock exchanges on the individual country level (e.g., Abd-Elsalam, 
1999; Omar, 2007). This may be attributed to the improved awareness among managements 
of listed companies regarding the importance of compliance with these items (i.e., compliance 
with these items has become embedded within the disclosure sub-cultural values), improved 
familiarity with respect to their proper application, and the improved monitoring of these 
items by the regulatory bodies in the two stock exchanges. One example is the disclosure of 
the capitalisation rate used to determine the amount of borrowing costs eligible for 
capitalisation (item 201) which achieved 98% and 83% compliance by companies listed on 
the EGX and ASE respectively compared to 79% in Abd-Elsalam (1999) and 33% in Omar 
(2007).  
 
The results of testing for significant statistical differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian 
contexts (section 6.4), in connection with the first research hypothesis promulgated the existence of 
significant statistical differences between the Egyptian and the Jordanian contexts in the overall 
level of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements (dependent variable). In 
addition, the results showed that there are statistically significant differences between companies 
listed on the EGX and those listed on the ASE with respect to all test and control variables except 
government ownership ratio. Based on this finding the univariate and multivariate analyses were 
carried out on individual country level. 
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The univariate and multivariate analyses (sections 6.5, 6.6) to assess the association between 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance test variables 
(board leadership, board independence, board size, government ownership, management 
ownership, private ownership and public ownership) and control variables (company size, 
profitability, gearing, liquidity, type of business activity and type of audit firm) revealed the 
following: 
1. On the level of the Egyptian context, the findings of the univariate and multivariate analyses 
implied that compliance behaviour with the overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements 
by companies listed on the EGX do not follow any pattern in relation to any of the 
independent variables employed in this study. This may be due to the novelty of corporate 
governance and the lack of awareness about the importance and the advantages of complete 
de facto compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance best 
practices in the Egyptian context. On the other hand, the non-existence of an association 
between compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on 
the EGX and any of the corporate attributes employed as control variables following prior 
research that proved their influence on compliance behaviour by companies listed on the EGX 
(company size, profitability, gearing, liquidity, type of business activity and type of auditor), 
is to some extent a good sign that generally all companies listed on the EGX are now similar 
in their attitude towards compliance with many mandatory disclosure requirements (i.e., they 
are now part of disclosure culture of all companies listed on the EGX). Consequently, it can 
also be concluded that, non-compliance with some requirements, hence current gap between 
de facto and de jure compliance with overall IFRSs disclosure requirements is most likely 
influenced by the existence of some factors mainly related to the secretive culture that is 
dominant in the Egyptian context. 
 
2. On the level of the Jordanian context, the univariate analysis revealed that public ownership 
has a significant negative relationship with the level of compliance with overall mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. Also, univariate analysis revealed 
that companies audited by big 4 audit firms comply better with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
than those audited by non-big 4 audit firms. These findings were confirmed by multivariate 
analysis which also revealed that company size has a significant positive association with 
compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements in the Jordanian context. 
Regression analysis revealed that 24.5% of the variation in the total disclosure index (overall 
compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements) in the Jordanian context is 
explained by the type of auditor, public ownership ratio and firm size. 
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3. Overall the findings of the univariate and multivariate analysis in both of scrutinised stock 
exchanges revealed that the impact of corporate governance best practice mechanisms is 
absent in both of scrutinised stock exchanges. Corporate governance codes for best practice 
were initiated in developed countries and only recently introduced in scrutinised MENA ones. 
Hence, its contribution towards enhancing capital market performance in such countries is 
subject to the extent to which the conditions for robust governance practice are consistent 
with the existing values and the needs of all parties involved in the financial reporting process. 
It is expected, therefore, to be some time before the impact of applying corporate governance 
can be measured in scrutinised contexts as this needs to develop, and favourable attitude and 
belief must be formed as well as efforts being made to develop the human resource 
capabilities that believe in and able to materially apply corporate governance requirements for 
best practice. Currently, there may be other factors that strongly influence attitudes to 
transparency in emerging MENA stock exchanges. These may not be easily quantifiable and 
testable using statistical models. This proposition is supported by the interviewee responses 
(section 7.4). Additionally, the efforts of stock market regulatory bodies are insufficient to 
close the gap between de jure and de facto compliance in the two stock exchanges.  Hence, it 
is expected that as national cultural values are developed to recognise the importance of 
compliance with IFRSs as is the case in developed countries where such standards originated, 
and as the qualification levels of the monitoring staff of the CMA and JSC and of accounting 
practitioners particularly in the Jordanian context improve, strictness of enforcement of 
mandatory disclosure requirements enhanced, so too will the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements.  
 
4. The results of this study support the existence of similarities between two emerging MENA 
stock exchanges (EGX and ASE) in terms of their reaction to the introduction of corporate 
governance mechanisms that are recommended by the OECD principles for corporate 
governance best practice. However, still both stock exchanges are not totally homogeneous; 
hence it can be argued that generalising the results of one developing country to others is not 
completely accurate.  
 
Table 8.1 summarises the results of the univariate and multivariate analyses concerning the 
variables influencing levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in each of the 
scrutinised contexts. 
 
 
 
 
236 
Table 8.1: Variables Influencing Levels of Compliance with Overall Mandatory IFRSs Disclosure 
Requirements in Egypt and Jordan  
 
 
Analysis Egypt Jordan 
H2: BOD Independence (Neutral Association) 
Univariate √ √ 
Multivariate √ √ 
H3:Board Leadership (Neutral Association) 
Univariate √ √ 
Multivariate √ √ 
H3:Board Size (Neutral Association) 
Univariate √ √ 
Multivariate √ √ 
H5a:Government Ownership  (Neutral Association) 
Univariate √ √ 
Multivariate √ √ 
H5b:Managaement Ownership  (Negative Association) 
Univariate X X 
Multivariate X X 
H5c:Private Ownership  (Neutral Association) 
Univariate √ √ 
Multivariate √ √ 
H5d:Public Ownership  (Neutral Association) 
Univariate √ X 
Multivariate 
√ 
 
 
X 
Control Variables 
 
Firm Size (Sig.+) 
Univariate X  X 
Multivariate X √ 
Profitablility (Sig.+ or -) 
Univariate X X 
Multivariate X X 
Gearing (Sig.+ or -) 
Univariate X X 
Multivariate X X 
Liquidity (Sig.+ or -) 
Univariate X X 
Multivariate X X 
Type of Business (Sig. + or -) 
Univariate X X 
Multivariate X X 
Type of Auditor (Sig.+ if Big 4) 
Univariate X √ 
Multivariate X √ 
√ Research hypothesis is supported 
X Research hypothesis is not supported 
 
 
The interviews conducted with different parties affecting and being affected by financial disclosure 
practices in scrutinised stock exchanges supported the quantitative research findings and the 
applicability of the proposed theoretical foundation (see Chapter Seven). The interviewees pointed 
out to the negative impact of low non-compliance costs, low demand for more disclosures by 
investors, inadequate qualification of accounting practitioners and of compliance monitoring staff. 
They also highlighted the negative influence of management resistance to transparency and the 
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irrelevance of some IFRSs requirements to the economic development stage of the scrutinised 
MENA emerging exchanges. 
 
Finally, with respect to the applicability of the proposed theoretical framework to the scrutinised 
contexts, it can be assessed in relation to the following considerations: 
 
• Firstly, whether the extent of de facto compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
shows that the gap between de facto and de jure compliance is closed. 
• Secondly, the interpretation of the findings of the analysis of the association between 
independent variables and levels of compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements.  
• Thirdly, the link between the notions of the proposed theoretical foundation and interview 
results. 
 
The analysis of the 150 annual reports of companies listed on the EGX and the ASE  to assess the 
extent of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements (Section 6.2) supported the notions of  
the institutional isomorphism theory, Gray’s (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, agency theory, 
and cost-benefit analysis. In addition, the proposed theoretical foundation competently supported 
the interpretation of the findings of the statistical analyses of the association between levels of 
compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance structures of companies 
listed on the EGX and the ASE. Moreover, the interviewee responses supported the notions of the 
proposed theoretical framework (see Section 7.6). 
The research findings are consistent with the institutional isomorphism theory as both MENA 
jurisdictions mandated the adoption of IFRSs under pressures from the international institutions to 
gain their legitimacy and respect without giving enough consideration to the importance of 
preparation of their markets by developing the national cultural values to perceive the importance 
of compliance with the IFRSs in the same way as it is perceived in developed countries where such 
standards were initially developed. Thus as long as all parties involved in the financial reporting 
process are not aware about the importance of transparency and de facto compliance with corporate 
governance and accounting international best practices and as public investors are not aware about 
the disclosures that must be made and they do not put any pressures on BOD or management to 
improve compliance with the IFRSs, it is impossible to close the gap between de facto and de jure 
compliance with  IFRSs disclosure requirements in the scrutinised contexts. 
This is also consistent with Gray (1988) accounting sub-cultural model, as secretive culture of 
MENA societies is associated with strong uncertainty avoidance that results from the need to 
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restrict information disclosure, so as to avoid conflict and competition and to preserve security. 
Secrecy is also associated with large power distance which results in the restriction of information 
to preserve power inequalities. On the other side, this lends support to the agency theory, as 
government, private and management stockholders are in a position to get access to all company 
information they need and as public investors do not demand more compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements and do not put any pressures on BOD or management to improve 
compliance, hence monitoring costs will be low. This in turn will reduce management incentives to 
fully comply with IFRSs disclosure requirements. In addition, this result is consistent with the 
notions of cost-benefit analysis as weak enforcement of IFRSs disclosure requirements and weak 
sanctions if any cause non-compliance costs to be less than compliance costs for companies listed 
on the scrutinised MENA stock exchanges, thus direct management incentives toward non-
compliance. All of this contribute to the problem of decoupling as companies listed on the 
scrutinised MENA stock exchanges state that they prepare their financial statements in accordance 
with the IFRSs, while none of them fully complies with those requirements. 
 
8.3 Study Contribution 
 
The contributions of this study can be summarised as follows: 
1. The capital markets under scrutiny have been early mandatory adopters of IFRSs, implying 
that their companies have considerable experience with the use of IFRSs on a mandatory 
rather than on a voluntary basis. This is expected to add to the compliance literature since 
most previous IFRSs/IASs compliance studies scrutinised developed jurisdictions that apply 
IFRSs on a voluntary basis. 
2. This study is one of the first, if not the first comparative study to investigate the influence of 
corporate governance structures on de facto compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
between two leading MENA emerging capital markets that witnessed a change in the 
ownership structures of companies listed on their stock exchanges as a result of privatising 
government owned enterprises, and introduced corporate governance mechanisms that are 
based on the OECD corporate governance principles as a means to enhance transparency 
and disclosure by empowering boards to enable them to carry out effective monitoring of 
management behaviour.  
3. This study provides recent evidence on the theoretical foundation of financial disclosure 
practices in the MENA region in addition to being the first to employ the notions of the 
institutional isomorphism in explaining the influence of corporate governance structures on 
compliance levels in Egypt and Jordan.  
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4. The disclosure index used in this study to the best of the researcher's knowledge is the first 
to scrutinise compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements within the scrutinised 
countries based on IFRSs disclosure requirements for the fiscal year beginning 1 January, 
2007. Consequently, this study extends that of Al-Akra et al. (2010a) that investigates the 
influence of accounting disclosure regulation, governance reforms and ownership changes, 
resulting from privatisation, on the levels of compliance with mandatory disclosures under 
IFRSs in Jordan in 1996 and 2004 respectively, by using more recent data, recognising the 
amendments to the disclosure requirements in 2007 and comparing the results with those of 
another leading MENA stock exchange. Furthermore, this study to the best of the 
researcher's knowledge is the first to investigate the impact of board leadership on the levels 
of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Jordan and the first to investigate the 
association between corporate governance structures and the levels of compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements in Egypt. The content of the disclosure index was refined to 
enable an objective comparison of compliance levels with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
between the group of companies listed on the EGX and those listed on the ASE. 
Furthermore, the disclosure index was divided into 20 sub-indices measuring compliance 
levels with disclosure requirements under each IFRS. Hence, this is expected to improve the 
objectivity of the comparison among the scrutinised countries as well as among companies 
within the same country. Consequently, this disclosure checklist represents advancement on 
the majority of disclosure checklists applied in other studies, which are organised by topic. 
5. The use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods to triangulate the data, and a 
well developed theoretical foundation, presents a methodological extension to research in 
comparative accounting disclosure practices in emerging capital markets in general and in 
the MENA region in particular and helps to answer the question with respect to the 
possibility of generalising the findings of one developing country to others. 
6. The results of the study have provided evidence on the applicability of theories originated in 
the developed context to the MENA emerging capital markets. This provides a better 
understanding not only of mandatory disclosure practices in the MENA context but also of 
the factors that affect it. This encourages the use of the proposed theoretical framework in 
explaining disclosure practices in other developing contexts.  
7. This study rovides an overview of the perceptions of different parties involved in the 
financail reporting process in Egypt and Jordan regarding the barriers to full compliance 
with IFRSs and the impact of corporate governance structures on compliance behaviour of 
publicly listed companies.  
8. Identifying the effect of different corporate governance variables on the extent of 
compliance with IFRSs will enhance knowledge about the level of awareness of the 
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importance of de facto compliance with corporate governance best practice among different 
parties involved in the financial reporting process in the MENA region. Hence, this study 
provides timely findings to different stakeholders concerned with achieving de facto 
compliance with international best practices in the MENA region. 
 
8.4 Implications of Research Findings 
The results from this study provide evidence of de jure but not de facto compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements by companies listed on the EGX and ASE. This was explained by the 
existence of barriers to compliance with IFRSs. These barriers are mainly related to a societal 
preference for secrecy, weak enforcement of IFRSs by capital market regulatory bodies, and low 
sanctions, if any. Furthermore, as indicated by interviewees, the inadequate qualification of the 
CMA and JSC monitoring staff stands as a major obstacle. It was also argued that for companies 
listed on the ASE, the shortage of qualified accountants is a principal problem. 
  
Building on the above discussion, a number of political and theoretical implications can be 
formulated. 
 
8.4.1 Policy Implications 
There are implications of the research findings for the IASB, OECD, CMA, JSC and big 4 audit 
firms. 
  
8.4.1.1 International Accounting Standard Board and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
Almost all MENA countries mandated the adoption of IFRSs to gain legitimacy and respect from 
the international community. Most took this step without preparing the different parties involved in 
the financial reporting process to accept the importance of compliance with the requirements of 
those standards in the same way as they are accepted by their counterparts in developed countries 
where those standards originated. Thus, the IASB should give more attention to the issue of de 
facto compliance with IFRSs in developing countries. This can be achieved by allowing more 
developing countries to gain membership of the IASB and by issuing a formal translation of the 
IFRSs in Arabic, which will eliminate the possibility of mistranslation and misinterpretation. 
 
The IASB should conduct workshops and training programmes to familiarise the IFRSs compliance 
monitoring staff at emerging stock exchanges (e.g., MENA stock exchanges) with the IFRSs 
updates and their technical application. Likewise, it is also important to ensure that these staff 
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accept the importance of compliance with such requirements in the same way as their counterparts 
in developed stock exchanges. It is crucial to develop a culture of compliance among those who are 
charged with enforcing IFRSs.  
 
Furthermore, a committee from the IASB to check the quality of monitoring staff in different 
developing stock exchanges is necessary to create an element of competition and hence encourage a 
closing of the gap between de jure and de facto compliance with IFRSs requirements in such stock 
exchanges. 
 
On the other hand, given the leading role of the OECD in spreading awareness and sponsoring the 
development of corporate governance reforms and codes that cope with the OECD corporate 
governance principles in many of the developing countries allover the world, including MENA 
countries, the OECD should reassess the applicability of its principles to such countries. This 
argument is supported by the findings of the international reports that reveal a de jure but not a de 
facto compliance with the requirements for good corporate governance best practice under the 
OECD principles. Furthermore, research evidence on the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in developing countries is not as 
strong as expected. Consequently, the OECD should think about the appropriate strategies that can 
foster the recognition of corporate governance mechanisms in practice. They should carry out more 
training programmes to capital market staff and members of the boards of directors and managers 
of listed companies to make sure that corporate governance best practices, are becoming part of 
their cultural values. They also should support a campaign to increase the awareness of the public 
regarding the importance of corporate governance and how best it can be achieved. 
 
8.4.1.2 Stock Exchange Regulatory Bodies 
The interviewees highlighted the lack of adequate qualification of IFRSs compliance monitoring 
staff in the CMA and JSC. In Jordan, this can be explained by the general shortage of qualified 
accounting practitioners which is the main barrier to quality financial reporting in the country, as 
stated by interviewees.  However, in Egypt it may be explained by the low salaries paid to the 
CMA monitoring staff which renders such a position unattractive to qualified personnel. This 
implies the need to recruit qualified personnel in the CMA by improving the payment scheme, and 
to recruit qualified foreign personnel in the JSC which also requires the payment of higher salaries 
to attract them.   
 
242 
The CMA in Egypt and JSC in Jordan should issue a detailed official disclosure checklist in 
Arabic 44 , which should be updated periodically to reflect changes in IFRSs requirements. 
Additionally, they should organise workshops for the CMA and JSC monitoring staff and 
accountants of listed companies to familiarise them with IFRSs updates and their proper application. 
They should also arrange workshops for managements of listed companies to ensure greater 
awareness of the importance of full compliance with each disclosure item even if items are 
perceived as too detailed or open to misuse by competitors. The importance of transparency must 
be instilled within all parties to the financial reporting process. 
 
The CMA in Egypt and JSC in Jordan should also be more stringent in imposing sanctions on non-
compliant companies. This is expected to help to close the gap between de facto and de jure 
compliance with IFRSs requirements. Simultaneously, the capital market regulators should monitor 
the performance of auditors by providing them with mandatory IFRSs requirements and other 
mandatory regulations periodically. They should also impose sanctions on audit firms which issue 
unqualified audit reports for companies which do not comply with mandatory IFRSs requirements.  
 
The results showed limited impact of good corporate governance practices on compliance with 
IFRSs disclosure requirements in Egypt and in Jordan, although they were recognised. This reveals 
the existence of another gap between de facto and de jure compliance with corporate gvernance 
best practice. De facto compliance requires the creation of a cultural change which takes time as it 
involves an evolution of national values and behaviours. Training, education and awareness 
building about the importance and relevance of a governance culture among regulators, 
management of listed companies, and other stakeholders is essential to develop such a culture in the 
MENA region. 
 
The unexpected negative impact of the dominance of public ownership on levels of compliance 
with IFRSs disclosure requirements in Jordan raises the need to develop awareness among small 
investors about their rights and how to exercise these. Additionally, they should be aware of what 
information must be disclosed, and of their entitlement to pressure the BOD and management to 
comply with disclosure requirements and improve transparency. Hence, the ASE and the EGX 
should launch a media campaign to educate small investors.  
 
Finally, the CMA and JSC should obligate listed companies to make their complete annual reports 
and details of their corporate governance structures available to the public in Arabic and in English. 
                                                          
44 In Egypt the CMA has a disclosure checklist which is supposed to be followed by listed companies, but it is neither 
detailed nor updated on a regular basis. 
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The enhancement of transparency and commitment is essential to develop the performance and 
reputation of MENA stock exchanges. 
 
8.4.1.3 Big 4 Audit Firms 
The majority of companies listed on the EGX and ASE are audited by affiliates of big 4 audit firms, 
and the issuance of unqualified audit reports for companies that do not fully comply with IFRSs 
raises the need to reconsider the quality of the audit work performed by these affiliates. 
Undoubtedly, the big 4 audit firms should give more attention to the qualification of auditors 
appointed in their affiliates in developing markets. Furthermore, they should monitor the quality 
and credibility of audit reports issued by these affiliates. 
 
8.5 Theoretical Implications 
The results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses supported the applicability of the notions of 
the proposed theoretical foundation (the institutional isomorphism, Gray's (1988) secrecy versus 
transparency accounting sub-cultural value, agency theory and cost-benefit analysis), all of which 
originated in the developed capital markets, to the emerging MENA stock exchanges examined in 
this study. This raises the need to explore the applicability of the proposed theoretical foundation to 
other developing contexts. This is justified on the grounds that developing societies are 
characterised by preference for secrecy which is associated with strong uncertainty avoidance, 
collectivism and large power distance which results in restriction of information to preserve power 
inequalities. Consequently, recognition of the impact of secrecy is expected to help in interpreting 
mandatory disclosure practices within developing contexts. With respect to the agency theory, as in 
most of the developing countries, there is a lack of separation between ownership and control, 
major stockholders have access to all company information and naïve investors do not put any 
pressures on BOD or management to improve disclosures, monitoring costs are low, so 
management will not be incentivised to fully comply with IFRSs disclosure requirements. 
Furthermore, as in most of the developing countries enforcement of regulations is not as effective 
as in developed countries, non-compliance costs are lower than compliance costs. This in turn 
adversely impacts compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements. Finally, with respect to the 
institutional isomorphism, decoupling problem is clear in many of developing countries. Although 
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the first glance may show that such countries adopt all forms of institutional isomorphism wheras 
formal structures and systems are harmonised with the international best practices, the existence of 
a gap between de facto and de jure compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements shows that 
the adopted formal structures and systems may be a window dressing to impress external 
communities such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund  in order to gain  
legitimacy as well as their financial and political support. This raises the need to consider the 
influence of the cultural context within developing countries as de facto compliance should be seen 
as the outcome of the interaction between cultural context and institutional pressures. 
 
8.6 Limitations 
1. There was a difficulty in obtaining the annual reports and corporate governance information 
for all of non-financial companies listed on the EGX and ASE at the time of commencing this 
study (2008). The study intended to investigate the annual reports for the fiscal year ending 
31 December, 2007, for the entire population of non-financial companies listed on scrutinised 
exchanges (a total of 311 companies -145 from Egypt and 166 from Jordan), but the 
unavailability of complete annual reports and/or corporate governance structure-related 
information for all listed companies at the time of collecting the data for this study (the 
beginning of 2009), reduced the final sample to 150 companies. The difficulty of collecting 
research data is a common problem in developing countries (e.g., Wallace, 1998; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Hassan, 2006; Omar, 2007), and provided a major reason for not conducting a 
longitudinal study. However, this issue is relatively solved in Jordan since the second half of 
2009, as the ASE began to provide the annual reports of publicly listed companies on its 
website. Annual reports for almost all companies listed on the ASE for the years 2009 and 
2010 are available which saves time, effort and costs for carrying out future research.   
2. The construction of the disclosure index and the assigning of scores incorporate some degree 
of researcher subjectivity. Additionally, the accuracy of scoring may be affected by the 
availability of annual reports in Arabic and the use of different Arabic vocabulary by 
Egyptian and Jordanian companies. However as indicated in section 5.5.1, every possible 
effort was made to reduce subjectivity by following the procedures recommended by prior 
researchers. These included ascertaining the validity and reliability of the disclosure index 
and those of the disclosure scores as well as the researcher competency in Arabic. 
3. The study investigated the association between levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements and corporate governance related variables in only two MENA stock exchanges. 
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However, as indicated in Section 1.2 the choice of Egypt and Jordan is justified as leading 
MENA exchanges that although non-oil exporters as GCC member countries, they achieved 
extraordinary economic progress in 2007 and are working on developing their stock 
exchanges to be the main vehicle for economic development for their future generations. 
Furthermore, this choice is made in the light of time and cost considerations for carrying out 
this study. 
4. The regression model developed failed to report any results on the level of the Egyptian 
context (i.e., the compliance behaviour by companies listed on the EGX did not follow any 
pattern in relation to the variables under study), however it reported an adjusted R2 of 24.5% 
on the level of the Jordanian context. This implies that the 13 variables included in the model 
were not able to explain the variation in the levels of compliance with total disclosure index 
in the Egyptian context (compliance with the overall mandatory IFRSs disclosure 
requirements), however they explained 24.5% of such variation in the Jordanian context. Thus, 
the unexplained variation may be attributable to factors that cannot be easily quantified and 
tested using statistical models. This raises the need to reconsider the development of a model 
with a higher explanatory power to capture the variation in overall compliance based on the 
interview findings, which revealed some other factors, mainly related to the cultural context 
and technical difficulties, as determinants of overall levels of compliance.  
5. The interviews were conducted in Arabic and the transcripts subsequently translated into 
English. Translation may not give the exact meaning as some words in one language may not 
have equivalents in the other language. To reduce the potential subjectivity resulting from 
translation the researcher gave considerable time to the translation process to ensure an 
English version that conveys the exact meaning, and asked a linguistic specialist to review her 
work to ensure its validity. 
 
8.7 Future Research 
1. This study investigated compliance with mandatory IFRSs disclosure requirements using 
the annual reports in two leading MENA stock exchanges and hence, future research 
may investigate disclosures in quarterly and interim reports among a number of 
countries. This can help in ascertaining the possibility of generalising the findings of one 
developing country to others. 
2. This study investigated the association between corporate governance structures and 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements for a single year. Future 
longitudinal research is needed to extend the current study to a longer period of time and 
to explore the progress in the explanatory power of corporate governance-related 
variables over a number of years. 
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3. This study investigated the association between corporate governance structures and 
levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements in two of the MENA region 
stock exchanges (the EGX and the ASE). Consequently, it will be interesting to replicate 
the study using a larger number of MENA stock exchanges to determine whether they 
are homogeneous. Additionally, it will be interesting to further investigate the extent to 
which the findings on the level of one country are statistically different from those 
related to other countries by introducing country as a dummy variable, and interacting 
this dummy with all test and control variables. Such studies would contribute to the 
literature on comparative international accounting. 
4. This study investigated the association between the extent of compliance with mandatory 
IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance structures. Future research can 
investigate the association between levels of compliance with IFRSs measurement 
requirements and corporate governance structures to get a complete picture regarding the 
association between corporate governance structures and levels of compliance with all 
requirements under IFRSs. Additionally, an examination of the association between 
corporate governance structures and voluntary disclosure practices among MENA region 
emerging stock exchanges, would be valuable in order to put hands on the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on disclosure practices in the MENA context and 
whether such influence is the same among different MENA countries.  
5. This study employed an unweighted disclosure index. The use of a weighted disclosure 
index to assess the importance of each item from the perspective of a specific user group 
(e.g., foreign investors, international financial analysts), could be adopted in a future 
research, and the outcomes compared with the results of this study to ascertain the 
impact of the type of the disclosure index (weighted versus unweighted) on the research 
findings. 
6. An investigation of the association between levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements by companies listed on different MENA stock exchanges and stock prices 
or dividends policy in those companies is also worthwhile to determine the economic 
consequences of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Attracting more 
investors is expected to reduce the cost of capital for listed companies. Furthermore, 
using the disclosure index construction approach employed in this study will enable the 
relationship between the level of compliance with each IFRS and stock prices to be 
established. 
7. An investigatation of the association between levels of compliance with IFRSs by 
companies listed on emerging exchanges and the type of audit report would also be an 
interesting topic for a longitudinal research as it will enable the examination of the 
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quality of audit work performed in emerging MENA exchanges. Furthermore, although 
the impact of the existence of an audit committee on the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements has been examined by Al-Akra et al. (2010a) in Jordan and by 
Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) in Kuwait,  investigating such issue among a number of 
developing countries will enrich emerging capital markets' comparative research as audit 
committee is one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring 
internal control within business firms hence the existence of an audit committee is 
supposed to improve compliance practices. 
8. An assessment of the levels of compliance with IFRSs and their association with 
corporate governance best practice after the recent 2011 revolutions in several MENA 
region countries, and a comparison of those findings with those relating to periods before 
these revolutions would also be a worthwhile topic for future research to scrutinise the 
progress in enforcement of laws and the developments in transparency practices, 
indicating the aspirations of the countries involved in respect of economic development. 
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Appendix 1: Empirical Financial Disclosure Studies 
 
The following table summarises prior empirical research related to financial disclosure practices. 
Studies are classified into three groups; single developed capital market studies, single developing 
capital market studies and cross-national comparative capital market studies. For each study, it is 
indicated whether it scrutinises mandatory, voluntary or an aggregate disclosure, whether it applies 
a weighted or un-weighted disclosure index, the explanatory variables used if any and the main 
findings. 
 
Study 
(year) Country Sample 
Disclosure 
Index 
Type of 
Disclosure 
Independent 
Variables Findings 
I. Single Developed Capital Market Studies 
Cerf (1961) USA 
527 randomly 
selected sample of 
US companies 
whose shares traded 
on the NYSE, an 
exchange other than 
the NYSE, or OTC. 
Weighted (31 
items) Aggregate 
Asset size 
Rate of return 
Number of 
shareholders 
Listing status 
Companies listed on New York Stock 
Exchange disclose significantly more 
information than non-listed companies. 
Positive relationship between extent of 
disclosure and company size, profitability 
and number of shareholders 
Asset size is the main explanatory 
variable of corporate financial disclosure 
Singhvi & 
Desai 
(1971) 
USA 
100 listed 
55 Unlisted for the 
year 1965 
Weighted (34 
items, 28 of 
them derived 
from Cerf, 
1961) 
Aggregate 
Asset size 
Number of 
shareholders 
Listing status 
Audit firm (CPA 
firms) 
Rate of return 
Earnings margin 
Positive relationship between the extent of 
financial disclosure and each of the 
identified company characteristics. 
Buzby 
(1975) USA 
44 pairs of 
companies listed 
and unlisted during 
the period 
from1970 to1972 
Weighted (39 
items) Aggregate 
Firm size 
Listing status 
Positive relationship between extent of 
financial disclosure and firm size and no 
association between financial disclosure 
and listing status. 
Stanga 
(1976) USA 
80 listed companies 
(1972-1973) 
Weighted (79 
items) Aggregate  
Firm size 
Industry type 
Aggregate disclosure is on average 
45.32%. 
Only industry type is a significant 
explanatory variable. 
Belkaoui & 
Kahl (1978) Canada 
200 non-financial 
companies 
Weighted (30 
items) Aggregate 
Asset size 
Sales size 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Capitalisation ratio 
Financial disclosure is positively 
associated with company size and 
liquidity. 
There is a negative association between 
financial disclosure and both 
capitalisation rate and profitability 
Firth (1979) UK 
180 (40 listed 
paired with 40 
unlisted and 100 
listed on London 
Stock Exchange) 
(annual reports for 
the year 1976). 
Weighted (48 
items) Aggregate 
Company size (sales 
turnover and capital 
employed); share 
listing and the 
auditor type. 
positive association between company 
size; listing status and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Auditor type is insignificant. 
Firth (1980) UK 
Three samples of 
companies were 
used: 40 new 
issues; 62 rights 
issues made by 
smaller size 
companies (market 
capitalisation below 
£50 million); and 
37 rights issues 
made by larger 
companies (market 
capitalisation of 
£50 million or 
over). Companies 
in each group were 
Weighted (48 
items) 
 
Aggregate Company size 
while there was no significant difference 
in the extent of disclosure between the 
new issues and their control group three 
years before raising capital, there was a 
significant difference between the two 
groups immediately after raising capital. 
Similar results were also reported for the 
rights issues made by smaller companies. 
As for the rights issues made by larger 
companies, it was found that there was no 
significant difference in the extent of 
disclosure between this group and its 
control, whether this was three years 
before or immediately after raising 
capital. 
Larger companies had less scope for 
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matched with a 
control group 
which did not raise 
new capital on the 
basis of size and 
similarity of 
industry. 
disclosure 
improvement since they go to the market 
frequently and already have high levels of 
disclosure.  
McNally et 
al. (1982) 
New 
Zealand 
103 annual reports 
of industerial listed 
companies between 
(1974-1979). 
Weight d 
(41voluntary 
items 
weighted by 
financial 
editors and 
stock 
exchange 
members) 
Voluntary 
 
Company size 
Rate of return 
Growth 
Auditing firm 
Industry groups. 
-The level of voluntary disclosure was 
very low. 
Only 50% of the 41 items included in the 
index were  disclosed by 10 companies. 
Size was found to be the only significant 
variable. 
-The remaining explanatory variables are 
insignificant. 
There is a considerable disagreement 
between disclosure practices and the 
importance perceived by users 
Cooke 
(1989a) Sweden 
90 (33 listed and 38 
unlisted and 19 
listed in Sweden 
Stock Exchange 
with at least one 
foreign quotation) 
for the year 1985. 
Unweighted 
(224 items).71 
mandatory 
115 voluntary 
32 social 
responsibility 
 
 
Aggregate 
 
Quotation status; 
company size (total 
assets, sales and 
number of 
shareholders) 
Industry type and 
parent company 
relationship 
Average of financial disclosure is 51.27%. 
Low level of disclosure for some areas in 
the balance sheet and income statement 
(e. g. leased property, provision for 
doubtful debts and cost of goods sold). 
High level of disclosure about acquiring 
and disposing of business . Consequently, 
disclosure is extensive in consolidated 
accounts. 
Only 7% of the companies disclose 
information about research and 
developments. 
Deferred taxes are rarely recognised. 
Inventory information is highly disclosed. 
70% of companies disclose information 
about methods and rates of depreciation 
and 6% do not disclose any information 
about depreciation. 
60% of disclosure is explained by the 
independent variables 
Only listing status and company size are 
significant 
Cooke 
(1989b) Sweden 
90 (33 listed and 38 
unlisted and 19 
listed in Sweden 
Stock Exchange 
with at least one 
foreign quotation) 
for the year 1985. 
Unweighted 
(146 items). Voluntary 
Listing status 
Industry type 
Firm size 
Parent company 
relationship 
-On average extent of voluntary 
disclosure is 36.67% 
-Only listing status, firm size and industry 
type are significant. 
Cooke 
(1991) Japan 
48 (25 listed and 13 
unlisted on Tokyo 
Stock Exchange 
and 10  listed on 
TSE as well as on 
other international 
stock markets) 
(annual reports for  
1988). 
Unweighted 
(106 items). Voluntary 
company size (total 
assets, number of 
shareholders, and 
turnover), listing 
status and 
industry type. 
Company size, listing status and industry 
type, were positively associated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
Cooke 
(1992) Japan 
35 (1988 annual 
reports) 
Unweighted 
(165 items; 89 
mandatory and 
76 voluntary) 
Mandatoty 
Voluntary 
Company size (8 
measures), listing 
status 
(domestic/internatio
nal) and industry 
type 
On average extent of financial disclosure 
is 55.8% 
60% of disclosure variation explained by 
independent variables. 
Large companies, multi-listed companies 
and manufacturing companies disclose 
more information 
Cooke 
(1993) 
Japan 
(Tokyo 
Stock 
Exchange) 
48 companies (15 
listed,10 multiply 
listed, 13 unlisted) 
(annual reports for 
1988) 
Unweighted 
(195 items; 
106 voluntary 
and 89 
mandatory) 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Listing status 
(listed/unlisted/multi
ply listed) 
Multiply listed companies disclose more 
voluntary information than others) 
Malone et 
al. (1993) USA 
125 American oil 
and gas companies 
(41 listed and 84 
unlisted)(annual 
reports for 1986) 
Weighted (129 
items) 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Debt/equity ratio; 
number of 
shareholders; total 
assets; industry type; 
rate of return; 
earning margin; 
audit company; 
listing status; foreign 
operations; and 
proportion of outside 
directors 
29% of disclosure variation explained by 
independent variables. 
-There was a significant and positive 
relationship between the level of financial 
disclosure and listing status, debt/equity 
ratio and number of share holders. 
-There is no relationship between 
financial disclosure and other company 
characteristics. 
 
 
 
272 
Wallace et 
al. (1994) Spain 
50 non-financial 
listed and unlisted 
companies (30 
listed and 20 
unlisted) in 1991. 
Weighted (16 
key mandatory 
items) 
Mandatory 
Structure related 
variables which 
included: company 
size (measured by 
total assets, and total 
sales), gearing 
(measured as 
debt\equity ratio); 
secondly, 
performance-related 
variables 
which included the 
liquidity ratio 
(measured as 
earnings return, and 
profit margin); 
finally market-
related variables 
which included 
industry type, listing 
status, and audit 
type. 
-65% of variation in the level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements is explained by independent 
variable. 
On average extent of compliance with 
disclosure requirements is 59.26%. 
-Asset 
size and listing status are positively 
associated with mandatory disclosure. 
-Liquidity is negatively 
Associated with the level of mandatory 
disclosure in Spain. 
No association is reprted between 
disclosure and the remaining variables. 
Hossain et 
al. (1995) 
New 
Zealand 
40 companies listed 
in New Zealand 
Stock Exchange 
with 15companies  
of them are also 
listed on Overseas 
Stock Exchanges 
for the year 1991 
Unweighted 
(95 voluntary 
items) 
Voluntary 
Firm size 
Foreign listing status 
Leverage 
Proportion of assets 
in place 
Audit firm type 
On average extent of voluntary disclosure 
is 18% 
Voluntary disclosure is significantly 
associated with firm size,  foreign listing 
status and leverage and not associated 
with the remaining variables 
Raffournier 
(1995) 
Switzerlan
d 
161 listed 
companies (annual 
reports of 1991) 
Unweighted 
(30 voluntary 
items) 
Voluntary 
Company size (total 
assets, total sales), 
Leverage 
(Debt/assets), 
Profitability (net 
profit/ equity), 
Ownership structure, 
Internationality 
level, 
Auditor size, 
Percentage of fixed 
assets, and Industry 
type. 
-The extent of disclosure has been found 
significantly related to size, 
internationality level, percentage of fixed 
assets, size of auditing firms and, to a 
smaller extent, to industry type and 
profitability. Inversely, no significant 
relationship was found for leverage and 
ownership diffusion. 
When examined simultaneously, the only 
significant variables were size and 
internationality. High correlations 
between size and other variables suggest 
that size serves as a proxy for several 
influences. 
 Size and internationality play a major 
role in the disclosure policy of firms, large 
and internationally diversified companies 
tending to disclose more information than 
small purely domestic enterprises. 
Company size measured as log of sales 
and level of internationality, were 
significant. percentage of fixed assets, 
size of auditors were significantly 
associated with level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
-less significant association appeared with 
industry type and profitability. 
-Leverage and the ownership structure 
were statistically insignificant. 
Inchausti 
(1997) Spain 
49 companies (for 
1989),47 
companies (for 
1990) and 42 
companies (for 
1991). 
Unweighted 
(50 items; 30 
mandatory and 
the remaining 
are voluntary) 
Aggregate 
Company size (total 
assets and sales); 
stock exchange cross 
listing; profitability, 
leverage, auditing 
firm, industry type 
and dividend policy. 
-43% of the differences in financial 
disclosure among sampled companies is 
explained by independent variables. 
-There is a signicant positive relationship 
between the level of financial disclosure 
and firm size, auditing company and the 
listing status. 
-There is no relationship between 
financial disclosure and profitability, 
leverage, industry type and the dividend 
payouts. 
-Financial disclosure is significantly 
related to Spanish legislation. 
Depoers 
(2000) France 
Annual reports of 
102 industrial and 
commercial 
companies listed on 
Paris Stock 
Exchange in 1995. 
Unweighted 
(65 voluntary 
items). 
Voluntary 
Company size 
(sales), 
Foreign activity, 
Ownership structure, 
Leverage 
(debt on total 
assets), 
Auditor size, 
Proprietary costs 
Independent variables explain 65% of the 
variation in the levels of voluntary 
disclosure. 
Managers disclose more information 
when a firm's size and foreign activity are 
important, but they hide information 
whose disclosure may compromise the 
firm's competitive advantage or increase 
labour pressure. 
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related to 
competition,  Labour 
pressure 
 
No significant effect due to leverage has 
been observed. The influence of 
ownership structure and auditor size 
disappears in the multiple regressions. 
Street & 
Gray (2002) USA 279 Unweighted 
Mandatory 
(compliance 
with IASs) 
Company size 
(measured as total 
assets, total sales, 
and market 
capitalization), 
profitability (as net 
income before 
tax/equity), industry 
type, country of 
domicile, size of 
home stock 
market, auditor size, 
type of auditing 
standards, and the 
way in which the 
auditors 
express their 
opinions. 
-There is a significant extent of non-
compliance as the level of compliance 
with IAS was on average 74%. 
-There is a significant relationship 
between the level of compliance of 
companies listed in the US, specifically 
companies in commerce and 
transportation, and companies audited by 
big audit firms. 
Glaum & 
Street 
(2003) 
Germany 
200 companies; 100 
apply IASs and 100 
apply US GAAP 
for the year 2000 
Unweighted 
(two 
checklists; 153 
IASs checklist 
and 144 US 
GAAP 
checklist) 
Mandatory 
Audit firm type 
Multiple listing 
Reference of using 
International 
Standards of 
Auditing (ISA) or 
US GAAS in the 
audit companies 
Firm size 
Financial disclosure averages 83.7%. 
The average compliance level is 
significantly lower for companies that 
apply IAS as compared to companies 
applying US GAAP. 
Extent of financial disclosure is positively 
associated with all independent variables 
except firm size 
Anderson & 
Daoud 
(2005) 
Sweden 54 listed companies in 2003 
Unweighted 
(285 items) 
Voluntary 
(corporate 
governance 
aspects) 
Role duality 
Existence of audit 
committee 
Number of 
shareholders 
Board composition 
The existence of 
compensation 
committee 
Firm size 
Multiple listing 
Management 
ownership 
The proportion of 
non-executive 
directors 
Audit firm size 
Diffuse ownership 
Board size 
The existence of 
nomination 
committee 
Board activity 
Industry type 
There is a positive relationship between 
financial disclosure and role duality 
existence of audit committee, number of 
shareholders board composition, the 
existence of compensation committee, 
firm size and Multiple listing,  however, 
there is no association with other 
independent variables. 
Arcay & 
Vazquez 
(2005) 
Spain 
91 firms out of 117 
that were indexed 
in the Actualidad 
Economica Index in 
1999 - all of which 
operate in the 
continuous 
(electronic) 
market of the 
Madrid Stock 
Exchange 
Weighted 
(Based on 
Actualidad 
Economica  
disclosure 
index that 
consists of 18 
indicators) 
Voluntary 
Independent non-
executive directors 
Audit committee 
Chairman of the 
board and chief 
executive officer 
being the same 
person 
Board participation 
in the capital of the 
company 
Stock option plans 
as directors’ pay 
Board size. 
Level of ownership 
concentration. 
Firm size 
Dual listing 
Industry type 
Corporate decisions regarding the 
provision of voluntary information are 
complex processes affected by a number 
of interrelated factors: the governance 
rules followed by the firm, corporate size, 
cross-listing status, and the ownership 
structure of the firm. 
The adoption of a number of good 
governance practices such as the 
appointment of independent directors, the 
formation of audit committees, 
participation of the board in the capital of 
the company, and establishment of stock 
option plans as a means of director 
remuneration exert a significant influence 
on corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Independent directors and audit 
committees strengthen the monitoring 
function of the board, so that firms 
become more responsive to stakeholders’ 
demands for information. 
Directors’ participation in the capital 
of the company and stock option plans 
contribute to the alignment of managers’ 
and shareholders’ interests as they help 
reduce management reluctance to disclose 
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voluntary information. 
Neither the separation of the functions of 
the CEO and Chairman, nor compliance 
with the recommendation of the Olivencia 
Code (1998) regarding the size of the 
board is significantly associated with the 
provision of voluntary information. 
Owusu-
Ansah & 
Yeoh (2005) 
New 
Zealand 
50 companies listed 
in New Zealand 
Stock Exchange 
with 200 
observations for 
years 1992, 1993 
before the new 
regulations and 
1996, 1997 after the 
introduction of the 
new regulations. 
Unweighted 
(495 items) Mandatory 
Disclosure 
regulatory regimes 
On average extent of compliance with 
financial disclosure requirements is 
92.61%. 
Univariate paired t-test reveals that the 
compliance level for post FRA period 
(1996-1997) is higher than in the pre FRA 
period (1992-1993). 
Multivariate analysis indicates that the 
enactment of the FRA was the reason for 
the improvement in the disclosure 
compliance of New Zealand companies. 
Moreover, sensitivy analysis shows that, 
after controlling the effects of other 
variables which are related to mandatory 
disclosure, the introduction of FRA was 
significant in improving the compliance 
level. 
Yeoh (2005) New Zealand 
Annual reports of 
49 listed companies 
on New Zealand 
Stock Exchange 
during the period 
1996-1998 
Unweighted 
(495 items) Mandatory None 
There is a high degree of corporate 
compliance with the financial reporting 
requirements. However, the compliance 
rate is higher with respect to the 
Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practices (SSAPs) than to both the 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs), 
and listing rules of the stock market. 
Extent of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements ranges from 
84.1% to a maximum level of 99.5%. 
The number of companies whose 
compliance rate was between 90% and 
100% of statutory and regulatory 
disclosure requirements consistently 
increased over time from 84% in 1996 to 
98% in 1998. 
II. Single Developing Capital Market Studies 
Singhvi 
(1968) India 
45 
companies listed on 
Indian Stock 
Exchanges for the 
period 1963-1965. 
Weighted (34 
items). Aggregate 
Asset size, 
Rate of return, 
Earnings margin 
Type of 
management 
Number of 
shareholders 
-On average extent of financial disclosure 
is 35.60% 
There is a strong positive relationship 
between the quality of financial disclosure 
and asset size, rate of return, earnings and 
type of management. 
-No relatioship identified between the 
quality of financial disclosure and size of 
audit firm. 
Chow & 
Wong-
Boren 
(1987) 
Mexico 
annual reports of 52 
manufacturing 
companies listed on 
the Mexican 
Stock Exchange in 
1982 
Unweighted 
Weighted (24 
voluntary 
items) 
Voluntary 
Company size 
(market value of 
equity plus the book 
value of debt), 
financial leverage 
(the book value of 
debt divided 
by size),and assets in 
place( dividing the 
book value of fixed 
assets net of 
depreciation, 
by total assets). 
-Multiple regression shows that the 
adjusted R2 for the weighted index was 
14% and for the un-weighted index was 
15%; 
- The t-test for both indices indicated that 
company size is significantly associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure in 
Mexico, and leverage and assets in place 
are insignificant regarding the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
-There are no differences in the results 
between the weighted and un-weighted 
disclosure index. 
Wallace 
(1988) Nigeria 
47 companies listed 
on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange 
from 1982 to 1986 
Weighted and 
Unweighted  
(120 
mandatory 
items and 65 
voluntary 
items) 
112 
mandatory, 35 
voluntary and 
38 included in 
both 
mandatory and 
voluntary. 
Aggregate 
Firm size 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Management type 
Business type 
Country of the origin 
Of the 
multinationals. 
- Overall level of financial disclosure in 
Nigerian companies' annual reports is 
below 50% in each year (39.75% in 1982; 
38.23% in 1983; 43.11% in 1984; 40.46% 
in 1985 and 37.55% in 1986).. 
- There is no significant differences 
between the results of weighted and un-
weighted disclosure indices. 
-Weak positive relationship between 
extent of financial disclosure and firm size 
and no relationship between financial 
disclosure and other identified company 
characteristics. 
Tai et al. 
(1990) 
Hong 
Kong 
76 companies listed 
on HK Stock 
Exchange in 1987 
Unweighted 
(11 items) 
Mandatory (an 
internal 
checklist 
Firm size 
(shareholder fund), 
Business sector of 
-On average the level of compliance was 
78% 
-company size is significantly associated 
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provided by a 
local office of 
one of big eight 
audit firms 
which contains 
all the 
mandatory 
disclosure 
requirements) 
the 
company and 
Type of audit firm 
with mandatory disclosure. Smaller and 
larger companies have significantly less 
non-compliance than medium sized 
companies.  
There is nosignificant relationship 
between the business sector or audit 
companies and the compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements 
Abayo et al. 
(1993) Tanzania 
51 annual reports of 
Tanzanian firms for 
the year 1990. 
Unweighted 
(the first index 
is based 
on 88 
mandatory 
items collected 
from 
Tanzanian 
accounting 
regulation. 
The second 
index is based 
on 44 
voluntary 
items specified 
by user needs). 
Mandatory 
Voluntary (in 
addition he 
applies two 
other measures 
of disclosure 
quality; the 
timeliness of the 
annual reports 
and the type of 
audit opinion. 
If annual reports are 
available; 
If companies are 
profit seeking; 
If they fall under the 
NBAA (National 
Board of 
Accountants and 
Auditors); and iv. if 
they fell into 
four industrial 
groups - distribution, 
chemical, textiles, 
and metal goods 
Timeliness of their 
financial reports. 
-The quality of companies' annual reports 
in Tanzania is very low (the average of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure is 
52.6%, and the average of the level of 
voluntary disclosure is 15.8%). 
–There is a weak, positive relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and 
mandatory disclosure. 
Ahmed & 
Nicholls 
(1994) 
Banglades
h 
63 companies listed 
on Dhaka stock 
exchange for the 
years 1987and 1988 
Unweighted 
(94 statutory 
items adapted 
from Cooke, 
1989a) 
Mandatory 
Company size (total 
assets and total 
sales), 
Total debt, 
Multinational 
company influence, 
Professional 
qualifications of the 
principal accounting 
officer 
Size of audit 
firm 
The level of compliance with mandatory 
requirements is on average 58.7%. 
-The multiple regression 
analysis,Stepwise, explains 50% of 
disclosure variation among the sampled 
companies. 
-The t-test results report that multinational 
companies and large audit firms have a 
significant, positive relationship with the 
level of compliance. 
-Weaker significant positive association 
between level of financial disclosure and 
company size. 
- Less effect on the level of compliance by 
professional qualification of the principal  
accounting officer is observed, and 
company size and debt appeared to have 
no effect on the level of compliance. 
Hossain et 
al. (1994) Malaysia 
67 non-financial 
companies listed on 
Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) in 1991, 12 
of them are also 
listed on London 
Stock Exchange 
. 
Unweighted 
(78 voluntary 
items based on 
prior research) 
Voluntary 
Company size 
(market 
capitalisation), 
Ownership structure 
(the number of 
shares held by the 
top 10 
shareholders), 
Leverage ( as ratio 
based on the book 
value, of long-term 
debt to owners' 
equity), 
Proportion of assets-
in place (as ratio, 
based on book value, 
of fixed assets to 
total 
assets), 
Audit Company, 
Foreign listing 
status. 
On average the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is 15.8% 
The results of the univariate analysis 
shows that there is a significant 
association between voluntary disclosure 
and company size, the big six audit firms 
and companies' ownership structure. 
-A marginally positive association with 
leverage is found, while there is no 
significant relationship with assets-in-
place. 
-The multiple regression indicates that  
only 28% of the disclosure variation is 
explained  by the independent variables. -
The t-test shows different results from the 
univariate analysis - company size and 
ownership structure were significantly 
associated with voluntary disclosure and 
the remaining variables were 
insignificant. 
 
Wallace & 
Naser 
(1995) 
Hong 
Kong 
85 listed firms on 
Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange for 1988-
1992 
Unweighted 
(30 mandatory 
items) 
Mandatory 
Asset size 
Scope of business 
operation 
Auditor type 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
Proportion of shares 
held by outsiders 
Market capitalisation 
There is a positive relationship between 
compliance with mandatory disclosure 
and asset size, scope of business operation 
(i.e., industry type) and auditor type. 
There is a negative relationship between 
compliance with mandatory disclosure 
and profitability. However there is no 
association between compliance level and 
the remaining independent variables. 
Al-Mulhem 
(1997) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Annual reports of 
40 listed and 
unlisted Saudi 
corporations for  
1994. 
Unweighted 
( index of 163 
mandatory and 
voluntary 
items 
developed to 
Aggregate 
Company size (total 
assets and annual 
sales), 
Listing status, 
Industry type, 
Profitability ratios 
The level of disclosure in corporate 
annual reports in Saudi Arabia varies 
considerably. 
The disclosure index means were found to 
range from the lowest being 38 % to the 
highest being76%. 
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to assess 
whether 
disclosure 
levels vary in 
Saudi 
corporate 
annual report. 
Then  
disclosure 
quality is 
measured  
based on 77 
mandatory 
items  and 
84 items 
perceived as 
important by 
different user 
groups in the 
Kingdom) 
(rates of return and 
earning margin)  
Type of audit 
firm 
Results obtained from univariate and 
multivariate analyses showed that firm 
size and Listing status are significantly 
related to the extent of disclosure. 
Listing status, however, was found to 
contribute most to explaining the 
variability in the extent of disclosure. 
In contrast, profitability, industry type and 
type of audit firm are not significant 
explanatory factors. 
The results revealed that none of the 
sampled corporations complied fully with 
mandatory regulations and items 
perceived as important by different user 
groups. 
-There is a significant, positive 
relationship between financial disclosure 
and company size, rate of return, and 
listing status, while there is no association 
with industry types and type of audit firm. 
Finally, none of the companies fully 
complied with the mandatory disclosure 
requirements and the important items for 
different users. 
 
Patton & 
Zelenka 
(1997) 
Czech 
Republic 
50 Cezech joint 
stock companies 
listed in Prague 
Stock Exchange in 
1993 
Unweighted 
(66 voluntary 
items) 
Mandatory 
Company size (as 
total assets), 
Performance (as 
return on equity), 
Risk factors (as 
percentage of 
intangible assets and 
leverage), Listing 
status, Number of 
employee, 
Audit firm type 
Industry type. 
-60% average level of companies' 
compliance with mandatory requirements 
was reported, and the logarithm regression 
explained only 25%. 
of the variation in the level of companies' 
compliance. 
-Univariate analyses generally suppon the 
existence of the hypothesized 
relationships between extent of disclostire 
in annual reports and firm size, 
profitability performance, financial risk, 
and monitoring variables.  
-Multivariate regressions explain about 
25% of the variance in the extent of 
disclosure in annual repons. Statistically 
significant variables in the multiple 
regressions include type of auditor, 
number of employees, stock exchange 
listing status, and retum on equity 
performance. 
 
Suwaidan 
(1997) Jordan 
28 
companies listed on 
Amman Financial 
Market  (which 
increased their 
capital during the 
period 1980-1991) 
Unweighted 
(75 voluntary 
items) 
Voluntary 
Company size ( total 
assets market 
capitalisation, 
sales/revenues, net 
income),number of 
Shareholders, 
institutional 
ownership ratio, 
government 
ownership, industry 
type, size of auditing 
firm, international 
contacts of auditing 
company, 
profitability (return 
on assets 
and return on 
equity), and 
frequency of 
external financing 
The lowest level of voluntary disclosure 
(2.61%) is found in the market-based 
information group, while the balance 
sheet group shows the highest level 
(65.39%). 
In addition, there is a wide variation in 
disclosure for individual items within 
each type of information group. 
The actual level of voluntary disclosure in 
Jordanian corporate annual reports is low, 
with 61% of the items disclosed in less 
than half the annual reports. 
The results of univariate and multivariate 
analyses identified the size of the 
company, size of auditing firm, 
government ownership and the industry 
type to be significant variables in 
explaining variation in the level of 
disclosure. 
Among these variables, size was the most 
important variable in explaining variation 
in the disclosure of different types of 
information and within each industry. 
Finally, the study found that companies 
have significantly increased their level of 
voluntary disclosure around the time they 
raised equity capital in AFM. 
Naser 
(1998) Jordan 
Annual reports for 
1993 of 54 non-
financial companies 
listed on Amman 
Financial Market  
Equally 
weighted 
index of 74 
items 
Aggregate 
Industry 
 Audit firm size 
Profitability 
Liquidity, Size 
Leverage  
Ownership. 
-Company size, leverage and return on 
equity were statistically related to the 
comprehensiveness of disclosure of the 
sample companies listed on the AFM.  
The average disclosure level is 63%.  
-Size was the main predictor in 
comprehensive reporting. 
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Owusu-
Ansah 
(1998b) 
Zimbabwe 
Annual reports of 
49 companies listed 
on Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange in 1994 
Unweighted 
(32 main 
mandatory 
items, sub-
divided into 
214 sub-items) 
Mandatory 
company size (total 
assets, and market 
values of equity 
shares), quality of 
external audit, 
ownership structure, 
industry type, 
company listing age, 
multinational 
companies (MNC) 
affiliation, 
profitability (return 
on 
turnover and return 
on capital employed) 
and liquidity. 
-74.43% of compliance was identified. 
-Robust regression explains 40% of the 
variation in the companies' compliance, 
and the t-test indicates that company age, 
profitability, multinational corporation 
affiliation, company size and ownership 
structure have a significant and positive 
association with the level of compliance, 
whereas the quality of external audit, 
industry type and liquidity are 
insignificant. 
Abd-
Elsalam 
(1999) 
Egypt 
72 companies listed 
on the Egyptian 
stock Exchange for 
the periods after 
1995 (for only 20 
cases there was a 
matching set of  
annual reports for 
the 
periods before and 
after the issuance of 
the CML (1991 and 
1995 respectively). 
Unweighted 
Mandatory (247 
items divided 
into three 
indices; 
companies Act 
(CA), Capital 
Market Law 
(CML) and IASs 
index 
Legal form 
Company size 
Share trading in the 
stock exchange 
Type of business 
activity 
Audit firm type 
Profit ratio 
Gearing 
Liquidity 
-Mandatory disclosure (three indices) and 
partial mandatory disclosure (each index) 
of Egyptian listed companies have 
increased significantly in 1995 compared 
to 1991, however no company shows 
100% compliance with any index. 
The level of compliance with mandatory 
requirements by Egyptian listed 
companies in 1995 is (CML, 84% and 
IASs, 85%) which is considered high 
compared to companies in other 
developing countries. 
Compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements is found to be positively 
associated with legal form, company size 
and share trading in the stock exchange; 
however it is not associated with the 
remaining variables. 
Companies audited by one of the big audit 
firms offer the highest disclosure on items 
required by the IASs while large public 
sector companies which were actively 
traded in the national stock exchange 
provide the highest disclosure on items 
required by the Egyptian new disclosure 
regulation. 
Agency and capital need theories appear 
to be applicable to the findings regarding 
Egypt, but the applicability of signaling 
theory is not clear. 
Haniffa 
(1999) Malaysia 
Published annual 
reports of 167 
randomly selected 
sample of 
Malaysian 
companies. 
Unweighted 
(123 voluntary 
items derived 
from prior 
research on 
Malaysia; 41 
items are 
related to 
social 
disclosure and 
82 items are 
related to non-
social 
reporting) 
Voluntary ( 3 
indices 
developed; 
voluntary 
non-social, 
social reporting 
and aggregate 
voluntary 
scores) 
Seven corporate 
governance 
variables (cross-
holdings of 
directorships, role 
duality, board 
composition, ratio of 
family 
members on the 
board, cross-
holdings by 
Chairperson, 
position of 
Chairperson and 
significance of 
finance director 
sitting on the board). 
Size 
Industry type Listing 
age 
Foreign listing status 
Foreign activities 
Complexity of 
business 
Level of 
diversification 
Gearing 
Profitability 
Type of auditors 
Assets in place 
Ownership structure. 
Profitability, top 10 shareholders and 
industry type are significant for both non-
social voluntary disclosure and social 
reporting disclosure. 
In the case of the former, one additional 
variable found significant was 
diversification while for the latter, listing 
status and size. 
There is a significant association between 
levels of voluntary disclosure and Chair 
with cross-holdings and a non-executive 
Chair. 
Personal characteristics seem to have a 
significant influence only in social 
reporting and two variables, the ratio of 
bumiputra directors on boards and 
bumiputra finance directors, were found 
to be significant. 
Ho & Wong 
(2001) 
Hong 
Kong 
98 listed companies 
on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange in 
1998. 
Weighted (35 
items) Voluntary 
Existence of audit 
committee 
Firm size 
Industry type 
On average the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is 29% 
There is a positive relationship between 
the level of voluntary disclosure and the 
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Proportion of family 
members in the 
board 
Ratio of independent 
directors to total 
directors in the 
board 
Family ownership 
Profitability 
Assets in place 
Leverage 
existence of audit committee, firm size 
and industry type. 
There is a negative relationship between 
level of voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of family members on the 
board. 
There is no relationship between the level 
of financial disclosure and the remaining 
variables. 
Al-Hajraf 
(2002) Kuwait 
All Kuwaiti banks 
(8 banks) and  20 
randomly selected 
sample of 
investment 
companies listed on 
Kuwait Stock 
Exchange in year 
2000. 
Weighted (117 
items) 
Mandatory 
(based on IAS 
30) 
None 
78% of the total sample said it is 
important for the users to know more 
about the international accounting 
standards in general and disclosure 
standards in particular. 
68% of the total sample said that it is 
important for banks' management to 
disclose more information according to 
the international accounting standards 
requirements and to those special 
requirements of the Central Bank of 
Kuwait and the Kuwait stock exchange 
market. 
38% of the total sample agreed that the 
Kuwaiti financial market is advanced and 
can compete with the world's financial 
markets. 
Disclosure level has improved toward 
more compliance with the IAS 30 
requirements from 57% in 1994 to 64.3% 
in 2000. 
Haniffa & 
Cooke 
(2002) 
Malaysia 
Published annual 
reports of 167 non-
financial companies 
for the year  1995 
Unweighted 
(65 voluntary 
disclosure 
items derived 
from prior 
research) 
Voluntary 
Proportion of non-
executive directors 
Proportion of family 
members on the 
board 
Role duality 
Position of Chair 
person 
Cross directorship of 
board members 
Cultural 
characteristics 
Education-board of 
directors 
Education of 
financial controller 
Firm size 
Gearing 
Diversification 
Asset in place 
Ownership structure 
Profitability 
Industry type 
Type of auditor 
Listing age 
Foreign activities 
 
On average the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is 31.3% 
Results based on the full regression model 
with thirty-one variables indicated that 
only two groups of variables, namely 
corporate governance and firm-specific 
characteristics, were associated with the 
extent of disclosure. 
The significance of the two corporate 
governance variables (i.e., family 
members sitting on board and non-
executive Chairman) identified indicates 
the importance of these variables as 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
Specifically, the Chairperson as 
nonexecutive director is negatively 
associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure which contradicts with agency 
theory model. 
A cultural factor (race), measured as the 
proportion of Malay directors on the 
board, was found to be significant. The 
findings of no significant association 
between disclosure and any of the cultural 
variables in the full model supports the 
suggestion of culture-free theorists that, 
over time, societal values converge 
resulting from technological development. 
Naser et al. 
(2002) Jordan 
84 companies listed 
on Amman 
Financial Market in 
1998 
Unweighted 
(86 items) Mandatory 
Number of 
shareholders 
Audit firm status 
Return on equity 
Foreign ownweship 
Arab ownership 
Government 
ownership 
Individual 
ownership 
Type of Industry 
Profit margin 
Net sales 
Gearing ratio 
Market 
capitalization 
Liquidity ratio 
Number of 
employess 
Assets size 
 
On average the extent of disclosure is 
63.51% 
There is a positive relationship between 
the extent of financial disclosure and firm 
size, audit firm status, gearing and 
profitability. 
There is a negative relatioship between 
extent of disclosure and liquidity while 
there is no association with the remaining 
variables. 
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Al-Shiab 
(2003) Jordan 
50 industrial 
companies listed on 
Amman stock 
Exchange during 
the period 1995-
2000 (This is 
divided in to 
premandatory 
action period 1995-
1998 and 
postmandatory 
action period 1998-
2000) 
Un-weighted 
(273 items) 
Mandatory 
(based on IASs) 
 
 
Firm size 
Industry type 
Size of audit firm 
Profitability 
Capital structure 
Compliance with IASs before and after 
mandating IASs. The findings of this 
study showed that the compliance with 
IASs 
was higher for the post mandatory action 
period (1998-2000) than the pre-
mandatory action period (1995-1998). 
 
The level of disclosure is quite low over 
not only pre but also post the mandatory 
action fro implementing the IAS 
suggesting that the government and the 
ASE systems regarding the financial 
reporting in Jordan are loose. 
 
Level of compliance with IASs ranges 
from 45 in 1995 to 56% in 2000. 
 
In the manufacturing sector, mining and 
building equipment companies were 
higher disclosing companies than others, 
except chemical companies 
Abdelsalam 
& Weetman 
(2003) 
Egypt 
100 of listed 
companies in 
Egypt’s Stock 
Exchange for the 
fiscal year ended 31 
December1995 or 
the first date 
thereafter in 1996 
Unweighted 
(241 items) 
Mandatory 
(based on IASs 
which were 
extant 
at the end of 
1995 which 
further 
disaggregated 
into IASs 
required by 
Company Act; 
IASs required by 
Capital Market 
Law (CML) and 
IASs which 
were not 
available in 
official Arabic 
translation 
(NA)) 
Size, 
Profitability, Type of 
business, 
Audit firm, Gearing, 
Legal form, Share 
trading, The 
presence 
of an IAS 
compliance note, 
The presence of a 
note of compliance 
with International 
Standards on 
Auditing (ISAs). 
-On average the level of compliance with 
IASs was 83% for Egyptian companies, 
which did not represent full compliance. 
A relatively high compliance with the 
familiar requirements represented in 
IAS(CA) (mean 0.94) but relatively lower 
compliance with the less familiar 
requirements represented in IAS(CMLA) 
(mean 0.73). The lowest average 
compliance was in IAS(NA) (mean 0.36) 
where unfamiliarity is compounded by the 
languagefactor. 
The multiple regression confirms the 
significance of the legal form variable. 
Actively traded companies scored 
significantly higher than the rarely traded 
companies. 
From both univariate andmultivariate 
analyses, a conclusion can be drawn that 
both agency theory and capital need 
theory, which have frequently been used 
in explaining disclosure practices by 
companies, do not apply in the same 
strength where there are other factors 
which can interfere with these theories 
such as familiarity and a language barrier. 
Signaling theory is generally weak across 
all categories, which may reflect the 
relatively early stages of development of 
the capital market. 
Various regression models explained only 
21–46% of changes in disclosure indices 
of Egyptian listed companies. 
. 
Eng & Mak 
(2003) Singapore 
158 companies 
listed on Singapore 
Stock Exchange in 
1995 
Weighted (42 
items 
weighted by 
research 
assistants) 
Voluntary 
Government 
ownership 
Proportion of 
outside directors 
Firm size 
Leverage 
Managerial 
ownership 
Blockholder 
ownership 
(percentage of 
ordinary shares held 
by substantial 
shareholders, 5% or 
more) 
Industry type 
Profitability 
 
On average the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is 21.75% 
There is a positive relationship between 
the extent of disclosure and governmental 
ownership, proportion of outside directors 
and firm size. 
There is a negative relationship between 
level of disclosure and managerial 
ownership and leverage while there is no 
association with the remaining 
independent variables. 
Al-Razeen 
& Karbhari 
(2004) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
55 
listed and 13 
unlisted companies 
in 1996 
Unweighted 
Weighted 
(Three 
disclosure 
indices were 
constructed; 
the first 
Aggregate None 
Saudi companies in general complied with 
mandatory requirements, on average by 
88%, and that there was a low level of 
voluntary disclosure that is related to 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure, on average 32%. 
- There is  a significant, positive 
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index with 23 
mandatory 
items collected 
from Saudi 
disclosure 
standards, the 
second 
index with 15 
voluntary 
items expected 
to be 
disclosed, and 
the third index 
with 18 
voluntary 
items related 
to mandatory 
requirements) 
correlation between mandatory disclosure 
and voluntary closely related to 
mandatory disclosure, and a weak 
relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and the other two indices. 
-No clear pattern of relationship between  
Al-Htaybat 
(2005) Jordan 
51 companies listed 
on Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) in 
1997 and in 2002. 
-55 of Jordanian 
companies listed on 
ASE in 2004 that 
make internet 
disclosure. 
Unweighted 
(Two different 
indices for the 
printed 
mandatory and 
voluntary 
financial 
disclosure 
indices for 
1997 and 
2002). 
Internet 
disclosure 
index. 
-Mandatory (33 
items  for 1997 
and 91 items for 
2002 ). 
-Voluntary (67 
items for 1997 
and 21 items for 
2002) 
-Internet 
voluntary 
disclosure(28 
items  for 2004 
(28 items) 
size, age, 
profitability, 
industry type, 
ownership structure 
and auditor 
size 
Jordanian manufacturing companies did 
not fully comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements in 1997 and 2002. 
- for 1997 a positive effect of the natural 
resources industry on the level of 
compliance was identified. 
Company profitability had a negative 
association, and none of the other 
variables contributed to explaining the 
variation in the level of companies' 
compliance in 1997. 
Financial disclosure theories (agency, 
signaling, Political costs and capital need 
theories) fail to explain disclosure 
practices in Jordan in 1997. 
For 2002 due to developments witnessed 
by ASE company age appears to have a 
significant effect on the mandatory 
disclosure in 2002 in the normal score 
regression, alongside the food & clothing 
industry. These results were consistent 
with the theoretical predictions of agency, 
signaling, political and capital need 
theories. 
The average voluntary disclosure 
increased from 58% in 1997 to 61% in 
2002. 
For 1997  company size, profitability, 
Natural resources and food & clothing 
industries are significantly ,positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. 
None of the other company variables able 
to explain the variation in voluntary 
disclosure in 1997. 
For 2002  company size, government 
ownership, company profitability, foreign 
ownership and the food & clothing 
industry have some effect on the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Company age, auditor size and other 
dummy variables did not affect the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the Jordanian 
manufacturing companies' annual reports 
in 2002. 
The overall level of printed financial 
disclosur was improved, from 87% in 
1997 to 95% in 2002. 
The result of the Internet disclosure 
investigation shows  that 55 (29%) out of 
190 Jordanian companies listed on  in 
August 2004 had active, accessible 
websites. 
A positive association between increasing 
financial disclosure in the printed 
companies' annual reports in 2002 and the 
level of Internet usage for financial 
disclosure in 2004. 
There is a significant and positive 
association between company size and the 
level of the Internet financial disclosure in 
2004. 
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Akhtaruddin 
(2005) 
Banglades
h 
94 companies listed 
on Dhaka Stock 
Exchange for the 
year 1999 
Unweighted 
(160 items) Mandatory 
Firm size 
Profitability 
Listing age 
Industry group 
The extent of compliance with disclosure 
requirements is positively associated with 
profitability and firm size (except sales), 
however it is not associated with listing 
age and industry group. 
Aksu & 
Kosedag 
(2006) 
Turkey 
52 companies listed 
on Istanbul Stock 
Exchange for 2003. 
Unweighted 
(106 items; 
ownership 
items, 
financial 
disclosure 
items, board 
and 
management 
items) 
Aggregate 
Firm size 
Profitability 
Market to book ratio 
Profitability 
Leverage 
 
Financial disclosure is positively 
associated with firm size, profitability and 
markrt to book ratio and profitability 
however, results show no association 
between financial disclosure and leverage. 
Barako et al. 
(2006) Kenya 
43 Kenyan listed 
firms for the period 
from 1992 to 2001 
Weighted (47 
items 
weighted by 
bank loan 
officers) 
Voluntary 
Presence of audit 
committee 
Percentage of stock 
owned by 
institutional 
shareholders 
The proportion of 
foreign ownership 
Firm size 
Leverage 
The proportion of 
non-executive 
directors on the 
board 
Board leadership 
structure 
Liquidity 
Profitability 
Type of external 
audit firm 
There is a positive relationship between 
level of financial disclosure and the 
presence of audit committee, percentage 
of stock owned by institutional 
shareholders, the proportion of foreign 
ownership, firm size and leverage. 
There is a negative association between 
the level of financial disclosure and the 
proportion of non-executive directors in 
the board however there is no association 
with the remaining independent variables. 
Ghazali & 
Weetman 
(2006) 
Malaysia 87 Malaysian listed companies in 2001 
Unweighted 
(53 items) Voluntary 
Number of 
employees 
Profitability 
Proportion of family 
members on the 
board 
Proportion of shares 
held by executive 
directors 
Government 
ownership 
Proportion of 
independent non-
executive directors 
on the board 
Presence of 
independent non-
executive Chairman 
on the board 
Company 
competitiveness 
Industry 
competitiveness 
On average the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is 31.4% 
There is a positive association between 
the level of voluntary disclosure and the 
number of employees and profitability of 
the firm. 
There is a negative association between 
level of disclosure and the proportion of 
family members on the board and 
proportion of shares held by executive 
directors. However, there is no association 
with the remaining variables. 
 
Hassan 
(2006) Egypt 
80 nonfinancial 
traded companies 
over the period 
1995 to 2002. This 
makes a sample of 
272 firm-year 
observations. 
Unweighted 
(75 items 
subdivided in 
to 7 groups) 
Aggregate 
(Based on 
Capital Market 
Authority(CMA) 
checklist and 
Centre for 
International 
Fianancial 
Analysis and 
Research 
(CIFAR) 
checklist) 
Firm size 
Legal form 
Gearing 
Profitability 
Stock activity. 
Individual measures of disclosure levels 
are negatively associated with estimated 
market beta. 
Disclosure is positively associated with 
firm value. 
Investors in Egypt pay much attention to 
income and dividends figures when 
making investment decisions. 
Disclosure level is negatively associated 
with market beta after controlling for 
other accounting measures of risk namely; 
asset size, profitability, gearing, growth, 
liquidity and dividend payout. 
Naser et al. 
(2006) Qatar 
Annual reports of 
21 out of 22 
companies listed on 
Doha Stock 
Exchang in 2001. 
Unweighted 
(34 items) Voluntary 
Firm size 
Dividends paid 
Gearing 
Ownership structure 
growth 
 
Average corporate social disclosure is 
very low (33%). 
Companies that are expected to be large in 
size, maintaining growth and are highly 
leveraged, are more likely to voluntary 
disclose social responsibility information. 
Samaha 
(2006) Egypt 
Annual reports of 
281 non-financial 
companies listed on 
Cairo and 
Unweighted 
disclosure list 
(306 items 
subdivided 
Aggregate 
(based on IASs 
and items 
derived from 
Legal status 
Industry 
Share trading 
 
There are large variations among listed 
companies in terms of the level of 
compliance with IASs. The over all level 
of compliance with IASs among listed 
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Alexandria Stock 
Exchange for the 
fiscal year 2000 
into 25 sub 
parts) and 
measurement 
list (127 items 
subdivided 
into 21 sub 
parts) 
prior research 
and checklists 
prepared by big 
4 audit firms)  
companies is very low (50% with 
disclosure IASs and 56% with 
measurement IASs). 
Compliance with mandatory items is 
higher than that for voluntary items. 
Legal status has no impact on compliance 
levels. 
Compliance in manufacturing companies 
is higher than in trade/service ones. 
Compliance level for actively traded 
companies is 64% for disclosure and 71% 
for measurement which reflect the poor 
performance of the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange. 
Abdelsalam 
& Weetman 
(2007) 
Egypt 
72 (final sample) 
annual reports of 
non-financial 
companies listed on 
Egypt’s Stock 
Exchange for the 
financial year 
ended on 
either December 
1991 or June 1992 
(referred to as 
1991–1992) and for 
the 
financial year 
ended on either 
December 1995 or 
June 1996 (referred 
to as 
1995–1996). 
Unweighted 
(241 items 
subdivided 
into CA, CML 
and IASs and 
further 
subclassified 
by location in 
the annual 
report) 
Mandatory 
(based on IASs) 
Legal form 
Activity of share 
trading 
Audit firm 
IASs compliance 
note 
Compliance with the established 
regulation improved between 1991–1992 
and 1995–1996 because companies 
responded to the new economic policy of 
privatization, 
The increase in stock exchange activity, 
and the expanded ownership base. 
The disclosure of some of the items 
required by the new regulations (CML 
and IASs) that were voluntarily disclosed 
in 1991–1992 before the new accounting 
regulations were enacted (mean 73% and 
76%, respectively)  significantly increased 
in 1995–1996 (mean 84% and 84%, 
respectively). 
In 1995-1996 balance sheet disclosures 
and accompanying notes were improved 
to correct previous omissions during the 
central planning period. 
Dahawy & 
Conover 
(2007) 
Egypt 
15 best performing 
listed companies on 
Egypt’s Stock 
Exchange for 2004 
Unweighted 
(the researcher 
applied 
disclosure 
checklist used 
by Capital 
Market 
Authority). 
Mandatory 
(based on IASs) None 
Low levels of compliance with IASs. 
Disclosure levels range from 52% to 76% 
with average level 62% which is 
attributed to secrecy. 
The lowest levels of compliance relates to 
conslolidated financial statements (44%) 
and leasing  (45%). 
Omar 
(2007) Jordan 
121 companies (55 
services and 66 
industries) for the 
year 2003. 
In addition,  a 
matched 
sample of 60 
companies was 
selected for two 
years, 1996 and 
2003 (before and 
after the 
new regulations). 
Unweighted 
(first index 
consists of 331 
items; 278 
mandatory and 
and 53 
voluntary). 
The next step 
a mandatory 
index (278 
items) 
employed to 
measure the 
impact of the 
new 
regulations. 
Aggregate 
 
Firm size, Leverage, 
Profitability, 
Number of 
shareholders, 
Listing status, 
Industry type, 
Assets-in-place, 
Ownership structure, 
Liquidity, Audit firm 
Size, Listing age 
There Is a significant increase in the level 
of aggregate disclosure (its average is 
69%) compared to previous studies in 
Jordan. 
The extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures is 83% and 34% respectively. 
Disclosure level is high in financial 
statements of Jordanian companies (e. g. 
balance sheet and income statement) and 
general information in the annual reports, 
but low in the voluntary item groups such 
as market based and financial history 
information. 
Univariate analysis indicates that firm 
size, profitability, number of shareholders, 
listing status, industry type, audit firm size 
and listing age are significant variables in 
explaining the variation in the level of 
aggregate disclosure among Jordanian 
companies. 
Multivariate analysis reveals that these 
variables are significantly associated with 
the level of aggregate disclosure: firm size 
(sales), profitability (ROE), audit firm 
size, industry type and listing status. 
There is a significant increase in the level 
of aggregate and mandatory disclosure for 
Jordanian companies in 2003 compared to 
1996. However, the level of voluntary 
disclosure is not significantly different in 
the two periods. 
Al-Jifri 
(2008) UAE 
annual reports of 31 
listed firms in the 
UAE for the fiscal 
year 
2003. 
Unweighted 
(73 items) Mandatory 
Sector type (banks, 
insurance, industrial, 
and 
service) 
Size (assets) 
Debt equity ratio 
profitability 
Significant differences are found among 
sectors. 
Firm size, the debt equity ratio, and the 
profitability were found to have 
insignificant association with the level of 
disclosure. 
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Samaha & 
Stapleton 
(2008) 
Egypt 
Annual reports of 
281 non-financial 
companies listed on 
Cairo and 
Alexandria stock 
exchange for the 
year 2000 
Unweighted 
disclosure list 
(306 items 
subdivided 
into 25 sub 
parts) and 
measurement 
list (127 items 
subdivided 
into 21 sub 
parts) 
Aggregate 
Legal status 
Industry sector 
Share trading 
- The over all level of compliance with 
IASs among listed companies is very low 
(50% with disclosure IASs and 56% with 
measurement IASs). 
-Industry sector does not explain 
compliance. 
-Leagal form does not explain compliance 
-Share trading seems to explain overall 
compliance however it doesnot explain 
every instance of accounting choice. 
Dahawy 
(2009) Egypt 
Annual reports of 
the most active 41 
companies listed on 
Cairo and 
Alexandria stock 
exchanges for the 
year 2002 
Unweighted 
(the researcher 
applied 
disclosure 
checklist used 
by Capital 
Market 
Authority). 
Mandatory 
(based on IASs) 
Company size 
Type of audit firm 
Listing motive 
(public listing versus 
Tax benefits) 
Leverage 
Sector 
-Average disclosure level is 54.37 
- Size is not a significant variable in 
explaining the level of disclosure. 
-Affiliation with international audit firms 
has a significant positive impact on 
disclosure. 
-listing status does not affect disclosure 
-leverage does not affect the degree of 
disclosure. 
-Sector type doesnot affect disclosure 
level. 
Hassan et al. 
(2009) Egypt 
80 nonfinancial 
traded companies 
over the period 
1995 to 2002. This 
makes a sample of 
272 firm-year 
observations. 
Unweighted 
(75 items 
subdivided in 
to 7 groups 
Aggregate 
(Based on 
Capital Market 
Authority(CMA) 
checklist and 
Centre for 
International 
Fianancial 
Analysis and 
Research 
(CIFAR) 
checklist) 
Asset size 
Profitability 
Leverage 
Growth 
Industry type 
-Increased compliance with mandatory 
disclosure has a negative association with 
firm value. 
-Voluntary disclosure has a positive, but 
insignificant association with firm value. 
-When considered together, both variables 
are jointly significant. 
 
Samaha & 
Stapleton 
(2009) 
Egypt 
Annual reports of 
281 non-financial 
companies listed on 
Cairo and 
Alexandria stock 
exchange for the 
year 2000 
Unweighted  
The same 
checklist used 
in Samaha and 
Stapleton 
(2008) 
Aggregate 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Company size 
Gearing 
Ownership 
concentration 
Auditor type 
Industry 
Share trading 
Sector 
Internationality 
-Engagement with international audit firm 
is the dominant factor associated with 
disclosure and measurement compliance. 
-Ownership concentration, share trading, 
size and internationality are associated 
with compliance. 
-Profitability, liquidity and leverage do 
not affect extent of compliance. 
-The performance of manufacturing is at 
par with non-manufacturing and the 
performance of private sector companies 
is at par with public sector companies. 
It cannot be entirely inferred that listed 
Egyptian companies may use de facto 
compliance with EAS as a means of 
reducing agency costs, raising capital, 
reducing political costs or signaling to the 
market that they are high quality firms. 
Al-Akra et 
al. (2010a) Jordan 
Annual reports of 
80 matched pair 
listed non-financial 
companies for the 
fiscal years 1996 
and 2004. 
- Unweighted  
Based on 
Epstein & 
Mirza 
checklist for 
1996 (301 
items) 
- Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers for 
2004 (641 
items) 
Mandatory 
-Disclosure 
regulation 
-Number of non-
executive directors 
- audit committee 
-Board size 
-Ownership structure 
-Company size 
-Leverage 
-Profitability 
-Liquidity 
-Auiting firm 
-Industry 
-Listing 
-Firm age 
 
-Compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements is significantly higher in 
2004 compared to 1996. 
-Disclosure regulation reforms produced 
the most significant influence on 
compliance. 
- Audit committee is a significant 
determinant of compliance. 
- The 1996 full model is insignificant 
while the reduced model (significant 
at .05 level) explains only 12.6% of 
compliance. 
- The 2004 full and reduced models 
(significant at the .05 and .01 
respectively) explain 14.7% and 20.7% 
respectively of compliance. 
-Under 2004 full model five variables are 
statistically significant (audit committee, 
size of the board, auditor type, liquidity 
and the gearing ratio). 
-Under 2004 reduced model six variables 
are significant: audit committee, size of 
the board, auditor type, liquidity, gearing 
ratio and profitability. 
. 
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Al-Akra et 
al. (2010b) Jordan 
A longitudinal 
examination of 243 
annual reports of 27 
privatised firms 
over a period of 9 
years (from 1996 to 
2004) 
Unweighted 
based on 
IFRSs 
Two ckecklists 
(the first 
consists of 90 
items 
applicable to 
the annual 
reports from 
the period 
1996-2002 and 
the second 
checklist 
consists of 81 
items 
applicable for 
the annual 
reports from 
2003-2004) 
Voluntary 
-Privatisation 
-Ownership structure 
-Regulatiry reforms 
- audit committee 
-Company size 
-Leverage 
-Profitability 
-Liquidity 
-Size of auditor 
-Industry 
 
 
 
 
-Voluntary disclosure is positively 
associated with privatization, foreign 
investment, company size and industry 
type. However, negatively associated with 
liquidity and auditor type.  
- Regulatory reforms and foreign 
investors account for a significant fraction 
of that improvement. 
-There is a notable decrease in state and 
individual ownership and an increase in 
foreign and institutional ownership 
between 1996 and 2004. 
-Individual and institutional investors 
need to be more effective in monitoring 
management. 
Elsayed & 
Hoque 
(2010) 
Egypt 
Annual reports of 
top100 non-
financial listed 
companies for the 
fiscal year 2004-
2005 
 
Unweighted 
based on 
Botosan 
(1997) 
disclosure 
index (70 
items) 
Voluntary 
-Intensity of global 
competition 
-Influence of 
international socio-
political institutions 
-Influence of 
international 
financial institutions 
-Company size 
-Industry type 
-Legal/Ownership 
form 
-cross-listing 
-The level of a company’s voluntary 
disclosure is positively and significantly 
associated with its perceived influence of  
(a)international socio-political institutions 
(such as the United Nations, the European 
Union, the Association of South East 
Asian Nations, the World Trade 
Organization, and the OECD), 
(b)international accounting standards, and 
(c) international financial institutions 
(such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund). 
- No significant association exists 
between voluntary disclosure level and 
perceived intensity of global competition. 
Ismail et al. 
(2010) Egypt 
Annual reports of 
39 companies listed 
on the EGX 
including the top 30 
actively traded 
companies in 2007 
Unweighted 
based on the 
checklist 
developed by 
the CMA for 
year 2000 
Mandatory 
-Size 
-Leverage 
-Assets in place 
-Age 
-Profitability 
-Liquidity 
-Industry type 
-Auditor type 
-Foreign activity 
- The findings reveal that the average 
level of mandatory disclosure was 74%, 
while the maximum disclosure level was 
83%. 
- Firm characteristics with a positive 
significant relationship with disclosure 
level are company size, and auditor type, 
while the factor that had a negative 
relationship is liquidity. 
Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2010) 
Egypt 
EGX top 30 listed 
companies for the 
year ending 2006 
Unweighted 
(80items) 
based on the 
one developed 
by Chau & 
Gray (2002) 
and Ghazali & 
Weetman 
(2006) 
Voluntary 
-Ownership structure 
-Establishment of 
audit commitees 
-Board 
independence 
-Size 
-Profitability 
-Industry 
-Leverage 
-Auditor 
-Liquidity 
 
-The overall level of voluntary disclosure 
is very low at just 19.38%. 
-Audit committee has a positive 
association with disclosure level. 
-Management ownership is the most 
important predictor of overall disclosure 
-There is a positive association between 
board independence and disclosure. 
-Manufacturing companies, higher 
liquidity and big 4 auditor result in higher 
disclosures however size is not 
significant. 
  
Alanezi & 
Albuloushi 
(2011) 
Kuwait 
68 listed companies 
on KSX at the end 
of 2007 
Unweighted 
(199 items 
based on 
IASs) 
Mandatory 
-Existence of audit 
committee  
-Family members on 
the board 
-Industry 
-Leverage 
-Company size 
-Age 
-Ownership 
diffusion 
-The existence of audit committee is 
significantly and positively associated 
with the level of IFRS-required 
disclosure. 
-Other factors explaining this association 
are multiple family members on the 
board, industry type and leverage.  
-In contrast, the other four independent 
variables (company size, profitability, 
company age and ownership diffusion) do 
not emerge as statistically significant 
explanations of the IFRS-required 
disclosures.  
Samaha & 
Dahawy 
(2011) 
Egypt 
EGX top 100 listed 
companies for the 
year ending 2006 
Unweighted 
(80items) 
based on the 
one developed 
by Chau & 
Gray (2002) 
and Ghazali & 
Weetman 
(2006) 
Voluntary 
Ownership structure 
-Establishment of 
audit commitees 
-Board 
independence 
-Size 
-Profitability 
-Industry 
-Leverage 
-Auditor 
- Overall voluntary disclosure was 
low at just 13.43% with a large 
variation range. 
- Companies with a higher ratio 
of independent non-executive 
directors have a higher extent of 
voluntarydisclosure.  
-Voluntary disclosure increases with 
decreases in block-holder ownership. 
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-Liquidity 
-Internationality 
 
-Two other ownership aspects – 
managerial and government – are not 
related to voluntary disclosure. 
- Profitability and internationality 
significantly impact voluntary 
disclosure.  
- Number of shareholders, type of 
auditor, size, liquidity, leverage and 
industry type of the firm do not 
affect the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
IIICross-national Comparative Capital Market Studies 
Choi (1973) 
11 
countries; 
Australia 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
The 
Netherland
s 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerlan
d (which 
tapped the 
Euro-
currency 
bond 
market for 
financing 
prior to 
July 1971) 
18 matched pairs 
from Eurobond 
entrants 
Weighted 
Unweighted 
(36  items) 
Aggregate 
(based on 
accounting and 
related 
information 
about a 
firm and its 
environment 
deemed relevant 
to international 
investors). 
Entry into a broadly 
based capital market. 
Entry into a broadly based capital market 
has a significant influence on disclosure 
behavior of borrowing enterprise-
investors. 
Barrett 
(1976) 
US, UK, 
Japan, 
France, 
West 
German, 
Netherland
s, and 
Sweden 
103 (15 company 
from each country 
except Netherlands 
only 13 companies) 
for the years 1963-
1972 
Weighted (17 
items) Aggregate None 
US and UK companies are superior and 
France is the last in terms of extent of 
financial disclosure 
Spero 
(1979) 
France 
Sweden 
UK 
 
7 disclosure 
indices (Cerf, 
1961; Singhvi 
& Desai, 
1971; 
Chandara, 
1974; Buzby, 
1975 and 3 
newly 
established 
indices; equal 
weights, the 
market 
weights and 
the split equal 
method). 
Voluntary None 
Different weighting schemes ar not as 
important as item selection because 
companies that view disclosure positively 
disclose many items and have high scores 
regardless of item weight. 
Using OLS regression, capital need theory 
is partially supported in scrutinised 
countries. 
Meek et al. 
(1995) 
US, UK 
and 
Continenta
l Europe 
226 multinational 
companies 
Unweighted 
(85 items). Voluntary 
company size 
(revenue), leverage 
(long-term debt to 
equity ratio), 
multinationality 
(ratio of sales from 
outside companies' 
home countries to 
total sales), 
profitability (ratio of 
return of sales), 
country/region, 
industry type, and 
listing status. 
-Independent variable explain 35% of 
voluntary disclsosure variation. 
-Company size, country/region, industry 
type and international listing status are the 
most significant explanatory variables, -
Other company characteristics appear 
insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hussain 
(1996) 
US 
Netherland
s 
80 companies (40 
matched pairs of 
US and Dutch 
listed Companies 
Unweighted 
(divided into 
three sections 
the first relates 
to 
Aggregate 
(based on 
indices used by 
Cerf, 1961; 
Choi, 1973 and 
 
Large Duch companies provide 
significantly more disclosure compared to 
their US counterparts. 
Disclosure demanded from large 
internationally oriented companies is 
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measurement, 
the second 
relates to 
disclosure and 
the third 
section relates 
to social, 
environmental 
and labor 
issues) 
Buzby, 1974) different from that smaller more 
domestically oriented ones. 
Proposing the use of cultural analysis 
approach for the comparative study of 
financial reporting of different countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zarzeski 
(1996) 
France, 
Germany, 
Hong 
Kong, 
Japan, 
Norway, 
UK and 
USA 
256 companies (65 
companies in US; 
47 in UK; 31 in 
France; 
39 in Japan; 16 in 
Norway; 29 in 
Germany and 29 in 
Hong Kong) 
Unweighted Aggregate 
Company size 
Leverage 
Foreign sales 
 
- The average extent of financial 
disclosure is 73% in US, 68.7% in UK; 
62.8% in France; 59.7% in Japan; 59.3% 
in Norway; 57.3% in Germany; 56.8% in 
Hong Kong 
-Larger firms disclose more information 
-Lower debt ratio is associated with 
higher disclosure 
-Higher levels of foreign sales increase 
disclosure 
Craig & 
Diga (1998) 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
The 
Phillipines 
and 
Thailand 
145 companies; 30 
from Singapore 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
The Phillipines and 
25 from Thailand 
for the year 1993 
 
Unweighted 
(530 items 
which are 
require in at 
least one of 
the five Asian 
countries 
Mandatory 
Firm size 
Industry group 
Country of origin 
Leverage 
International 
operations 
 
In terms of disclosure requirements, 
Singapore has the highest level of 
disclosure requirements (393 items out of 
530) while Indonesia has the lowest level 
of disclosure requirements (275 items out 
of 530). 
There is a positive association between 
the level of compliance and firm size, 
industry group and country of origin 
however there is no association with the 
remaining independent variables. 
 
Tower et al. 
(1999) 
Australia 
Thailand 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Hong 
Kong 
The 
Phillipines 
60 listedcompanies 
(10 from each 
country) for the 
year 1997 
Unweighted 
(512 items 
consist of 26 
IASs) 
Mandatory 
Country of reporting 
Length of time to 
report 
Firm size 
Leverage 
Profitability 
Industry type 
There is a positive association between 
the level of compliance with IASs and 
country of reporting and a negative 
association with length of time to report, 
however, there is no association with 
other variables 
Vlachos  
(2001) 
Cyprus 
Greece 
 
124 companies (50 
from Cyprus and 74 
from Greece) for 
the year 1996. 
Unweighted (2 
disclosure 
indices, one 
for Cyprus 
include 332 
items and the 
other for 
Greece which 
include 514 
items) 
Mandatory 
Company size 
Company age 
Company 
profitability 
Company liquidity 
Industry type 
Listing status 
Auditor type 
The Cypriot and Greek corporate 
mandatory disclosure practices on the 
whole appear to be extensive. 
Cypriot public companies which are more 
profitable are classified as conglomorates 
or manufacturing or whose shares are 
listed on the main market of the Athens 
Stock Exchange tend to disclose 
significantly more extensive mandatory 
information in their 1996 annual reports. 
Comparative analysis reveals that 
although the influence of listing status snd 
industry type on Cypriot and Greek 
mandatory disclosure practices is similar 
the influence of company size is different. 
In contrast to Cyprus company size has a 
negative influence on the extent of Greek 
corporate mandatory disclosure practices. 
Camfferman 
& Cooke 
(2002) 
UK 
Netherland
s 
322 companies 
(161 from each 
country) for the 
year 1996 
Unweighted 
(93 items 
classified into 
13 categories 
include in in 
the Fourth and 
Seventh EU 
Directives) 
Aggregate 
Size 
Leverage 
Liquidity 
Industry 
Auditor 
Profitability 
Return on equity 
Significant differences in disclosure 
between the two countries were found in 
11 categories. The other two categories of 
disclosure items (three items on 
revaluation and two on deferred tax) were 
discovered to have no significant 
difference in disclosure between the UK 
and the Netherlands. 
British companies provide more 
comprehensive disclosures to comply with 
EU requirements than their Dutch 
counterparts with mean scores 58.74 and 
54.32 for the UK and the Netherlands 
respectively. 
- The impact of size is the same for both 
countries, but other firm‐specific 
characteristics have different effects. 
 
Chau & 
Gray (2002) 
Hong 
Kong 
And 
Singapore 
60 companies listed 
in Hong Kong 
(HK) Stock 
Exchange and 62 
Unweighted 
(113 voluntary 
items derived 
mainly from 
Voluntary 
Ownership structure, 
family ownership 
and control 
For Hong Kong companies, the overall 
mean disclosure is 12.23% and the extent 
of disclosure varies from 9.77% for 
financial information to 18.49% for 
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companies listed in 
Singapore Stock 
Exchange in 1997. 
Meek et al. 
(1995) index 
strategic information, with 10.49% 
disclosure for non-financial information. 
For Singapore companies, the overall 
mean disclosure is 13.83% and the extent 
of disclosure varies from 10.68% for 
financial information to 16.76% for non-
financial information with 16% disclosure 
for strategic information. 
Level of voluntary disclosure with the 
exception of non-financial information, is 
approximately similar for companies in 
both countries. 
The results of the regression analysis 
explains the variation in the level of 
voluntary disclosure by 42% for HK and 
72% for Singapore.  
The results suggest that there is a 
significant, positive relationship between 
wider ownership and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in both HK and 
Singapore companies, and there was a 
negative relationship between family 
ownership or control and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Archambaul
t & 
Archambaul
t (2003) 
37 
countries 
761 companies 
listed in scrutinised 
countries' stock 
exchanges in 1992 
and 1993 
Unweighted 
(85 items) Aggregate  
Culture 
 National, political 
and economic 
systems, 
 Corporate financial 
and 
operating system. 
-The average total disclosure was 75.69%, 
with a range from 16% to 94% 
- Culture, national, political, economic 
systems, corporate financial and operating 
system affect disclosure practices. 
Ali et al. 
(2004) 
Bangladish 
Pakistan 
India 
566 companies 
(118 from 
Bangladesh; 229 
from Pakistan and 
219 from India) for 
the year 1998 
Unweighted 
(131 items 
require by 14 
national 
accounting 
standards) 
Mandatory 
Firm size 
Profitability 
Multinational 
company Status 
Leverage 
Quality of external 
auditor 
Level of compliance is 80% for the whole 
sample (81% for Pakistan, 79% for 
Indiaand 78% for Bangladesh) 
The highest level of compliance was 
found for standards relating to 
depreciation, inventories and property, 
plant and equipment standards regarding 
leases and accounting borrowing costs 
had the lowest level of compliance. 
Compliance with disclosure requirements 
is positively associated with firm size, 
profitability, and multinational company 
status, however, it is not associated with 
leverage and quality of external auditor. 
 
Al-
Shammari et 
al. (2008) 
Gulf Co-
Operation 
Council 
(GCC) 
member 
states 
(Saudi 
Arabia, 
Qatar, 
Bahrain, 
UAE, 
Kuwait 
and 
Oman). 
137 GCC 
companies during 
the period 1997-
2002 
Un-weighted 
(self-
constructed 
measurement 
and disclosure 
indices for 
each year- 
ranging from 
160 items (128 
disclosure and 
32 
measurement 
items in 1997 
to 220 items in 
2002- 185 
disclosure and 
35 
measurement). 
 
Mandatory 
 
Country of origin 
Company size 
Internationality 
Ownership diffusion 
Company age 
Industry 
Leverage 
The level of mandatory compliance 
(measurement and disclosure) with the 14 
IASs, averaged over all companies and all 
years, was 0.75. Themean level of 
disclosure compliance was 0.69 and 
measurement compliance was 0.81. 
The level of compliance with IASs differs 
between the GCC member states. The 
highest average compliance level over all 
years sampled is found in the UAE (0.80). 
This is followed by Saudi Arabia (0.78), 
Kuwait (0.75), Oman (0.74), Bahrain 
(0.73), and Qatar (0.70). 
There is significant variation between 
countries  and among companies levels of 
compliance based on size, leverage, 
internationality, and industry. 
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Appendix 2: Disclosure Checklist 
No Item Reference Disclosure Requirement Effective Date Investigation in Prior Research 
  IFRS 3 Business Combinations 31/3/2004   
    Disclosures for Business combinations effected during the period      
1 IFRS 3.67(a) The names and descriptions of the combining entities or businesses   First time 
2 IFRS 3.67(b) The acquisition date   First time 
3 IFRS 3.67(c) The percentage of voting equity instruments acquired   First time 
4 IFRS 3.67(d) The cost of the combination   First time 
5 IFRS 3.67(d) A description of the components of that cost   First time 
6 IFRS 3.70(a) The revenue of the combined entity for the period    First time 
7 IFRS 3.70(b) The profit or loss of the combined entity for the period    First time 
  Changes in the carrying amount of goodwill   
  IFRS 3.75 The entity shall disclose a reconciliation of the carrying amount of goodwill at the beginning and end of the period, showing separately:     
8 IFRS 3.75(a) The gross amount at the beginning of the period   First time   
9 IFRS 3.75(a) Accumulated impairment losses at the beginning of the period   First time    
10 IFRS 3.75(b) Additional goodwill recognised during the period   First time   
11 IFRS 3.75(e) Impairment losses recognised during the period    First time   
  Sub-index (1) Total       
  IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements 1/1/2005   
    Components of financial statements     
12 IAS 1.8(a) A balance sheet   First time 
13 IAS 1.8(b) An income statement   First time 
14 IAS 1.8(c) A statement of changes in equity    First time 
15 IAS 1.8(d) A cash flow statement   First time 
16 IAS 1.8(e) Notes, comprising a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory notes   First time 
    Fair presentation and compliance with IFRSs     
17 IAS 1.14 The financial statements shall include an explicit and unreserved statement of compliance with IFRSs in the notes 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
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    Going concern     
 IAS 1.23 When the financial statements are not prepared on a going concern basis, the company shall disclose the following:   
18 IAS 1.23 That fact   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
19 IAS 1.23 The basis on which the financial statements are prepared    Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
20 IAS 1.23 The reason why the entity is not considered to be a going concern   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
    Comparative information     
21 IAS 1.36 Comparative information shall be disclosed in respect of the previous period for all amounts reported in the financial statements   
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
    Identification of the financial statements     
22 IAS 1.44 The financial statements shall be identified clearly and distinguished from other information in the annual report    First time 
  IAS 1.46 The following information shall be displayed prominently:     
23 IAS 1.46(a) The name of the reporting entity   First time 
24 IAS 1.46(b) Whether the financial statements cover the individual entity or a group accounts   
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
25 IAS 1.46(c) The balance sheet date or the period covered by the financial statements   First time 
26 IAS 1.46(d) The presentation currency   
Al-Mulhem,  1997; 
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
27 IAS 1.46(e) The level of rounding for amounts presented in the financial statements   First time 
    Balance sheet     
    Current/non-current distinction     
28 IAS 1.51 
An entity shall present current and non-current assets, and current and non-
current liabilities, as separate classifications on the face of the balance sheet 
except when a presentation is based on liquidity 
  
Al-Mulhem,  1997; 
Hope, 2003; Naser & 
Nuseibeh, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
28 IAS 1.51 
If the presentation is based on liquidity, assets and liabilities shall be 
presented broadly in order of their liquidity (either in increasing or 
decreasing order of liquidity) 
  First time 
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29 IAS 1.52 
An entity shall disclose the amount expected to be recovered or settled after 
more than twelve months, for each asset and liability line item that combines 
amounts expected to be recovered or settled (a) no more than twelve months 
after the balance sheet date, and (b) more than twelve months after the 
balance sheet date 
  First time 
    Information to be presented on the face of the balance sheet:     
30 IAS 1.68(a) Property, plant and equipment   First time 
31 IAS 1.68(b) Investment property   First time 
32 IAS 1.68(c) Intangible assets   
Cooke, 1989a; Gray et 
al., 1995; Al-Mulhem, 
1997; Camfferman & 
Cooke, 2002; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
33 IAS 1.68(d) Financial assets other than investments accounted for using the equity method; trade and other receivables; cash and cash equivalents   
Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002; Omar, 2007 
34 IAS 1.68(e) Investments accounted for using the equity method    First time 
35 IAS 1.68(f) Biological assets   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002;  Hooks et al., 
2002Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Hope, 2003; Naser & 
Nuseibeh, 2003;Omar, 
2007 
36 IAS 1.68(g) Inventories   First time 
37 IAS 1.68(h) Trade and other receivables   First time 
38 IAS 1.68(i) Cash and cash equivalents   
Cooke, 1989a;Al-
Mulhem,  1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002;  Hooks et al., 
2002Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Hope, 2003; Naser & 
Nuseibeh, 2003;Omar, 
2007 
39 IAS 1.68(j) Trade and other payables   First time 
40 IAS 1.68(k) Provisions   First time 
41 IAS 1.68(l) Financial liabilities other than trade and other payables and provisions   First time 
42 IAS 1.68(o) Minority interest (shareholding<5% according to compulsory disclosure requirements in investigated MENA Jurisdictions), presented with equity   
Cooke, 1989a; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; 
Alshiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
43 IAS 1.68(p) Issued capital attributable to equity holders of the parent   First time 
44 IAS 1.68(p) Reserves attributable to equity holders of the parent    First time 
45 IAS 1.68A(a) The total of assets classified as held for sale and assets included in disposal groups classified as held for sale   First time 
46 IAS 1.68A(b) Liabilities included in disposal groups classified as held for sale   First time 
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  IAS 1.74; IAS 1.75 
Information to be disclosed either on the face of the balance sheet or in 
the notes     
47 IAS 1.75 Items of property, plant and equipment are disaggregated into classes   
Stanga, 1976; Cooke, 
1989a; Cooke, 1989b; 
Hooks et al., 2002; 
Naser & Nuseibeh, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
  IAS 1.75 Receivables are disaggregated into:    
48 IAS 1.75 Amounts receivable from trade customers     First time 
49 IAS 1.75 Receivables from related parties    First time 
50 IAS 1.75 Prepayments    First time 
51 IAS 1.75 Other amounts   First time 
  IAS 1.75 Inventories are sub-classified (in accordance with IAS 2, Inventories) into classifications such as:   
Cooke, 1989b; 
Zarzeski, 1996; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfermman& Cooke, 
2002, Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Omar, 2007 
52 IAS 1.75 Merchandise     
53 IAS 1.75 Production supplies     
54 IAS 1.75 Materials     
55 IAS 1.75 Work in progress      
56 IAS 1.75 Finished goods     
  IAS 1.75 provisions are disaggregated into:    
57 IAS 1.75 Provisions for employee benefits    First time 
58 IAS 1.75 Other items   First time 
  IAS 1.75 Contributed equity and reserves are disaggregated into various classes, such as:     
59 IAS 1.75 Paid-in capital   First time  
60 IAS 1.75 Share premium    First time 
61 IAS 1.75 Reserves   First time 
  IAS 1.76(a) The entity shall disclose the following, either on the face of the balance sheet or in the notes for each class of share capital:     
62 IAS 1.76(a) i)  The number of shares authorised   
Cooke, 1989a; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
63 IAS 1.76(a) ii) The number of shares issued and fully paid    
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
64 IAS 1.76(a) ii) Issued but not fully paid   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
65 IAS 1.76(a) iii)   Par value per share, or that the shares have no par value   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
66 IAS 1.76(a) iv)  A reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the beginning and at the end of the period   
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
67 IAS 1.76(a) v)  The rights, preferences and restrictions attaching to that class   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
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 IAS 1.76(a) Shares in the entity held by:   
68 IAS 1.76(a) vi)  The entity itself    First time 
69 IAS 1.76(a) vi) Subsidiaries    First time 
70 IAS 1.76(a) vi) Associates   First time 
71 IAS 1.76(a vii) Shares reserved for issue under options and contracts for the sale of shares; and   
Zarzeski, 1996; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
72 IAS 1.76(b) A description of the nature of each reserve within equity   
Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
73 IAS 1.76(b) A description of the purpose of each reserve within equity   
Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
    Income statement     
    Information to be presented on the face of the income statement     
74 1.81(a) Revenue   
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfermman & 
Cooke, 2002; Al-Shiab, 
2003; Omar; 2007 
75 1.81(b) Finance costs;   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
76 1.81(c) Share of profit or loss of associates accounted for using the equity method    First time 
77 1.81(c) Share of profit or loss of joint ventures accounted for using the equity method   First time 
78 1.81(f) Profit or loss   First time 
    Allocations of profit or loss for the period as follows:     
79 1.82(a) Profit or loss attributable to minority interest   Cooke, 1989a; Hope, 2003; Omar, 2007 
80 1.82(b) Profit or loss attributable to equity holders of the parent   First time 
    Information to be presented either on the face of the income statement or in the notes     
81 IAS 1.93 If expenses are classified by function, the entity shall disclose additional information on the nature of expenses   First time 
82 IAS 1.95 
The amount of dividends recognised as distributions to equity holders during 
the period (this information can also be disclosed on the face of the statement 
of changes in equity) 
  Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Omar, 2007 
83 IAS 1.95 The related amount per share   First time 
    Statement of changes in equity     
    Information to be presented on the face of the statement of changes in equity     
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84 IAS 1.96(a) Profit or loss for the period   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
85 IAS 1.96(b) Each item of income and expense for the period that is recognised directly in equity    
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
86 IAS 1.96(b) The total of these items    Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007  
87 IAS 1.96(c) Total income and expense for the period (calculated as the sum of (a) and (b)   First time 
88 IAS 1.96(c) 
Total income and expense for the period (calculated as the sum of (a) and 
(b)), showing separately the total amounts attributable to equity holders of the 
parent and to minority interest 
  First time 
    Information to be presented either on the face of the statement of changes in equity or in the notes     
89 IAS 1.97(a) The amounts of transactions with equity holders acting in their capacity as equity holders   
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
90 IAS 1.97(b) The balance of retained earnings (i.e. accumulated profit or loss) at the beginning of the period    First time 
91 IAS 1.97(b) The balance of retained earnings at the balance sheet date   First time 
92 IAS 1.97(b) The changes during the period   First time 
    Notes     
    The notes shall:     
93 IAS 1.103(a) Present information about the basis of preparation of the financial statements   First time 
94 IAS 1.104 Each item on the face of the balance sheet shall be cross-referenced to any related information in the notes   First time 
95 IAS 1.104 Each item on the face of the income statement shall be cross-referenced to any related information in the notes   First time 
96 IAS 1.104 Each item on the face of the statement of changes in equity shall be cross-referenced to any related information in the notes   First time 
97 IAS 1.104 Each item on the face of the cash flow statement shall be cross-referenced to any related information in the notes   First time 
    Disclosure of accounting policies     
98 IAS 1.108(a) The measurement basis (or bases) used in preparing the financial statements   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
99 IAS 1.108(b) The other accounting policies used that are relevant to understanding of the financial statements 
 
 
 
 
 
  
First time 
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    Key sources of estimation uncertainty     
100 IAS 1.116 Key assumptions concerning the future   First time 
101 IAS 1.116 
Other key sources of estimation uncertainty at the balance sheet date that 
have a significant risk of causing a material adjustment to the carrying 
amounts of assets and liabilities within the next financial year 
  First time 
  For such assets and liabilities, the notes shall include details of:   
102 IAS 1.116(a) Their nature   First time 
103 IAS 1.116(b) Their carrying amount as at the balance sheet date   First time 
    Capital     
104 IAS 1.124B(a) i)  A description of what the entity manages as capital   First time 
105 IAS 1.124B(a) ii)  When an entity is subject to externally imposed capital requirements, the nature of those requirements    First time 
106 IAS 1.124B(a) ii) How those requirements are incorporated into the management of capital   First time 
107 IAS 1.124B(a) iii)  How it is meeting its objectives for managing capital   First time 
108 IAS 1.124B(b) Summary quantitative data about what it manages as capital   First time 
109 IAS 1.124B(c) Any changes in 124B (a) and 124B (b) (see above) from the previous period   First time 
    Other disclosures     
110 
IAS 1.125(a) 
The amount of dividends proposed or declared before the financial statements 
were authorised for issue but not recognised as a distribution to equity 
holders during the period 
  Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 200 ; IAS 10.13 
111 IAS 1.125(a) The related amount per share   First time 
    An entity shall disclose the following, if not disclosed elsewhere in information published with the financial statements:     
112 IAS 1.126(a) The domicile    
Abd-Elsalam,1999; Al-
Shiab,2003; Makhija & 
Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
113 IAS 1.126(a) Legal form of the entity   
Abd-Elsalam,1999; Al-
Shiab,2003; Makhija & 
Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
114 IAS 1.126(a) Its country of incorporation    
Abd-Elsalam,1999; Al-
Shiab,2003; Makhija & 
Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
115 
IAS 1.126(b) 
A description of the nature of the entity’s operations and its principal 
activities   
Al-Mulhem,1997;  
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Hooks et al., 2002;  
Singleton  & 
Globerman, 2002; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Naser & 
Nuseibeh, 2003; Omar, 
IAS 24.12 
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2007 
116 
IAS 1.126(c) 
The name of the parent entity   
Abd-Elsalam, 
1999;Makhija &Patton, 
2004; Omar, 2007 IAS 24.12 
117 IAS 1.126(c) The ultimate parent of the group   
Abd-Elsalam, 
1999;Makhija &Patton, 
2004; Omar, 2007 
  Sub-index (2) Total       
  IAS 2 Inventories 1/1/2005   
118 IAS 2.36(a) The accounting policies adopted in measuring inventories   
Cooke, 1989a; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
119 IAS 2.36(b) The total carrying amount of inventories   
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002;  Hooks et al., 
2002; Hope, 
2003;Omar, 2007 
120 IAS 2.36(c) The carrying amount of inventories carried at fair value less costs to sell   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003 Omar, 
2007 
121 IAS 2.36(d) The amount of inventories recognised as an expense during the period   First time 
122 IAS 2.36(e) The amount of any write-down of inventories recognised as an expense in the period   First time 
123 IAS 2.36(h) The carrying amount of inventories pledged as security for liabilities   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003 Omar, 
2007 
  Sub-index (3) Total       
  IAS 7 Cash Flow Statements 1/1/1994   
    Classification of cash flows     
124 IAS 7.10 Cash flows during the period are classified by operating, investing and financing activities   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar 
2007 
    Reporting cash flows from investing and financing activities     
125 IAS 7.21 An entity shall report separately major classes of gross cash receipts and gross cash payments arising from investing and financing activities   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Omar, 2007 
    Foreign currency cash flows     
126 IAS 7.28 
The effect of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents held or due 
in a foreign currency is presented separately from cash flows from operating, 
investing and financing activities 
  Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Omar, 2007 
    Interest and dividends     
127 IAS 7.31 Cash flows arising from interest and dividends received and paid shall each be disclosed separately   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Omar, 2007 
    Acquisitions and disposals of subsidiaries and other business units     
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128 IAS 7.39 The aggregate cash flows arising from acquisitions and from disposals of subsidiaries or other business units shall be presented separately    
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Omar, 2007 
129 IAS 7.39 The aggregate cash flows arising from acquisitions and from disposals of subsidiaries or other business units shall be classified as investing activities   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Omar, 2007 
    
An entity shall disclose, in aggregate, in respect of both acquisitions and 
disposals of subsidiaries or other business units during the period, each 
of the following: 
    
130 IAS 7.40(a) The total purchase or disposal consideration   First time 
131 IAS 7.40(b) The portion of the purchase or disposal consideration discharged by means of cash and cash equivalents   First time 
132 IAS 7.40(c) The amount of cash and cash equivalents in the subsidiary or business unit acquired or disposed of   First time 
133 IAS 7.40(d) 
The amount of the assets and liabilities other than cash or cash equivalents in 
the subsidiary or business unit acquired or disposed of, summarised by each 
major category 
  First time 
    Components of cash and cash equivalents     
134 IAS 7.45 An entity shall disclose the components of cash and cash equivalents   First time 
  Sub-index (4) Total       
  IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 1/1/2005   
    Disclosing changes in accounting policies     
    
When an initial application of a Standard or an Interpretation has an 
effect on the current period or any prior period, however it is 
impracticable to determine the amount of the adjustment, or might have 
an effect on future periods, an entity shall disclose: 
    
135 IAS 8.28(a) The title of the Standard or Interpretation   First time 
136 IAS 8.28(c) The nature of the change in accounting policy   First time 
  IAS 8.28(f) For the current period and each prior period presented, to the extent practicable, the amount of the adjustment:     
137 IAS 8.28(f) i)   For each financial statement line item affected   First time 
138 IAS 8.28(f) ii)  For basic earnings per share   First time 
139 IAS 8.28(f) ii) For diluted earnings per share   First time 
140 IAS 8.28(g) The amount of the adjustment relating to periods before those presented   First time 
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  IAS 8.29(c) 
When a voluntary change in accounting policy has an effect on the 
current period or any prior period however it is impracticable to 
determine the amount of the adjustment, or might have an effect on 
future periods, an entity shall disclose for the current period and each 
prior period presented, to the extent practicable, the amount of the 
adjustment: 
  
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
141 IAS 8.29(c) i)  For each financial statement line item affected   First time 
142 IAS 8.29(c) ii)  For basic earnings per share   First time 
143 IAS 8.29(c) ii) For diluted earnings per share   First time 
144 IAS 8.29(d) The amount of the adjustment relating to periods before those presented   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
    Disclosing the effect of a change in accounting estimate     
145 IAS 8.39 The nature of a change in an accounting estimate that has an effect in the current period or which is expected to have an effect in future periods   First time 
146 IAS 8.39 The amount of a change in an accounting estimate that has an effect in the current period or which is expected to have an effect in future periods   First time 
147 IAS 8.40 If the amount of the effect in future periods is not disclosed because estimating it is impracticable, the entity shall disclose that fact   First time 
  Sub-index (5) Total       
  IAS 11 Construction Contracts 1/1/1995   
    An entity shall disclose each of the following for contracts in progress at the balance sheet date:     
148 IAS 11.40(a) The aggregate amount of costs incurred and    
 Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
149 IAS 11.40(a) Recognised profits (less recognised losses) to date   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
150 IAS 11.40(b) The amount of advances received   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
151 IAS 11.40(c) The amount of retentions   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
152 IAS 11.42(a) The gross amount due from customers for contract work is presented as an asset   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
153 IAS 11.42(b) The gross amount due to customers for contract work is presented as a liability   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
  Sub-index (6) Total 
  
 
 
 
    
  IAS 14 Segment Reporting 1/7/1998    
    Disclosures for primary reporting format     
154 IAS 14.51 Segment revenue for each reportable segment   First time 
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155 IAS 14.51 
For each reportable segment, reporting separately segment revenue from 
sales to external customers and segment revenue from transactions with other 
segments 
  First time 
156 IAS 14.52 Segment result for each reportable segment   First time 
157 IAS 14.52 For each reportable segment, reporting separately segment result from continuing operations and segment result from discontinued operations   First time 
158 IAS 14.55 The total carrying amount of segment assets for each reportable segment   First time 
159 IAS 14.57 
The total cost incurred during the period to acquire segment assets that are 
expected to be used during more than one period (property, plant, equipment, 
and intangible assets for each reportable segment) 
  First time 
160 IAS 14.58 The total amount of expense included in segment result for depreciation and amortisation of segment assets for the period for each reportable segment   First time 
  IAS 14.67 
An entity shall present a reconciliation between the information 
disclosed for reportable segments and the aggregated information in the 
consolidated or individual financial statements, which includes a 
reconciliation of: 
    
161 IAS 14.67 Segment revenue to entity revenue from external customers    First time 
  IAS 14.67 Segment result from continuing operations to:     
162 IAS 14.67  i)    A comparable measure of entity operating profit or loss from continuing operations     First time 
163 IAS 14.67 ii)   Entity profit or loss from continuing operations   First time 
164 IAS 14.67 Segment result from discontinued operations to entity profit or loss from discontinued operations   First time 
165 IAS 14.67 Segment assets to entity assets   First time 
166 IAS 14.67 Segment liabilities to entity liabilities   First time 
167  IAS 14.81 The types of products and services included in each reported business segment   First time 
168  IAS 14.81 The composition of each reported geographical segment   First time 
  Sub-index (7) Total   
  
 
 
 
  
  IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment 1/1/2005   
    The financial statements shall disclose, for each class of property, plant and equipment:     
169 IAS 16.73(a) The measurement bases used for determining the gross carrying amount   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
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170 IAS 16.73(b) The depreciation methods used   
Firth, 1980; Firth, 
1984; Cooke, 1989b; 
Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Hooks et al., 2002; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Makhija& 
Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
171 IAS 16.73(c) The useful lives or the depreciation rates used   
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002; Hooks et al., 
2002; Al-Shiab, 2003; 
Omar, 2007 
172 IAS 16.73(d) The gross carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period    First time 
173 IAS 16.73(d) The accumulated depreciation (aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning and end of the period   First time 
  IAS 16.73(e) a reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period showing:     
174 IAS 16.73(e) i)  Additions   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
175 IAS 16.73(e) ii) Assets classified as held for sale or included in a disposal group classified as held for sale    
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
176 IAS 16.73(e) iii) Acquisitions through business combinations   First time 
177 IAS 16.73(e) iv) Increases or decreases resulting from revaluations     First time 
178 
IAS 16.73(e) 
iv) Decreases resulting from impairment losses recognized directly in equity    First time 
IAS 36.126 (c) 
179 
IAS 16.73(e) 
v)  Impairment losses recognised in profit or loss   First time 
IAS 36.126 (a) 
180 
IAS 16.73(e) 
vi)  Impairment losses reversed in profit or loss in accordance with IAS 36   First time 
IAS 36.126 (b) 
181 IAS 16.73(e) vii) Depreciation   First time 
182 IAS 16.73(e) viii) The net exchange differences arising on the translation of the financial statements from the functional currency into a different presentation currency   First time 
183 IAS 16.74(a) The existence of restrictions on title, and property, plant and equipment pledged as security for liabilities   
Camfermman & 
Cooke, 2002; Makhija 
& Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
184 IAS 16.74(a) Amounts of restrictions on title   
Camfermman & 
Cooke, 2002; Makhija 
& Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
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185 IAS 16.74(b) The amount of expenditures recognised in the carrying amount of an item of property, plant and equipment in the course of its construction   
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
186 IAS 16.74(c) The amount of contractual commitments for the acquisition of property, plant and equipment   First time 
    Assets carried at revalued amounts     
187 IAS 16.77(a) The effective date of the revaluation   First time 
188 IAS 16.77(b) Whether an independent valuer was involved   First time 
189 IAS 16.77(c) The methods and significant assumptions applied in estimating the items’ fair values   First time 
190 IAS 16.77(e) 
For each revalued class of property, plant and equipment, the carrying 
amount that would have been recognised had the assets been carried under 
the cost model 
  First time 
  Sub-index (8) Total       
  IAS 18 Revenue 1/1/2005   
191 IAS 18.35(a) The accounting policies adopted for the recognition of revenue   
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
  IAS 18.35(b) The amount of revenues arising from:     
192 IAS 18.35(b) i) The sale of goods   
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfermman, & 
Cooke, 2002; Al-Shiab, 
2003,; Omar, 2007 
193 IAS 18.35(b) ii)  The rendering of services   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
194 IAS 18.35(b) iii)  Interest   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
195 IAS 18.35(b) v)   Dividends   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
  Sub-index (9) Total       
  IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 1/1/2005   
196 IAS 21.52(a) The amount of exchange differences recognised in profit or loss   First time 
197 IAS 21.52(b) Net exchange differences classified in a separate component of equity   First time 
198 IAS 21.52(b) A reconciliation of the amount of such exchange differences at the beginning and end of the period   First time 
  Sub-index (10) Total 
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  IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 1/1/1995   
    Disclosures required where the benchmark treatment  (expensing of borrowing costs) is adopted     
199 IAS 23.9 The accounting policy adopted for borrowing costs   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
    Disclosures required where the allowed alternative treatment (capitalization of borrowing costs) is adopted     
199 IAS 23.29(a) The accounting policy adopted for borrowing costs   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
200 IAS 23.29(b) The amount of borrowing costs capitalised during the period   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Hooks et al., 2002; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
201 IAS 23.29(c) The capitalisation rate used to determine the amount of borrowing costs eligible for capitalisation   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
  Sub-index (11) Total       
  IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 1/1/2005   
202 IAS 24.13 Disclosing the related party relationship when control exists, irrespective of whether there have been related party transactions   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Omar, 2007 
    Compensation of key management personnel     
203 IAS 24.16 Disclosing key management personnel compensation in total   First time 
   IAS 24.16 An entity shall disclose key management personnel compensation for each of the following categories:     
204 IAS 24.16(d) Termination benefits   First time 
205 IAS 24.16(e) Share-based payment   First time 
    Transactions between related parties     
206 IAS 24.17 The nature of the related party relationship   First time 
207 IAS 24.17(a) The amount of the transactions   First time 
208 IAS 24.17(b) The amount of the outstanding balances   First time 
209 IAS 24.17(b) i)  Their terms and conditions, including whether they are secured ` First time 
210 IAS 24.17(b) i) The nature of the consideration to be provided in settlement   First time 
211 IAS 24.17(b) ii)  Details of any guarantees given or received   First time 
212 IAS 24.17(c) Provisions for doubtful debts related to the amount of outstanding balances   First time 
  Sub-index (12) Total       
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  IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 1/1/2005   
    Minority interests     
213 IAS 27.33 Minority interests shall be presented in the consolidated balance sheet within equity, separately from the parent shareholders' equity   First time 
214 IAS 27.33 Minority interests in the profit or loss of the group shall be separately disclosed   First time 
  Sub-index (13) Total       
  IAS 28 Investments in Associates 1/1/2005   
215 IAS 28.37(a) Disclosing the fair value of investments in associates for which there are published price quotations   First time 
  IAS 28.37(b) Summarised financial information of associates, including the aggregated amounts of:     
216 IAS 28.37(b) Assets   First time 
217 IAS 28.37(b) Liabilities   First time 
218 IAS 28.37(b) Revenues and   First time 
219 IAS 28.37(b) Profit or loss   First time 
220 IAS 28.37(h) h)The fact that an associate is not accounted for using the equity method   First time 
  IAS 28.37(i) 
Summarised financial information of associates, either individually or in 
groups, that are not accounted for using the equity method, including the 
amounts of: 
    
221 IAS 28.37(i) Total assets   First time 
222 IAS 28.37(i) Total liabilities   First time 
223 IAS 28.37(i) Revenues and   First time 
224 IAS 28.37(i) Profit or loss   First time 
225 IAS 28.40(a) Investor share of the contingent liabilities of an associate incurred jointly with other investors   First time 
226 IAS 28.40(b) Contingent liabilities that arise because the investor is severally liable for all or part of the liabilities of the associate   First time 
  Sub-index (14) Total   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures 1/1/2005   
227 IAS 31.30,34 
The venturer may combine its share of each of the assets, liabilities, income 
and expenses of the jointly controlled entity with the similar items, line by 
line, in its financial statements; or 
  First time 
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227 IAS 31.30,34 
The venturer may include separate line items for its share of the assets, 
liabilities, income and expenses of the jointly controlled entity in its financial 
statements 
  
First time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Disclosures     
228 IAS 31.54(a) Any contingent liabilities that the venturer has incurred in relation to its interests in joint ventures   First time 
229 IAS 31.54(a) Its share in each of the contingent liabilities that have been incurred jointly with other venturers   First time 
230 IAS 31.55(a) Any capital commitments of the venturer in relation to its interests in joint ventures   First time 
231 31.55(a) Venturer share in the capital commitments that have been incurred jointly with other venturers;    First time 
232 IAS 31.55(b) Venturer share of the capital commitments of the joint ventures themselves   First time 
233 IAS 31.56 The proportion of ownership interest held in each of its jointly controlled entities   First time 
234 IAS 31.57 The method venturer uses to recognise its interests in jointly controlled entities   First time 
  Sub-index (15) Total       
  IAS 33 Earnings per Share 1/1/2005   
    Retrospective adjustments     
235 IAS 33.64 
If the number of ordinary or potential ordinary shares outstanding increases 
as a result of a capitalisation or bonus issue or share split, or decreases as a 
result of a reverse share split, the calculation of basic earnings per share for 
all periods presented shall be adjusted retrospectively 
   Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
236 IAS 33.64 
If the number of ordinary or potential ordinary shares outstanding increases 
as a result of a capitalisation or bonus issue or share split, or decreases as a 
result of a reverse share split, the calculation of diluted earnings per share for 
all periods presented shall be adjusted retrospectively 
  Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
  IAS 33.68 An entity that reports a discontinued operation shall disclose:     
237 IAS 33.68 The basic amounts per share for the discontinued operation either on the face of the income statement or in the notes   First time 
238 IAS 33.68 The diluted amounts per share for the discontinued operation either on the face of the income statement or in the notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
First time 
    Disclosures     
239 IAS 33.70(a) The amounts used as the numerators in calculating basic earnings per share;   
Street & Gray, 2002; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
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240 IAS 33.70(a) The amounts used as the numerators in calculating diluted earnings per share   
Street & Gray, 2002; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
241 IAS 33.70(b) The weighted average number of ordinary shares used as the denominator in calculating basic earnings per share   
Street & Gray, 2002; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
242 IAS 33.70(b) The weighted average number of ordinary shares used as the denominator in calculating  diluted earnings per share   
Street & Gray, 2002; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Hope, 
2003; Omar, 2007 
243 IAS 33.70(b) A reconciliation of these denominators to each other   First time 
  Sub-index (16) Total       
  IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
First annual 
period 
beginning on 
or after 31 /3/ 
2004 
  
244 IAS 36.126(a) For each class of assets the line item(s) of the income statement in which those impairment losses are included   
AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
    Entities reporting segment information     
245 IAS 36.129(a) The amount of impairment losses recognised during the period   First time 
  Sub-index (17) Total       
  IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 1/1/1999   
    Information to be disclosed for each class of provision     
246 IAS 37.84(a) The carrying amount at the beginning    
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
247 IAS 37.84(a) The carrying amount at the end of the period   
Abd-Elsalam, 1999; 
Al-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
248 IAS 37.84(b) Additional provisions made in the period   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
249 IAS 37.84(c) Amounts used (i.e. incurred and charged against the provision) during the period   
AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
250 IAS 37.84(d) Unused amounts reversed during the period   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
251 IAS 37.85(a) A brief description of the nature of the obligation    AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
252 IAS 37.85(a) The expected timing of any resulting outflows of economic benefits   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
253 IAS 37.85(b) An indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those outflows   
AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
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254 IAS 37.85(c) The amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of any asset that has been recognised for that expected reimbursement 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooke, 1989a,b; 
Raffournier, 1995; 
Zarzeski, 1996; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; 
Suwaidan, 1997; Abd-
Elsalam, 1999; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002; Hooks et al., 
2002; Hope, 2003; Al-
Shiab, 2003; Makhija 
& Patton, 2004; Omar, 
2007 
    Contingent liabilities     
255 IAS 37.86 A brief description of the nature of the contingent liability   First time 
256 IAS 37.86(b) An indication of the uncertainties relating to the amount or timing of any outflow   First time 
    Contingent assets     
257  IAS 37.89 A brief description of the nature of the contingent assets at the balance sheet date   First time 
  Sub-index (18) Total       
  IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
First annual 
period on or 
after 
31/3/2004 
  
    General disclosures      
258 IAS 38.118(a) Whether the useful lives are indefinite or finite   First time 
259 IAS 38.118(a) The useful lives or the amortisation rates used for intangible assets with finite useful lives   First time 
260 IAS 38.118(b) The amortisation methods used for intangible assets with finite useful lives   First time 
261 IAS 38.118(c) The gross carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
262 IAS 38.118(c) Any accumulated amortisation (aggregated with accumulated impairment losses) at the beginning and end of the period   
AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 
2007 
263 IAS 38.118(d) The line item(s) of the income statement in which any amortisation of intangible assets is included   
Cooke, 1989a,b; Al-
Mulhem, 1997; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002; Alshiab, 2003; 
Omar, 2007 
  IAS 38.118(e) A reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period showing:     
264 IAS 38.118(e) i)  Additions;   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
265 IAS 38.118(e) iii) Increases or decreases during the period resulting from revaluations   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
266 IAS 38.118(e) iii) Increases or decreases from impairment losses recognised or reversed directly in equity (if any) 
  
 
 
 
 
 AL-Shiab, 2003; 
Omar, 2007 
267 IAS 38.118(e) vi)  Any amortisation recognised during the period   AL-Shiab, 2003; Omar, 2007 
    Research and development expenditure     
268 IAS 38.126 The aggregate amount of research and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the period   First time 
306 
  Sub-index (19) Total       
  IAS 40 Investment Property  1/1/2005   
269 IAS 40.75(a) Whether the entity applies the fair value model or the cost model   First time 
270 IAS 40.75(d) The methods applied in determining the fair value of investment property   Omar, 2007 
271 IAS 40.75(d) Significant assumptions applied in determining the fair value of investment property   Omar, 2007 
  IAS 40.75(f) The amounts recognised in profit or loss for:     
272 IAS 40.75(f) i) Rental income from investment property   Omar, 2007 
273 IAS 40.75(f) ii) Direct operating expenses (including repairs and maintenance) arising from investment property that generated rental income during the period   Omar, 2007 
    If the entity measures investment property using the cost model because of the lack of a reliable fair value, an entity shall disclose:     
274 IAS 40.78(a) A description of the investment property   First time 
275 IAS 40.78(b) An explanation of why fair value cannot be reliably determined   First time 
  Sub-index (20) Total       
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Appendix 3: Names and Sectors of Scrutinised Egyptian and 
Jordanian Listed Companies  
 
Name of the Company Industry 
EGX 
Egyptian Electronics Technology Company Manufacturing 
Arab Ceramic Company Manufacturing 
Paints and Chemical Industries Manufacturing 
Oriental Weavers Carpet Manufacturing 
Egyptian Food Company Manufacturing 
Egyptian Iron and Steel Company Manufacturing 
Middle East Glass Manufacturing Company Manufacturing 
Amreyah Pharmaceutical Industries Manufacturing 
T3A Pharma Group Manufacturing 
International Agricultural Products Manufacturing 
Quena Paper Industry Company Manufacturing 
Memphis Company for Pharmaceuticals and 
Chemical Industries 
Manufacturing 
El Ezz Aldekhela Steel Manufacturing 
Engineering Industries Manufacturing 
Nile Clothing Company Manufacturing 
Egyptian International Pharmaceutical Industries 
Company 
Manufacturing 
Alexandria Portland Cement Company Manufacturing 
South Cairo and Giza Flour Mills Manufacturing 
AJWA for Food Industries - Middle East Manufacturing 
Cairo Cotton Center Manufacturing 
Samad Misr (Egyfert) Manufacturing 
General Company for Research and Groundwater Manufacturing 
Medical Union Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing 
Al Ezz Steel Rebars Manufacturing 
Middle East Paper Company - Egypt Manufacturing 
El Nasr Transformers and Electrical Products 
Company 
Manufacturing 
Lecico Egypt Manufacturing 
Al Ezz Ceramics and Porcelain Company Manufacturing 
 Kafr El Zayat Pesticides and Chemicals 
Company 
Manufacturing 
Abu Qir Fertilizers and Chemical Industries 
Company 
Manufacturing 
Sinai Cement Company Manufacturing 
Delta Sugar Company Manufacturing 
Cairo Oil and Soap Manufacturing 
Misr Glass Manufacturing Company Manufacturing 
National Cement Company - Egypt Manufacturing 
El Badr Plastic Manufacturing 
National Glass and Crystal Company Manufacturing 
National Gas Company - Egypt Manufacturing 
Egyptian Fibers Company Manufacturing 
General Engineering Industries Manufacturing 
Ismailia Misr Poultry Manufacturing 
Aluminium Company of Egypt Manufacturing 
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East Delta Flour Mills Manufacturing 
Electro Cable Egypt Manufacturing 
Misr Cement Company Manufacturing 
Egyptian Chemical Industries Manufacturing 
Misr Mechanical Projects Manufacturing 
Amreyah Cement Manufacturing 
National Company for Maize Products Manufacturing 
Development and Engineering Consultants Non-Manufacturing 
Egyptians Company for Housing Development  
Reconstruction 
Non-manufacturing 
Orascom Hotel Holdings Non-manufacturing 
International Company for Medical Investment Non-Manufacturing 
Cairo Housing and Development Company Non-manufacturing 
Egyptian Media Production City Non-manufacturing 
Heliopolis Housing and Development Company Non-manufacturing 
El Shams Hotels and Tourism Non-manufacturing 
T N Holdings for Investment Non-Manufacturing 
National Investment and Reconstruction 
Company 
Non-Manufacturing 
Palm Hills Developments Non-manufacturing 
National Company for Housing for Professional 
Syndicates 
Non-manufacturing 
Misr Hotels Company Non-Manufacturing 
Egyptian Real Estate Group Non-Manufacturing 
United Housing and Development Non-manufacturing 
Alexandria for Real Estate Investments Non-Manufacturing 
Contact Car Company Non-manufacturing 
National Navigation Company Non-Manufacturing 
Orascom Hotels and Development Non-manufacturing 
Al Ahly Real Estate Development Non-manufacturing 
Egypt Gas Company Non-Manufacturing 
El Gezirah Hotels and Tourism Company Non-manufacturing 
Egyptian Company for Mobile Services Non-manufacturing 
Egyptian Company for Tourim Resorts Non-manufacturing 
EI Wadi Export Company for AgriculturaI 
Products 
Non-Manufacturing 
Orascom Telecom Holding Non-manufacturing 
ASE 
Universal Modern Industries Company Manufacturing 
Arab Company for Investment Projects Manufacturing 
Comprehensive Multiple Projects Company Manufacturing 
Jordan Ceramic Industries Company Manufacturing 
Jordan Steel Manufacturing 
Arab Food and Medical Appliances Manufacturing 
Jordan Paper and Cardboard Factories Company Manufacturing 
Jordan Sulpho Chemicals Company Manufacturing 
Arab Potash Company Manufacturing 
Jordan Magnesia Company Manufacturing 
The Jordanian Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Hayat Pharmaceutical Industries Co. Manufacturing 
Dar AL Dawa Development & Investment Manufacturing 
The Arab Pesticides & Veterinary Drugs MFG. 
CO. 
Manufacturing 
The Industrial Commercial & Agricultural Manufacturing 
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Company 
Universal Chemical Industries Manufacturing 
Industrial Industries & Match/JIMCO Manufacturing 
Union Advanced Industries Manufacturing 
National Poultry Manufacturing 
Nutri Dar Manufacturing 
Amana for AGR.& Industrial Investment Manufacturing 
Jordan Vegetable Oil Industries Manufacturing 
First National Vegetable Oil Industries Co. Manufacturing 
Jordan Poultry Processing & Marketing Manufacturing 
General Investment Manufacturing 
AL-Qaria Food & Vegetable Oil Industries Co. 
P.L.C 
Manufacturing 
Travertine Company LTD Manufacturing 
General Mining Company PLC Manufacturing 
Arab Aluminium Industry /ARAL Manufacturing 
National Steel Industry Manufacturing 
Jordan Phosphate Mines Manufacturing 
The Jordan Cement Factories Manufacturing 
Assas for Concrete Products Co.LTD Manufacturing 
The Jordan Pipes Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Middle East Specialised Cables Company Manufacturing 
Arab Electrical Industries Manufacturing 
Real Estate Development Non-manufacturing 
Amad Investment and Real Estate Development 
Company 
Non-manufacturing 
Union Land Development Corporation Non-manufacturing 
Jordanian Duty Free Shops Non-manufacturing 
Unified Transport and Logistics Company Non-manufacturing 
Irbid District Electricity Company Non-manufacturing 
Jordanian Real Estate Company for Development Non-manufacturing 
Arab International Company for Education and 
Investment 
Non-manufacturing 
Jordan Telecom Group Non-manufacturing 
Al Faris National Company for Investment and 
Export 
Non-Manufacturing 
Jordan Press and Publishing Company Non-manufacturing 
United Group Holdings - Jordan Non-Manufacturing 
Jordan Express Tourist Transport Non-manufacturing 
Ittihad Schools Non-manufacturing 
Zarka Education and Investment Company Non-manufacturing 
Zara Investment (Holding) Company Non-Manufacturing 
Jordan International Trading Centre Non-manufacturing 
AL-Isra for Education and Investment "PLC" Non-manufacturing 
Petra Education Company Non-manufacturing 
Philadelphia International Educational Investment 
Company 
Non-manufacturing 
AL- Sharq Investment Projects (Holding) Non-manufacturing 
Jordan Hotels & Tourism Non-manufacturing 
AL-Rakaez Investment Co. Non-manufacturing 
Arab International Hotels Non-manufacturing 
AL-Tajamouat for Touristic Projects Co. PLC Non-manufacturing 
Mediterranean Tourism Investment Non-manufacturing 
Masafat for Specialised Transport Non-manufacturing 
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Jordan National Shipping Lines Non-manufacturing 
Salam International Transport & Trading Non-manufacturing 
Trust International Transport Non-manufacturing 
Bindar Trading & Investment Co . P.L.C Non-manufacturing 
Offtec Holding Group PLC Non-manufacturing 
AL Ahlia Enterprises Non-manufacturing 
Specialised Investment Compounds Non-manufacturing 
Arab East for Real Estate Investments Co Non-manufacturing 
Taameer Jordan Holdings Public Shareholding 
Company 
Non-manufacturing 
Arab Investors Union Co. for Real Estates 
Developments 
Non-manufacturing 
AL-Tajamouat for Catering and Housing Co. PLC Non-manufacturing 
Palaces Realestate & Development P.L.C Non-manufacturing 
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Appendix 4: Invitation Letter 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a PhD student at Aston Business School, Aston University, UK. My research 
study is entitled ‘Corporate Governance and Compliance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) - MENA Evidence’. You are being invited to take part 
in this research study.  Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. 
The main objective of my research is to investigate the extent of compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) disclosure requirements by 
companies listed on two of the best performing Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) stock exchanges; the Egyptian and Jordanian stock exchanges. In addition, 
this research aims to examine the influence of board independence, board leadership 
and ownership structure on the levels of compliance with the IFRSs by companies 
listed on the stock exchanges of both jurisdictions.  
To achieve the above mentioned research objectives a disclosure index and 
interviews will be employed as research methods.   
In general terms, the findings of this study are expected to be of interest to the 
national as well as the international community particularly stakeholders of the 
MENA region capital markets who are keen to know the strengths and weaknesses in 
disclosure practices among different MENA region capital markets. Furthermore, the 
findings of this study are not only of importance for current and potential investors 
but also are expected to provide regulators and policy-makers in each of the 
investigated capital markets with recent comprehensive evidence that is expected to 
enhance their knowledge about the position of their capital market among others 
within the region. This will help them to develop new approaches to reduce variation 
and strengthen enforcement mechanisms in order to improve financial disclosure 
practices within their markets and meet international best practices. With respect to 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) the findings of this study are 
expected to provide an insight regarding the levels of de facto compliance with 
disclosure requirements of IFRSs by a range of emerging capital markets that follow 
IASB issued standards. Additionally, this study intends to explore the underlying 
theoretical rationale of corporate financial disclosure in the scrutinised MENA region 
capital markets. 
I intend to conduct 40 interviews (20 in Egypt and 20 in Jordan). You have been 
chosen as one of the interviewees because of your position that relates to educating, 
practising, auditing, or enforcing the adoption of the IFRSs by companies listed on 
the stock exchange of your jurisdiction, or as a user of the annual reports of listed 
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companies in making investment decisions. The interview questions are related to the 
barriers to de facto compliance (i.e., compliance in practice) with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements and the influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of 
compliance with the IFRSs by listed companies. The interview is expected to take 
approximately thirty minutes and you are free to withdraw at any time from the 
interview. Furthermore, if you prefer me to take notes instead of tape recording, I 
will do so and you will have the right to review these to make sure that they really 
reflect your points of view and that no words are missing. I would be grateful if you 
accept to participate.  
You should know that the data collected will be treated confidentially and will be 
used only for research purposes. I guarantee anonymity. However, if you wish I 
could acknowledge your contribution in the thesis and in any related academic 
publications. Furthermore, if you wish I can send you an electronic copy of my thesis 
and of any other related publication. This will not be ready before the end of 2010.  
This research project has been approved by Aston University's Ethics Committee, and 
will be conducted in full in accordance with the principles laid down by it. If, however, 
you have any concerns about the way in which the interview will be conducted, you 
may contact the Secretary of the University Ethics Committee on 
j.g.walter@aston.ac.uk or telephone +44(0)1212044665.  
Many thanks in advance for your co-operation. I look forward to hearing from you. 
For any information, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Marwa Hassaan 
e-mail: hassanm3@aston.ac.uk 
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Appendix 5: Consent Form  
 
INTERVIEWEE CONSENT FORM 
Title of the Research Study: Corporate Governance and Compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) - MENA Evidence. 
Name of the Researcher: Marwa Hassaan 
  Tick Box 
1 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered 
 
 
2 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, and without 
my legal rights being affected. 
 
3 I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Name of   Interviewee           Date         Signature 
 
 
Name of Person taking consent       Date         Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
 
Researcher          Date        Signature 
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Appendix 6: Tests of Normality on Individual Country Level  
Tests of Normality 
 
countryb 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Board Independence 
0 .102 75 .049 .977 75 .183 
1 .096 75 .085 .944 75 .002 
Board Size 
0 .173 75 .000 .894 75 .000 
1 .133 75 .002 .937 75 .001 
Board Leadership 
0 .343 75 .000 .636 75 .000 
1 .496 75 .000 .475 75 .000 
Government Ownership 
0 .298 75 .000 .693 75 .000 
1 .286 75 .000 .636 75 .000 
Management Ownership 
0 .409 75 .000 .551 75 .000 
1 .229 75 .000 .758 75 .000 
Private Ownership 
0 .233 75 .000 .742 75 .000 
1 .088 75 .200* .946 75 .003 
Public Ownership 
0 .288 75 .000 .675 75 .000 
1 .145 75 .001 .897 75 .000 
Total Assets 
0 .367 75 .000 .340 75 .000 
1 .319 75 .000 .452 75 .000 
ROA 
0 .158 75 .000 .865 75 .000 
1 .128 75 .004 .862 75 .000 
Debt to Equity 
0 .180 75 .000 .873 75 .000 
1 .227 75 .000 .786 75 .000 
Quick ratio 
0 .205 75 .000 .864 75 .000 
1 .141 75 .001 .838 75 .000 
Auditor Type 
0 .439 75 .000 .580 75 .000 
1 .378 75 .000 .629 75 .000 
Industry Type 
0 .419 75 .000 .601 75 .000 
1 .350 75 .000 .636 75 .000 
Total Score 
0 .068 75 .200* .977 75 .200 
1 .105 75 .041 .960 75 .017 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
b. 0 refers to Egypt, 1 refers to Jordan 
*This is a lower pound of the true 
significance 
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Appendix 7: Pearson Correlations Reported with Regression Analysis 
Using Normal Scores- Egypt  
 
Pearson 
Correlation   Total score 
Audit
or 
Indust
ry 
BOD 
lead 
 BOD 
Indp   
 BOD 
Size   
  Gov.  
Own 
 
Mngt. 
Own   
 
Private 
Own  
Public 
Own   
Firm 
Size    Profit     Gear   
  
Liquid   
 Total score   1.000                           
Auditor -.048 1.000                         
Industry .007 .062 1.000                       
BOD lead .071 .194 .046 1.000                     
 BOD indp .032 -.039 .216 -.001 1.000                   
 BOD Size   .060 -.001 -.011 -.126 -.091 1.000                 
Gov Own  .145 -.242 .065 -.107 .130 -.072 1.000               
 Mngt Own  .017 .072 .033 .048 -.037 -.080 -.193 1.000             
Private 
Own   -.027 .010 -.099 -.049 -.090 .040 -.422 .624 1.000           
 Public  
Own -.079 .001 -.085 -.108 .074 -.004 .005 -.065 -.118 1.000         
Firm Size   .155 .310 .142 -.049 -.049 -.063 .182 .155 -.191 .097 1.000       
Profit.   -.053 -.080 -.014 -.002 .170 -.188 .176 -.264 -.130 -.130 -.008 1.000     
 Gear   -.112 .102 -.166 .118 -.161 -.028 -.380 .122 .243 -.018 -.144 .018 1.000   
 Liquid.   .021 -.062 -.012 -.007 .129 .008 .182 -.279 -.109 -.005 -.190 .304 -.047 1.000 
     Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
 
Total score   
                            
Auditor .343                           
Industry .476 .297                         
BOD lead .272 .048 .347                       
 BOD indp .391 .370 .031 .497                     
 BOD Size   .303 .497 .464 .140 .218                   
Gov Own  .107 .018 .288 .180 .133 .269                 
 Mngt Own  .443 .270 .388 .340 .375 .247 .049               
Private 
Own   .410 .465 .200 .337 .222 .367 .000 .000             
 Public  
Own .249 .497 .233 .177 .265 .485 .484 .291 .157           
Firm Size   .092 .003 .113 .338 .337 .297 .059 .092 .050 .203         
Profit.   .326 .247 .451 .492 .073 .053 .066 .011 .132 .132 .473       
 Gear   .170 .191 .077 .157 .084 .407 .000 .148 .018 .439 .109 .438     
 Liquid.   .430 .299 .460 .475 .135 .473 .059 .008 .176 .481 .051 .004 .344 . 
 
 
 
 
 
316 
Appendix 8: Coeffecient Estimates and their Significance for Stepwise 
Regression Excluded Independent Variables- Jordan 
 
Excluded Variables 
Variable Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlati
on 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Minimum 
Tolerance 
 Type of Business Activity .126 1.242 .219 .147 .983 1.018 .887 
Board Leadership -.105 -1.005 .318 -.119 .931 1.074 .888 
Board Independence -.001 -.011 .992 -.001 .752 1.330 .752 
Board Size .185 1.843 .070 .215 .977 1.024 .887 
Government Ownership Ratio .116 1.140 .258 .135 .984 1.016 .886 
Management Ownership Ratio .034 .327 .744 .039 .976 1.025 .882 
Private Ownership Ratio -.043 -.382 .704 -.046 .824 1.214 .751 
Profitability .074 .697 .488 .083 .908 1.101 .868 
Gearing .003 .024 .981 .003 .904 1.107 .847 
Liquidity .008 .079 .937 .009 .961 1.040 .878 
- Predictors in the Model as Indicated in Table 6.17 : Auditor, Public ownership ratio, Firm Size  
- Dependent Variable: Total Disclosure Index    
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Appendix 9: Coeffecient Estimates and their Significance for Stepwise 
Regression Excluded Independent Variables  
Excluded Variables 
Variable Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF Minimum Tolerance 
 Country*type of Bus. .155 1.965 .051 .161 .854 1.170 .854 
Country .078 .748 .456 .062 .504 1.982 .504 
Auditor -.119 -1.059 .291 -.087 .433 2.311 .425 
Type of Business .092 1.245 .215 .102 .995 1.005 .966 
BOD Leadership .000 .006 .995 .001 .933 1.072 .933 
Country* BOD 
Leadership 
-.014 -.152 .880 -.013 .646 1.548 .646 
BOD Size  .143 1.851 .066 .151 .896 1.117 .885 
BOD Independence  .031 .380 .704 .031 .839 1.193 .815 
Country*BODSize  .140 1.494 .137 .123 .610 1.639 .610 
Country*BOD 
Independence  
.071 .845 .399 .070 .776 1.288 .776 
Country* FirmSize  .115 1.221 .224 .101 .613 1.631 .599 
Country*Profitability  .123 1.594 .113 .131 .905 1.105 .883 
Country*Gearing  .086 .904 .368 .075 .595 1.681 .595 
Country*Liquidity  .089 .932 .353 .077 .596 1.678 .596 
Prof itability -.005 -.064 .949 -.005 .852 1.173 .852 
Gearing  -.025 -.325 .746 -.027 .901 1.110 .875 
 Liquidity .035 .468 .641 .039 .994 1.006 .964 
Private Ownership -.006 -.074 .941 -.006 .866 1.154 .866 
Public Ownership -.139 -1.826 .070 -.149 .917 1.091 .892 
Country*Private 
Ownership 
.051 .474 .636 .039 .480 2.081 .480 
Country*Public 
Ownership 
-.139 -1.468 .144 -.121 .604 1.656 .604 
Government 
Ownership 
.107 1.426 .156 .117 .965 1.036 .942 
Management 
Ownership 
-.003 -.033 .974 -.003 .953 1.050 .925 
Country*Government 
Ownership 
.118 1.496 .137 .123 .860 1.163 .860 
Country*Management 
Ownership 
.028 .324 .746 .027 .734 1.362 .734 
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Appendix 10: Interview Questions (First Questionnaire) 
 
Part One: Barriers to full compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements 
1. The results of the quantitative analysis revealed that none of the companies listed on the 
stock exchange of your jurisdiction makes full-compliance with total IFRSs disclosure 
requirements although they are mandatory. In your opinion what are the barriers to full 
compliance with IFRSs in your jurisdiction? 
Part Two: Impact of corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements 
2. Do you think board independence affect the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements by companies listed on the stock exchange of your jurisdiction? Why? 
3. Do you think board leadership (i.e., whether the CEO and the Chair positions are held by 
the same person or by two different persons) affects the levels of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements by companies listed on the stock exchange of your jurisdiction? 
Why? 
4. Do you think dominance of government ownership in the companies listed on the stock 
exchange of your jurisdiction affects the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements? Why? 
5. Do you think dominance of management ownership in the companies listed on the stock 
exchange of your jurisdiction affects the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure 
requirements? Why? 
6. Do you think dominance of private ownership in the companies listed on the stock exchange 
of your jurisdiction affects the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements? 
Why? 
7. Do you think dominance of public ownership in the companies listed on the stock exchange 
of your jurisdiction affects the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements? 
Why? 
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Appendix 11: Interview Questions (Second Questionnaire) 
 
Part One: Investor perceptions regarding the importance of compliance with IFRSs 
disclosure requirements 
1. Do you think the companies listed on the stock exchange of your jurisdiction make all 
disclosures required to make rational investment decisions? Why? 
2. Are you aware of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)? 
3. What do you know about accounting disclosures that a listed company in your 
jurisdiction is obligated to make? 
Part Two: Investor awareness of corporate governance and perceptions regarding the impact 
of corporate governance structures on disclosure behaviour of listed companies 
4. Are you aware of corporate governance best practice? 
5. What do you think about the possible impact of board independence (i.e., appointing 
non-executive board members who are independent to the board of directors of the 
company)? 
6. In your opinion for better levels of compliance with IFRSs in your jurisdiction, is it 
better for the CEO and the Chair positions to be held by the same person or to be held 
by two different persons? 
7. Do you think dominance of government ownership affects the levels of company 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in your jurisdiction? Why? 
8. Do you think dominance of management ownership affects the levels of company 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in your jurisdiction? Why? 
9. Do you think dominance of private ownership affects the levels of company compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements in your jurisdiction? Why? 
10. Do you think dominance of public ownership affects the levels of company compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements in your jurisdiction? Why? 
